Monday, December 30, 2019

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Shana Becerra, v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., Docket No. 18-16721


California Consumer Fraud
Advertisement
Labeling
Packaging
Reasonable Consumer Test
Unfair Competition
California Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s third amended complaint alleging that Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc. violated various California consumer-fraud laws by branding Diet Dr Pepper using the word “diet.”

The panel held that the allegations in the complaint failed to sufficiently allege that reasonable consumers read the word “diet” in a soft drink’s brand name to promise weight loss, healthy weight management, or other health benefits. The panel held that diet soft drinks are common in the marketplace and the prevalent understanding of the term in that context is that the “diet” version of a soft drink has fewer calories than its “regular” counterpart. Just because some consumers may unreasonably interpret the term differently does not render the use of “diet” in a soda’s brand name false or deceptive. Accordingly, because plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged that Diet Dr Pepper’s labeling was false or misleading, dismissal was proper.

The second amended complaint raised five causes of action: (1) violations of the California False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq.; (2) violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq.; (3) violations of the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; (4) breach of express warranty in violation of Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1); and (5) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability in violation of Cal. Com. Code § 2314.

Becerra’s claims under the California consumer- protection statutes are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). Under this standard, Becerra must “show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” Id.; see also Bank of West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545, 553 (Cal. 1992). This requires more than a mere possibility that Diet Dr Pepper’s label “might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.” Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); see id. at 492 (rejecting a “least sophisticated consumer” standard). Rather, the reasonable consumer standard requires a probability “that a significant portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” Id.

When considering the term in its proper context, no reasonable consumer would assume that Diet Dr Pepper’s use of the term “diet” promises weight loss or management. In context, the use of “diet” in a soft drink’s brand name is understood as a relative claim about the calorie content of that soft drink compared to the same brand’s “regular” (full- caloric) option. See Geffner, 928 F.3d at 200 (“the ‘diet’ label refers specifically to the drink’s low calorie content; it does not convey a more general weight loss promise” (footnote omitted)). And considering “diet” as a proper noun—as in Diet Dr Pepper—does not further Becerra’s argument. In common usage, consumers know that Diet Dr Pepper is a different product from Dr Pepper—different not only in name, but in packaging and, importantly, taste.

Becerra argues that, regardless of the common understanding of the word, dismissal was still improper because she alleged a plausible misunderstanding of the word. But we have previously affirmed dismissal of claims based on similar unreasonable assumptions. In Ebner, the plaintiff claimed that a net-weight statement on packaging for a lip balm was deceptive because the design of the dispenser left twenty-five percent of the product inaccessible. 838 F.3d at 961. We held that similar dispensers were “commonplace in the market,” such that a reasonable consumer “understands the general mechanics of these dispenser tubes and further understands that some product may be left in the tube” even when pushed all the way up. Id. at 965. “A rational consumer would not simply assume that the tube contains no further product” when he or she could see the remaining product in the tube. Id. at 966. And even if some consumers would make that assumption, the packaging was not deceptive just because some consumers could unreasonably misunderstand the product. Id.

(…) As the Second Circuit pointed out when considering a nearly identical complaint, “the use of physically fit and attractive models using and enjoying advertised products is so ubiquitous that it cannot be reasonably understood to convey any specific meaning at all.” Geffner, 928 F.3d at 200.

Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:
Evan A. Young (argued), Baker Botts L.L.P., Austin, Texas; Van H. Beckwith, Baker Botts L.L.P., Dallas, Texas; Ariel D. House, Baker Botts L.L.P., San Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, December 30, 2019, Shana Becerra, v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., Docket No. 18-16721, For Publication)

Friday, December 27, 2019

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Great Minds, v. Office Depot, Inc., Docket No. 18-55331, For Publication


Copyright Infringement
License
Creative Commons License
Contract Drafting
California Law Applies Here to the Construction of the License
Third-Party Liability for Infringement?

A licensee’s hiring of a third-party copy service to reproduce licensed material strictly for the licensee’s own permitted use does not turn that third party into a licensee that is bound to the License terms.
Independent repair company that copied protected work on behalf of its customers-licensees was not liable for copyright infringement.
However, the License itself could provide a basis to distinguish between permitted copies made by a licensee’s own employees (e.g., school teachers or staff) versus those made by a third-party contractor. Here it is not so.


The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of a copyright infringement brought by Great Minds, publisher of math curriculum Eureka Math.
The panel held that defendant Office Depot, Inc., did not become a licensee of a Creative Commons license, and become bound by its terms, or otherwise infringe Great Minds’ copyright by making copies of Eureka Math materials for a profit on behalf of school and school district licensees. There was no dispute that the school and school districts licensees’ copying of Great Minds’ material was permitted under the license. There also was no dispute that, if Office Depot were itself a licensee, commercial copying of Great Minds’ material would fall outside the scope of the license and infringe Great Minds’ copyright. The panel held that, under California law, the school and school district licensees’ exercise of their rights under the license through the services provided by Office Depot did not result in Office Depot becoming a licensee. The panel further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint.

Great Minds is an education-based non-profit organization. It created and copyrighted a math curriculum called “Eureka Math” for grades PreK-12, which it publishes and sells commercially in print form nationwide. It also releases digital files of Eureka Math online for free download to any member of the public under a limited public copyright license template produced by Creative Commons. Under the License, “every recipient of [Eureka Math] automatically receives an offer from [Great Minds] to exercise the Licensed Rights.” License § 2(a)(5)(A).

(Creative Commons is a non-profit organization that offers free copyright license templates to be used to share and protect creative and academic works. See What We Do, CREATIVE COMMONS, (Nov. 17, 2019, 3:23 PM), https://creativecommons.org/about/. The License at issue here is available online at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc- sa/4.0/legalcode).

The License grants “the individual or entity exercising the Licensed Rights” a “worldwide, royalty-free, non- sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to . . . reproduce and Share [Eureka Math], in whole or in part, for NonCommercial purposes only . . . .” License §§ 1(n), 2(a)(1). The License defines “Share” to mean, in pertinent part, “to provide material to the public by any means or process that requires permission under the Licensed Rights, such as reproduction, public display, public performance, distribution, dissemination, communication, or importation, . . .” License § 1(l). “NonCommercial” means, in pertinent part, “not primarily intended for or directed towards commercial advantage or monetary compensation.” License § 1(k).
But § 2(b)(3) of the License reserves Great Minds’ right to collect royalties for commercial uses of Eureka Math (…).
To the extent possible, the Licensor waives any right to collect royalties from [the licensee] for the exercise of [these NonCommercial] Licensed Rights, whether directly or through a collecting society under any voluntary or waivable statutory or compulsory licensing scheme. In all other cases the Licensor expressly reserves any right to collect such royalties, including when [Eureka Math] is used other than for NonCommercial purposes.

If any individual or entity exercising the licensed rights “fails to comply with [the License], [their] rights under [the License] terminate automatically.” License § 6(a). Great Minds claims that this applies equally to every individual or entity that possesses Eureka Math materials, including all “downstream recipients.”

Office Depot provides copy services on request and behalf of public schools and school districts. It charges a fee for those services, and at times it makes copies of Eureka Math materials for the schools’ use. It does not sell those copies to the public in Office Depot stores. Great Minds claims, and Office Depot does not dispute, that Office Depot employs field representatives to advertise its copying services to schools and school districts that use Eureka Math.

