U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Express Oil Change, L.L.C.; TE, L.L.C., doing business as Tire Engineers v. Mississippi Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, Docket No. 18-60144, Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith

Trademark

Use of the Term/Mark “Engineer”

State Regulation of the Term

First Amendment’s Commercial Speech

Disclaimer

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

E. raises only its constitutional claim on appeal.

Mississippi regulates the practice of engineering and restricts the use of the term “engineer.” Express Oil Change (“Express”) operates several automotive service centers in Mississippi under the name “Tire Engineers.” In 2015, the Mississippi Board of Licensure for Professional Engineers & Surveyors (“the Board”) determined that the name “Tire Engineers” violated the pertinent statutes and requested that Express cease using it. Following protracted correspondence, the parties could not reach a compromise, and Express sued for a declaratory judgment and related relief. The company contended, inter alia, that the relevant statutory provisions violate the First Amendment as incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After discovery, the district court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed. Because the Board’s decision violates the First Amendment’s commercial speech protections, we reverse and render judgment for Express.

Express operates a number of automotive service centers in Mississippi under the Tire Engineers mark. According to Express, Tire Engineers provides “oil changes, car repairs, and tire services—repair, maintenance, and replacement—to customers in fifteen states, including Mississippi.”

(…) After the parties were unable to agree, Express sued, seeking a declaratory judgment and related relief on three theories: first, that the Board’s decision concerning the use of the term engineer violated Mississippi law; second, that it violated Express’s “rights of commercial free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment”; and third, that the decision violated Express’s “rights under preemptive federal trademark law pursuant to the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127.”

(…) Commercial speech is “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).

(…) At the outset, a court must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, a court asks whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, a court must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. “The party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it.” Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n.20 (1983). This “burden is a ‘heavy’ one,” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996)), and may not be “satisfied ‘by mere speculation or conjecture,’” id. (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993)).

(…) Statements that are only potentially misleading, however, are safeguarded by the First Amendment. In such a case, a state actor must “‘show that the restriction directly and materially advances a substantial state interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.’” Am. Acad., 860 F.3d at 308–09 (alteration in original) (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg., Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994)).

(…) The better view is that the district court erred in concluding that Express’s use of Tire Engineers is inherently misleading.

Because its essential character is not deceptive, Tire Engineers is not inherently misleading. The name, first trademarked in 1948, apparently refers to the work of mechanics using their skills “not usually considered to fall within the scope of engineering” to solve “technical problems” related to selecting, rotating, balancing, and aligning tires. That this definition of “engineer” does not meet the Board’s preferred definition does not make its use inherently misleading. The term “engineer” can mean many things in different contexts, and it is certainly not limited to those professionals licensed by Mississippi to practice engineering. It is not, therefore, “devoid of intrinsic meaning.” Joe Conte Toyota, 24 F.3d at 756 (quoting Peel, 496 U.S. at 112 (Marshall, J., concurring)). Additionally, as Express explains, “the district court’s analysis failed to account for the manner in which the Tire Engineers mark is transmitted—on the company’s website, which describes its automotive services (not any professional engineering services), and at its retail stores, which appear like any other store that performs automotive services . . . .” Consequently, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party—here, Express—the use of Tire Engineers is not inherently misleading under our precedent.

(…) Actually misleading: evidence of deception is necessary to sustain a finding that commercial speech is actually misleading (…) The Board was required to present evidence of deception. Because it did not, the district court erred in concluding that the Tire Engineers mark was actually misleading. Given that the name is neither actually nor inherently misleading, it enjoys limited First Amendment protections, as discussed in Central Hudson.

