Monday, December 31, 2012

Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, S195031



Torts: duty of ordinary care: application of Primary Assumption of Risk to “Nonsport” Recreational Activities“. Although persons generally owe a duty of due care not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a)), some activities—and, specifically, many sports—are inherently dangerous.  Imposing a duty to mitigate those inherent dangers could alter the nature of the activity or inhibit vigorous participation.  (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1003.)  The primary assumption of risk doctrine, a rule of limited duty, developed to avoid such a chilling effect.  (Ibid.; Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 308.)  Where the doctrine applies to a recreational activity, operators, instructors and participants in the activity owe other participants only the duty not to act so as to increase the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity.  (Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 148, 162; Kahn, at p. 1004.); in defendant’s view, a duty to minimize the inherent risk of injury from bumper car rides would “require amusement park operators to eliminate their existing rides and to replace them with rides that are fundamentally different,” contrary to the policy motivating this court’s primary assumption of risk decisions, that of preventing common law tort rules from undermining Californians’ recreational opportunities.  For reasons explained below, we agree with defendant; we agree with the dissenting justice below, and the court in Beninati, that the primary assumption of risk doctrine is not limited to activities classified as sports, but applies as well to other recreational activities “involving an inherent risk of injury to voluntary participants . . . where the risk cannot be eliminated without altering the fundamental nature of the activity.”  (Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 658.); the primary assumption of risk doctrine rests on a straightforward policy foundation:  the need to avoid chilling vigorous participation in or sponsorship of recreational activities by imposing a tort duty to eliminate or reduce the risks of harm inherent in those activities.  It operates on the premise that imposing such a legal duty “would work a basic alteration—or cause abandonment” of the activity.  (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1003; see also Shin v. Ahn, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 492, quoting Dilger v. Moyles (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1455 [“ ‘Holding golfers liable for missed hits would only encourage lawsuits and deter players from enjoying the sport.’ ”]; Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist., supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 165 [in baseball, recognizing tort liability for hitting the batter with a pitch would tend to deter throwing inside, an essential part of the sport]; Ford v. Gouin, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 345 [imposing tort liability for negligence in towing water-skier might well chill participation and “have a generally deleterious effect on the nature of the sport of waterskiing as a whole”]; Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 318 [doctrine avoids chilling vigorous participation in sport].)  The doctrine’s parameters should be drawn according to that goal; the policy behind primary assumption of risk applies squarely to injuries from physical recreation, whether in sports or nonsport activities.  Allowing voluntary participants in an active recreational pursuit to sue other participants or sponsors for failing to eliminate or mitigate the activity’s inherent risks would threaten the activity’s very existence and nature.  In thus concluding, we do not “expand the doctrine to any activity with an inherent risk,” as the majority below cautioned.  While inherent risks exist, for example, in travel on the streets and highways and in many workplaces, we agree with the lower court that “the primary assumption of risk doctrine in its modern, post-Knight construction is considerably narrower in its application.”  (See Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 311-312 [primary assumption of risk inapplicable to automobile accidents or medical negligence].)  But active recreation, because it involves physical activity and is not essential to daily life, is particularly vulnerable to the chilling effects of potential tort liability for ordinary negligence.  And participation in recreational activity, however valuable to one’s health and spirit, is voluntary in a manner employment and daily transportation are not. 
The doctrine thus applies to bumper car collisions, regardless of whether or not one deems bumper cars a “sport.”  Low-speed collisions between the padded, independently operated cars are inherent in—are the whole point of—a bumper car ride.
As she did in Knight and several cases since, Justice Kennard dissents here from application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine. (Dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at pp. 1-2.)  In light of the dissenter’s consistent urging that we return to the traditional consent-based assumption of risk defense, it is worth reiterating some of the reasons given in Knight for abandoning that defense in favor of a limited-duty rule.  (See Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 311-313); the traditional rule, resting on a legal fiction that the plaintiff had impliedly consented to the activity’s known risks, would completely bar the plaintiff’s recovery because of his or her unreasonable conduct, putting the defense in severe tension with comparative fault principles adopted in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804.  (Knight, at p. 311.)  In theory, moreover, it could apply to risks beyond those inherent in the activity—even reckless or intentional misconduct, were it shown the plaintiff was aware of the potential for such misconduct—and apply as well to activities far beyond the realm of sports and recreation, such as automobile travel and medical treatment, that carry known risks of injury from others’ negligence.  (Id. at pp. 311-312.)  Finally, the implied-consent theory’s focus on what the individual plaintiff subjectively knew about the nature and magnitude of the risks being encountered subjected defendants to widely disparate liability for the same conduct, and made summary judgment on the basis of assumption of risk very rare, since the defense depended on proof of the particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge and expectations.  (Id. at pp. 312-313.)  The dissenting opinion here does not persuade us these considerations have lost their force. Bumper car rides like Rue le Dodge are dissimilar to roller coasters in ways that disqualify their operators as common carriers.  “A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill.”  (Civ. Code, § 2100); riders on Rue le Dodge, in other words, are not passively carried or transported from one place to another.  They actively engage in a game, trying to bump others or avoid being bumped themselves.  The rationale for holding the operator of a roller coaster to the duties of a common carrier for reward—that riders, having delivered themselves into the control of the operator, are owed the highest degree of care for their safety—simply does not apply to bumper car riders’ safety from the risks inherent in bumping.  “The rule that carriers of passengers are held to the highest degree of care is based on the recognition that ‘ “to his diligence and fidelity are intrusted the lives and safety of large numbers of human beings.” ’   (Gomez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1136.)  A bumper car rider, in contrast, does not entrust the operator with his or her safety from the risks of low-speed collisions; the undisputed facts in the summary judgment record demonstrate defendant was not a common carrier for reward in its operation of Rue le Dodge.  The public policy supporting a higher duty of care for common carriers, therefore, does not apply here and does not preclude application of the primary assumption of risk doctrine; our later decisions establish that under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, operators, sponsors and instructors in recreational activities posing inherent risks of injury have no duty to eliminate those risks, but do owe participants the duty not to unreasonably increase the risks of injury beyond those inherent in the activity.  (Avila v. Citrus Community College Dist., supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 162; Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1003, 1005); the operator of a bumper car ride might violate its “duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent” in the activity (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 316) by failing to provide routine safety measures such as seat belts, functioning bumpers and appropriate speed control, but does not do so by failing to restrict the angle of bumping; conclusion: the risk of injuries from bumping was inherent in the Rue le Dodge ride, and under our precedents defendant had no duty of ordinary care to prevent injuries from such an inherent risk of the activity.  The absence of such a duty defeats plaintiff’s cause of action for negligence as a matter of law.  Plaintiff’s “willful misconduct” cause of action, which (as described by the lower court and in plaintiff’s briefing) rests on a duty to minimize head-on collisions, fails for the same reason.  Finally, in light of our conclusion defendant did not act as a common carrier for reward in operating the bumper car ride, summary judgment was also proper on the cause of action for common carrier liability (Cal. S. Ct., 31.12.2012, Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, S195031).