When Great Minds discovered that Office Depot was reproducing Eureka Math on behalf of the schools, the parties entered into a separate licensing agreement, whereby Great Minds permitted Office Depot to make the copies in exchange for royalty payments. After the Eastern District of New York ruling in Great Minds v. FedEx Office and Print Servs., Inc., No. 16-CV-1462 (DRH)(ARL), 2017 WL 744574, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2017), aff’d, 886 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2018), which held that the License could not “be read to preclude a licensee from hiring someone to make copies of [Eureka Math] so the licensee can use them for a ‘noncommercial’ purpose,” Office Depot terminated the royalty agreement.

As a result, on October 11, 2017, Great Minds filed suit against Office Depot in district court, alleging claims of copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., and breach of contract. Great Minds does not dispute that the school districts’ own use and distribution of Eureka Math materials is “NonCommercial” and permitted by the License. Rather, it alleges that Office Depot was “deliberately and willfully infringing [Great Minds’ copyrights] by actively soliciting customers for commercial reproduction of Eureka Math,” and “by reproducing and distributing Eureka Math for profit without Great Minds’ authorization.” Great Minds asserts that the “NonCommercial” restriction in the License requires commercial print shops like Office Depot to “negotiate a license and pay a royalty to Great Minds if they wish to use or reproduce Eureka Math for commercial purposes—i.e., for their own profit.”

On December 6, 2017, Office Depot filed a motion to dismiss the copyright infringement claim, which the district court granted without leave to amend. Great Minds v. Office Depot, Inc., No. CV 17-7435-JFW (EX), 2018 WL 4945643, at *4–5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2018). The court found that the License did not prohibit the school districts from employing third parties like Office Depot to make copies of the Eureka Math curriculum on their behalf. Id. This appeal followed.

A valid claim for copyright infringement requires (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.

The claim fails if the challenged use of the work falls within the scope of a valid license.

A copyright license “must be construed in accordance with the purposes underlying federal copyright law.” (citing Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988)). Federal courts “rely on state law to provide the canons of contractual construction, but only to the extent such rules do not interfere with federal copyright law or policy.” Id. (citing Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 482–83 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Here, the parties agree that California law applies to the construction of the License. Great Minds, 2018 WL 4945643, at *4 n.7. “Under California law, the interpretation of contract language is a question of law.” Atel Fin. Corp. v. Quaker Coal Co., 321 F.3d 924, 925–26 (9th Cir. 2003). “The terms of a contract must be construed in a manner that takes into account the context of the language and is consistent with the contract as a whole.” Actuate Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. C-09-05892 JCS, 2010 WL 1340519, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010); Cal. Civ. Code § 1641.

There is no dispute that the school and school district licensees’ copying of Great Minds’ material is permitted under the License. There also seems to be no dispute that if Office Depot were itself a licensee, commercial copying of Great Minds’ material would fall outside the scope of the License and infringe Great Minds’ copyright. The issue we consider then is whether the school and school district licensees’ exercise of their rights under the License through the services provided by Office Depot results in Office Depot becoming a licensee. We hold that it does not. A licensee’s hiring of a third-party copy service to reproduce licensed material strictly for the licensee’s own permitted use does not turn that third party into a licensee that is bound to the License terms. See Great Minds v. FedEx Office and Print Servs., Inc., 886 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Great Minds’ licensees may rely on non-employee agents in carrying out permitted uses without converting those agents into independent licensees.”); Automation by Design, Inc. v. Raybestos Prods. Co., 463 F.3d 749, 761 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment for both licensee and third party); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (independent repair company that copied protected work on behalf of its customers-licensees was not liable for copyright infringement); Hogan Sys., Inc. v. Cybersource Int’l, Inc., 158 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1998) (third-party contractor was “sheltered under” the licensee’s rights); Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. Simon, 227 F. 906, 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff’d, 231 F. 1021 (2d Cir. 1916), reversed on other grounds, 246 U.S. 46 (1918) (third-party contractor was “not an infringer because he [was] supplying lawful goods to a lawful licensee”). See also Raymond T. Nimmer & Jeff C. Todd, 1 Modern Licensing Law § 6:28 (2018) (similarly describing the consensus in courts).

Under Great Minds’ reading of the License, third party contractors like Office Depot are “downstream recipients” of Eureka Math as contemplated in § 2(a)(5)(A) of the License, meaning they “automatically receive an offer from Great Minds to exercise the Licensed Rights,” they accept that offer the moment the copy store employee presses “copy” on a machine, and they become bound to the terms of the License. Office Depot is not a downstream recipient. That Office Depot employed field representatives to advertise the availability of copying services for schools and school districts that use Eureka Math does not confer a licensee status on Office Depot. Its activities remain within the ambit of the schools and school districts’ license.

Great Minds’ interpretation cannot be correct. The License itself provides no basis to distinguish between permitted copies of Eureka Math made by a licensee’s own employees (e.g., school teachers or staff) versus those made by a third-party contractor (e.g., Office Depot employees). We decline to read such a distinction into the License.

Under the License, a non-commercial licensee may hire a third-party contractor, including those working for commercial gain, to help implement the License at the direction of the licensee and in furtherance of the licensee’s own licensed rights. The License extends to all employees of the schools and school districts and shelters Office Depot’s commercial copying of Eureka Math on their behalf. Holding differently would prevent proper non-commercial licensees from using relatively common means of reproduction to share, engage with, and exercise their rights to the licensed work in a way that would contravene the intent of the License and undermine its utility. We conclude that the licensees’ contract with Office Depot to exercise the licensees’ rights under the License does not impose an independent liability on Office Depot. As a result, Great Minds has failed to state a plausible claim to relief on its copyright infringement claim.


Secondary authority: Raymond T. Nimmer & Jeff C. Todd, Modern Licensing Law § 6:28 (2018).


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, December 27, 2019, Great Minds, v. Office Depot, Inc., Docket No. 18-55331, For Publication)

Friday, December 20, 2019

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Sean Wilson, v. Huuuge, Inc., a Delaware corp., Docket No. 18-36017


E-Commerce
Clickwrap Agreements
Browsewrap Agreements
Smartphone App User
Reasonable Notice of its Terms of Use
Constructive Notice
Contract Drafting
Motion to Compel Arbitration
Online Commerce: Traditional Principles of Contract Still Apply
Washington State Law

Argued and Submitted August 29, 2019 Seattle, Washington

The question of first impression for our court is under what circumstances does the download or use of a mobile application (“app”) by a smartphone user establish constructive notice of the app’s terms and conditions?

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of HUUUGE Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration against a smartphone app user.

Under Washington law, the panel held that because Huuuge did not provide reasonable notice of its Terms of Use, the app user did not unambiguously manifest assent to the terms and conditions or the imbedded arbitration provision. The panel held that the app user had neither actual notice nor constructive notice of the Terms of Use, and thus was not bound by Huuuge’s arbitration clause in the Terms.

Wilson downloaded the app from Apple’s App Store in early 2017 and played Huuuge Casino for over a year.

Huuuge does not require users to affirmatively acknowledge or agree to the Terms before downloading or while using the app. Users can access Huuuge’s Terms in two ways: 1) reading the Terms before downloading the app, although the user is not required to do so; or 2) viewing the Terms during game play, which is similarly not necessary to play the game. Either way, the user would need Sherlock Holmes’s instincts to discover the Terms.

Typically, a user would first search for the app in a smartphone app store. One option is to download the app directly from the search results, in which case the user does not view anything that alerts him to the existence of the Terms. Alternatively, instead of a direct download, the user would need to click through to Huuuge Casino’s landing page. Next, the user must click on the small blue text stating “more” in the app’s description, which reveals the app’s full profile. The user would then need to scroll through several screen-lengths of text to encounter a paragraph that starts with “Read our Terms of Use,” and includes the text of a link to the Terms. The link, however, doesn’t magically conjure the Terms. Instead, the user must copy and paste or manually enter the URL into a web browser to access the Terms.

