U.S. Supreme Court, Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, Docket No. 19–968, J. Thomas

 

Nominal Damages v. Actual, Compensatory or Statutory Damages

 

Article III Standing

 

Common Law

 

 

 

To establish Article III standing, the Constitution requires a plaintiff to identify an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and to seek a remedy likely to redress that injury. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 338.

 

 

We granted certiorari to consider whether a plaintiff who sues over a completed injury and establishes the first two elements of standing (injury and traceability) can establish the third by requesting only nominal damages.

 

 

The dispute here concerns whether the remedy Uzuegbunam sought—nominal damages—can redress the completed constitutional violation that he alleges occurred when campus officials enforced the speech policies against him. The Court looks to the forms of relief awarded at common law to determine whether nominal damages can redress a past injury. The prevailing rule at common law was that a party whose rights are invaded can always recover nominal damages without furnishing evidence of actual damage. By permitting plaintiffs to pursue nominal damages whenever they suffered a personal legal injury, the common law avoided the oddity of privileging small economic rights over important, but not easily quantifiable, nonpecuniary rights.

 

 

The common law did not require a plea for compensatory damages as a prerequisite to an award of nominal damages. Nominal damages are not purely symbolic. They are instead the damages awarded by default until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other form of damages. A single dollar often will not provide full redress, but the partial remedy satisfies the redressability requirement.

 

 

(…) An award of nominal damages constitutes relief on the merits.

 

 

A request for redress in the form of nominal damages does not guarantee entry to court. In addition to redressability, the plaintiff must establish the other elements of standing and satisfy all other relevant requirements, such as pleading a cognizable cause of action. Uzuegbunam experienced a completed violation of his constitutional rights when respondents enforced their speech policies against him. Nominal damages can redress Uzuegbunam’s injury even if he cannot or chooses not to quantify that harm in economic terms.

 

 

(…) The parties here agree that courts at common law routinely awarded nominal damages. They, instead, dispute what kinds of harms those damages could redress.

 

 

(…) Dissenting, Lord Holt argued that the common law inferred damages whenever a legal right was violated. Observing that the law recognized “not merely pecuniary” injury but also “personal injury,” Lord Holt stated that “every injury imports a damage” and that a plaintiff could always obtain damages even if he “does not lose a penny by reason of the violation.” Id., at 955, 92 Eng. Rep., at 137. Although Lord Holt was in the minority, the House of Lords overturned the majority decision, thus validating Lord Holt’s position, 3 Salk.17, 91 Eng. Rep. 665 (K. B. 1703), and this principle “laid down . . . by Lord Holt” was followed “in many subsequent cases,” Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353, 368, 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585 (1851).

 

 

The dissent correctly notes that English courts differed in some respects from courts under our system, but Lord Holt’s position also prevailed in courts on this side of the Atlantic. Applying what he called Lord Holt’s “incontrovertible” reasoning, Justice Story explained that a prevailing plaintiff “is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages” whenever “no other kind of damages be proved.” Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508–509 (No. 17,322) (CC Me. 1838). Because the common law recognized that “every violation imports damage,” Justice Story reasoned that “the law tolerates no farther inquiry than whether there has been the violation of a right.” Ibid. Justice Story also made clear that this logic applied to both retrospective and prospective relief. Id., at 507 (stating that nominal damages are available “wherever there is a wrong” and that, “a fortiori, this doctrine applies where there is not only a violation of a right of the plaintiff, but the act of the defendant, if continued, may become the foundation, by lapse of time, of an adverse right”).

 

 

Respondents and the dissent thus get the relationship between nominal damages and compensatory damages backwards. Nominal damages are not a consolation prize for the plaintiff who pleads, but fails to prove, compensatory damages. They are instead the damages awarded by default until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to some other form of damages, such as compensatory or statutory damages.

 

 

(…) A plaintiff must maintain a personal interest in the dispute at every stage of litigation, including when judgment is entered, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561 (1992), and must do so “separately for each form of relief sought,” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 185 (2000).

