Tuesday, July 31, 2018

Hansen v. Newegg.com Americas, Inc., Docket B271477


Competition law: Unfair competition: Advertising: Consumer protection: Price: Origin: Geographic origin: Labeling of origin: Demurrer:

The complaint alleged that Newegg’s website advertised fictitious former price and discount information that was intended to induce customers to purchase its products (…) Hansen further asserted that he would not have purchased the products had he known the “true nature of the discounts.”

Newegg filed a demurrer arguing that Hansen lacked “standing to . . . assert any claim under the FAL, UCL or CLRA” because he had “suffered no loss of money or property as a result of Newegg’s actions.” According to Newegg, Hansen’s complaint showed he had received the “products he wanted for the prices he agreed to pay”; he had not alleged that “the products were different than what he wanted, were unsatisfactory in any way, or were worth less than what he paid for them.” Accordingly, he had suffered no form of “economic injury.”


Summary of Applicable Law:

Unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) (UCL):
“The UCL’s purpose is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949.) “In service of that purpose, the Legislature framed the UCL’s substantive provisions in “broad, sweeping language” and provided ‘courts with broad equitable powers to remedy violations’.” (Kwikset, 51 Cal.4th at p. 320.)


False advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.) (FAL):
“Any violation of the false advertising law . . . necessarily violates the UCL.” (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 950.) Section 17500 “proscribes not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which, although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” (Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 663, 679.) Section 17501 specifically limits the use of advertisements that purport to convey the former price of a product: “No price shall be advertised as a former price of any advertised thing, unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price . . . within three months next immediately preceding the publication of the advertisement or unless the date when the alleged former price did prevail is clearly, exactly and conspicuously stated in the advertisement.” As used in section 17501, the term “‘former price’ . . . includes but is not limited to the following words and phrases when used in connection with advertised prices; ‘formerly –,’ ‘regularly –,’ ‘usually –,’ ‘originally –,’ ‘reduced from ___,’ ‘was ___ now ___,’ ‘___% off.’” (4 Cal. Code Regs., § 1301.) (…) Our Legislature has adopted multiple statutes that specifically prohibit the use of deceptive former price information and misleading statements regarding the amount of a price reduction. (See § 17501; Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(13).) These statutes make clear that, contrary to Newegg’s assertions, our Legislature has concluded “reasonable people can and do attach importance to a product’s former price in their purchasing decisions.” (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 333 [statutory prohibition on use of deceitful “Made in U.S.A.” labels shows that reasonable consumers do rely on that form on information]; see also id. at p. 329 [Legislature’s prohibition on deceitful Made in the U.S.A. labels demonstrates “the materiality of this representation”].) As noted in Hinojos, this conclusion is supported by empirical research showing that the presence of a higher original price affects consumers’ perceptions “about the product’s worth,” and increases their willingness to buy the product. (Hinojos, 718 F.3d at p. 1106.)


Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) (CLRA)
The CLRA makes unlawful . . . various “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” The CLRA sets forth 27 proscribed acts or practices. (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(1)-(27).) (Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 915 (Veera).) One of those “proscribed acts” is “making false or misleading statements of fact concerning . . . the existence of, or amounts of, price reductions.” (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(13).)


(Examples: are prohibited: To some consumers, processes and places of origin matter.  In particular, to some consumers, the ‘Made in U.S.A.’ label matters. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 328-329.) The Court noted that the “Legislature had recognized the materiality of this form of representation by specifically outlawing deceptive and fraudulent ‘Made in America’ representations.” (Id. at p. 329 (citing § 17533.7) [prohibiting deceitful representations that a product was “Made in the U.S.A.”] and Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(4) [prohibiting deceptive representations of geographic origin].) (…) the Legislature has also specifically prohibited false former price advertising, as it did false labeling of origin. (See § 17501, Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a).)


(…) Kwikset, however, held that a consumer’s decision to pay more for a product than he or she would have but for the misrepresentation is itself a form of economic injury: In the eyes of the law, a buyer forced to pay more than he or she would have is harmed at the moment of purchase.


(…) The Supreme Court has concluded that to establish standing under California’s UCL and FAL, a consumer need only allege that he or she relied on a misrepresentation when purchasing the product, and that he or she would not have purchased the product but for the representation. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 317.)


(California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, July 31, 2018, Hansen v. Newegg.com Americas, Inc., Docket B271477, Certified for Publication, Acting P.J. Zelon)


Le demandeur soutient que le site Internet de l’entreprise défenderesse contenait des prix avant rabais qui ne correspondaient pas à la réalité, dans l’intention d’inciter le consommateur à l’achat. Il allègue en outre que sans cette publicité, il n’aurait pas acheté de produits à la défenderesse.