Once a user has downloaded the app, the user can play games immediately. During gameplay, a user can view the Terms by accessing the settings menu. The settings menu can be accessed by clicking on a three dot “kebob” menu button in the upper right-hand corner of the home page. If a user clicks on the button, a pop-up menu of seven options appears. The fifth option is titled “Terms & Policy” and reveals the Terms, including the arbitration agreement.

It is not necessary for a user to open the settings menu while playing the app. Nor is there a requirement to acknowledge or agree to the Terms when opening the app, creating an account, playing the game, or at any other point.

The FAA requires district courts to stay judicial proceedings and compel arbitration of claims covered by a written and enforceable arbitration agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 3.

Huuuge, as the party seeking to compel arbitration, must prove the existence of a valid agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, 845 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017). To determine whether such an agreement exists, “federal courts ‘apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts.’” Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).

The parties agree that Washington state law governs the validity of the arbitration agreement since there is no choice of law provision in the agreement and the district court has diversity jurisdiction. See First Options of Chi., Inc., 514 U.S. at 944.

As we have acknowledged many times, although online commerce has presented courts with new challenges, traditional principles of contract still apply. See, e.g., In re Holl, 925 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2019).

In the context of online agreements, the existence of mutual assent turns on whether the consumer had reasonable notice of the terms of service agreement. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177; Wilson v. Playtika, Ltd., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1037 (W.D. Wash. 2018).

(…) We now move to the issue of constructive notice. Just as we have applied traditional contract principles to online contracts, we do so here too. Online contracts fall into two broad categories. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1175-76. Clickwrap agreements require users to affirmatively assent to the terms of use before they can access the website and its services. Browsewrap agreements do not require the user to take any affirmative action to assent to the website terms. Id. In some situations, a user may not even know a website has a user agreement.

Huuuge’s agreement is unambiguously a browsewrap agreement. Wilson was not required to assent to Huuuge’s Terms before downloading or using the app—or at any point at all. Huuuge did not notify users that the app had terms and conditions, let alone put them in a place the user would necessarily see. Instead, a user would need to seek out or stumble upon Huuuge’s Terms, either by scrolling through multiple screens of text before downloading the app or clicking the settings menu within the app during gameplay.

In the absence of actual knowledge, a reasonably prudent user must be on constructive notice of the terms of the contract for a browsewrap agreement to be valid.

In Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, we stressed that “the onus must be on website owners to put users on notice of the terms to which they wish to bind consumers.” Id. at 1179. The burden similarly falls on app operators.

Users are put on constructive notice based on the conspicuousness and placement of the terms and conditions, as well as the content and overall design of the app. For example, courts will not enforce agreements where the terms are “buried at the bottom of the page or tucked away in obscure corners of the website,” especially when such scrolling is not required to use the site. Id. (citing to Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2002)). Similarly, courts decline to enforce agreements where the terms are available only if users scroll to a different screen, Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), complete a multiple-step process of clicking non-obvious links, Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 792-93 (N.D. Ill. 2011), or parse through confusing or distracting content and advertisements, Starke v. SquareTrade, Inc., 913 F.3d 279, 293 (2d Cir. 2019); Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 237 (2d Cir. 2016). Even where the terms are accessible via a conspicuous hyperlink in close proximity to a button necessary to the function of the website, courts have declined to enforce such agreements. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178-79.

Huuuge’s app is littered with these flaws. When downloading the app, the Terms are not just submerged— they are buried twenty thousand leagues under the sea. (…) This is the equivalent to admonishing a child to “please eat your peas” only to then hide the peas. A reasonably prudent user cannot be expected to scrutinize the app’s profile page with a fine-tooth comb for the Terms.

Huuuge argues Wilson’s repeated use of the app places him on constructive notice since it was likely he would stumble upon the Terms during that time period. However, just as “there is no reason to assume that users will scroll down to subsequent screens simply because screens are there,” there is no reason to assume the users will click on the settings menu simply because it exists. Specht, 306 F.3d at 32. The user can play the game unencumbered by any of the settings.

Nothing points the user to the settings tab and nowhere does the user encounter a click box or other notification before proceeding. Only curiosity or dumb luck might bring a user to discover the Terms.

Instead of requiring a user to affirmatively assent, Huuuge chose to gamble on whether its users would have notice of its Terms. The odds are not in its favor.


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, December 20, 2019, Sean Wilson, v. Huuuge, Inc., a Delaware corp., Docket No. 18-36017, For Publication)

Tuesday, December 17, 2019

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Map Geico Marine Insurance Company, v. James Shackleford, Docket No. 18-12105


Maritime Law
Admiralty Jurisdiction
Admiralty Law
Insurance Law
Marine Insurance Contracts
Maritime Contracts
Maritime Doctrine of uberrimae fidei
Policy Construction
Waiver
Right to Contract Out of Federal Maritime Law
Florida Law

(…) In March 2016, Shackleford obtained a liability-only policy from Geico Marine.

General Conditions: (…) CRUISING LIMITS: While afloat, the insured Yacht shall be confined to the waters indicated below:
(There is no coverage outside of this area without the Company’s written permission.)
U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coastal waters and inland waters tributary thereto between Eastport, ME and Brownsville, TX, inclusive and the waters of the Bahamas including the Turks and Caicos, however the boat must be north of Cape Hatteras, NC from June 1 until November 1 annually.

The day after the policy issued, Shackleford asked Geico Marine to change the policy to “Port Risk Ashore.” That restriction provides no coverage for navigation; instead, it provides coverage only while the vessel is out of the water. Geico Marine issued an endorsement and updated declarations page adding the restriction that same day. Because coverage now applied only if the vessel was ashore, the updated declarations page removed the original navigational limit that required the vessel to be north of Cape Hatteras during hurricane season if afloat.

(…) In May 2016, Shackleford called Geico Marine to seek removal of the Port Risk Ashore restriction so he could sail the vessel to Fort Lauderdale. He also confirmed that the policy now insured the vessel’s hull for $264,000 and that the vessel had “full coverage” for the voyage. On May 27, 2016, Geico Marine sent Shackleford an email confirming that it had removed the Port Risk Ashore restriction. Attached to the email was an endorsement removing the restriction and an updated declarations page. The updated declarations page reinstated the original navigational limit that required the vessel “while afloat” to be “north of Cape Hatteras, NC from June 1 until November 1 annually.”

(…) On May 28, one day after Geico Marine removed the Port Risk Ashore restriction and reinstated the navigational limit, Shackleford set sail from Taylor Boatworks to Fort Lauderdale. After arriving in Fort Lauderdale, Shackleford anchored the vessel in nearby Lake Sylvia. In June 2016, a storm caused the vessel to drag anchor and drove her into a sea wall, leading her to take on water and suffer other damage. Shackleford filed a claim under his insurance policy, but Geico Marine denied coverage.

After denying coverage, Geico Marine filed a declaratory-judgment action against Shackleford, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and invoked admiralty jurisdiction, id. § 1333. Geico Marine sought a declaration that the policy was void ab initio under the maritime doctrine of uberrimae fidei, or utmost good faith, because Shackleford failed to disclose material facts about the vessel when procuring insurance. And it sought a declaration that coverage was barred by the policy’s navigational limit, which required the vessel to be north of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, during hurricane season.

