Class v. United States, Docket No. 16-424

Plea agreement: Waiver: Appeal (direct): Constitutional claims: Harlan, J.: Ames, J.:

Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (1974)

Menna v. New York, 423 U. S. 61 (1975) (per curiam)

United States v. Broce, 488 U. S. 563 (1989)

A guilty plea, by itself, does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of his statute of conviction on direct appeal.

In this case, Class neither expressly nor implicitly waived his constitutional claims by pleading guilty. As this Court understands them, the claims at issue here do not contradict the terms of the in­dictment or the written plea agreement and they can be resolved “on the basis of the existing record.” Broce, supra, at 575. Class chal­lenges the Government’s power to criminalize his (admitted) conduct and thereby calls into question the Government’s power to “constitu­tionally prosecute” him. Ibid. (quoting Menna, supra, at 61–62, n. 2). A guilty plea does not bar a direct appeal in these circumstances.

Fifty years ago this Court directly addressed a similar claim (a claim that the statute of conviction was unconsti­tutional). And the Court stated that a defendant’s “plea of guilty did not . . . waive his previous constitutional claim.” Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85, 87, n. 2 (1968). Though Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court in Haynes offered little explanation for this statement, sub­sequent decisions offered a rationale that applies here.

(…) The Court noted that a guilty plea bars appeal of many claims, including some “antecedent constitutional viola­tions” related to events (say, grand jury proceedings) that had “occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258, 266– 267 (1973)). While Tollett claims were “of constitutional dimension,” the Court explained that “the nature of the underlying constitutional infirmity is markedly different” from a claim of vindictive prosecution, which implicates “the very power of the State” to prosecute the defendant. Blackledge, 417 U. S., at 30. Accordingly, the Court wrote that “the right” Perry “asserts and that we today accept is the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge” since “the very initiation of the proceedings” against Perry “operated to deprive him due process of law.” Id., at 30–31.

(…) The Court held that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” Menna, 423 U. S., at 63, and n. 2. Menna’s claim amounted to a claim that “the State may not convict” him “no matter how validly his factual guilt is established.” Ibid. Menna’s “guilty plea, therefore, did not bar the claim.”

Ibid.

These holdings reflect an understanding of the nature of guilty pleas which, in broad outline, stretches back nearly 150 years. In 1869 Justice Ames wrote for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: “The plea of guilty is, of course, a confession of all the facts charged in the indictment, and also of the evil intent imputed to the defendant. It is a waiver also of all merely technical and formal objections of which the defendant could have availed himself by any other plea or motion. But if the facts alleged and admitted do not constitute a crime against the laws of the Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled to be dis­charged.” Commonwealth v. Hinds, 101 Mass. 209, 210.

(…) As an initial matter, a valid guilty plea “forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional guarantees.” Ruiz, 536 U. S., at 628–629. While those “simultaneously” relinquished rights include the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the jury trial right, and the right to confront accusers, McCarthy v. United States, 394 U. S. 459, 466 (1969), they do not include “a waiver of the privileges which exist beyond the confines of the trial.” Mitchell v. United States, 526 U. S. 314, 324 (1999). Here, Class’ statutory right directly to appeal his conviction “cannot in any way be characterized as part of the trial.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 156, 165 (2012).

In more recent years, we have reaffirmed the Menna-Blackledge doctrine and refined its scope.

In sum, the claims at issue here do not fall within any of the categories of claims that Class’ plea agreement forbids him to raise on direct appeal. They challenge the Gov­ernment’s power to criminalize Class’ (admitted) conduct. They thereby call into question the Government’s power to “constitutionally prosecute” him. Broce, supra, at 575 (quoting Menna, supra, at 61–62, n. 2). A guilty plea does not bar a direct appeal in these circumstances.

We hold that Rodney Class may pursue his constitutional claims on direct appeal.

(U.S.S.C., Feb. 21, 2018, Class v. United States, Docket No. 16-424, J. Breyer)

L'appel direct n'est pas d'emblée exclu à l'encontre d'un "plea agreement" : le condamné pour une infraction fédérale peut faire valoir de la sorte l'inconstitutionnalité (fédérale) de sa condamnation (sauf renonciation, intégrée au "plea", à ces moyens de rang constitutionnel).

Toutefois, même de rang constitutionnel, certains moyens pourront être considérés comme indisponibles du fait du "plea" (comme p. ex. le droit à une procédure par le biais de l'intervention du Grand Jury, le droit de ne pas s'incriminer soi-même, le droit au Jury, le droit de confronter ceux qui déposent contre soi). Mais le "plea" n'empêchera pas le condamné de faire valoir des moyens qui contestent la compétence de l'état de poursuivre pénalement en l'espèce, donc sa compétence d'initier la poursuite pénale (laquelle serait ainsi contraire au principe de "due process of law"). L'accusé ne peut donc pas renoncer valablement à des droits qui se situent au-delà des limites du procès lui-même.

