Representation: Agent: CEO: Board of directors:
Licensing agreement:
Actual authority: Ostensible authority:
Ratification: Equitable estoppel:
(…) AMS nonetheless asserts that the 2008
licensing agreement is invalid or unenforceable due to lack of mutual assent on
the ground that Diane Ruff executed the agreement in an agency capacity without
authorization of AMS’s board of directors.
Agency is “the fiduciary relation which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person to another” that the agent
shall act on behalf of the principal subject to the principal’s control and
consent. Butler Mfg. Co. v. J & L Implement Co., 167 Mont. 519, 523,
540 P.2d 962, 965 (1975). See also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01
(2006); § 28-10-101, MCA (agent is one who represents another in dealings with
third parties).
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a
principal may authorize an agent to perform any act that the principal may
lawfully perform. Section 28-10-105, MCA. A principal may create an agency
relationship by prior authorization or subsequent ratification of the representative
acts of another. Section 28-10-201, MCA.
An agent has the authority actually or
ostensibly conferred upon the agent by the principal. Section 28-10-401, MCA.
Actual authority is authority that a principal either “intentionally confers”
upon the agent or intentionally or negligently “allows the agent to believe the
agent possesses.” Section 28-10-402, MCA. Ostensible authority is authority that
a principal intentionally or negligently “allows a third person to believe the
agent possesses.” Section 28-10-403, MCA. A principal may confer actual or
ostensible authority upon an agent by express authorization or circumstantial
implication. Freeman v. Withers, 104 Mont. 166, 172, 65 P.2d 601,
603 (1937). An actual or ostensible agent has implied authority to “do
everything necessary, proper, and usual in the ordinary course” of the
principal’s business “for effecting the purpose of the agency.” Section
28-10-405(1), MCA. A disclosed principal is liable in contract to third parties
for the representative acts of an agent within the scope of the actual or
ostensible authority conferred on the agent by the principal. Restatement
(Third) of Agency § 6.01; see also §§ 28-10-401 and -405, MCA.
Accordingly, unless otherwise “specially restricted” by board directive or
bylaw, “a general or managing officer or agent” of a corporation has actual or
ostensible authority to “enter into any contract which is usual, proper, or
necessary . . . in the ordinary transaction of the company’s business.” Audit
Servs., Inc. v. Elmo Rd. Corp., 175 Mont. 533, 536, 575 P.2d 77, 79 (1978).
Here, it is beyond genuine material dispute on
the Rule 56 record that, at all times pertinent, Diane Ruff was the chief
executive officer of AMS with general authority to act on behalf of the
corporation within the broad scope of AMS’s ordinary course of business. AMS
was engaged in the business of, inter alia, providing payroll recordkeeping
and processing services to its clients, including but not limited to the
acquisition of software necessary or helpful to that end. It is beyond genuine
material dispute on the Rule 56 record that the 2008 licensing agreement and
its subject matter were within the scope of the ordinary course of AMS’s
business.
AMS’s corporate counsel drafted the licensing
agreement for Diane Ruff’s signature in the name of the corporation. AMS made
no affirmative factual showing disputing Diane’s authority to enter into the
licensing agreement without prior authorization of the AMS board. AMS made no
affirmative factual showing that Diane had any reason to believe that either
the initial informal agreement or the subsequent licensing agreement was
outside the scope of her authority as the chief executive officer of AMS. AMS
further made no affirmative factual showing that Daniel had any non-speculative
reason to believe that Diane was not authorized to enter into the development
and licensing agreements or that Diane actively or intentionally concealed the
existence and terms of the licensing agreement from the AMS board. The mere
facts that Diane and Daniel were mother and son and that the AMS board was not
formally or specifically aware of the licensing agreement until the new AMS
executive director raised “concerns” about it in 2013 after Diane left the
company are insufficient without more to raise a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Diane was acting outside the scope of her actual or ostensible
authority when she executed the licensing agreement seven years earlier. On the
Rule 56 record presented, we hold that Ruff was entitled to judgment that Diane
executed the 2008 licensing agreement within the scope of her actual and
ostensible authority as the chief executive officer of AMS.