Responsabilité civile en droit californien (ses règles peuvent s'appliquer même dans le cas d'une relation contractuelle) : devoir de diligence : application de la théorie du "risque préalablement  assumé" à des activités récréatives non sportives. Précision sinon modification de la jurisprudence californienne. Bien qu'ordinairement chacun soit redevable d'un devoir de diligence qui impose de ne pas provoquer un risque déraisonnable de causer un dommage à autrui, certaines activités, et spécifiquement certains sports, sont intrinsèquement dangereux. Imposer un devoir d'atténuer ces dangers inhérents est susceptible de modifier la nature de l'activité ou d'inhiber une participation vigoureuse. La doctrine du "risque préalablement assumé", qui est une règle impliquant un devoir limité, s'est développée pour éviter de tels effets dissuasifs. Lorsque la doctrine s'applique à des activités récréatives, les opérateurs, les instructeurs et les participants ne doivent aux autres participants qu'un devoir d'agir de manière à ne pas augmenter le risque de dommage corporel au-delà du risque inhérent à l'activité. Selon le défendeur (le parc d'attraction qui met à disposition des pistes d'autos tamponneuses), un devoir à lui imposé de réduire le risque inhérent de se blesser en pratiquant l'auto tamponneuse aurait comme conséquence d'obliger les parcs d'attraction à éliminer ce type d'amusement et de les remplacer par des activités fondamentalement différentes, cela en contradiction avec le raisonnement appliqué par la Cour dans le cas de risque préalablement  assumé, ce raisonnement étant d'éviter que les règles de responsabilité civile de la Common law ne portent préjudice aux opportunité récréatives des Californiens. La Cour accepte ces arguments. La doctrine du risque préalablement  assumé n'est pas limitée aux activités dites sportives, mais s'applique également à d'autres activités récréatives qui impliquent pour les participants, qui pratiquent l'activité de leur plein gré, un risque inhérent de se blesser, cela lorsque le risque ne peut pas être éliminé sans altérer la nature fondamentale de l'activité. Par exemple, tenir un joueur de golf responsable pour un tir manqué n'aurait comme conséquences que d'encourager les procès et d'éloigner les intéressés de cette activité sportive. Cette théorie du risque préalablement assumé est d'application étroite. Elle est par exemple inapplicable en cas d'accident de la circulation ou en cas d'erreur médicale. Mais elle s'applique aux activités récréatives actives, parce que ces activités impliquent une dépense physique et ne sont pas essentielles à la vie quotidienne. L'existence de ces activités récréatives est ainsi particulièrement vulnérable en cas d'application d'une responsabilité pour négligence ordinaire. La doctrine s'applique ainsi à la pratique de l'auto tamponneuse, sans égard au fait que cette activité soit ou non considérée comme un sport. Est donc abandonné le moyen de défense du risque assumé sur une base consensuelle. Ce moyen de défense est ainsi abandonné au profit d'une obligation limitée, ici à charge de l'organisateur des activités d'autos tamponneuses. Il n'est pas opportun de maintenir une telle défense car obtenir un « summary judgment » serait en cas de maintien une tâche presque impossible, et le consentement au risque pourrait s'appliquer de manière extensive à des risques crées intentionnellement ou par négligence fautive, s'il venait à être démontré que l'usager connaissait ces risques. Par ailleurs, l'opérateur d'une activité d'autos tamponneuses ne peut pas être tenu au plus haut degré de diligence tel que celui qui s'applique aux transporteurs de personnes (a common carrier for reward), tels les compagnies aériennes ou les opérateurs de roller coaster. En effet, les participants au jeu des autos tamponneuses ne soumettent pas leurs vies à la diligence de l'opérateur. L'opérateur d'une attraction d'autos tamponneuses peut violer son devoir d'être suffisamment attentif à ne pas augmenter les risques inhérents à l'activité en n'offrant pas les mesures de sécurité de routine, telles que des ceintures de sécurité, des pare-chocs qui fonctionnent, ou un moyen de contrôle de la vitesse. Aucune faute n'est commise en ne réglementant pas l'angle de collision.