Marine insurance contracts qualify as maritime contracts, which fall within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts and are governed by maritime law. AIG Centennial Ins. Co. v. O’Neill, 782 F.3d 1296, 1302 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1333). Even so, “it does not follow that every term in every maritime contract can only be controlled by some federally defined admiralty rule.” Id. at 1302 (alteration adopted) (quoting Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313 (1955)). “In the absence of a ‘judicially established federal admiralty rule,’ we rely on state law when addressing questions of marine insurance.” Id. (quoting Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 314); see also Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 69, at 570 (2016). The parties agree that Florida law fills any gaps here.

We reject Shackleford’s arguments and agree with Geico Marine that the navigational limit bars coverage. And because we agree with Geico Marine on this issue, we need not address its argument that Shackleford breached a duty of uberrimae fidei. The navigational limit is dispositive.

No established rule of maritime law governs whether a navigational limit is part of a marine insurance contract, so we apply Florida law to determine whether the policy contained a navigational limit. AIG Centennial, 782 F.3d at 1302. Under Florida law, we first look to the text of the policy and construe the policy “in accordance with its plain language.” Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003). But “if the relevant policy language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the other limiting coverage,” the policy is ambiguous and we must construe it in favor of coverage. Id. (alterations adopted). That “a provision is complex and requires analysis for application” does not “automatically” mean it is ambiguous. Id. Before concluding that a provision is ambiguous, we must “read the policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.” Id. at 166.

Reading the policy as a whole, we readily conclude that it unambiguously contained a navigational limit when the loss occurred.

(…) No established rule of maritime law governs the waiver of a navigational limit, so we apply Florida law to determine whether Geico Marine waived its right to enforce that provision. AIG Centennial, 782 F.3d at 1302. In Florida, implied waiver of a contractual right requires “conduct which implies the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So. 2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005). Shackleford’s theory of implied waiver appears to be that Geico Marine waived the navigational limit by agreeing to a course of conduct that it knew would make it impossible for Shackleford to comply with the requirement that his vessel be north of Cape Hatteras by June 1. We are unpersuaded.

Geico Marine knew Shackleford was taking the vessel to Fort Lauderdale for “extensive repairs,” and it could reasonably have expected that Shackleford would comply with the navigational limit by having the vessel hauled ashore for repairs in Fort Lauderdale by June 1. The only way Geico Marine’s conduct could have suggested it intended to waive the navigational limit is if the voyage to Fort Lauderdale was impossible to complete by June 1. But Shackleford conceded at oral argument that the vessel arrived in Fort Lauderdale by June 1 and that he intended to haul the vessel ashore upon arrival, which would have complied with the navigational limit.

That the vessel arrived in Fort Lauderdale by June 1 shows that it was possible to complete the voyage by June 1. So Geico Marine plainly did not agree to a course of conduct that it knew would make compliance with the navigational limit impossible. Nothing in this record supports the conclusion that Geico Marine voluntarily and intentionally relinquished its right to enforce the navigational limit. The district court erred in ruling otherwise.

Even if Geico Marine did not waive the navigational limit, Shackleford argues that his breach of the navigational limit does not bar coverage because Florida law does not strictly enforce express warranties in marine insurance contracts. As Shackleford acknowledges, federal maritime law requires “strict” or absolute enforcement of express navigational warranties. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Cooke’s Seafood, 835 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Strict, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Absolute; requiring no showing of fault.”). And established federal maritime rules, like the rule requiring absolute enforcement of express navigational warranties, ordinarily control “even in the face of contrary state authority.” AIG Centennial, 782 F.3d at 1303. But Shackleford contends that he and Geico Marine contracted out of the federal maritime rule of enforcement and instead selected Florida’s more forgiving rule.

Although parties to a marine insurance policy are generally free to contract out of federal maritime law, King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1537, 1540–42 (11th Cir. 1990), we are not persuaded that Shackleford and Geico Marine did so.

The phrase “terms of this policy” appears in a provision titled “Conformity to Law,” and as its name suggests, the provision operates to conform any illegal policy terms to Florida law. Provisions like this one exist to address conflicts between the contract the parties wrote and what the law requires.

Shackleford effectively asks us to transform the policy’s conformity-to-law provision into a choice-of-law provision. By default, federal maritime law displaces contrary state law when construing a marine insurance contract. AIG Centennial, 782 F.3d at 1302–03. Shackleford would have us read the conformity- to-law provision as reversing this default rule, so that state law displaces any contrary federal maritime rule. But the provision does no such thing. The parties could have included a choice-of-law provision selecting state law over federal law, but they did not. And we “may not rewrite the parties’ contract, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise reach results contrary to the intentions of the parties.” Taurus Holdings, 913 So. 2d at 532.

Because the parties did not contract out of maritime law, we must apply the federal rule requiring absolute enforcement of express navigational limits. Under that rule, “breach of an express navigational warranty by the insured releases the insurance company from liability even if compliance with the warranty would not have avoided the loss.” Lexington, 835 F.2d at 1366. Here, the policy contained a navigational limit that conditioned coverage on the vessel being “north of Cape Hatteras, NC from June 1 until November 1 annually” if the vessel was “afloat.” The vessel suffered damage while afloat during a storm in Florida in early June. Because the vessel was outside of the covered navigational area when the loss occurred, the policy does not cover the loss.


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, December 17, 2019, Map Geico Marine Insurance Company, v. James Shackleford, Docket No. 18-12105, For Publication)

Wednesday, December 11, 2019

U.S. Supreme Court, Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., Docket No. 18-801, J. Sotomayor, Unanimous


Attorney’s Fees
American Rule
Baker Botts, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at …)
Patents

Pathways to challenge an adverse decision by the United States Patent and Trademark Of­fice (PTO)
Salaries of attorney and paralegal employees of the PTO
The PTO moved for reimbursement of expenses that included—for the first time in the 170-year history of §145—the pro rata salaries of PTO attorneys and a paralegal who worked on the case.


Section 145 of the Patent Act affords applicants “dissat­isfied with the decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board” an opportunity to file a civil action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 35 U. S. C. §145. The statute specifies that “all the ex­penses of the proceedings shall be paid by the applicant.” Ibid. The question presented in this case is whether such “expenses” include the salaries of attorney and paralegal employees of the United States Patent and Trademark Of­fice (PTO). We hold that they do not.

The Patent Act creates two mutually exclusive pathways to challenge an adverse decision by the PTO. The first per­mits judicial review by direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. §141. There is “no opportunity for the applicant to offer new evidence” in a §141 proceeding, and the Federal Circuit “must review the PTO’s decision on the same administrative record that was before the agency.” Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U. S. 431, 434 (2012); 35 U. S. C. §144.

The second pathway allows applicants to file a new civil action against the Director of the PTO in federal district court. §145. Unlike §141, §145 “permits the applicant to present new evidence . . . not presented to the PTO.” Kap­pos, 566 U. S., at 435. The district court “acts as a factfinder when new evidence is introduced in a §145 proceeding” and must make de novo determinations that take into account “both the new evidence and the administrative record be­fore the PTO.” Id., at 444, 446. The parties may appeal the district court’s final decision to the Federal Circuit. 28 U. S. C. §1295(a)(4)(C).

Because §145 does not limit an applicant’s ability to in­troduce new evidence to challenge the denial of a patent, Kappos, 566 U. S., at 439, it can result in protracted litiga­tion. As a condition for permitting such extensive review, the Patent Act requires applicants who avail themselves of §145 to pay “all the expenses of the proceedings.” 35 U. S. C. §145.

The PTO moved for reimbursement of expenses that included—for the first time in the 170-year history of §145—the pro rata salaries of PTO attorneys and a paralegal who worked on the case.

