California Court of Appeal, Carrillo v. County of Santa Clara, Docket No. B322810

Statute of Limitations

 

Demurrer Without Leave to Amend

 

Civil Procedure

 

Suit Brought Against a Public Entity

 

Accrual of a Cause of Action

 

Discovery Rule

 

Delayed Discovery Exception

 

Medical Malpractice

 

California Law

 

 

 

Appellant Emilio Carrillo appeals from a judgment of dismissal of his medical negligence claim against respondent County of Santa Clara after the trial court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend on statute of limitations grounds. We affirm.

 

 

On July 12, 2019, the County demurred to Carrillo’s FAC. The County argued that Carrillo’s medical negligence claim was time-barred, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 (MICRA),1which provides that a plaintiff must file suit “within three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) Because Carrillo’s foot was amputated on December 20, 2017, the County argued he was required to file suit no later than December 20, 2018, making his January 18, 2019, complaint untimely.

 

 

1 MICRA is the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act. (Anson v. County of Merced (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1199 (Anson).)

 

 

The County also argued that MICRA’s one-year limitations period was not extended by Government Code section 945.6 (the Government Claims Act), which provides that “any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a pre-filing claim is required to be presented” to the public entity must be filed within six months after the public entity’s rejection of the claim. The County argued that, for his claim against the County to be timely, Carrillo was required to satisfy the deadlines in both statutes.

 

 

Except in circumstances inapplicable here, “any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented” must be brought within six months after the County’s rejection of the claim. (Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) Additionally, under MICRA, a plaintiff alleging medical negligence must file suit within “three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) As to the one-year limitations period, MICRA “sets forth two alternate tests for triggering the limitations period: (1) a subjective test requiring actual suspicion by the plaintiff that the injury was caused by wrongdoing; and (2) an objective test requiring a showing that a reasonable person would have suspected the injury was caused by wrongdoing.” (Kitzig v. Nordquist (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1384,1391.)

 

 

(…) We hold that, here, where both section 945.6 and MICRA apply, Carrillo was obligated to meet the deadlines set forth in both statutes.

 

 

Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, supra, 35 Cal.4th 797 at 806). The “discovery rule” is an exception to this general rule and postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. (Id. at 807.) To rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, a plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. (Id. at 808.) In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the burden on the plaintiff to show diligence. (Ibid.) Conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer. (Ibid.)

 

 

(…) Because Carrillo filed his suit more than a year after his amputation, the trial court did not err in sustaining the County’s demurrer on statute of limitations grounds.

 

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, March 13, 2023, Carrillo v. County of Santa Clara, Docket No. B322810, Certified for Publication)

Supreme Court of Texas, Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services of Nevada, Inc. v. Triex Texas Holdings, LLC, Docket No. 21-0913

Statute of Limitations

 

Accrual and Limitations

 

Tolling

 

Discovery Rule

 

Fraudulent Concealment Distinguished from the Discovery Rule

 

Fraud Distinguished from the Discovery Rule

 

Equitable Estoppel

 

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

 

Texas Law

 

 

 

 

A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty generally accrues, and limitations begins to run, when the claimant knows or should know of the wrongful injury. See Berry v. Berry, 646 S.W.3d 516, 525-26 (Tex. 2022). The court of appeals held that the discovery rule delays accrual and limitations until the claimant also knows of the wrongful acts and actors, without requiring the plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence. 2021 WL 4318406 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 23, 2021). Because that holding conflicts with the established rule, and because respondents’ actions for fraud and conspiracy are also barred by limitations, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s summary judgment for respondents.

 

 

Taylor’s and Dorris’s deposition testimony caused Triex to suspect that Marcus & Millichap misrepresented the sale to Triex by omitting key details about the nature of the lease and overvaluing the property in order to raise its commission. As a result, Triex added Marcus & Millichap to the lawsuit in March 2017—more than four years after Taylor Petroleum breached the lease and more than eight years after Marcus & Millichap brokered the sale. In its amended petition, Triex asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud by nondisclosure, and conspiracy.