Celle-ci soutient pour sa part que la demande doit être rejetée d’entrée de cause, le demandeur n’ayant pas subi de dommage économique : les allégués de la demande démontreraient que le demandeur aurait reçu les produits qu’il voulait pour des prix qu’il avait consenti à payer, sans prétendre avoir reçu d’autres produits, des produits défectueux, ou de moindre valeur que la somme effectivement payée.

Cette affaire est jugée en application du droit californien, et les dispositions topiques sont les suivantes :

Loi contre la concurrence déloyale (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) : il est rappelé ici que la loi utilise des formulations non restrictives, attribuant ainsi aux Tribunaux des compétences de décision étendues.

Loi contre la publicité mensongère (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.) : toute violation de dite loi implique nécessairement violation de la loi contre la concurrence déloyale. Dite loi proscrit non seulement la publicité mensongère, mais aussi la publicité qui ne l’est pas mais qui a la capacité, la possibilité, ou la tendance de tromper ou d’induire en erreur le public. La Section 17501 de la loi limite spécifiquement la publicité d’un ancien prix : un ancien prix ne peut pas apparaître, sauf si cet ancien prix correspondait au prix du marché dans les trois mois antérieurs à la publicité, ou sauf si la publicité indique clairement la date à laquelle l’entreprise pratiquait effectivement cet ancien prix.
Le législateur a considéré que dans sa décision d’achat, le consommateur attachait de l’importance à l’ancien prix.

La loi « consumers legal remedies » (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) : dite loi consacre l’illicéité de diverses méthodes déloyales ou trompeuses, soit avec l’objectif de vendre (biens ou services), soit qui résultent effectivement en une vente (biens ou services). La loi décrit 27 pratiques illicites. L’une de ces pratiques consiste à déclarer de manière fausse ou trompeuse des faits relatifs à l’existence ou au montant d’une réduction de prix. D’autres pratiques consistent notamment à tromper quant à l’origine géographique d’un produit.


Antitrust: Price fixing: Wages


FTC Act §5: Unfair competition: Antitrust: Price fixing (wages or fees paid to workers): Labor law (wages): Human resource:
Illegal for competitors to agree to fix wages or fees paid to workers in order to drive wages down.
FTC
Bureau of Competition
July 31, 2018
Republication
FTC File No. 171-0134

“Just as it is illegal for competitors to agree to fix prices on the products they sell in order to drive prices up, it is illegal for competitors to agree to fix wages or fees paid to workers in order to drive wages down,” said Bruce Hoffman, Director of the Bureau of Competition. “All workers are entitled to competitive wages and the FTC will enforce the antitrust laws against any companies that agree not to compete for workers, or to attempt to drive down workers’ wages. Fortunately, in cooperation with the Texas Attorney General’s office, we were successful in stopping this conduct quite quickly. We will aggressively investigate any other instances in which companies engage in this type of behavior, and we will seek relief commensurate with the conduct, the harm to workers, and—where appropriate—any ill-gotten benefits received by the firms engaged in the illegal activities.”

According to the complaint, the two owners agreed to lower their therapist pay rates to the same level and also invited several of their competitors to lower their rates in an attempt to keep therapists from switching to staffing companies that paid more. The complaint alleges that they entered into the agreement after learning that a home health agency planned to pay significantly lower rates to the therapist staffing companies for therapist services.

The complaint charges Your Therapy Source and the two owners with violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by unreasonably restraining competition to offer competitive pay rates to therapists; fixing or decreasing pay rates for therapists; and depriving therapists of the benefits of competition among therapist staffing companies.

In October 2016, the FTC and the Department of Justice issued Guidance for Human Resource Professionals for tips on how to avoid antitrust risks associated with agreements among competing employers to fix wages. That guidance, which is available on the FTC website, outlines steps businesses can take to comply with the antitrust laws in recruiting and retaining employees.

The FTC will publish the consent agreement package in the Federal Register shortly. The agreement will be subject to public comment for 30 days, beginning today and continuing through Aug. 30, 2018, after which the Commission will decide whether to make the proposed consent order final. Comments can be filed electronically or in paper form by following the instructions in the “Supplementary Information” section of the Federal Register notice.


ANALYSIS OF AGREEMENT CONTAINING
CONSENT ORDER TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT
In the Matter of Your Therapy Source, LLC; Neeraj Jindal; and Sheri Yarbray
FTC File No. 171-0134


FTC and DOJ Release Guidance for Human Resource Professionals on How Antitrust Law Applies to Employee Hiring and Compensation:



Monday, July 30, 2018

Counterfeiting


Customs: Counterfeiting:


Last year, CBP launched a major ad campaign – Fake Goods, Real Dangers – and a companion webpage containing information about the downsides of purchasing counterfeit goods.
CBP also collaborates with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE-HSI) and 21 other partners at the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center to ensure a comprehensive response to intellectual property theft.
If you have information concerning counterfeit merchandise illegally imported into the United States, CBP encourages you to submit an anonymous report through the e-Allegations Online Trade Violation Reporting System.