 

 

Because nominal damages were available at common law in analogous circumstances, we conclude that a request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element of standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed violation of a legal right.

 

 

 

Secondary sources: D. Laycock & R. Hasen, Modern American Remedies 636 (5th ed. 2019).

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, March 8, 2021, Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, Docket No. 19–968, J. Thomas)

 

 

James v. Boise, Docket 15-493, Per Curiam

Attorney’s fee: civil rights: 42 U.S.C. §1983: frivolous: Story, J.: under federal law, a court has discretion to “allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reason­able attorney’s fee” in a civil rights lawsuit filed under 42 U. S. C. §1983. 42 U. S. C. §1988. In Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U. S. 5 (1980) (per curiam), this Court interpreted §1988 to permit a prevailing defendant in such a suit to recover fees only if “the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreason­able, or without foundation.” Id., at 14 (quoting Chris­tiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412, 421 (1978)).

In the decision below, the Idaho Supreme Court con­cluded that it was not bound by this Court’s interpretation of §1988 in Hughes. According to that court, “although the Supreme Court may have the authority to limit the discretion of lower federal courts, it does not have the authority to limit the discretion of state courts where such limitation is not contained in the statute.” 158 Idaho 713, 734, 351 P. 3d 1171, 1192 (2015). The court then pro­ceeded to award attorney’s fees under §1988 to a prevailing defendant without first determining that “the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda­tion.” The court’s fee award rested solely on its interpreta­tion of federal law; the court explicitly refused to award fees under state law. Id., at 734–735, 351 P. 3d, at 1192– 1193. We grant certiorari, and now reverse.

Section 1988 is a federal statute. “It is this Court’s responsibility to say what a federal statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.” Nitro-Lift Technologies, L. L. C. v. Howard, 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (per curiam) (slip op., at 5) (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U. S. 298, 312 (1994)). And for good reason. As Jus­tice Story explained 200 years ago, if state courts were permitted to disregard this Court’s rulings on federal law, “the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mis­chiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 348 (1816).

The Idaho Supreme Court, like any other state or fed­eral court, is bound by this Court’s interpretation of federal law. The state court erred in concluding otherwise. The judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

(U.S.S.C., Jan. 25, 2016, James v. Boise, Docket 15-493, Per Curiam).

Remboursement par la partie perdante des frais d’avocat de la partie victorieuse dans les actions fondées sur la disposition 42 U.S.C. §1983 (action directe de droit civil contre un tiers, même agissant en une capacité officielle). Ce remboursement est laissé dans son principe à la discrétion du Tribunal. Le montant cas échéant alloué doit être raisonnable. Si le défendeur s’avère être la partie victorieuse, il ne pourra se voir allouer des dépens, a jugé la Cour Suprême fédérale, que si l’action du demandeur était frivole, déraisonnable, ou dépourvue de mérite. Dans la présente affaire, c’est à tort que la Cour Suprême de l’état de l’Idaho a attribué des dépens au défendeur victorieux sans déterminer si le demandeur avait procédé de manière frivole, déraisonnable, ou sans mérite. La Cour de l’Idaho a justifié sa pratique en indiquant n’être pas tenue à ce niveau par les exigences posées par la Cour Suprême fédérale, dans la mesure où le texte de la Section 1983 ne mentionne pas les conditions de « procédure frivole, déraisonnable, ou sans mérite ». La Cour Suprême de l’Idaho a encore soutenu qu’elle serait liée par ces exigences si elle était une cour fédérale. Il est encore précisé que les dépens ont été ici alloués sur la base du seul droit fédéral, la Cour de l’Idaho refusant en effet d’en allouer sur la base du droit de son état. Ce qui contraint la Cour Suprême fédérale de rappeler in casu qu’elle est seule à disposer de la compétence de dire le contenu du droit fédéral édicté par le Congrès fédéral, sous peine d’application contradictoire dudit droit fédéral d’un état à l’autre. L’affaire est ainsi renvoyée à la Cour Suprême de l’Idaho pour nouvelle décision au sens des considérants.