 

 

Actions for breach of fiduciary duty are governed by a four-year statute of limitations.1 TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.004(a)(5). Generally, a claim accrues when the defendant’s wrongful conduct causes the claimant to suffer a legal injury. Am. Star Energy & Mins. Corp. v. Stowers, 457 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex. 2015). This is true “even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred.” S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996).

 

 

1 Triex’s claims for fraud and civil conspiracy also have a four-year limitations period. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.004(a)(4); see Agar Corp. v. Electro Cirs. Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. 2019) (holding that “civil conspiracy . . . shares a limitations period with that of its underlying tort”). “Generally, in a case of fraud the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the fraud is discovered or until it might have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1997). Like its breach of fiduciary duty claim, Triex based its fraud claim on allegations that Marcus & Millichap failed to disclose certain information despite its duty to do so. Accordingly, we apply the same analysis to all three claims.

 

 

The discovery rule is a “narrow exception” to the legal injury rule that “defers accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996)). It “applies when the injury is by its nature inherently undiscoverable.” Agar Corp., 580 S.W.3d at 139 (citing Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Tex. 1998)). “An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it is by nature unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 25). “The determination of whether an injury is inherently undiscoverable is made on a categorical basis rather than on the facts of the individual case.” Archer v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d 281, 290 (Tex. 2018) (citing HECI Expl. Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998)). The question is whether the injury is “the type of injury that could be discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex. 2011) (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734-35 (Tex. 2001)). We have held that “in the fiduciary context, . . . the nature of the injury is presumed to be inherently undiscoverable” because “fiduciaries are presumed to possess superior knowledge.” Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456. So “a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed may be unable to inquire into the fiduciary’s actions or may be unaware of the need to do so.” Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 231 (Tex. 2015). Accordingly, “even if inquiry is made, ‘facts which might ordinarily require investigation likely may not excite suspicion where a fiduciary relationship is involved.’” Id. (quoting Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988)). Here the discovery rule applies, but it does not save Triex’s claims. The rule applies because a fiduciary relationship existed, and before Taylor Petroleum’s breach, Triex was unaware of the need to inquire into its fiduciary’s actions. See S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 8 (explaining that the rationale for finding a fiduciary’s misconduct to be inherently undiscoverable is that “a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed is either unable to inquire into the fiduciary’s actions or unaware of the need to do so”). When the discovery rule applies, the statute of limitations does not begin to run “until the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the wrongful act and resulting injury.” Id. at 4. We have stated this rule in slightly different ways. But last Term, we explained that this means the discovery rule defers accrual “until the claimant knew or should have known of facts that in the exercise of reasonable diligence would have led to the discovery of the wrongful act.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420). Or, in other words, accrual is deferred “until the plaintiff knew, or exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. (quoting Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 455). Consistent throughout our cases is the requirement of reasonable diligence. We have also explained that “the discovery rule does not linger until a claimant learns of actual causes and possible cures.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Hous. Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. 2004); see also KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. 1999). Nor does it defer accrual until the plaintiff knows “the specific nature of each wrongful act that may have caused the injury,”KPMG, 988 S.W.2d at 749, or “the exact identity of the wrongdoer.” Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 40; see also PPG Indus., 146 S.W.3d at 93.

 

 

In 2012, Triex had actual knowledge of its injuries and became aware of the need to inquire into Marcus & Millichap’s actions. The court of appeals concluded that “the evidence conclusively established that appellants were aware that they had sustained an injury by December 1, 2012,” the date Taylor Petroleum defaulted. 2021 WL 4318406, at *4. But it determined that a fact issue existed as to whether Triex “knew or should have known on December 1, 2012, that the injury was the result of wrongful acts committed by Marcus & Millichap.” Id. The court of appeals came to this conclusion by “relieving Triex of the responsibility of diligent inquiry” because of its fiduciary relationship with Marcus & Millichap. Id. at *3. But as we reiterated last Term, “those owed a fiduciary duty are not altogether absolved of the usual obligation to use reasonable diligence to discover an injury.”Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 526 (citing Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420); see also Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456. Recognizing that “the presence of a fiduciary relationship can affect application of the discovery rule,” we explained that “it remains the case that ‘a person owed a fiduciary duty has some responsibility to ascertain when an injury occurs.’ ‘When the fact of misconduct becomes apparent it can no longer be ignored, regardless of the nature of the relationship.’” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456, then quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 8). Had Triex exercised reasonable diligence, it would have discovered Marcus & Millichap’s allegedly wrongful acts. See Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420. Part of Triex’s claim against Marcus & Millichap is that it misrepresented that “this was a sure-fire and financially sound investment,” and that “rent would be coming in every month without any issues or risk.” When Taylor Petroleum defaulted on the lease, Triex “knew or should have known that something was amiss.” See Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 525. Indeed, Weiner’s affidavit in response to the summary judgment motion admitted that at the time of the breach, he knew Marcus & Millichap did a “poor job” of representing him. His awareness of his injury and of Marcus & Millichap’s poor representation “obligated him to make further inquiry on his own if he wanted to preserve a timely claim.” Id. Instead, Triex waited three years to sue the initial defendants, and an additional year to take depositions (…)