(…) “Under Central Hudson, a restriction on commercial speech survives First Amendment scrutiny if: (1) ‘the asserted governmental interest is substantial,’ (2) the regulation ‘directly advances’ that interest, and (3) the regulation ‘is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.’” Pub. Citizen, 632 F.3d at 219 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002)). “Each of these latter three inquiries must be answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found constitutional.” Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367.
(…) ad 1) the evidence in the record establishes that the asserted interests of the Board are substantial.
(…) ad 2) the evidence supports a holding that the ban directly advances the Board’s asserted interest.
(…) ad 3) the final inquiry is whether the regulation is “‘more extensive than is necessary to serve’” the identified interest. Pub. Citizen, 632 F.3d at 219 (quoting Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367). “‘The free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing . . . the harmless from the harmful . . . .’” Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (quoting Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988)). The means employed by the government actor need not be the “least restrictive means,” but it must be narrowly tailored to achieve (…)

(…) In Byrum, 566 F.3d at 449, concerning the terms “interior design” and “interior designer,” we held that “the State could have eliminated any constitutional challenge here by not limiting use of the terms ‘interior design’ and ‘interior designer’ but by allowing only designers who satisfy its licensing qualifications to represent themselves as ‘licensed’ interior designers.” See also Am. Acad., 860 F.3d at 311–12. Further, this court and others have identified “sufficient disclaimers as a means to address consumer deception.” This remedy seemingly derives from Peel, Bates, and earlier Supreme Court cases that “described various regulatory safeguards which the state may impose in place of a total ban on commercial speech.” Abramson, 949 F.2d at 1577.

The record does not support the need for a total ban on the use of Tire Engineers. Evidence offered by both parties, particularly when viewed in the light most favorable to Express as the non-moving party, demonstrates that other states with similar statutes have not challenged the use of the trademark. Thus, despite claims to the contrary, the Board is an outlier in this respect, and it fails to address why alternative, less-restrictive means, such as a disclaimer, would not accomplish its stated goal of protecting the public. The Board thereby fails to satisfy the required burden of demonstrating a reasonable fit between its regulation and the constitutionally-protected speech.

Summary judgment is REVERSED, and judgment is RENDERED for Express.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, February 19, 2019, EXPRESS OIL CHANGE, L.L.C.; TE, L.L.C., doing business as Tire Engineers v.  MISSISSIPPI BOARD OF LICENSURE FOR PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS & SURVEYORS, Docket No. 18-60144, Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Docket No. 17-2003, Published

Facebook Page

President Trump’s Twitter Account

Governmental Social Media Page

Right of Account Owner to Suppress a Public Comment?

First Amendment

Government Speech

Public Forum

Traditional Public Forum, or Designated or Limited Public Forum

Viewpoint Discrimination

42 U.S.C. § 1983

Randall has chaired the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors since January 1, 2016. The day before she was sworn in as chair, Randall created the “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” Facebook Page (the “Chair’s Facebook Page”). According to Facebook, Inc., unlike personal Facebook profiles, which are for non-commercial use and represent individual people, Facebook “Pages”—like the Chair’s Facebook Page—“help businesses, organizations, and brands share their stories and connect with people.” J.A. 403. “Pages are managed by people who have personal profiles,” the company explains. J.A. 403. In addition to the Chair’s Facebook Page, Randall created and maintained two other Facebook profiles: a personal profile and a Page devoted to her campaign. Randall classified her campaign page as belonging to a “politician” and used no designation for her personal profile, but she designated the Chair’s Facebook Page as a “governmental official” page. J.A. 209–10.

((…) “‘Liking’ on Facebook is a way for Facebook users to share information with each other.” Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385 (4th Cir. 2013) (Op., fn. 1, p. 7)).

(…) On November 3, 2016, Davison filed an amended complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Randall, in both her official and individual capacities, and the Loudoun Board alleging that the “banning of [Davison] from commenting on [the Chair’s Facebook Page] is viewpoint discrimination.” J.A. 31.

(…) Considering the totality of these circumstances, the district court correctly held that Randall acted under color of state law in banning Davison from the Chair’s Facebook Page.

(…) Third, Randall argues that the district court erred in ruling in Davison’s favor on his individual capacity First Amendment claim against Randall. Randall principally challenges the district court’s conclusion that the Chair’s Facebook Page constitutes a “public forum” under traditional First Amendment law. We review this legal question de novo. See Helton, 709 F.3d at 350.