This Court’s “‘basic point of reference’ when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the ‘“American Rule”’: Each litigant pays his own attor­ney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 252–253 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 683 (1983)). The American Rule has “roots in our common law reaching back to at least the 18th century.” Baker Botts, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (citing Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306 (1796)); see also Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v. Carpenters, 456 U. S. 717, 721 (1982) (observing that the American Rule “has been consist­ently followed for almost 200 years”); Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U. S., at 257 (referring to the presumption against shifting attorney’s fees as a “general” rule).

(…) Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U. S. 369 (2013), confirms that the presumption against fee shifting applies to all statutes—even those like §145 that do not explicitly award attorney’s fees to “prevailing parties.”

(…) §145 has all the marks of the kind of adversarial litigation in which fee shifting, and the pre­sumption against it, is common; the statute authorizes fil­ing a separate civil action where new evidence can be intro­duced for de novo review by a district judge. Thus, the presumption against fee shifting not only applies, but is particularly important because §145 permits an unsuccess­ful government agency to recover its expenses from a pre­vailing party. Reading §145 to award attorney’s fees in that circumstance “would be a radical departure from longstand­ing fee-shifting principles adhered to in a wide range of con­texts.” Ruckelshaus, 463 U. S., at 683.

The American Rule thus provides the starting point for assessing whether §145 authorizes payment of the PTO’s legal fees.

To determine whether Congress intended to depart from the American Rule presumption, the Court first “looks to the language of the section” at issue. Hardt, 560 U. S., at 254. While “the ab­sence of a specific reference to attorney’s fees is not dispositive,” Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 815 (1994), Congress must provide a sufficiently “specific and explicit” indication of its intent to overcome the Amer­ican Rule’s presumption against fee shifting. Alyeska Pipe­line, 421 U. S., at 260.

The reference to “expenses” in §145 does not invoke attor­ney’s fees with the kind of “clarity we have required to de­viate from the American Rule.” Baker Botts, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4).

(…) Reading the term “expenses” alongside neighboring words in the statute, however, supports a conclusion ex­cluding legal fees from the scope of §145.

(…)  The modifier “all” does not expand §145’s reach to include attorney’s fees. Although the word conveys breadth, it cannot transform “expenses” to reach an outlay it would not otherwise include. Cf. Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 6–7) (“The adjective ‘full’ in §505 therefore does not alter the meaning of the word ‘costs.’ Rather, ‘full costs’ are all the ‘costs’ otherwise available under law”).

Section 145’s plain text thus does not overcome the Amer­ican Rule’s presumption against fee shifting to permit the PTO to recoup its legal personnel salaries as “expenses of the proceedings.”

(…) That “expenses” and “attorney’s fees” appear in tandem across various statutes shifting litigation costs indicates that Congress understands the two terms to be distinct and not inclusive of each other.

(…) While some other statutes refer to attorney’s fees as a subset of expenses, they show only that “expenses” can in­clude attorney’s fees when so defined. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §361 (authorizing “reasonable expenses, including attor­neys’ fees”); §1447(c).

Simply put, in common statutory usage, the term “ex­penses” alone has never been considered to authorize an award of attorney’s fees with sufficient clarity to overcome the American Rule presumption.

Because Congress failed to make its intention (…) clear in §145, the Court will not read the statute to “contravene fun­damental precepts of the common law.” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S. 677, 716 (1983).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the PTO can­not recover the pro rata salaries of its legal personnel under §145 and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Ap­peals for the Federal Circuit.


(U.S. Supreme Court, December 11, 2019, Peter v. NantKwest, Inc., Docket No. 18-801, J. Sotomayor, Unanimous)

Sunday, December 1, 2019

Swiss Competition Commission Opinion (in German) - Distribution Agreement - Vertical Restraints

 

Swiss Competition Commission opinion (in German)

 

Antitrust

 

Competition

 

Distribution Agreement

 

Vertical Restraints

 

Horizontal Restraints

 

Supplier in Germany

 

Two Distributors in Switzerland

 

Customer Sharing Agreement in Switzerland

 

Passive Sales Forbidden by Agreement

 

 

 

Vertikales Verhältnis

 

Hier Passivverkäufe aufgrund des Wortlauts der Kundenaufteilungsklausel im Kooperationsvertrag sind ausgeschlossen. Folglich liegt eine qualitativ schwerwiegende Abrede

 

Da die absatzseitige Kundenaufteilung eine qualitativ schwerwiegende Abrede gemäss Ziff. 12 Abs. 2 Bst. b VertBek darstellt, braucht es in quantitativer Hinsicht nur wenig, um die Abrede gestützt auf eine Gesamtbeurteilung der betrachteten qualitativen und quantitativen Kriterien als erhebliche Wettbewerbsbeschränkung zu qualifizieren

 

Intrabrand-und Interbrand-Wettbewerbs

 

 

Die absatzseitige Kundenaufteilung ist hier auch als horizontale Wettbewerbsabrede zwischen Bucher und Brenntag zu werten

 

Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede (In der Schweiz Kundinnen und Kunden untereinander teilen)

 

Bewusstes und Gewolltes Zusammenwirken

 

Subjektive Absicht der an der Abrede Beteiligten ist unerheblich

 

Beteiligung Dritter

 

Vertikale Wettbewerbsabreden :

-       Die europäischen Regeln in der Schweiz analog anwendbar sind

-       Definition eines Wettbewerbers

 

Handelsvertreterverhältnisse

 

Parallelimporten

 

Passivverkäufe

 

 

 

 

 

AdBlue ist eine wässrige Harnstofflösung, die den Ausstoss von Stickoxiden (NOx) bei Dieselmotoren reduziert. Mit AdBlue können die Abgase um bis zu 90 % reduziert werden. Die Flüssigkeit ist technisch normiert (ISO 22241-1). Erfüllt ein Anbieter diese Norm, kann er mit dem in Berlin ansässigen Verband der Automobilindustrie e.V, dem Inhaber der Individualmarke «Ad-Blue®», eine Lizenzvereinbarung treffen, um diesen Markennamen verwenden zu dürfen (Rz 4).

 

 

(…) In der Schweiz Kundinnen und Kunden untereinander aufgeteilt haben (Rz 1).

 

 

(…) Mit der Untersuchung sollte geprüft werden, ob die Untersuchungsadressatinnen eine unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede im Sinne von Art. 5 Abs. 3 Bst. c KG getroffen haben (Rz 1).

 

 

8. Auf die SHAB-Publikation der Untersuchungseröffnung vom 5. Dezember 2017 meldeten sich keine Dritten, die sich im Sinne von Art. 43 Abs. 1 Bst. a KG mit Parteistellung am Verfahren beteiligen wollten.

 

 

B.4. Unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede

30. Abreden, die den Wettbewerb auf einem Markt für bestimmte Waren oder Leistungen erheblich beeinträchtigen und sich nicht durch Gründe der wirtschaftlichen Effizienz rechtfertigen lassen, sowie Abreden, die zur Beseitigung wirksamen Wettbewerbs führen, sind unzulässig (Art. 5 Abs. 1 KG).

 

 

B.4.1 Wettbewerbsabrede

31. Als Wettbewerbsabreden gelten rechtlich erzwingbare oder nicht erzwingbare Vereinbarungen sowie aufeinander abgestimmte Verhaltensweisen von Unternehmen gleicher oder verschiedener Marktstufen, die eine Wettbewerbsbeschränkung bezwecken oder bewirken (Art. 4 Abs. 1 KG).

 

 

32. Eine Wettbewerbsabrede im Sinne von Art. 4 Abs. 1 KG definiert sich daher durch folgende Tatbestandselemente: a) ein bewusstes und gewolltes Zusammenwirken der an der Abrede beteiligten Unternehmen und b) die Abrede bezweckt oder bewirkt eine Wettbewerbsbeschränkung.