 

 

(…) (Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 455). But in that case, we explained that although fraudulent concealment is “similar in effect” to the discovery rule, it is a different doctrine that exists for different reasons: “Unlike the discovery rule exception, deferral in the context of fraud or concealment resembles equitable estoppel. ‘Fraudulent concealment estops the defendant from relying on the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to the plaintiff’s claim.’” Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456 (alterations in original) (quoting Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983)); see also Wagner & Brown, 58 S.W.3d at 736 (distinguishing fraudulent concealment from the discovery rule); Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 93 (collecting cases).

 

 

 

(Supreme Court of Texas, Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services of Nevada, Inc. v. Triex Texas Holdings, LLC, Jan. 13, 2023, Docket No. 21-0913, Per Curiam)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc., Docket No. 18-1075

Trade Secrets

Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), 18 U.S.C. § 1836

Iowa Trade Secrets Law, Iowa Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), Iowa Code § 550

Statute of Limitations

Discovery Rule

Conversion ("Civil Equivalent" to Theft)

Unjust Enrichment

In Equity v. at Law

Equitable Claim

Iowa Law

Statutory Causes of Action

The DTSA creates a private right of action for an owner of a trade secret when that secret has been misappropriated, if the secret relates to a product used in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1836. Trade secrets include, as relevant here, "scientific, technical . . . engineering information, including patterns, plans, . . . designs." Id. § 1839(3). However such information only qualifies as a trade secret if the owner has "taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret" and the information has economic value. Id. § 1839(3). "Misappropriation" essentially means to acquire the trade secret of another by improper means and without the owner's consent. Id. § 1839(5)-(6). The UTSA is similar and both statutes have a three-year statute of limitations for bringing a claim for trade secret misappropriation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d); Iowa Code § 550.8.

The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until such time as the injured person knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, the fact and cause of the injury. Woodroffe v. Hasenclever, 540 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1995). The rule extends when the plaintiff "first becomes aware of facts that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to begin seeking information as to the problem and its cause." Estate of Montag v. T H Agric. & Nutrition Co., 509 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa 1993). The ultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed. Franzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1985). Once a plaintiff is on inquiry notice, he is charged with knowledge that a reasonably diligent investigation would have disclosed, and has a duty to do such an investigation, regardless of the plaintiff's exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49. The plaintiff need only know a problem exists. Id. While this can be an issue for the factfinder, it is not always so. See, e.g., Shams v. Hassan, 905 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Iowa 2017) (holding that this inquiry can be one for the factfinder "unless the issue is so clear it can be resolved as a matter of law"). While Iowa Parts has the burden of proving the statute of limitations bars the action, CMI Roadbuilding has the burden of proving the discovery rule tolls application of the statutory bar. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc. v. Acorn Window Sys., Inc., 394 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2005).

(…) Application of the inquiry notice portion of the discovery rule. As stated above, the ultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed. Franzen, 377 N.W.2d at 662.

(…) At the point it was on notice there was a possible problem, it had a duty to investigate, regardless of its exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49.

Unjust Enrichment

Equitable Claim

Even if the unjust enrichment claim was not time-barred, which it likely was, see Iowa Code § 614.1(4), Iowa Parts was entitled to summary judgment because an equitable claim fails when there is an adequate remedy at law. Where a party seeks damages pursuant to both a statutory and an equitable claim, the very existence of the statutory claims bars recovery on the equitable claim, "even if recovery under the statutes is time-barred." United States v. Bame, 721 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2013).