Under long-established First Amendment law, governmental entities are “strictly limited” in their ability to regulate private speech in public fora. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009). The Supreme Court has recognized two categories of public fora: “traditional public forums” and “limited (or designated) public forums.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 443 (4th Cir. 2005). “Traditional” public forums—“such as streets, sidewalks, and parks”—“have the characteristics of a public thoroughfare, a purpose that is compatible with expressive conduct, as well as a tradition and history of being used for expressive public conduct.” Id. “Limited” or “designated” forums are forums that are “not traditionally public, but that the government has purposefully opened to the public, or some segment of the public, for expressive activity.” Id. Accordingly, the hallmark of both types of public fora—what renders the fora “public”—is that the government has made the space available—either by designation or long-standing custom—for “expressive public conduct” or “expressive activity,” and the space is compatible with such activity. Id. “Conversely, a non-public forum is one that has not traditionally been open to the public, where opening it to expressive conduct would ‘somehow interfere with the objective use and purpose to which the property has been dedicated.’” Id. (quoting Warren v. Fairfax Cty., 196 F.3d 186, 190–91 (4th Cir. 1999)).

Although neither the Supreme Court nor any Circuit has squarely addressed whether, and in what circumstances, a governmental social media page—like the Chair’s Facebook Page—constitutes a public forum, aspects of the Chair’s Facebook Page bear the hallmarks of a public forum. Randall “intentionally opened the public comment section of the Chair’s Facebook Page for public discourse,” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985), inviting “ANY Loudoun citizen” to make posts to the comments section of the Chair’s Facebook Page—the interactive component of the page—“on ANY issues, request, criticism, complement or just your thoughts,” J.A. 455. Randall placed no restrictions on the public’s access to the page or use of the interactive component of the Chair’s Facebook Page. And, in accordance with Randall’s invitation, the public made numerous posts on matters of public concern.

(In addition to the court below, two other district courts have considered whether a government official’s social media page constituted a public forum. Those courts reached conflicting results. Compare Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010 (E.D. Ky. 2018) (holding that First Amendment forum analysis did not apply to restrictions on speech in the official Facebook and Twitter pages of the Governor of Kentucky), with Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding that the interactive component of the President’s Twitter account, as opposed to the President’s tweets themselves, constituted a designated public forum), appeal docketed, No. 18-1691 (2d Cir. Oct. 24, 2018).)

(…) And the Supreme Court and lower courts have held that private property, whether tangible or intangible, constituted a public forum when, for example, the government retained substantial control over the property under regulation or by contract. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547, 555 (1975) (holding that “a privately owned Chattanooga theater under long-term lease to the city” was a “public forum designed for and dedicated to expressive activities”); Halleck v. Manhattan Community Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 306–07 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that public access television channels operated by a private non-profit corporation constituted public forums), cert. granted 139 S. Ct. 360 (2018) (mem.); First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Forum analysis does not require that the government have a possessory interest in or title to the underlying land. Either government ownership or regulation is sufficient for a First Amendment forum of some kind to exist.”); Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, Wis., 203 F.3d 487, 494 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that private property abutted by public park constituted public forum). 

(…) Of particular importance, Randall had complete control over the aspect of the Chair’s Facebook Page giving rise to Davison’s challenge because, as administrator of the page, Randall had authority to ban Facebook profiles or Pages from using the Chair’s Facebook Page—and, therefore, the interactive component of the page—authority she exercised in banning Davison’s Virginia SGP Page. Cf. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566–67 (holding that the interactive component of the President’s Twitter account constituted public forum because the President and his advisors “exercise control over various aspects of the . . . account,” including the power to block other users from accessing the account).

(…) The interactive component of the Chair’s Facebook Page constitutes a public forum, even though Randall’s curation of and posts to the Chair’s Facebook Page amount to government speech. Additionally, the interactive component of the Chair’s Facebook Page does not face the same spacial limitations as those of the park in Pleasant Grove, but instead is “capable of accommodating a large number of public speakers without defeating its essential function.”

(…) Upon concluding that interactive component of the Chair’s Facebook Page amounts to a public forum, we would normally need to determine whether it constitutes a traditional public forum or designated or limited public forum. In the present case, however, we need not decide that question because Randall’s ban of Davison amounted to “viewpoint discrimination,” which is “prohibited in all forums.” See Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062, 1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006). “Viewpoint discrimination . . . ‘targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.’” Id. (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). Viewpoint discrimination is apparent, for example, if a government official’s decision to take a challenged action was “impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a particular point of view.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812–13.