 

 

B.4.1.1. Bewusstes und gewolltes Zusammenwirken

33. Die in Art. 4 Abs. 1 KG aufgeführten Formen von Wettbewerbsabreden zeichnen sich alle dadurch aus, dass zwei oder mehrere wirtschaftlich voneinander unabhängige Unternehmen kooperieren. Am einfachsten gelingt der Nachweis eines bewussten und gewollten Zusammenwirkens, wenn die Wettbewerbsabrede in der Form einer ausdrücklichen Vereinbarung vorliegt.

 

 

35. Die Kundenaufteilung ergab sich gemäss den Untersuchungsadressatinnen aus ihren spezifischen Stärken: Brenntag habe AdBlue importiert und verfüge über die für Grosshändlerinnen typischen Ressourcen, um AdBlue zu transportieren, zu lagern und in kleinere Behälter abzufüllen. Brenntag sei daher ausgerüstet, um Kundinnen und Kunden in der Schweiz zu beliefern, die grössere Mengen AdBlue nachfragen würden (i.d.R. lose im Tankfahrzeug oder in grösseren Behältern). Bucher hingegen verfüge über eine starke Präsenz als Händlerin für kleinere Endkundinnen und Endkunden. Buchers Stärke sei folglich die Belieferung von Kundinnen und Kunden mit kleineren Behältern von AdBlue.

 

 

36. In casu haben Brenntag und Bucher mit dem Kooperationsvertrag und der darin enthaltenen Kundenaufteilung eine ausdrückliche Vereinbarung getroffen und die Kundenaufteilung mit der Aktennotiz zum Treffen der Untersuchungsadressatinnen vom 20. August 2015 aktualisiert. Damit liegt ein bewusstes und gewolltes Zusammenwirken bezüglich der absatzseitigen Kundenaufteilung vor.

 

 

37. Neben einem bewussten und gewollten Zusammenwirken muss die Abrede «eine Wettbewerbsbeschränkung bezwecken oder bewirken» (vgl. oben, Rz 32). Eine Abrede bezweckt eine Wettbewerbsbeschränkung, wenn die Abredebeteiligten «die Ausschaltung oder Beeinträchtigung eines oder mehrerer Wettbewerbsparameter zum Programm erhoben haben». Dabei genügt es, wenn der Abredeinhalt objektiv geeignet ist, eine Wettbewerbsbeschränkung durch Ausschaltung eines Wettbewerbsparameters zu verursachen. Die subjektive Absicht der an der Abrede Beteiligten ist unerheblich.

 

 

(…) Konnte mit der vertraglichen Regelung letztlich der Zweck verfolgt werden, sich bezüglich Kundinnen und Kunden nicht zu konkurrieren (Rz 38).

 

 

Ausserdem belieferten sowohl Brenntag als auch Bucher während des Untersuchungszeitraums, d.h. vom 5. Mai 2014 (Abschluss Kooperationsvertrag) bis zum 9. Juni 2017 (Aufhebung der Kundenaufteilung), Kundinnen und Kunden, die vertragsgemäss der jeweiligen anderen Vertragspartnerin zugeordnet waren. So erzielte Bucher in den Jahren 2014, 2015, 2016 und 2017 rund [0–20] %, [0–20] %, [0–20] % und [0–20] % des Umsatzes mit AdBlue mit «Brenntag-Kunden». Bei Brenntag lagen die Mengenanteile, die in den Jahren 2014, 2015, 2016 und 2017 an «Bucher-Kunden» geliefert wurden, bei [0–20] %, [0–20] %, [0–20] % und [0–20] %. Mengenmässig sind die Lieferungen an die Kundinnen und Kunden, die vertragsgemäss der jeweiligen Vertragspartnerin zugeordnet waren, im Untersuchungszeitraum sowohl bei Bucher als auch bei Brenntag gestiegen, wobei zu beachten ist, dass der Absatzmarkt für AdBlue in der Schweiz in den letzten Jahren wachsend war (Rz 38).

 

 

41. Vertikale Wettbewerbsabreden sind erzwingbare oder nicht erzwingbare Vereinbarungen sowie aufeinander abgestimmte Verhaltensweisen von Unternehmen verschiedener Marktstufen, die eine Wettbewerbsbeschränkung bezwecken oder bewirken und Geschäftsbedingungen betreffen, zu denen die beteiligten Unternehmen bestimmte Waren oder Dienstleistungen beziehen, verkaufen oder weiterverkaufen können (Ziff. 1 VertBek64).

 

 

42. In Erw.-Gr. VI. und VII. nimmt die Vertikalbekanntmachung Bezug auf die Vertikal-GVO65 und die entsprechenden EU-Vertikalleitlinien und stellt klar, dass die europäischen Regeln in der Schweiz analog anwendbar sind.

 

 

44. Ziff. 8 Abs. 1 VertBek hält fest, dass die Bekanntmachung für vertikale Wettbewerbsabreden gilt. Weiter findet sie auch Anwendung, wenn Wettbewerber eine nicht gegenseitige vertikale Vereinbarung treffen und a) der Anbieter zugleich Hersteller und Händler von Waren ist, der Abnehmer dagegen Händler, jedoch kein Wettbewerber auf der Herstellungsebene; oder b) der Anbieter ein auf mehreren Handelsstufen tätiger Dienstleister ist, der Abnehmer dagegen Waren oder Dienstleistungen auf der Einzelhandelsstufe anbietet und auf der Handelsstufe, auf der er die Vertragsdienstleistungen bezieht, kein Wettbewerber ist (Ziff. 8 Abs. 2 VertBek; sog. zweigleisiger oder dualer Vertrieb). Zudem schliesst die Anwendung der Bekanntmachung nicht aus, dass ein Sachverhalt ganz oder teilweise als horizontale Wettbewerbsabrede gemäss Art. 5 Abs. 3 KG qualifiziert oder von Art. 7 KG erfasst wird. Diesfalls ist der Sachverhalt unabhängig von der Bekanntmachung gemäss den einschlägigen Vorschriften des Kartellgesetzes zu beurteilen (Ziff. 8 Abs. 3 VertBek).

 

 

(64 Bekanntmachung der WEKO vom 28.6.2010 über die wettbewerbsrechtliche Behandlung vertikaler Abreden (Stand am 22.5.2017; Vertikalbekanntmachung, VertBek), BBl 2017 4543, abrufbar unter: www.weko.ch>Dokumentation>Bekanntmachungen/Erläuterungen).

(65 Verordnung (EU) Nr. 330/2010 der Kommission vom 20.4.2010 über die Anwendung von Artikel 101 Absatz 3 des Vertrags über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union auf Gruppen von vertikalen Vereinbarungen und abgestimmten Verhaltensweisen (nachfolgend: Vertikal-GVO), ABl. L 102 vom 23.4.2010, 1).

(66 Leitlinien für vertikale Beschränkungen, Mitteilung der Europäischen Kommission (nachfolgend: EU-Vertikalleitlinien), ABl. C 130 vom 19.5.2010, 1).

 

 

46. Ein Wettbewerber ist laut Definition der Vertikal-GVO (Art. 1 Abs. 1 Bst. c) ein tatsächlicher oder potenzieller Wettbewerber; ein «tatsächlicher Wettbewerber» ist ein Unternehmen, das auf demselben relevanten Markt tätig ist; ein «potenzieller Wettbewerber» ist ein Unternehmen, bei dem realistisch und nicht nur hypothetisch davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass es ohne die vertikale Vereinbarung als Reaktion auf einen geringen, aber anhaltenden Anstieg der relativen Preise wahrscheinlich innerhalb kurzer Zeit die zusätzlichen Investitionen tätigen oder sonstigen Umstellungskosten auf sich nehmen würde, die erforderlich wären, um in den relevanten Markt einzutreten. Dies zeigt, dass nicht allein auf die unterschiedlichen Produktions- oder Vertriebsstufen abzustellen ist, sondern auf ein konkretes Wettbewerbsverhältnis.