Republication
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, July 30, 2018

Tuesday, July 24, 2018

OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897


Evidence: Clear and convincing evidence: Preponderance of the evidence:

Clear and convincing evidence requires greater proof than preponderance of the evidence. To meet this higher standard, a party must present sufficient evidence to produce ‘in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that [the asserted factual contentions are] highly probable.’ Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 24, 2018, OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897, J. Clifton, for publication)

Le degré de la preuve en procédure civile fédérale. « Clear and convincing evidence » : les moyens de preuve présentés doivent rendre le fait à prouver « hautement probable ».

OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897


Judgment as a matter of law: Jury: Waiver:

Rule 50 governs the timing of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to Rule 50(a), a “motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). If the court does not grant the motion, Rule 50(b) allows a party to file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after the judgment is entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). But “failing to make a Rule 50(a) motion before the case is submitted to the jury forecloses the possibility of considering a Rule 50(b) motion.” Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009).

Likewise, a “party cannot raise arguments in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) that it did not raise in its pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion.” Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003). Such arguments are also waived for purposes of appeal. See Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1985). In his Rule 50(a) motion, West argued that OTR had failed to prove that West removed the Outrigger mark from tires in commerce. West did not mention Dastar or the likelihood of confusion. Thus, these arguments would normally be waived.

But if a party fails to object to a Rule 50(b) motion on the basis of waiver, then the party waives its waiver defense. Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Where a defendant does not object to an improperly-filed Rule 50(b) motion, and does not raise the issue of default for failure to abide Rule 50(a) before the trial court, then the procedural flaw in the Rule 50(b) motion is waived . . . .”)


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 24, 2018, OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897, J. Clifton, for publication)


Règle 50 de procédure civile fédérale : la requête en jugement « as a matter of law » peut être déposée en tout temps, mais avant que le cas ne soit soumis au Jury (Règle 50(a)). Si la cour rejette la requête, la partie peut la renouveler après jugement (Règle 50(b)). Mais si la requête n’a pas été déposée avant soumission du cas au Jury, la partie ne pourra pas la déposer après jugement.
Par ailleurs, le requérant ne peut rien alléguer/invoquer dans sa requête 50(b) qui n’ait pas été allégué/invoqué dans sa requête 50(a). Mais si la partie adverse omet de se prévaloir d’une requête 50(b) qui contient des éléments étrangers à la requête 50(a), la cour ne relèvera pas le défaut d’office et une décision sera rendue s’agissant de ces éléments.

OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897


Trademark: Registration requirement: Trade dress:

If a trademark is not registered, then a plaintiff may still assert a claim for infringement of its protectable trade dress right, but that plaintiff bears the burden to establish distinctiveness and non-functionality. Talking Rain, 349 F.3d at 603. Thus, if a mark is cancelled, a claim for infringement may still be pursued based on an unregistered mark. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation for State of Cal. v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir.2001)). In other words, fraud on the PTO “does not affect the mark’s validity, because a trademark need not be registered to be enforceable.” Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Industries, LP, 616 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2010); cf. J. Thomas McCarthy, 6 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 31:60 (5th ed. 2018). Thus, if a defendant establishes that a mark was obtained through fraud on the PTO, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish distinctiveness and non-functionality. See Tie Tech, 296 F.3d at 783; see also Talking Rain, 349 F.3d at 603. The plaintiff always maintains the burden to establish consumer confusion.

(…) OTR argues that it pled an unregistered trade dress claim by asserting a claim under section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125. It was not enough to simply cite section 43, however, because that section covers both registered and unregistered marks. GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The provision at issue here—§ 43—protects against infringement of unregistered marks and trade dress as well as registered marks.” (citing Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.1998)). OTR’s reference to section 43 did not by itself signal an unregistered trade dress claim.

(…) We pause to note that OTR’s unregistered claim was only precluded to the extent that it asserted a broader claim than the registered claim. As noted above, registration only provides a presumption of validity, shifting the burden to the defendant to rebut either distinctiveness or non-functionality. Tie Tech, 296 F.3d at 783. If a registration is cancelled, for example, due to fraud on the PTO, then the claim survives but becomes more difficult to prove. See Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d at 1131. Perhaps appreciating that fact, OTR argues that its unregistered claim encompassed “something more” than what was covered by the registered claim. OTR describes that “something more” as the OTR tire’s “overall appearance, including the sidewall and its relationship to the road.” To assert this broader claim, however, OTR was required to clearly plead the claim in the complaint, and it did not.