(…) Indeed, Iowa law recognizes that "equity generally will not provide relief where an adequate remedy at law existed and defendant was denied that relief for appropriate legal reasons." Mosebach v. Blythe, 282 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979). See also State ex rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154 n.2 (Iowa 2001) ("The adequacy of a legal remedy is a general limitation on the exercise of equity jurisdiction . . . .").

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, April 4, 2019, CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc., Docket No. 18-1075)

SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, Docket 15-927

Laches: Patent: Equity: Claim accrual: Cause of action: Statute of limitations: Estoppel: Discovery rule:

The issue: the relationship between the equitable defense of laches and claims for damages that are brought within the time allowed by a statute of limitations.

In Petrella (Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. ___ (2014)), we held that laches cannot preclude a claim for damages incurred within the Copyright Act’s 3-year limitations period. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 1). “Laches,” we explained, “cannot be invoked to bar legal relief ” “in the face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13). The question in this case is whether Petrella’s reason­ing applies to a similar provision of the Patent Act, 35

U. S. C. §286. We hold that it does.

Laches is “a defense developed by courts of equity” to protect defendants against “unreasonable, prejudicial delay in commencing suit.” Petrella, supra, at ___, ___ (slip op., at 1, 12). See also D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §2.3(5), p. 89 (2d ed. 1993) (Dobbs) (“The equitable doc­trine of laches bars the plaintiff whose unreasonable delay in prosecuting a claim or protecting a right has worked a prejudice to the defendant”). Before the separate systems of law and equity were merged in 1938, the ordinary rule was that laches was available only in equity courts. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U. S. 226, 244, n. 16 (1985). This case turns on the appli­cation of the defense to a claim for damages, a quintessen­tial legal remedy.

“The federal courts always had equity powers as well as law power, but they operated, until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by distinctly separating equity cases and even had separate equity rules.” Dobbs §2.6(1), at 148, n. 2; see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 279 (1988).

Petrella’s holding rested on both separation-of-powers principles and the traditional role of laches in equity. Laches provides a shield against untimely claims, id., at ___ (slip op., at 19), and statutes of limitations serve a similar function. When Congress enacts a statute of limi­tations, it speaks directly to the issue of timeliness and provides a rule for determining whether a claim is timely enough to permit relief. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). The enactment of a statute of limitations necessarily reflects a congressional decision that the timeliness of covered claims is better judged on the basis of a generally hard and fast rule rather than the sort of case-specific judicial determination that occurs when a laches defense is asserted. Therefore, applying laches within a limitations period specified by Congress would give judges a “legislation ­overriding” role that is beyond the Judiciary’s power. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14). As we stressed in Petrella, “courts are not at liberty to jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 1).

Applying laches within the limitations period would also clash with the purpose for which the defense developed in the equity courts. As Petrella recounted, the “principal application” of laches “was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast for which the Legislature has provided no fixed time limitation.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12); see also R. Weaver, E. Shoben, & M. Kelly, Principles of Remedies Law 21 (2d ed. 2011); Dobbs §2.4(4), at 104; J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §55(a), p. 73 (2d ed. 1839). Laches is a gap-filling doctrine, and where there is a statute of limitations, there is no gap to fill. Petrella, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14); see also Dobbs §2.4(4), at 108 (“If the plaintiff has done only what she is permitted to do by statute, and has not misled the defend­ant [so as to trigger equitable estoppel], the basis for barring the plaintiff seems to have disappeared”).

Although the relevant statutory provisions in Petrella and this case are worded differently, Petrella’s reasoning easily fits the provision at issue here. As noted, the stat­ute in Petrella precludes a civil action for copyright in­fringement “unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U. S. C. §507(b). We saw in this language a congressional judgment that a claim filed within three years of accrual cannot be dismissed on time­liness grounds. 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11); see also id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 14–15).