K.R. v. Super. Ct., S231709

Plea agreements: juvenile proceedings: waiver: mandate:

Plea negotiations and agreements are an accepted and integral component of the criminal justice system and essential to the expeditious and fair administration of our courts. Plea agreements benefit that system by promoting speed, economy, and the finality of judgments. (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929; see People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79–80.) The same is true in proceedings involving juvenile offenders. Plea bargaining is a common feature in juvenile delinquency proceedings, just as it is in criminal proceedings in adult court. Similar principles apply in both settings. (In re Ricardo C. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 688, 698; accord, In re Jermaine B. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 634, 639 [plea bargaining is an accepted practice in juvenile delinquency proceedings].)

A plea agreement is a tripartite agreement which requires the consent of the defendant, the People and the court. Acceptance of the agreement binds the court and the parties to the agreement. (People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426, 436–437.) Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing discretion, a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain. (People v. Segura, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 931.) Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, directly or indirectly. (See People v. Blount (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 992, 997.)

A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract and is interpreted according to general contract principles. (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 69.) When enforcing such an agreement, courts will apply general contract principles to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.) Not all contract terms, however, are expressly stated in a contract. Experience and practice can, in some circumstances, lead courts to recognize the incorporation of implied terms to a contractual agreement. (Retired Employees Assn. of Orange County, Inc. v. County of Orange (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1171, 1178–1179.)

One such implied term of a plea agreement was recognized in People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754. In Harvey, the defendant complained the trial court improperly sentenced him to the upper term for robbery by relying on the facts underlying a dismissed count to establish a circumstance in aggravation. We agreed. It would be improper and unfair to permit the sentencing court to consider any of the facts underlying the dismissed count three for purposes of aggravating or enhancing defendant‘s sentence. Count three was dismissed in consideration of defendant‘s agreement to plead guilty to counts one and two. Implicit in such a plea bargain, we think, is the understanding (in the absence of any contrary agreement) that defendant will suffer no adverse sentencing consequences by reason of the facts underlying, and solely pertaining to, the dismissed count. (Id., at p. 758.)

We recognized a different implied term for all plea agreements in Arbuckle, 22 Cal.3d 749, holding that a defendant‘s negotiated plea agreement necessarily included an implied term that the same judge who accepted his plea would preside at sentencing (…) Arbuckle reversed and remanded, explaining that he should be sentenced by the same judge who accepted his plea, or if internal court administrative practices render that impossible, then in the alternative defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea. (Id. at p. 757.) We later applied the Arbuckle rule to a plea before a commissioner in juvenile court, where the parties impliedly stipulated that the judicial officer could act as a temporary judge. (Mark L., 34 Cal.3d 171.) The rule has since been extended to juvenile proceedings generally. (See In re James H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 911, 917; In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 136, 139–140 [whenever a juvenile enters a plea bargain before a judge he has the right to be sentenced by that same judge].)

Even after Arbuckle, however, parties to a plea agreement—i.e., the pleading defendant and the prosecuting attorney—remained free to chart a different course by making explicit on the record that the defendant did not care if the same judge pronounced sentence. To do so, the prosecutor need only secure, at the time the plea is accepted, what has come to be known as an Arbuckle waiver. (See People v. Martinez (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1160).

(…) In sum, because of the plain meaning of the Arbuckle opinion, the contemporaneous understanding of that opinion by the Arbuckle dissenters, the understanding by the intermediate appellate courts and legal commentators in the years immediately following the case, this court‘s citation of Arbuckle with approval in both Mark L., 34 Cal.3d 171, and Rodriguez, 1 Cal.5th 676, and Mark L.‘s failure to question or undermine the basic reasoning of Arbuckle, we reject the appellate court‘s position below that it has been settled law for more than 25 years that an Arbuckle right to be sentenced by the judge who accepted a negotiated plea arises not as a matter of general principle, but only when the specific facts of a given case show that the plea was given in expectation of and in reliance upon sentence being imposed by the same judge. Instead, we adhere to the plain and original understanding of Arbuckle that in every plea in both adult and juvenile court, an implied term is that the judge who accepts the plea will be the judge who pronounces sentence. Should the People wish to allow a different judge to preside at sentencing (or, in juvenile cases, disposition), they should seek to obtain a waiver from the pleading defendant or juvenile.

(…) As a rule, trial courts accepting a plea always retain discretion over sentencing. Should the court later decide not to impose the negotiated sentence, the court can withdraw its prior approval of the bargain and allow the pleading defendant (or juvenile) to withdraw his or her plea.