(…) Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575 (holding that the President engaged in viewpoint discrimination when he blocked individuals from his Twitter account because the individuals “posted tweets that criticized the President or his policies”).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Jan 7, 2019, Docket No. 17-2003, Published)

Town of Greece v. Galloway

First Amendment: Establishment Clause:  since 1999, the monthly town board meetings in Greece, New York, have opened with a roll call, a recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, and a prayer given by clergy selected from the congregations listed in a local directory. While the prayer program is open to all creeds, nearly all of the local congregations are Christian; thus, nearly all of the participating prayer givers have been too; legislative prayer, while religious in nature, has long been un­derstood as compatible with the Establishment Clause. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 792. In Marsh, the Court concluded that it was not necessary to define the Establishment Clause’s precise boundary in order to uphold Nebraska’s practice of employing a legis­lative chaplain because history supported the conclusion that the specific practice was permitted. The First Congress voted to appoint and pay official chaplains shortly after approving language for the First Amendment, and both Houses have maintained the office virtu­ally uninterrupted since then. See id., at 787–789, and n. 10. A ma­jority of the States have also had a consistent practice of legislative prayer. Id., at 788–790, and n. 11. There is historical precedent for the practice of opening local legislative meetings with prayer as well. Marsh teaches that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted “by reference to historical practices and understandings.” County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 670 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). Thus, any test must acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change. The Court’s inquiry, then, must be to determine whether the prayer prac­tice in the town of Greece fits within the tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures; the “content of the prayer is not of concern to judges,” provided “there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to prose­lytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.” ; To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force the legislatures sponsoring prayers and the courts decid­ing these cases to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech, thus involving government in religious matters to a far greater de­gree than is the case under the town’s current practice of neither ed­iting nor approving prayers in advance nor criticizing their content after the fact; in rejecting the suggestion that legislative prayer must be nonsectarian, the Court does not imply that no constraints remain on its content. The relevant constraint derives from the prayer’s place at the open­ing of legislative sessions, where it is meant to lend gravity to the oc­casion and reflect values long part of the Nation’s heritage. From the Nation’s earliest days, invocations have been addressed to assemblies comprising many different creeds, striving for the idea that people of many faiths may be united in a community of tolerance and devotion, even if they disagree as to religious doctrine. The prayers delivered in Greece do not fall outside this tradition. They may have invoked, e.g., the name of Jesus, but they also invoked universal themes, e.g., by calling for a “spirit of cooperation.” Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible gov­ernment purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a par­ticular prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation. See 463 U. S., at 794–795. Finally, so long as the town maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing  (U.S.S.Ct., 05.05.14, Town of Greece v. Galloway, Docket 12-696, J. Kennedy).

Premier Amendement, Clause prohibant l’établissement d’une religion par le Gouvernement : comme préambule à leurs débats, les autorités législatives peuvent organiser un service de prière donné par un prêtre. Cette habitude est bien établie dans tout le pays, cela dès sa fondation. Elle était déjà acceptée du temps des rédacteurs de la Constitution fédérale. Elle ne s’analyse nullement en un soutien actif d’une religion par le Gouvernement. Dans cette affaire, le programme de prières est ouvert à toutes les confessions. Il n’est pas utilisé à des fins de prosélytisme. Il ne vise pas à promouvoir ni à rabaisser une confession particulière. La Constitution fédérale n’impose pas non plus que le contenu de la prière se réfère à un être suprême sans référence à une religion en particulier. Une telle exigence reviendrait à imposer aux Tribunaux de s’immiscer dans l’exercice de la religion, ce qui serait inconstitutionnel. La Cour pourrait toutefois intervenir dans certains cas, différents de ce type de situation où le service de prière a lieu en début de session parlementaire pour en souligner la gravité et l’importance, reflétant des valeurs parties de longue date de l’héritage de la nation. L’idée de base est que des personnes de confessions différentes peuvent être unies dans une communauté de tolérance et de dévotion, même si elles sont en désaccord sur la doctrine religieuse. En l’absence d’un système de prières qui au cours du temps dénigre, pratique le prosélytisme, ou trahit un but gouvernemental qui n’est pas permis, une action fondée uniquement sur le contenu d’une prière particulière n’établira vraisemblablement pas une violation constitutionnelle. Enfin, aussi longtemps que la ville maintient une politique de non-discrimination, la Constitution n’exige pas d’elle qu’elle recherche au-delà de ses frontières un ministre du culte non-chrétien dans un effort d’accomplir un équilibre religieux. Le fait que les prières soient généralement des prières chrétiennes en l’espèce résulte de la situation des différentes fois présentes en ville : une forte majorité de la population religieuse est chrétienne.

McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n

Elections, contributions:  the right to participate in democracy through political contributions is protected by the First Amendment, but that right is not absolute. Congress may regulate campaign contributions to protect against corruption or the appearance of corruption. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26–27. It may not, however, regulate contribu­tions simply to reduce the amount of money in politics, or to restrict the political participation of some in order to enhance the relative in­fluence of others. See, e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. ___, ___. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), imposes two types of limits on campaign contributions. Base limits restrict how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee while aggregate limits restrict how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. 2 U. S. C. §441a. In the 2011–2012 election cycle, appellant McCutcheon contributed to 16 different federal candidates, complying with the base limits ap­plicable to each. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to 12 additional candidates and to a number of noncandidate political committees. He also alleges that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future, all within the base limits. McCutcheon and appellant Republican National Committee filed a complaint before a three-judge District Court, asserting that the ag­gregate limits were unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the Government’s motion to dismiss. Assuming that the base limits appropriately served the Government’s anticorruption in­terest, the District Court concluded that the aggregate limits sur­vived First Amendment scrutiny because they prevented evasion of the base limits.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 893 F. Supp. 2d 133, reversed and remanded. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, joined by JUSTICE SCALIA, JUSTICE KENNEDY, and JUSTICE ALITO, concluded that the aggregate limits are inva­lid under the First Amendment. 

(a) Appellants’ substantial First Amendment challenge to the cur­rent system of aggregate limits merits plenary consideration.

(1) In Buckley, this Court evaluated the constitutionality of the original contribution and expenditure limits in FECA. Buckley dis­tinguished the two types of limits based on the degree to which each encroaches upon protected First Amendment interests. It subjected expenditure limits to “the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression.” 424 U. S., at 44–45. But it concluded that contribution limits impose a lesser re­straint on political speech and thus applied a lesser but still “rigorous standard of review,” id., at 29, under which such limits “may be sus­tained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms,” id., at 25. Because the Court found that the primary purpose of FECA—preventing quid pro quo corruption and its appearance—was a “sufficiently important” governmental inter­est, id., at 26–27, it upheld the base limit under the “closely drawn” test, id., at 29. After doing so, the Court devoted only one paragraph of its 139-page opinion to the aggregate limit then in place under FECA, noting that the provision “had not been separately addressed at length by the parties.” Id., at 38. It concluded that the aggregate limit served to prevent circumvention of the base limit and was “no more than a corollary” of that limit. Id., at 38.

(2) There is no need in this case to revisit Buckley’s distinction between contributions and expenditures and the corresponding dis­tinction in standards of review. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the “closely drawn” test applies, the analysis turns on the fit between the stated governmental objective and the means selected to achieve that objective. Here, given the substantial mismatch between the Government’s stated objective and the means selected to achieve it, the aggregate limits fail even under the “closely drawn” test.

Buckley’s ultimate conclusion about the constitutionality of the ag­gregate limit in place under FECA does not control here. Buckley spent just three sentences analyzing that limit, which had not been separately addressed by the parties. Appellants here, by contrast, have directly challenged the aggregate limits in place under BCRA, a different statutory regime whose limits operate against a distinct le­gal backdrop. Most notably, statutory safeguards against circumven­tion have been considerably strengthened since Buckley. The 1976 FECA Amendments added another layer of base limits—capping con­tributions from individuals to political committees—and an antipro­liferation rule prohibiting donors from creating or controlling multi­ple affiliated political committees. Since Buckley, the Federal Election Commission has also enacted an intricate regulatory scheme that further limits the opportunities for circumvention of the base limits through “unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to contribute” to a particular candidate. 424 U. S., at 38. In addition to accounting for such statutory and regulatory changes, ap­pellants raise distinct legal arguments not considered in Buckley, in­cluding an overbreadth challenge to the aggregate limit.