The same reasoning applies in this case. Section 286 of the Patent Act provides: “Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be had for any infringement com­mitted more than six years prior to the filing of the com­plaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action.” By the logic of Petrella, we infer that this provision represents a judgment by Congress that a patentee may recover damages for any infringement committed within six years of the filing of the claim.

As we wrote in Petrella, “a claim ordinarily accrues ‘when a plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’” 572 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4); see Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U. S. 409, 418–419 (2005). While some claims are subject to a “discovery rule” under which the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury giving rise to the claim, that is not a universal feature of statutes of limitations. See, e.g., ibid. (limitations period in 31 U. S. C. §3731(b)(1) begins to run when the cause of action accrues); TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 28 (2001) (same with regard to 15 U. S. C. §1681p).

Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 314, 326 (1894) (“Though a good de­fense in equity, laches is no defense at law. If the plaintiff at law has brought his action within the period fixed by the statute of limitations, no court can deprive him of his right to proceed”).

Laches cannot be interposed as a defense against dam­ages where the infringement occurred within the period prescribed by §286.

Secondary sources: D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §2.3(5), p. 89 (2d ed. 1993); R. Weaver, E. Shoben, & M. Kelly, Principles of Remedies Law 21 (2d ed. 2011); J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §55(a), p. 73 (2d ed. 1839); J. Pomeroy, Treatise on Equitable Remedies §568, p. 977 (1905); Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 Yale L. J. 848,913–914 (2016); H. McClintock, Handbook of the Principles of Equity §28, p. 75 (2d ed. 1948).

(U.S.S.C., March 21, 2017, SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, Docket 15-927, J. Alito. Only J. Breyer filed a dissenting opinion).

Principe de l'extinction d'un droit par l'écoulement du temps ("laches"). Application du principe à une action en dommages-intérêts lorsque la loi prévoit un délai pour agir ?

Dans sa décision Petrella, la Cour a jugé que "laches", moyen de défense prévu par l'"equity", ne pouvait pas être utilement opposé à une prétention en dommages-intérêts déposée dans le délai de trois ans prévu par la loi fédérale sur le Copyright. La Cour a exposé que "laches" ne pouvait pas être invoqué pour défaire une prétention déposée dans le délai légal prévu par le Congrès fédéral. En l'espèce, la question se pose de savoir si ce raisonnement s'applique à une disposition similaire prévue par la Section 286 de la loi fédérale sur les brevets (35 U.S.C. § 286). La réponse est affirmative.

"Laches" est un moyen de défense développé par les cours jugeant en équité pour protéger les défendeurs contre un demandeur qui tarderait trop, sans raison, à déposer son action, le délai causant en soi un préjudice. Avant que les systèmes séparés "at law" et "in equity" aient été fusionnés en 1938, la règle ordinaire voulait que "laches" ne fut disponible que devant les cours statuant "in equity". La présente espèce concerne l'application de ce moyen de défense à une prétention en dommages-intérêts, par essence un remède "at law".

(Les cours fédérales ont toujours été compétentes aussi bien "in equity" que "at law", mais jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur des Règles fédérales de procédure civile, elles opéraient en séparant distinctement les cas "in equity", et appliquaient des règles distinctes dans ce type de cas.

La décision Petrella est fondée sur le principe de séparation des pouvoirs et sur le rôle traditionnel de "laches" en équité. "Laches" prévoit une protection contre les prétentions tardives, et les délais légaux ont une fonction similaire. Quand le Congrès adopte une loi qui contient un délai, il adresse directement la question temporelle et apporte une règle pour déterminer si une prétention est ou non tardive. La promulgation d'un délai légal reflète nécessairement la décision du Congrès selon laquelle la question de la tardiveté d'une prétention se juge plus favorablement à la lumière d'une règle légale claire qu'à la lumière d'une détermination judiciaire au cas par cas à l'occasion de l'invocation du moyen de défense "laches". C'est pourquoi, appliquer "laches" pendant un délai prévu par le Congrès donnerait au Juge un pouvoir au-dessus de celui de la loi, pouvoir qui exorbiterait celui conféré à l'ordre judiciaire. Les Tribunaux ne disposent pas de la liberté d'écarter le jugement du Congrès s'agissant de la question de la tardiveté d'une prétention.