Thursday, December 20, 2012

Estate of Giraldin, S197694



Trust: revocable trust and fiduciary duty of the trustee: a revocable trust is a trust that the person who creates it, generally called the settlor, can revoke during the person’s lifetime.  The beneficiaries’ interest in the trust is contingent only, and the settlor can eliminate that interest at any time.  When the trustee of a revocable trust is someone other than the settlor, that trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the settlor, not to the beneficiaries, as long as the settlor is alive.  During that time, the trustee needs to account to the settlor only and not also to the beneficiaries.  When the settlor dies, the trust becomes irrevocable, and the beneficiaries’ interest in the trust vests.  We must decide whether, after the settlor dies, the beneficiaries have standing to sue the trustee for breach of the fiduciary duty committed while the settlor was alive and the trust was still revocable.
Because a trustee’s breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the settlor can substantially harm the beneficiaries by reducing the trust’s value against the settlor’s wishes, we conclude the beneficiaries do have standing to sue for a breach of that duty after the settlor has died.  We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which concluded the beneficiaries have no such standing (Cal. S. C., 20.12.12, Estate of Giraldin, S197694).


« Revocable Trust » : définition. Devoir de diligence et de fidélité du trustee. Ce devoir est uniquement dû au settlor durant sa vie. Après son décès, les beneficiaries peuvent agir contre le trustee pour violation de ce devoir pendant la vie du settlor. Le settlor, qui a créé le trust, peut le révoquer de son vivant. Les intérêts des bénéficiaires dans le trust sont uniquement de nature contingente, et le settlor peut éliminer ces intérêts quand il le veut. Lorsque le trustee d’un revocable trust est une autre personne que le settlor, le trustee doit son devoir de diligence au settlor, non aux beneficiaries, cela aussi longtemps que le settlor est vivant. Pendant ce temps, le trustee doit répondre devant le settlor uniquement et non également devant les bénéficiaires. Au décès du settlor, le trust devient irrévocable, et l’intérêt des bénéficiaires dans le trust « vests » (prend nature de droit acquis, irrévocable). Dans cette affaire, la Cour Suprême de Californie doit décider si, après le décès du settlor, les beneficiaries disposent ou non de la qualité pour agir contre le trustee pour violation de son devoir de diligence commise pendant la vie du settlor et pendant que le trust était encore révocable. La Cour juge que du fait que la violation du devoir de diligence du trustee due au settlor peut porter un dommage substantiel aux beneficiaries en réduisant la valeur du trust contrairement à la volonté du settlor, les beneficiaries disposent de la qualité pour agir sur la base d’une telle violation après le décès du settlor.