(b) Significant First Amendment interests are implicated here. Contributing money to a candidate is an exercise of an individual’s right to participate in the electoral process through both political ex­pression and political association. A restriction on how many candi­dates and committees an individual may support is hardly a “modest restraint” on those rights. The Government may no more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse. In its simplest terms, the aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contrib­uting to the primary and general election campaigns of ten or more candidates, even if all contributions fall within the base limits. And it is no response to say that the individual can simply contribute less than the base limits permit: to require one person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes is to penalize that individual for “robustly exercising” his First Amendment rights. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 739. In assessing the First Amendment interests at stake, the proper fo­cus is on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a col­lective conception of the public good. The whole point of the First Amendment is to protect individual speech that the majority might prefer to restrict, or that legislators or judges might not view as use­ful to the democratic process.

(c) The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmen­tal interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. 

(1) This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or  the appearance of corruption. See Davis, supra, at 741. Moreover, the only type of corruption that Congress may target is quid pro quo corruption. Spending large sums of money in connection with elec­tions, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corrup­tion. Nor does the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or po­litical parties. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 359. The line between quid pro quo corruption and general in­fluence must be respected in order to safeguard basic First Amend­ment rights, and the Court must “err on the side of protecting politi­cal speech rather than suppressing it.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U. S. 449, 457 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.).

(2) The Government argues that the aggregate limits further the permissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption. The dif­ficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contribu­tions of any amount, even though Congress’s selection of a base limit indicates its belief that contributions beneath that amount do not create a cognizable risk of corruption. The Government must thus defend the aggregate limits by demonstrating that they prevent cir­cumvention of the base limits, a function they do not serve in any meaningful way. Given the statutes and regulations currently in ef­fect, Buckley’s fear that an individual might “contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate through . . . unear­marked contributions” to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 U. S., at 38, is far too speculative. Even accepting Buckley’s circum­vention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive “massive amounts of money” that could be traced back to a particular donor uninhibited by the aggregate limits. The Government’s scenar­ios offered in support of that possibility are either illegal under cur­rent campaign finance laws or implausible.

(3) The aggregate limits also violate the First Amendment be­cause they are not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.” Buckley, supra, at 25. The Government ar­gues that the aggregate limits prevent an individual from giving to too many initial recipients who might then recontribute a donation, but experience suggests that the vast majority of contributions are retained and spent by their recipients. And the Government has pro­vided no reason to believe that candidates or party committees would dramatically shift their priorities if the aggregate limits were lifted. The indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate lim­its is thus disproportionate to the Government’s interest in prevent­ing circumvention.

Importantly, there are multiple alternatives available to Congress that would serve the Government’s interest in preventing circumven­tion while avoiding “unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights. Buckley, supra, at 25. Such alternatives might include tar­geted restrictions on transfers among candidates and political com­mittees, or tighter earmarking rules. Transfers, after all, are the key to the Government’s concern about circumvention, but they can be addressed without such a direct and broad interference with First Amendment rights.

(4) Disclosure of contributions also reduces the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system. Disclosure requirements, which are justified by “a governmental interest in ‘providing the electorate with information’ about the sources of election-related spending,” Citizens United, supra, at 367, may deter corruption “by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publici­ty,” Buckley, supra at 67. Disclosure requirements may burden speech, but they often represent a less restrictive alternative to flat bans on certain types or quantities of speech. Particularly with mod­ern technology, disclosure now offers more robust protections against corruption than it did when Buckley was decided.

(d) The Government offers an additional rationale for the aggregate limits, arguing that the opportunity for corruption exists whenever a legislator is given a large check, even if the check consists of contri­butions within the base limits to be divided among numerous candi­dates or committees. That rationale dangerously broadens the cir­cumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in prior cases. Buckley confined its analysis to the possibility that “massive amounts of money” could be funneled to a particular candidate in ex­cess of the base limits. 424 U. S., at 38. Recasting as corruption a donor’s widely distributed support for a political party would dramat­ically expand government regulation of the political process. And though the Government suggests that solicitation of large contribu­tions poses the corruption danger, the aggregate limits are not lim­ited to any direct solicitation by an officeholder or candidate. 