Secondary sources: J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 31:60 (5th ed. 2018).


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 24, 2018, OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897, J. Clifton, for publication)

Droit des marques. Trade dress (terme juridique qui se rapporte à des caractéristiques de l'aspect visuel d'un produit ou de son emballage, donnant une indication de l'origine du produit aux consommateurs). Une action en violation de la marque peut être déposée même si elle n’est pas enregistrée, ou peut être maintenue même si l’enregistrement est annulé. Il en va de même en cas d’action en violation de la présentation (protégée) du produit associé à la marque (trade dress). 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Section 43 du Lanham Act) (false designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden), peut être invoqué que la marque soit ou non enregistrée.
L’action en violation d’une marque qui n’est pas enregistrée pose davantage de problèmes de preuve que dans le cas d’une marque enregistrée. Le sachant, le demandeur dans l’action en violation d’une marque enregistrée doit veiller à alléguer la violation de l’ensemble des caractères liés à la marque, même ceux qui ne ressortent pas de l’enregistrement : de la sorte, si l’enregistrement est considéré comme invalide, le demandeur aura maintenu la possibilité d’alléguer la violation des caractéristiques qui exorbitent l’enregistrement.


Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182


Tortious interference with business relations: Prospective economic advantage:

The essential elements of tortious interference with business relations or prospective economic advantage are: (1) an intentional act or conduct by the alleged tortfeasor; (2) performed by the tortfeasor “without right or justifiable cause”; (3) performed for the purpose of causing damage or loss to another; and (4) resulting damages. Maloney v. Home & Inv. Ctr., Inc., 2000 MT 34, ¶ 41, 298 Mont. 213, 994 P.2d 1124 (distinguishing tortious interference with contractual relations). Here, as correctly concluded by the District Court, AMS acted lawfully within its contract rights regarding TimeTracker and did not impede or interfere with Ruff’s ability to independently market TimeTracker, either to existing AMS clients or to new clients.


(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018, Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182, J. Sandefur)


Affaire jugée en application du droit de l’état du Montana.

Notion d’ingérence illicite dans les relations d’affaire d’un tiers, dans le but de lui porter préjudice, et lui causant effectivement un dommage.

Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182


Unjust enrichment: Restitution: Constructive trust: Equitable disgorgement of resulting profits: Equitable remedy:


A constructive trust is an equitable remedy applicable when “a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that the person holding title would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.” Section 72-33-123, MCA. Thus, rather than a predicate claim for relief, a constructive trust is generally an equitable remedy available upon proof of an unjust enrichment claim. See § 72-33-123, MCA. Accord, Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 3 cmt. a (discussing equitable disgorgement of resulting profits as another remedy for an unjust enrichment claim involving “conscious wrongdoing”).

(…) But see Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 1 cmt. c (noting limitations and inflexibility of overly simplified elemental formulation of unjust enrichment). Compare N. Cheyenne Tribe, (unjust enrichment claim for constructive trust lies only where “no other remedy exists”), with Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 4(2) (unjust enrichment claims “need not demonstrate the inadequacy of available remedies at law”); Davis v. Westphal, 2017 MT 276, ¶ 18, 389 Mont. 251, 405 P.3d 73 (“modern merger of law and equity . . . equitable defenses, and even affirmative relief, may be available, as equitable, to counter or ameliorate a common law” claim).

(…) Unjust enrichment no longer requires proof of a wrongful act or conduct. N. Cheyenne Tribe, ¶¶ 30-35 and 39 (noting statutory abandonment of former requirement for proof of a wrongful act or conduct as a prerequisite for a constructive trust). Accord Volk, ¶¶ 45 and 50 (affirming imposition of constructive trust where defendant “has done nothing wrong”); Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 1 cmt. f.

(…) Nonetheless, “a valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment.” Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 2(2). Accord Welu v. Twin Hearts Smiling Horses, Inc., 2016 MT 347, ¶ 36, 386 Mont. 98, 386 P.3d 937 (unjust enrichment inapplicable where matter at issue governed by an enforceable contract); Pruyn, ¶ 63 (unjust enrichment “is an obligation created by law in the absence of an agreement between the parties”).


(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018, Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182, J. Sandefur)



La présente affaire est jugée en application du droit de l’état du Montana.