The District Court alternatively ruled that,
even if arguendo Diane had executed the licensing agreement outside the
scope of her actual or ostensible authority, AMS nonetheless ratified the
agreement after she left the company. A principal may create an agency
relationship by subsequent ratification of the representative acts of another.
Section 28-10-201, MCA. “A contract which is voidable solely for want of due
consent may be ratified by a subsequent consent.” Section 28-2-304, MCA.
Ratification is the affirmative confirmation of a prior act. Erler v.
Creative Fin. & Inv., 2009 MT 36, ¶¶ 25-26, 349 Mont. 207, 203 P.3d
744. A principal with knowledge of the material facts may ratify a prior unauthorized
act or transaction by express declaration or implicitly by acts, statements, or
conduct which reasonably manifests an intent to affirm or be bound by the act. Erler,
¶¶ 25-26; Freeman, 104 Mont. at 172, 65 P.2d at 603. Thus, a principal
may ratify an unauthorized act by “knowingly accepting or retaining the benefit
of the act.” Section 28-10-211, MCA.
(…) Ratification rests, inter alia, upon
the principle of equitable estoppel and “the duty of the principal to
repudiate” an unauthorized act of an agent “within a reasonable time after
discovery.” Larson, 61 Mont. at 9, 201 P. at 687. See also Butler
Mfg. Co., 167 Mont. at 526, 540 P.2d at 966 (duty to repudiate or disavow
unauthorized act of agent immediately upon discovery). Thus, a principal with knowledge
who acquiesces and affirmatively performs or pays on a previously unauthorized
but otherwise lawful and beneficial act of a previously established agent is equitably
estopped from later asserting that the act was unauthorized ab initio.
(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018,
Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018
MT 182, J. Sandefur)
Cette affaire est
jugée en application du droit de l’état du Montana.
Etendue des
pouvoirs de représentation d’un directeur général : ce directeur engage la
société si son acte est expressément autorisé par le conseil d’administration,
si le conseil laisse croire par négligence que l’acte est autorisé, ou s’il est
ratifié par dit conseil. Le directeur général engage également la société si
son acte pouvait raisonnablement être compris par un tiers comme étant autorisé
par le conseil. Quant à elle, la ratification peut être expresse ou par actes
concluants (par exemple en conservant les bénéfices découlant de l’acte non
autorisé). S’agissant de la ratification, il y a plus : la notion de
ratification est liée au principe d’ « equitable estoppel » ainsi
qu’au devoir du représenté de répudier l’acte non autorisé dans un délai
raisonnable après sa découverte. De la sorte, un représenté qui ne répudie pas
peut être « equitably estopped » d’alléguer valablement que le
représentant a excédé ses pouvoirs.
A défaut de
directive contraire du conseil ou de norme statutaire contraire, le directeur
dispose de la compétence de conclure tous les types de contrats usuels, ou appropriés,
ou nécessaires à la réalisation du but social.
Est en l’espèce
discutée la question de la validité d’un contrat de licence conclu par la CEO
pour le compte de son entreprise, active dans la fourniture de services
digitaux liés à la tenue de dossiers de ressources humaines. Le contrat de
licence portait sur un software utile à la réalisation du but social, de sorte
que la directrice disposait de la compétence de signer ce contrat au nom de la
société. En outre, le contrat de licence avait été rédigé par le service
juridique interne de l’entreprise. Dite entreprise n’a nullement contesté
l’autorité de sa directrice de signer, et celle-ci n’avait aucune raison de
penser qu’elle n’en avait pas la compétence. Et l’autre partie au contrat de
licence n’avait aucune raison de penser que la directrice aurait été dépourvue
de l’autorité de signer au nom de l’entreprise, ni de penser que la directrice
aurait caché au conseil d’administration l’existence et les termes du contrat.
Le fait qu’en l’espèce la directrice et l’autre partie au contrat de licence
étaient mère et fils n’était en soi pas suffisant pour nier le pouvoir de
représentation de la directrice. Aucun conflit d’intérêt n’a été démontré,
s’agissant d’une transaction conforme aux conditions du marché.