 

 

48. Die dargelegten europäischen Bestimmungen sind ausführlicher als jene in der Vertikalbekanntmachung. Sie gelten gestützt auf Erw.-Gr. VI. und VII. sowie Ziff. 8 VertBek auch in der Schweiz.

 

 

52. Aus dem Kooperationsvertrag (siehe oben, Rz 34) wird ersichtlich, dass darin die Liefer- und Bezugsbeziehung zwischen Brenntag und Bucher zwecks Weiterverkaufs von AdBlue geregelt wurde. Bezüglich dieser Liefer- und Bezugsbeziehung stehen Brenntag und Bucher auf verschiedenen Marktstufen. Während Brenntag Generalimporteurin und Anbieterin des AdBlue ihrer Lieferantin ist, ist Bucher Abnehmerin. Somit handelt es sich bei dieser Liefer- und Bezugsbeziehung um ein vertikales Verhältnis. Zur Beantwortung der Frage, ob die im Kooperationsvertrag gleichzeitig vereinbarte absatzseitige Kundenaufteilung eine eigenständige horizontale Verhaltenskoordinierung darstellt, ist zu eruieren, ob sich die Vertragsparteien (entlang der ganzen Vertriebskette von AdBlue oder in Teilbereichen) als Wettbewerberinnen (siehe oben, Rz 46) gegenüberstehen.

 

 

(…) Anlage 3 des Kooperationsvertrags definierte denn auch Spezialfälle, die ausnahmsweise Lieferungen oder vorgängige Abstimmungen der Vertragsparteien vor einer Kontaktaufnahme bzw. einer Lieferung an die jeweiligen Kundinnen und Kunden vorsahen (vgl. oben, Rz 34) (Rz 53).

 

 

54. Diese Elemente zeigen auf, dass Bucher und Brenntag absatzseitig entlang der gesamten Vertriebskette von AdBlue Wettbewerberinnen sind, wenn auch mit unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten: Während Brenntag vor allem Grosskundinnen und -kunden beliefert, die grössere Mengen von AdBlue nachfragen (i.d.R. lose im Tankfahrzeug oder in grösseren Behältern), verkauft Bucher überwiegend abgepackte Ware (Kanister) an kleinere Abnehmerinnen und Abnehmer über den Aussendienst. Im Übrigen haben die Abklärungen des Sekretariats ergeben, dass Bucher auch ohne Zusammenarbeit mit Brenntag ins Geschäft mit AdBlue eingestiegen wäre. Somit war Bucher zum Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses des Kooperationsvertrags eine potenzielle Wettbewerberin von Brenntag.

 

 

Die absatzseitige Kundenaufteilung ist somit als horizontale Wettbewerbsabrede zwischen Bucher und Brenntag zu werten, die nach den einschlägigen Bestimmungen des Kartellgesetzes zu würdigen ist (Ziff. 8 Abs. 3 VertBek).

 

 

61. Aufgrund des Agreements ist Brenntag von einer Lieferantin von AdBlue zum Vertrieb von AdBlue in der Schweiz ermächtigt. Brenntag vertritt ihre Lieferantin von AdBlue gemäss deren Instruktion und darf sie in diesen Schranken vertraglich binden. Verkäufe erfolgen im Namen von Brenntag, aber auf Rechnung der Lieferantin von AdBlue.

 

 

62. Das Agreement sieht vor, dass Brenntag ein Konsignationslager führt. Das Eigentum an der Vertragsware geht direkt von der Lieferantin von AdBlue auf den Käufer über. Im Verhältnis zu Brenntag übernimmt die Lieferantin von AdBlue diverse Kosten wie solche, die aufgrund vertragsgemässer Durchführung des Vertrags entstehen, sowie Liefer- und Versicherungskosten. Die Lieferantin von AdBlue übernimmt auch das Risiko der Nichterfüllung.

 

 

65. Im Schweizer Kartellrecht gibt es keine Bestimmungen, welche vorsehen, wie Personen, die im Auftrag einer anderen Person (Auftraggeber) entweder im eigenen Namen oder im Namen des Auftraggebers handeln, kartellrechtlich zu behandeln sind.88 Anders ist dies in der EU. Die EU-Vertikalleitlinien behandeln diese Konstellation mit dem Rechtsinstitut des Handelsvertreters (siehe oben, Rz 64). Gestützt auf die Erw.-Gr. VI. und VII. VertBek können die in der EU entwickelten Grundlagen bezüglich der Risikoverteilung zur Klärung der Frage herangezogen werden, ob die Tätigkeit des Auftragnehmers aufgrund des fehlenden unternehmerischen Risikos vollumfänglich dem Auftraggeber zuzurechnen ist.89

 

88 Das Schweizer Zivilrecht kennt jedoch im Bundesgesetz vom 30.3.1911 betreffend die Ergänzung des Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuches (Fünfter Teil: Obligationenrecht) (Obligationenrecht, OR; SR 220) mit dem Auftrag (Art. 394 ff. OR), insb. dem Agenturvertrag (Art. 418a ff. OR), und der Kommission (Art. 425 ff. OR) Vertragsverhältnisse, die das Handeln im Auftrag einer anderen Person entweder im eigenen oder im Namen des Auftraggebers regeln.

 

89 Vgl. Urteil des BVGer B-3975/2013 vom 30.10.2019, E. 6.3, Les Editions Flammarion SA/COMCO; RPW 2013/4, 481 f. Rz 32 ff., Costa Kreuzfahrten; RPW 2016/1, 79 Rz 97 f., Online-Buchungsplattformen für Hotels; RPW 2017/4, 701 ff. Rz 45 ff., Gutachten: Vertrieb ausländischer Zeitschriften in der Schweiz; RPW 2018/2, 256 Rz 86 ff., marché du livre écrit en français. Siehe auch HADI MIRZAI/MARQUARD CHRISTEN, Handelsvertreterverhältnisse im Kartellrecht, in: Jusletter vom 15.10.2018, welche u.a. einen Überblick über die Beratungspraxis des Sekretariats i.S. Handelsvertreterverhältnisse geben.

 

 

 

77. Vorliegend wird nicht abschliessend geklärt, ob Brenntag im Verhältnis mit ihrer Lieferantin von AdBlue wirtschaftliche Risiken trägt, und falls ja, in welchem Umfang, und ob Brenntags Verhalten demnach Brenntag oder ihrer Lieferantin von AdBlue zuzurechnen ist. Es ist deshalb nicht nachgewiesen, dass es sich bei der Kundenaufteilung, die Brenntag und Bucher vereinbart haben, um eine Abrede zwischen Konkurrenten handelt, die gemäss den einschlägigen Bestimmungen des Kartellgesetzes zu beurteilen ist. Eine Abrede über eine Kundenaufteilung im horizontalen Verhältnis beseitigt vermutungsweise den wirksamen Wettbewerb. Dagegen erfüllt eine absatzseitige Abrede über eine Kundenaufteilung zwischen Wettbewerbern, die gestützt auf Ziff. 8 Abs. 2 Bst. a VertBek nach der Vertikalbekanntmachung zu beurteilen ist, keinen der Vermutungstatbestände gemäss Art. 5 KG.