En cas de détention illicite d’un bien par un tiers, la requête en restitution peut conclure au prononcé par le juge de la constitution d’un « constructive trust », qui met le bien sous protection en le séparant du patrimoine du possesseur illicite. Il s’agit d’un remède équitable, distinct de l’action en dommages-intérêts, et qui suppose la preuve de l’enrichissement illégitime. Par ailleurs, les profits acquis du fait de la possession illicite peuvent être récupérés par le biais de la conclusion en « disgorgement of resulting profits ». Il s’agit également d’une conclusion en équité, qui suppose la conscience de l’illicéité. Pour sa part, l’action en enrichissement illégitime et en constitution d’un « constructive trust » ne sont pas subordonnées à faute.

La jurisprudence a parfois considéré que la conclusion en « constructive trust » n’était recevable que si le demandeur ne disposait d’aucun autre type d’action (i.e. condamnatoire), contrairement à ce que prévoit le Restatement (Third) of Restitution.

En tous les cas, si une action contractuelle est possible, l’action en enrichissement illégitime est irrecevable.


OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897


Trademark: Designation of origin: Passing off: Reverse passing off: Trade dress: Confusion: Competition law: Consumer law: Packaging: Design: Copyright:


(…) OTR sells tires for industrial use. One of OTR’s products is a tire called the “Outrigger.” OTR obtained a registered trademark on the Outrigger name and a registered trade dress on the Outrigger tire tread design.

OTR Wheel and Samuel West are competitors in the business of selling industrial tires. West asked one of OTR’s suppliers to provide him with sample tires from OTR’s molds, and he asked the supplier to remove OTR’s identifying information from the tires. West wanted to use the tires to obtain business from one of OTR’s customers. OTR sued West, asserting various claims under the Lanham Act and state law.

(…) The primary issue before us is whether West can be found liable for reverse passing off under the Lanham Act. (…) (False Designation of Origin: Reverse Passing Off) (…) Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), a claim for reverse passing off cannot be brought to prevent the copying of intellectual property. We conclude that West did not simply copy OTR’s intellectual property but passed off genuine OTR products as his own, so we affirm the judgment holding him liable for reverse passing off ((…) The jury could therefore conclude that the development tires were taken from part of an anticipated OTR (Solideal) order and were genuine OTR products, not just copies).

(…) The panel affirmed the district court’s rejection of a proposed jury instruction asserting a claim for infringement of an unregistered trade dress. The panel explained that a registered claim converts to an unregistered claim if the registration is invalidated; thus, a plaintiff does not need to separately plead the identical unregistered claim. But where the unregistered claim would cover something more than the registered claim, a plaintiff must put a defendant on notice of such through the pleadings.

The Lanham Act prohibits conduct that would confuse consumers as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services. See Slep-Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Wired for Sound Karaoke & DJ Servs., LLC, 845 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2017); see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001). To prevent consumer confusion, the Act allows the producers of goods and services to enforce trademark rights. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209–10 (2000). A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device. . . used or intended to be used to identify and distinguish goods from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. In addition, the Lanham Act protects more than words and symbols. It also protects a product’s “trade dress,” which includes the packaging, dressing, and design of a product. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 28; Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209.

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits a person from using “in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device. . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin. . . of his or her goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The term “origin” in section 43(a) lends itself to two causes of action for “passing off” based on false designation of origin: passing off and reverse passing off. “Passing off . . . occurs when a producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s. ‘Reverse passing off,’ as its name implies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as his own.” Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27 n.1.

(…) In Dastar, the Supreme Court explained that the term “origin” in section 43 “refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.” Id. at 37. Thus, a reverse passing off claim cannot be brought to prevent the copying of intellectual property. Copying is dealt with through the copyright and patent laws, not through trademark law. Id. At 33–34.

(…) To prove a claim under section 43(a), a plaintiff must establish a likelihood of consumer confusion. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992). Thus, in order to prevail on its claim for reverse passing off, OTR was required to prove that consumers would likely be confused as to the origin of Outrigger tires that had their identifying information removed. The likelihood of confusion inquiry “generally considers whether a reasonably prudent consumer in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin or source of the goods or services.” Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir.2012). Thus, the jury had to determine whether a hypothetical consumer would likely be confused. Evidence of actual confusion was not required. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011). The jury was shown pictures of an OTR production tire and the West development tire. Comparing the two tires, a reasonable jury could conclude that consumers would be confused by tires that lack the identifying information.