(…) Conclusion: The judgment of the Court of Appeal denying K.R.‘s petition for writ of mandate is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to grant the petition.

Secondary sources: Erwin et al., California Criminal Defense Practice (2016) Arraignment and Pleas, chapter 42.44[1], pages 42-154.8(5) to 42-154.9; California Criminal Law: Procedure and Practice (Cont. Ed. Bar 2015) Pronouncing Judgment, section 35.11, page 1028; Levenson, Cal. Criminal Procedure (2002–2003) Plea Bargaining, ¶ 14:17, p. 598; Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1985 Supp.) Proceedings Before Trial, § 265-O, p. 335 quoting Arbuckle; Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (1997) Delinquency, § 3.92[1], p. 3–94.

(Cal.S.C., June 29, 2017, K.R. v. Super. Ct., S231709, Diss. Op. by C.J. Cantil-Sakauye, J. Chin and J. Corrigan concur. with the dissent).

Plea agreement en droit pénal des adultes et des mineurs : les mêmes principes s'appliquent dans les deux cas.

Le plea agreement est un accord tripartite, qui lie le prévenu, l'accusation et le tribunal. Si un tel accord est soumis au tribunal et que celui-ci le trouve inacceptable, il devra le rejeter. Il ne pourra s'en distancer s'il l'a accepté (cf. toutefois ci-dessous in fine).

Le plea est négocié, il constitue une forme de contrat et il est interprété selon le droit général des contrats. Le cas échéant, le tribunal peut accepter l'incorporation de termes implicites dans l'accord.

La Cour a reconnu du contenu implicite dans le plea suivant : le prévenu avait plaidé coupable s'agissant des préventions une et deux. De la sorte, la prévention numéro trois avait été abandonnée. Le plea était ainsi entré en force. A la phase de fixation de la peine, le tribunal avait prononcé une aggravation de peine en se fondant sur des faits à la base de la seule prévention numéro trois. La Cour suprême, saisie, jugea que le plea contenait implicitement la notion selon laquelle le condamné ne souffrira nul préjudice des faits à la base de la seule prévention numéro trois (cf. People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754).

La jurisprudence Arbuckle (22 Cal.3d 749) a en outre précisé que tous les plea agreements contenaient de manière implicite l'exigence que le juge qui a accepté le plea sera le juge qui présidera la phase de la procédure de fixation de la peine. Si les règles internes du tribunal ne permettent pas une telle organisation, l'accusé doit être autorisé à retirer son plea.

L'accusé peut renoncer à son droit à ce que le juge du plea soit le juge du prononcé de la peine. Dite renonciation doit être explicite et contemporaine au plea (Arbuckle waiver).

La présente espèce confirme que tous les plea, en droit pénal des adultes comme des mineurs, contiennent une clause implicite prévoyant l'identité du juge du plea et du juge du prononcé de la peine. Il est inexact de prétendre que cette clause n'est à retenir que si les faits de la cause démontrent que le plea a été conclu en considération de dite identité des deux juges.

Nonobstant ce qui précède, la cour pénale qui accepte un plea conserve ultérieurement son pouvoir d'appréciation de la peine à prononcer. Si la cour décide finalement de ne pas imposer la peine convenue, la cour peut retirer son approbation et permettre à l'accusé de retirer son plea.

Doe v. Harris, S191948

Plea agreement: the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is considering a claim by plaintiff that his plea agreement would be violated by requiring him to comply with postconviction amendments to California’s Sex Offender Registration Act, Penal Code section 290 et seq., requested an answer to the following question:  “whether, under California law, the default rule of contract interpretation is (a) that the law in effect at the time of a plea agreement binds the parties, or (b) that the terms of a plea agreement may be affected by changes in law.”  We accepted the request and slightly rephrased the question as:  “Under California law of contract interpretation as applicable to the interpretation of plea agreements, does the law in effect at the time of a plea agreement bind the parties or can the terms of a plea agreement be affected by changes in the law?”  We respond that the general rule in California is that the plea agreement will be “ ‘deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public policy. . . .’ ”  (People v. Gipson (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1070 (Gipson).)  That the parties enter into a plea agreement thus does not have the effect of insulating them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to them (Cal. S. Ct., 01.07.2013, Doe v. Harris, S191948).

Plea agreement : en droit californien, le droit contractuel et ses principes d’interprétation s’appliquent au contenu du plea. En outre, si ultérieurement au plea le droit contractuel connaît des modifications prises dans l’intérêt public, le contenu du plea peut être affecté conformément au nouveau droit. Le contenu d’un plea peut donc subir des modifications subséquemment à sa prise d’effet.