Monday, December 10, 2012

Kloeckner v. Solis



Labor Law: federal employees: discharge, demotion, discrimination, mixed cases: procedure to follow in case of contestations and litigations: the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) permits a federal employ­ee subjected to a particularly serious personnel action such as a dis­charge or demotion to appeal her agency’s decision to the Merit Sys­tems Protection Board (MSPB or Board). Such an appeal may allege that the agency had insufficient cause for taking the action under the CSRA itself; but the appeal may also or instead charge the agency with discrimination prohibited by a federal statute. See 5 U. S. C. §7702(a)(1). When an employee alleges that a personnel action ap­pealable to the MSPB was based on discrimination, her case is known as a “mixed case.” See 29 CFR §1614.302. Mixed cases are governed by special procedures set out in the CSRA and regulations of the MSPB and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Under those procedures, an employee may initiate a mixed case by filing a discrimination complaint with the agency. If the agency de­cides against the employee, she may either appeal the agency’s deci­sion to the MSPB or sue the agency in district court. Alternatively, the employee can bypass the agency and bring her mixed case direct­ly to the MSPB. If the MSPB upholds the personnel action, whether in the first instance or after the agency has done so, the employee is entitled to seek judicial review. Section 7703(b)(1) of the CSRA provides that petitions for review of MSPB decisions “shall be filed in the . . . Federal Circuit,” except as provided in §7703(b)(2). Section 7703(b)(2) instructs that “cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [§7702] shall be filed under the enforcement provision of a listed antidiscrimination statute.” Those enforcement provisions all authorize suit in federal district court. The “cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of §7702” are those in which an employee “(A) has been affected by an action which she may appeal to the MSPB, and (B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by” a listed federal stat­ute; in other words, “mixed cases.”; a federal employee who claims that an agency action appealable to the MSPB violates an antidiscrimination statute listed in §7702(a)(1) should seek judicial review in district court, not the Fed­eral Circuit, regardless whether the MSPB decided her case on pro­cedural grounds or on the merits; two sections of the CSRA, read naturally, direct employees like Kloeckner to district court. Begin with § 7703, which governs judicial review of MSPB rulings. Section 7703(b)(1) provides that petitions to review the Board’s final decisions should be filed in the Federal Cir­cuit—“except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection.” Sec­tion 7703(b)(2) then provides that “cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [§7702]” “shall be filed under” the enforcement pro­vision of a listed antidiscrimination statute. Each of the referenced enforcement provisions authorizes an action in federal district court. Thus, “cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [§7702]”shall be filed in district court. Turn next to §7702, which provides that the cases “subject to its provisions” are cases in which a federal employee “has been affected by an action which she may appeal to the MSPB,” and “alleges that a basis for the action was discrimina­tion prohibited by” a listed federal statute. The “cases of discrimina­tion subject to” §7702 are therefore mixed cases. Putting §7703 and §7702 together, mixed cases shall be filed in district court. That is where Kloeckner’s case should have been, and indeed was, filed. Re­gardless whether the MSPB dismissed her claim on the merits or threw it out as untimely, she brought the kind of case that the CSRA routes to district court (U.S. S. Ct., 10.12.12, Kloeckner v. Solis, J. Kagan, unanimous).