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 24, 2018, OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897, J. Clifton)


1 ) Trade dress : terme juridique qui se rapporte à des caractéristiques de l'aspect visuel d'un produit ou de son emballage, donnant une indication de l'origine du produit aux consommateurs. Trade dress peut être enregistré, comme une marque (ici une partie du design d’un pneu).
2 ) Les bases légales des actions en violation du droit à la marque. Le Lanham Act ne protège pas que la marque comprise comme combinaison de mots et de symboles. Il protège aussi le « trade dress » du produit, notion qui inclut le « packaging », le « dressing » et le design du produit.
3 ) Un exemple de « reverse passing off ». Notions et bases légales de « passing off » et de « reverse passing off » : ces concepts juridiques visent à combattre la confusion portant sur l’origine d’un produit.
4 ) Notion de confusion du consommateur.
5 ) Si dans la procédure en violation du droit à la marque l’enregistrement de celle-ci est déclaré invalide, la procédure peut se poursuivre, la marque dont la violation est alléguée n’étant plus considérée comme enregistrée. Le demandeur ne pourra cependant faire valoir que les allégués et les moyens de droit qui découlent de ses mémoires.

Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182


Misappropriation of intellectual property: Infringement: Conversion: Common law: Trade secret:
Montana Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA)

The essential elements of common law conversion are: (1) a claimant’s right of possession or control over the subject personal property; (2) the intentional exercise of possession or control over the property by another inconsistent with the right of the owner and without right or consent; and (3) resulting damages to the claimant. Gebhardt v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 203 Mont. 384, 389, 661 P.2d 855, 858 (1983).

Apart from conversion, the common law further recognizes two related but distinct theories of misappropriation of intellectual property―contract-based misappropriation and property right-based tortious misappropriation. See Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097-98 (N.Y. 1993) (distinguishing breach of non-disclosure agreement, contract misappropriation of intellectual property, and tortious misappropriation of property right-based intellectual property). Accord Nadel v. Play-by-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 374-78 (2nd Cir. 2000) (construing Apfel).

As a specialized variant of a breach of contract theory, the elements of a claim for contract misappropriation of intellectual property are: (1) an agreement for one to communicate an idea or knowledge to another in return for valuable consideration; (2) the idea or knowledge had value to the recipient at the time of contract formation regardless of whether “grossly unequal” or of “dubious value” in relation to the consideration paid or provided in return; (3) the recipient breached the agreement; and (4) resulting damages to the claimant based on breaching party’s beneficial use of the idea or knowledge. See Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1097-98 (emphasizing freedom of contract and subjective assessment of value). Accord Nadel, 208 F.3d at 376-80. While a truly novel idea or knowledge is presumed to be of value to a recipient who paid or pledged valuable consideration to acquire it, an idea or knowledge need not be truly original or novel to be of value to a recipient as a matter of contract consideration. Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1098.

The essential elements of a property rights-based claim for tortious misappropriation of intellectual property are: (1) an idea was communicated by the claimant to another in confidence; (2) the idea was novel and original; (3) the recipient used the idea to the recipient’s benefit; and (4) resulting damages to the claimant based on the tortfeasor’s beneficial use of the idea or knowledge. See Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1097-98; Alevizos v. John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Found., 764 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla. App. 1999). An idea may give rise to a cognizable property right or interest only if novel and original. Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1098; Paul v. Haley, 588 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (idea that is not novel is not cognizable as property and thus cannot be misappropriated or stolen); Downey v. Gen. Foods Corp., 286 N.E.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. 1972) (ideas are cognizable and protectable as property rights only if novel and original).

In contrast to the common law protection of intellectual property, MUTSA defines the term “trade secret” as any “information or computer software, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (a) derives independent economic value . . . from not being generally known. . . [or] readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. Section 30-14-402(4), MCA. In pertinent part, MUTSA defines actionable “misappropriation” of a trade secret as the “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who . . . used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret.” Section 30-14-402(2)(b)(i), MCA. As used in § 30-14-402(2)(b)(i), MCA, and as pertinent here, “improper means” includes theft, misrepresentation, or breach of a duty to maintain secrecy.


(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018, Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182, J. Sandefur)


Une violation des droits de propriété intellectuelle peut être reconnue si sont réunies alternativement les conditions de :
1 ) la théorie de la « conversion »,
2 ) la théorie de l’appropriation illicite basée sur un contrat,
3 ) la théorie de l’appropriation illicite extracontractuelle.
(Théories à distinguer de la violation d’une clause de confidentialité).

1 ) La notion de « conversion » provient de la Common law et suppose une prise intentionnelle de contrôle ou de possession illicite, par un tiers, d’un droit de propriété du lésé, provoquant un dommage.
2 ) La notion d’appropriation illicite basée sur un contrat provient de la Common law et suppose la transmission conventionnelle d’idées ou de connaissances moyennant contre-prestation (« consideration »), le bénéficiaire de la communication violant par la suite le contrat, par exemple en divulguant à des tiers ce qui lui a été communiqué, causant ainsi un dommage à son cocontractant. L’idée ou les connaissances doivent avoir une certaine valeur pour celui qui les reçoit. L’idée ou les connaissances n’ont pas nécessairement à être nouvelles ou originales.
3 ) La notion d’appropriation illicite extracontractuelle provient elle-aussi de la Common law et suppose la transmission confidentielle à un tiers d’une idée ou de connaissances nouvelles et originales, le tiers violant par la suite la confidentialité en utilisant à son profit l’idée ou la connaissance et causant ainsi un dommage.