 

 

Räumlich relevanter Markt

Von Direktimport wird gesprochen, wenn Endkundinnen und Endkunden Produkte im Ausland einkaufen und in die Schweiz einführen. Von Parallelimporten wird gesprochen, wenn Händler Produkte im Ausland erwerben und ausserhalb der vom Hersteller vorgesehenen Vertriebskanäle in die Schweiz einführen (Rz 88).

 

 

Qualitative Beeinträchtigung des Wettbewerbs

 

89. Vorliegend ist erwiesen, dass Brenntag und Bucher zwischen 2014 und 2017 eine absatzseitige Kundenaufteilung vereinbart haben. Zu prüfen ist, ob durch die Kundenaufteilung auch Passivverkäufe, d.h. die Erledigung unaufgeforderter Bestellungen einzelner Kundinnen und Kunden, eingeschränkt worden sind.

 

90. In der Anlage 3 zum Kooperationsvertrag ist festgehalten, dass gewisse Kundinnen und Kunden exklusiv nur durch Bucher resp. Brenntag beliefert werden. Im Kooperationsvertrag wird nicht zwischen passiven und aktiven, d.h. die aktive Ansprache einzelner Kundinnen und Kunden, Verkäufen unterschieden, doch legt eine Auslegung dieser Klausel nach dem Wortlaut nahe, dass Bucher resp. Brenntag die Kundinnen und Kunden exklusiv beliefern soll, ungeachtet dessen, ob die Lieferung aufgrund einer unaufgeforderten Bestellung einzelner Kundinnen und Kunden oder aktiven Ansprache einzelner Kundinnen und Kunden ausgelöst wurde.

 

91. Gemäss Ziff. 12 Abs. 2 Bst. b VertBek wird eine Beschränkung der Kundengruppen, an die ein an der Vereinbarung beteiligter Abnehmer verkaufen darf, als qualitativ schwerwiegend betrachtet. Eine qualitativ schwerwiegende Beeinträchtigung des Wettbewerbs aufgrund des Gegenstandes liegt jedoch nicht vor bei Beschränkungen des aktiven Verkaufs an Kundengruppen, die der Abnehmer sich selbst vorbehalten hat, vorausgesetzt, dass Passivverkäufe uneingeschränkt möglich sind (Ziff. 12 Abs. 2 Bst. b i) VertBek). Diese Ausnahme greift vorliegend nicht, weil Passivverkäufe aufgrund des Wortlauts der Kundenaufteilungsklausel im Kooperationsvertrag ausgeschlossen sind. Folglich liegt eine qualitativ schwerwiegende Abrede im Sinne von Ziff. 12 Abs. 2 Bst. b VertBek vor.

 

 

Quantitative Beeinträchtigung des Wettbewerbs

 

92. Die Prüfung der quantitativen Beeinträchtigung des Wettbewerbs erfolgt üblicherweise anhand derselben Konzepte wie die Frage, ob die Unzulässigkeitsvermutung nach Art. 5 Abs. 4 KG widerlegt werden kann ; d.h. im Fall von Vertikalabreden anhand des vorhandenen Intrabrand- und Interbrand-Wettbewerbs. Die Analyse unterscheidet sich jedoch im Mass der Wettbewerbsbeeinträchtigung, welches erreicht sein muss, damit eine Abrede den Wettbewerb beseitigt oder (nur) erheblich beeinträchtigt.

 

93. Da die absatzseitige Kundenaufteilung eine qualitativ schwerwiegende Abrede gemäss Ziff. 12 Abs. 2 Bst. b VertBek darstellt (siehe oben, Rz 91), braucht es in quantitativer Hinsicht nur wenig, um die Abrede gestützt auf eine Gesamtbeurteilung der betrachteten qualitativen und quantitativen Kriterien als erhebliche Wettbewerbsbeschränkung zu qualifizieren (siehe oben, Rz 82).

 

94. Der mengenbasierte Marktanteil von Brenntag auf dem Schweizer Markt für AdBlue lag im Untersuchungszeitraum gestützt auf Schätzungen von Brenntag zwischen [20–30] % im Jahr 2014 und [10–20] % im Jahr 2017. Gestützt auf die Schätzungen des Gesamtmarktvolumens von Brenntag und die Liefermengen von Brenntag an Bucher ergeben sich geschätzte Marktanteile von Bucher in Höhe von [0–10] % im Jahr 2014 und [0–10] % im Jahr 2017. Bucher schätzt die eigenen mengenbasierten Marktanteile auf [0–10] % im Jahr 2016 und [0–10] % im Jahr 2017.

 

95. Nebst Bucher und Brenntag gibt es eine Reihe anderer Anbieter mit Vertrieb von AdBlue in der Schweiz. Dazu gehört insbesondere die BASF SE, Deutschland, mit der Schweizer Vertriebspartnerin Thommen-Furler AG, die österreichische Borealis AG mit Vertrieb über ein eigenes Netz und externe Partner sowie die deutsche Hoyer mit der Schweizer Vertriebspartnerin Oel Pool AG. Weitere Wettbewerber sind Tankstellenketten (z.B. Shell, Avia, Total) und internationale Transportunternehmen.

 

B.4.3.4. Fazit

97. Gestützt auf eine Gesamtbeurteilung der dargelegten qualitativen und quantitativen Kriterien kommt die WEKO zum Schluss, dass die absatzseitige Kundenaufteilungsabrede zwischen Bucher und Brenntag den Wettbewerb auf dem schweizweiten Markt für den Vertrieb von AdBlue im Sinne von Art. 5 Abs. 1 KG erheblich beeinträchtigte.

 

 

B.4.4. Rechtfertigung aus Effizienzgründen

 

99. Vorliegend sind keine Gründe ersichtlich, welche die absatzseitige Kundenaufteilungsabrede im Sinne von Art. 5 Abs. 2 KG rechtfertigen könnten. Die Parteien haben auch keine möglichen Effizienzgründe geltend gemacht.

 

 

B.4.5. Ergebnis

100. Die WEKO kommt gestützt auf die vorstehenden Erwägungen zu folgendem Ergebnis:

 

 • Die im Kooperationsvertrag zwischen Brenntag und Bucher vereinbarte Kundenaufteilung stellt eine Wettbewerbsabrede im Sinne von Art. 4 Abs. 1 KG dar (vgl. oben, Rz 31 ff.).

 

Vorliegend wird nicht abschliessend geklärt, wie die Risikoverteilung zwischen Brenntag und ihrer Lieferantin von AdBlue aussieht, und ob Brenntags Verhalten, d.h. die absatzseitige Kundenaufteilung mit Bucher, folglich Brenntag selber oder ihrer Lieferantin von AdBlue zuzurechnen ist (vgl. oben, Rz 71 f.). Es ist deshalb nicht nachgewiesen, dass es sich bei der Kundenaufteilung um eine Abrede zwischen Konkurrenten im Sinne von Art. 5 Abs. 3 Bst. c KG handelt (vgl. oben, Rz 77 f.).

 

 

101. Die absatzseitige Kundenaufteilungsabrede zwischen Bucher und Brenntag ist somit eine unzulässige Wettbewerbsabrede im Sinne von Art. 5 Abs. 1 KG

 

 

 

 

(Verfügung vom 2. Dezember 2019 in Sachen Untersuchung gemäss Art. 27 KG betreffend AdBlue wegen unzulässiger Wettbewerbsabrede gemäss Art. 5 KG gegen 1. Brenntag Schweizerhall AG, in Basel, vertreten durch [...], 2. Bucher AG Langenthal, in Langenthal, vertreten durch [...], RPW 2020/2, S. 626 ff.)