JUSTICE THOMAS agreed that the aggregate limits are invalid under the First Amendment, but would overrule Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, and subject BCRA’s aggregate limits to strict scrutiny, which they would surely fail. Buckley’s “analytic foundation . . . was tenuous from the very beginning and has only continued to erode in the inter­vening years.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 412 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Contributions and expenditures are simply “two sides of the same First Amendment coin,” and this Court’s efforts to distinguish the two have produced mere “word games” rather than any cognizable constitutional law principle. Buckley, supra, at 241, 244 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dis­senting in part). (U.S.S.Ct., 02.04.2014, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, Docket 12-536, C.J. Roberts).

Contributions financières aux candidats à des élections fédérales : le droit de participer au processus démocratique par des contributions politiques est protégé par le Premier Amendement de la Constitution fédérale. Ce droit n’est pas absolu. Le Congrès fédéral peut légiférer le système des contributions dans le cadre des campagnes électorales pour parer la corruption ou son apparence (cf. jurisprudence Buckley). Il ne peut toutefois pas légiférer en matière de contributions seulement pour réduire le montant total des sommes investies dans le domaine politique, ni seulement pour restreindre la participation politique de certains en vue d’augmenter l’influence relative d’autres. Les deux lois fédérales électorales principales prévoient deux types de limites s’agissant des contributions financières dans les campagnes électorales. La limite dite de base restreint le montant qu’un donateur peut allouer à un candidat ou à un comité électoral. La limite combinée, de son côté, restreint les montants qu’un donateur peut allouer à l’ensemble des candidats et des comités électoraux. Dans cette affaire, la cour de district fédérale juge que la limite combinée est conforme au Premier Amendement du fait qu’elle prévient le contournement de la législation sur la limite de base, laquelle n’est pas en cause.

La Cour Suprême fédérale annule ce jugement de première instance, et déclare que la législation sur la limite combinée est contraire au Premier Amendement.

Dans sa jurisprudence Buckley, la Cour ne consacre qu’un paragraphe à la question de la limite combinée, jugeant qu’elle est un corollaire de la limite de base, en ce qu’elle permet d’éviter le contournement de la limite de base, la législation relative à cette dernière étant jugée conforme à la Constitution.

La présente espèce n’implique nullement de revoir la distinction opérée par la jurisprudence Buckley entre contributions et dépenses d’une part, et entre les deux standards qui leurs sont applicables respectivement, d’autre part. Que l’on applique l’un ou l’autre des deux standards (« strict scrutiny » ou « closely drawn »), la question en dernière analyse est celle de la relation entre l’objectif gouvernemental allégué (par exemple prévenir la corruption dans le champ électoral) et les moyens sélectionnées pour atteindre cet objectif. Dans cette affaire, la dichotomie entre l’intérêt gouvernemental allégué et les moyens pour l’atteindre, la législation sur la limite combinée n’est pas conforme à la Constitution.

La présente espèce ne remet en cause que le principe de la législation sur la limite combinée et non celle sur la limite de base. La question de la limite combinée n’a pratiquement pas été abordée par Buckley.

Des intérêts significatifs relevant du Premier Amendement sont ici en jeu : une donation à un candidat dans le cadre d’une campagne électorale constitue pour une personne l’exercice de son droit individuel à participer au processus électoral à la fois par expression politique et par association politique.

Une restriction portant sur le nombre de candidats et de comités électoraux qu’un individu peut soutenir n’est guère une restriction modeste aux droits en matière électorale. Le Gouvernement n’est pas non plus autorisé à prescrire à un journal combien de candidats il est en droit de soutenir. En résumé, la législation sur la limite combinée interdit à un individu de contribuer pleinement aux campagnes des élections primaire et générale lorsque sont en lice 10 candidats ou davantage, même si l’ensemble de ses contributions respectent la limite de base. On ne saurait soutenir à ce niveau qu’il suffit pour le donateur de verser des montants inférieurs à la limite de base pour pouvoir soutenir davantage de candidats. Pratiquer ainsi reviendrait à pénaliser le droit de la personne à exercer ses droits découlant du Premier Amendement de manière énergique (« robustly »).