En plus de ces théories de la Common law protégeant la propriété intellectuelle, peut s’appliquer la loi (ici de l’état du Montana) protégeant les secrets d’affaires (ce type de lois découle d’une loi uniforme et se retrouve dans d’autres états).



Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182


Copyright and Common law-protected ideas:

Apart from conversion, the common law further recognizes two related but distinct theories of misappropriation of intellectual property―contract-based misappropriation and property right-based tortious misappropriation. See Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097-98 (N.Y. 1993) (distinguishing breach of non-disclosure agreement, contract misappropriation of intellectual property, and tortious misappropriation of property right-based intellectual property). Accord Nadel v. Play-by-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 374-78 (2nd Cir. 2000) (construing Apfel).

See also Paul v. Haley, 588 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (distinguishing common law-protected ideas from federal law-copyrightable expressions of ideas).


(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018, Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182, J. Sandefur)


Distinction entre la protection fédérale conférée à l’expression d’une idée par le mécanisme du copyright, et la protection conférée par la Common law à certaines idées.

Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182


Representation: Agent: CEO: Board of directors: Licensing agreement:
Actual authority: Ostensible authority: Ratification: Equitable estoppel:

(…) AMS nonetheless asserts that the 2008 licensing agreement is invalid or unenforceable due to lack of mutual assent on the ground that Diane Ruff executed the agreement in an agency capacity without authorization of AMS’s board of directors.

Agency is “the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another” that the agent shall act on behalf of the principal subject to the principal’s control and consent. Butler Mfg. Co. v. J & L Implement Co., 167 Mont. 519, 523, 540 P.2d 962, 965 (1975). See also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006); § 28-10-101, MCA (agent is one who represents another in dealings with third parties).

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a principal may authorize an agent to perform any act that the principal may lawfully perform. Section 28-10-105, MCA. A principal may create an agency relationship by prior authorization or subsequent ratification of the representative acts of another. Section 28-10-201, MCA.

An agent has the authority actually or ostensibly conferred upon the agent by the principal. Section 28-10-401, MCA. Actual authority is authority that a principal either “intentionally confers” upon the agent or intentionally or negligently “allows the agent to believe the agent possesses.” Section 28-10-402, MCA. Ostensible authority is authority that a principal intentionally or negligently “allows a third person to believe the agent possesses.” Section 28-10-403, MCA. A principal may confer actual or ostensible authority upon an agent by express authorization or circumstantial implication. Freeman v. Withers, 104 Mont. 166, 172, 65 P.2d 601, 603 (1937). An actual or ostensible agent has implied authority to “do everything necessary, proper, and usual in the ordinary course” of the principal’s business “for effecting the purpose of the agency.” Section 28-10-405(1), MCA. A disclosed principal is liable in contract to third parties for the representative acts of an agent within the scope of the actual or ostensible authority conferred on the agent by the principal. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.01; see also §§ 28-10-401 and -405, MCA. Accordingly, unless otherwise “specially restricted” by board directive or bylaw, “a general or managing officer or agent” of a corporation has actual or ostensible authority to “enter into any contract which is usual, proper, or necessary . . . in the ordinary transaction of the company’s business.” Audit Servs., Inc. v. Elmo Rd. Corp., 175 Mont. 533, 536, 575 P.2d 77, 79 (1978).

Here, it is beyond genuine material dispute on the Rule 56 record that, at all times pertinent, Diane Ruff was the chief executive officer of AMS with general authority to act on behalf of the corporation within the broad scope of AMS’s ordinary course of business. AMS was engaged in the business of, inter alia, providing payroll recordkeeping and processing services to its clients, including but not limited to the acquisition of software necessary or helpful to that end. It is beyond genuine material dispute on the Rule 56 record that the 2008 licensing agreement and its subject matter were within the scope of the ordinary course of AMS’s business.

