Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n v. U.S.

Takings clause: Government-induced flooding: Fifth Amendment: Government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection; no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference with property is a taking; none of the Court’s decisions authorizes a blanket temporary-flooding exception to the Court’s Tak­ings Clause jurisprudence, and the Court declines to create such an exception in this case; the Court summarized prior flooding cases as standing for the proposition that in order to create an enforceable liability against the Government, it is, at least, neces­sary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and con­stitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land; when regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, time is a factor in determining the existence vel non of a compensable taking. See, e.g., Loretto v. Tele­prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419, 435, n. 12. Also rel­evant to the takings inquiry is the degree to which the invasion is in­tended or is the foreseeable result of authorized government action. See, e.g., John Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 138, 146. So, too, are the character of the land at issue and the owner’s “rea­sonable investment-backed expectations” regarding the land’s use, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 618, as well as the severity of the interference, see, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 130–131. In concluding that the flooding was foreseeable in this case, the Court of Federal Claims noted the Commission’s repeated complaints to the Corps about the destructive impact of the successive planned devia­tions and determined that the interference with the Commission’s property was severe. The Government, however, challenged several of the trial court’s factfindings, including those relating to causation, foreseeability, substantiality, and the amount of damages. Because the Federal Circuit rested its decision entirely on the temporary du­ration of the flooding, it did not address those challenges, which re­main open for consideration on remand (U.S. S. Ct., 04.12.12, Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n v. U.S., J. Ginsburg).

Expropriation: de manière générale et dans les cas particuliers d'inondations provoquées par l'état : même si l'inondation n'est que temporaire, il n'existe pas de règle automatique impliquant que l'acte gouvernemental ne saurait être dans ce cas qualifié d'expropriation. Les cas d'inondations temporaires peuvent donc de cas en cas constituer une expropriation, et les facteurs à considérer à cet égard sont la durée de l'inondation, la mesure dans laquelle la nuisance est envisagée, la mesure dans laquelle la nuisance constitue un résultat prévisible de l'acte gouvernemental en lui-même conforme au droit, les caractéristiques des terres inondées, les espérances raisonnables du propriétaire liées à son investissement et relatives à l'usage de ses terres, et l'intensité de la nuisance.

U.S. v. Tohono O’odham Nation

Court of Federal Claims (CFC): two suits are for or in respect to the same claim, precluding CFC jurisdiction, if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit; since 1868, Congress has restricted the jurisdiction of the CFC and its predecessors when related actions are pending elsewhere. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 212, held that two suits are for or in respect to the same claim when they are “based on substantially the same operative facts . . . , at least if there is some overlap in the relief requested,” but it reserved the question whether the jurisdictional bar operates if suits based on the same operative facts do not seek overlapping relief; Keene permits two constructions of “for or in respect to” the same claim, one based on facts alone and the other on factual plus remedial overlap. The former is the more reasonable interpretation in light of the statute’s use of a similar phrase in a way consistent only with factual overlap. The CFC bar applies where the other action is against a “person who, . . . when the cause of action . . . arose, was, in respect thereto, acting” under color of federal law. But at the time that a cause of action arose, the person could not act in respect to the relief requested, for no complaint was yet filed. Although the phrase at issue involves a “claim” rather than a cause of action, there is reason to think that both phrases refer to facts alone and not to relief. As Keene explained, “ ‘claim’ is used here synonymously with ‘cause of action,’ ” 508 U. S., at 210. And if the phrase that uses “cause of action,” the more technical term, does not embrace the concept of remedy, it is reasonable to conclude that neither phrase does; The Nation errs in arguing that this Court’s interpretation unjustly forces plaintiffs to choose between partial remedies available in different courts. The Nation could have recovered any losses in the CFC alone; the substantial overlap in operative facts between the Nation’s District Court and CFC suits precludes jurisdiction in the CFC. Both actions allege that the United States holds the same assets in trust for the Nation’s benefit, and they describe almost identical breaches of fiduciary duty (U.S.S.Ct., 26.04.11, U.S. v. Tohono O’odham Nation, J. Kennedy).

Compétence juridictionnelle et litispendance : Court of Federal Claims (CFC) et U.S. District Court : le demandeur a d’abord saisi la cour fédérale, puis ultérieurement la Court of Federal Claims, sur la base des mêmes faits juridiquement déterminants. Par conséquent, la litispendance s’applique et le demandeur ne peut saisir la Court of Federal Claims. Il aurait pu choisir de porter l’ensemble du litige, dès le départ, devant la Court of Federal Claims, ce qu’il n’a pas fait. La Cour précise que ce sont les faits à la base de l’action qui doivent être semblables pour empêcher la compétence de la CFC, et non pas les remèdes requis de la cour. En l’espèce, les deux actions allèguent que les Etats-Unis détiennent les mêmes biens sous forme de trust pour le bénéfice du demandeur aux deux actions ; en outre, les allégués décrivent des violations du devoir de diligence presque identiques dans les deux actions.

U.S. v. Navajo Nation

Indian Tribes: in order to be able to sue the U.S., the Tribe has to: (…) that in order to invoke the ITA and thereby bypass federal sovereign immunity, a tribe “must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties.” Id., at 506. Holding that such duties were not imposed by the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), by the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (IMDA), or by 25 U. S. C. §399, the Court reversed a judgment for the Tribe and remanded. The Court of Federal Claims then dismissed the Tribe’s claim, but the Federal Circuit reversed, finding violations of duties imposed by the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act of 1950, 25 U. S. C.§§635(a), 638, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U. S. C. §1300(e). If a statute or regulation imposes a trust relationship, then common law principles are relevant in determining whether damages are available for breach of the duty, but the Tribe cannot identify a specific, applicable, trust-creating statute or regulation that the Government violated, so trust principles do not come into play here. Here The Tribe’s claim for compensation fails (U.S.S.Ct., 06.04.09, U.S. v. Navajo Nation, J. Scalia, unanimous).

Si une Tribu indienne entend actionner le Gouvernement fédéral sans en être empêchée par le principe d’immunité, elle doit identifier une règle de droit qui établit un devoir fiduciaire spécifique ou d’autres devoirs à charge du Gouvernement, puis alléguer que le Gouvernement ne s’est pas conformé à ces devoirs. Si une règle de droit impose une relation de trust, alors s’appliquent les principes de la Common law pour déterminer si le lésé peut alléguer un dommage pour violation des devoirs imposés par le trust. En l’espèce, la Tribu indienne n’est pas parvenue à identifier une loi créant une relation de trust qui aurait été violée par le Gouvernement, de sorte que les principes du droit du trust ne sont pas applicables. Les prétentions de la Tribu sont en l’espèce rejetées.