Droit du travail applicable aux employés du Gouvernement fédéral : procédures à suivre en cas de litiges suite à une rétrogradation, un licenciement, une discrimination, ou un cas mixte : description des compétences de l'agency qui a pris la décision contestée, du Merit Sys­tems Protection Board, de l'Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, de la District Court, et du Federal Circuit.
L’enseignement principal de cette affaire est que les cas mixtes, impliquant une action hostile de l’employeur (résiliation des rapports de travail p.ex.) combinée à un motif discriminatoire (dits cas mixtes), sont ultimement, au niveau du Tribunal de première instance, de la compétence du Tribunal fédéral de district, et non pas du Circuit fédéral. La loi fédérale de base à considérer en priorité est la loi de 1978 sur la réforme de l’emploi public. Dans les cas d’une des actions adverses énumérées ci-dessus, l’employé affecté par la décision de l’administration qui l’emploie peut saisir le Merit Systems Protection Board. L’appelant peut alléguer que l’administration ne disposait que d’une cause insuffisante pour rendre sa décision, au sens de la loi fédérale de 1978. Mais l’appel peut aussi, ou alternativement, alléguer que la décision administrative contestée revêt un caractère discriminatoire, prohibé par une disposition d’une loi fédérale. Quand un employé allègue qu’une action lui portant atteinte et susceptible d’un appel devant le Board est fondée sur une discrimination, son cas est qualifié de cas mixte. Les cas mixtes sont régis par des procédures spéciales déterminées par la loi fédérale de 1978, par la réglementation du Board et de l’EEOC. Selon ces procédures, un employé peut initier un cas mixte en déposant une plainte pour discrimination devant l’administration qui l’emploie. Si la décision de l’administration est défavorable à l’employé, il peut soit appeler de la décision devant le Board, soit actionner l’administration devant la cour de district fédérale. Alternativement, l’employé peut éviter de saisir l’administration qui l’emploie et dépose son cas mixte directement devant le Board. Si le Board rejette les prétentions de l’employé, soit intervenant en première instance soit intervenant après décision de l’administration, l’employé peut saisir le Tribunal. La Section 7703(b)(1) de la loi de 1978 dispose que les recours déposés contre les décisions du Board doivent l’être devant le Circuit fédéral, sauf les cas décrits à la Section 7703(b)(2). Ces derniers sont des cas de discrimination, de la compétence non du Circuit fédéral, mais de la cour de district fédérale. Si le cas mixte a d’abord été décidé par le Board, la cour fédérale de district sera compétente en tous les cas, que le Board ait rendu sa décision pour des motifs de procédure ou de fonds (y compris si la décision du Board est une décision d’irrecevabilité fondée sur l’échéance d’un délai).

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n v. U.S.



Takings clause: Government-induced flooding: Fifth Amendment: Government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection; no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference with property is a taking; none of the Court’s decisions authorizes a blanket temporary-flooding exception to the Court’s Tak­ings Clause jurisprudence, and the Court declines to create such an exception in this case; the Court summarized prior flooding cases as standing for the proposition that in order to create an enforceable liability against the Government, it is, at least, neces­sary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and con­stitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land; when regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, time is a factor in determining the existence vel non of a compensable taking. See, e.g., Loretto v. Tele­prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435, n. 12. Also rel­evant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the invasion is in­tended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action. See, e.g., John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 138, 146. So, too, are the character of the land at issue and the owner’s “rea­sonable investment-backed expectations” regarding the land’s use, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 618, as well as the severity of the interference, see, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 130–131. In concluding that the flooding was foreseeable in this case, the Court of Federal Claims noted the Commission’s repeated complaints to the Corps about the destructive impact of the successive planned devia­tions and determined that the interference with the Commission’s property was severe. The Government, however, challenged several of the trial court’s factfindings, including those relating to causation, foreseeability, substantiality, and the amount of damages. Because the Federal Circuit rested its decision entirely on the temporary du­ration of the flooding, it did not address those challenges, which re­main open for consideration on remand (U.S. S. Ct., 04.12.12, Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n v. U.S., J. Ginsburg).

Expropriation: de manière générale et dans les cas particuliers d'inondations provoquées par l'état : même si l'inondation n'est que temporaire, il n'existe pas de règle automatique impliquant que l'acte gouvernemental ne saurait être dans ce cas qualifié d'expropriation. Les cas d'inondations temporaires peuvent donc de cas en cas constituer une expropriation, et les facteurs à considérer à cet égard sont la durée de l'inondation, la mesure dans laquelle la nuisance est envisagée, la mesure dans laquelle la nuisance constitue un résultat prévisible de l'acte gouvernemental en lui-même conforme au droit, les caractéristiques des terres inondées, les espérances raisonnables du propriétaire liées à son investissement et relatives à l'usage de ses terres, et l'intensité de la nuisance.