AMS’s corporate counsel drafted the licensing agreement for Diane Ruff’s signature in the name of the corporation. AMS made no affirmative factual showing disputing Diane’s authority to enter into the licensing agreement without prior authorization of the AMS board. AMS made no affirmative factual showing that Diane had any reason to believe that either the initial informal agreement or the subsequent licensing agreement was outside the scope of her authority as the chief executive officer of AMS. AMS further made no affirmative factual showing that Daniel had any non-speculative reason to believe that Diane was not authorized to enter into the development and licensing agreements or that Diane actively or intentionally concealed the existence and terms of the licensing agreement from the AMS board. The mere facts that Diane and Daniel were mother and son and that the AMS board was not formally or specifically aware of the licensing agreement until the new AMS executive director raised “concerns” about it in 2013 after Diane left the company are insufficient without more to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Diane was acting outside the scope of her actual or ostensible authority when she executed the licensing agreement seven years earlier. On the Rule 56 record presented, we hold that Ruff was entitled to judgment that Diane executed the 2008 licensing agreement within the scope of her actual and ostensible authority as the chief executive officer of AMS.

The District Court alternatively ruled that, even if arguendo Diane had executed the licensing agreement outside the scope of her actual or ostensible authority, AMS nonetheless ratified the agreement after she left the company. A principal may create an agency relationship by subsequent ratification of the representative acts of another. Section 28-10-201, MCA. “A contract which is voidable solely for want of due consent may be ratified by a subsequent consent.” Section 28-2-304, MCA. Ratification is the affirmative confirmation of a prior act. Erler v. Creative Fin. & Inv., 2009 MT 36, ¶¶ 25-26, 349 Mont. 207, 203 P.3d 744. A principal with knowledge of the material facts may ratify a prior unauthorized act or transaction by express declaration or implicitly by acts, statements, or conduct which reasonably manifests an intent to affirm or be bound by the act. Erler, ¶¶ 25-26; Freeman, 104 Mont. at 172, 65 P.2d at 603. Thus, a principal may ratify an unauthorized act by “knowingly accepting or retaining the benefit of the act.” Section 28-10-211, MCA.

(…) Ratification rests, inter alia, upon the principle of equitable estoppel and “the duty of the principal to repudiate” an unauthorized act of an agent “within a reasonable time after discovery.” Larson, 61 Mont. at 9, 201 P. at 687. See also Butler Mfg. Co., 167 Mont. at 526, 540 P.2d at 966 (duty to repudiate or disavow unauthorized act of agent immediately upon discovery). Thus, a principal with knowledge who acquiesces and affirmatively performs or pays on a previously unauthorized but otherwise lawful and beneficial act of a previously established agent is equitably estopped from later asserting that the act was unauthorized ab initio.


(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018, Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182, J. Sandefur)


Cette affaire est jugée en application du droit de l’état du Montana.
Etendue des pouvoirs de représentation d’un directeur général : ce directeur engage la société si son acte est expressément autorisé par le conseil d’administration, si le conseil laisse croire par négligence que l’acte est autorisé, ou s’il est ratifié par dit conseil. Le directeur général engage également la société si son acte pouvait raisonnablement être compris par un tiers comme étant autorisé par le conseil. Quant à elle, la ratification peut être expresse ou par actes concluants (par exemple en conservant les bénéfices découlant de l’acte non autorisé). S’agissant de la ratification, il y a plus : la notion de ratification est liée au principe d’ « equitable estoppel » ainsi qu’au devoir du représenté de répudier l’acte non autorisé dans un délai raisonnable après sa découverte. De la sorte, un représenté qui ne répudie pas peut être « equitably estopped » d’alléguer valablement que le représentant a excédé ses pouvoirs.
A défaut de directive contraire du conseil ou de norme statutaire contraire, le directeur dispose de la compétence de conclure tous les types de contrats usuels, ou appropriés, ou nécessaires à la réalisation du but social.
Est en l’espèce discutée la question de la validité d’un contrat de licence conclu par la CEO pour le compte de son entreprise, active dans la fourniture de services digitaux liés à la tenue de dossiers de ressources humaines. Le contrat de licence portait sur un software utile à la réalisation du but social, de sorte que la directrice disposait de la compétence de signer ce contrat au nom de la société. En outre, le contrat de licence avait été rédigé par le service juridique interne de l’entreprise. Dite entreprise n’a nullement contesté l’autorité de sa directrice de signer, et celle-ci n’avait aucune raison de penser qu’elle n’en avait pas la compétence. Et l’autre partie au contrat de licence n’avait aucune raison de penser que la directrice aurait été dépourvue de l’autorité de signer au nom de l’entreprise, ni de penser que la directrice aurait caché au conseil d’administration l’existence et les termes du contrat. Le fait qu’en l’espèce la directrice et l’autre partie au contrat de licence étaient mère et fils n’était en soi pas suffisant pour nier le pouvoir de représentation de la directrice. Aucun conflit d’intérêt n’a été démontré, s’agissant d’une transaction conforme aux conditions du marché.