Appliquer "laches" pendant l'écoulement du délai serait en outre contradictoire avec le but pour lequel ce principe a été développé par les cours statuant en équité : ce principe s'applique principalement à des prétentions en équité pour lesquelles le législateur n'a pas prévu de délai. "Laches" est une théorie juridique qui vise à combler une lacune, et en présence d'un délai légal, aucune lacune n'est à combler. Comme l'indique Dobbs, si le demandeur n'a fait que ce que la loi permet, et n'a pas trompé le défendeur (ce qui lui permettrait d'invoquer "equitable estoppel"), le fondement autorisant l'irrecevabilité de la demande fait défaut.

Dans la décision Petrella, la disposition légale étudiée disposait qu'une action civile pour violation d'un copyright pouvait être déposée dans les trois ans dès la naissance du droit d'action (17 U. S. C. §507(b)). Par cette formulation, le Congrès a signifié qu'une telle action déposée dans le délai prévu ne pouvait pas être écartée au motif qu'elle serait tardive. Un raisonnement identique s'applique en l'espèce : la Section 286 de la loi fédérale sur les brevets dispose qu'une action en violation (ou une prétention reconventionnelle) peut être déposée dans les six ans dès la violation.

"Laches" est ainsi un moyen de défense utile en équité, mais beaucoup moins utile "at law". En l'espèce, "laches" ne peut pas être invoqué comme moyen de défense contre des prétentions civiles quand la violation s'est produite pendant le délai prévu par la Section 286 de la loi fédérale sur les brevets.

Merck v. Reynolds

Securities: securities fraud action: limitations period: on November 6, 2003, respondent investors filed a securities fraud action under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging that petitioner Merck & Co. knowingly misrepresented the heart attack risks associated with its drug Vioxx. A securities fraud complaint is timely if filed no more than “2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation” or 5 years after the violation. 28 U. S. C. §1658(b); the limitations period in §1658(b)(1) begins to run once the plaintiff actually discovered or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have “discovered the facts constituting the violation”—whichever comes first. In the statute of limitations context, “discovery” is often used as a term of art in connection with the “discovery rule,” a doctrine that delays accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff has “discovered” it; facts showing scienter are among those that “constitute the violation.” Scienter is assuredly a “fact.” In a §10(b) action, it refers to “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 194, n. 12, and “constitutes” an important and necessary element of a §10(b) “violation.” See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U. S. 308, 319; it would frustrate the very purpose of the discovery rule codified in §1658(b)(1) if the limitations period began to run regardless of whether a plaintiff had “discovered” any facts suggesting scienter (U.S.S.Ct., 27.04.10, Merck v. Reynolds, J. Breyer).

Securities : action délictuelle : prescription : le 6 novembre 2003, des investisseurs ouvrirent une action délictuelle en matière de Securities, fondée sur la section 10(b) du Securities Exchange Act de 1934, en alléguant que la partie Merck & Co avait intentionnellement mal représenté les risques d’attaque cardiaque associés à son médicament Vioxx. Une action délictuelle en matière de Securities est ouverte à temps si la requête n’est pas déposée après 2 ans suivant la discovery des faits constitutifs de la violation, ou après un délai de 5 ans suivant la violation ; la prescription commence à courir dès que le requérant a en l’espèce « découvert » les faits constitutifs de la violation, ou, si ce moment est antérieur, dès qu’un requérant raisonnablement diligent les aurait découverts. Dans le contexte de la prescription, « discovery » est souvent utilisé comme un terme de l’art en relation avec la « discovery rule », une doctrine qui suspend le début de la prescription jusqu’à ce que le requérant ait découvert la réalisation des conditions matérielles de son action. Les faits démontrant l’existence d’une intention sont parmi ceux qui constituent la violation. L’intention est assurément un « fait ». Dans une action basée sur la section 10(b), ce fait se réfère à un état mental qui recouvre l’intention de tromper, de manipuler ou de commettre une illicéité, et constitue un élément important et nécessaire d’une violation au sens de la section 10(b). Il serait contraire au but de la discovery rule de fixer le point de départ de la prescription sans égard au fait de savoir si le requérant avait découvert un « fait » qui suggèrait une intention.