La législation sur la limite combinée n’est pas adéquate pour concrétiser l’intérêt admissible du Gouvernement à prévenir la corruption ou son apparence.

La Cour n’a identifié qu’un intérêt gouvernemental légitime pour limiter les contributions financières dans les campagnes électorales : prévenir la corruption ou l’apparence de celle-ci. Par ailleurs, contribuer par de larges sommes ne veut encore pas dire vouloir contrôler l’action du parlementaire élu, de sorte que l’apparence de corruption n’est pas réalisée du seul fait de dépenser de larges sommes dans la campagne électorale. La possibilité qu’un donateur qui dépense d’importantes sommes pourrait ainsi influencer l’élu n’est pas en soi un fait établi.

D’autre part, la notion de limite combinée viole aussi le premier Amendement parce qu’elle n’est pas précisément cadrée pour éviter sans nécessité des restrictions à la liberté d’association. L’interdiction sans aucune distinction de toutes les contributions au-dessus de la limite combinée est disproportionnée en comparaison avec l’intérêt gouvernemental à prévenir le contournement de la législation électorale.

Il est important de remarquer que le Congrès dispose de multiples alternatives susceptibles de servir l’intérêt du Gouvernement à prévenir ce contournement, tout en évitant des restrictions sans nécessité des droits découlant du Premier Amendement, telle par exemple une réglementation des restrictions de transferts parmi les candidats et les comités politiques.  Par ailleurs, la publication des contributions réduit également le potentiel d’abus du système de financement des campagnes électorales. Des obligations de publications, justifiées par un intérêt gouvernemental à procurer à l’électorat des informations relatives aux sources des dépenses liées aux élections, peuvent prévenir la corruption en exposant publiquement  aussi bien les larges contributions que les dépenses importantes. Des obligations de publicité peuvent porter atteinte à la liberté d’expression, mais elles représentent souvent une alternative d’une nature moins restrictive que de simples interdictions de certains types ou de certaines « quantité » d’expression. Particulièrement grâce à la technologie moderne, la publication maintenant offre une protection plus robuste contre la corruption qu’à l’époque où a été rendue la jurisprudence Buckley.

Le Juge Thomas est lui aussi d’avis que la législation sur la limite combinée ne résiste pas au Premier Amendement. Mais il souhaiterait en plus renverser la décision Buckley v. Valeo. Selon lui, les contributions et les dépenses ne sont que les deux faces de la même pièce soumise au Premier Amendement, et, toujours selon lui, les efforts de la Cour pour les distinguer n’ont produit que des jeux de mots, au lieu de principes de droit constitutionnel compréhensibles.

American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock

Election law: corporations expenditures: First Amendment: a Montana state law provides that a “corporation may not make . . . an expenditure in connection with a candi­date or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.” Mont. Code Ann. §13–35–227(1) (2011). The Montana Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ claim that this statute violates the First Amendment. 2011 MT 328, 363 Mont. 220, 271 P. 3d 1. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, this Court struck down a similar federal law, holding that “political speech does not lose First Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation.” 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 26). The question presented in this case is whether the holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana state law. There can be no serious doubt that it does. See U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Montana’s arguments in support of the judgment below either were already rejected in Citi­zens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.

The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana is reversed (U.S.S.Ct., 25.06.12, American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, Per Curiam).

Loi électorale : soutien financier des entreprises commerciales aux candidats : Premier Amendement : une loi de l’état du Montana prévoit qu’une entreprise commerciale ne peut pas dépenser des fonds au profit d’un candidat ou au profit d’un comité politique qui supporte ou qui s’oppose à un candidat ou à un parti politique. Cette loi porte atteinte au Premier Amendement de la Constitution fédérale. La jurisprudence de la Cour « Citizens United » s’applique. Dans cette jurisprudence, la Cour avait annulé une loi fédérale de même contenu que la loi en question de l’état du Montana, en considérant que le discours politique ne perd pas la protection que lui confère le Premier Amendement simplement du fait qu’une entreprise commerciale est à sa source.