P. v. Martinez, S199495

Plea bargain and deportation (California): Penal Code section 1016.5 requires that before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any criminal offense, the trial court must advise the defendant that if he or she is not a United States citizen, conviction of the offense may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.  (Pen. Code, § 1016.5, subd. (a).)  If the advisement was not given, and the defendant shows that conviction of the offense to which he or she pleaded guilty or nolo contendere may result in adverse immigration consequences, the court, on the defendant’s motion, is required to vacate the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea and enter a plea of not guilty.  (Id., subd. (b).)  Relief will be granted, however, only if the defendant establishes prejudice.  (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 210 (Zamudio).)  As we explained in Zamudio, prejudice is shown if the defendant establishes it was reasonably probable he or she would not have pleaded guilty if properly advised.  (Ibid.)

We granted review to consider whether a court ruling on a motion to vacate pursuant to section 1016.5 may deny relief, for lack of prejudice, if it concludes the defendant would not have obtained a more favorable outcome had he or she chosen not to plead guilty or nolo contendere.  We hold that because the question is what the defendant would have done, relief should be granted if the court, after considering evidence offered by the parties relevant to that question, determines the defendant would have chosen not to plead guilty or nolo contendere, even if the court also finds it not reasonably probable the defendant would thereby have obtained a more favorable outcome. Having so concluded, we also consider whether, as defendant contends, the court ruling on the motion may consider a claim that the defendant would have rejected the existing plea bargain to attempt to negotiate a bargain that would not result in deportation, a denial of naturalization, or exclusion from admission to the United States, or if, as the Attorney General contends, relief is available only if the defendant would have rejected the plea bargain to go to trial.  We hold relief is available if the defendant establishes he or she would have rejected the existing bargain to accept or attempt to negotiate another.

Because the trial court in this case denied relief on the ground there was no reasonable probability defendant would have obtained a more favorable result by rejecting the plea bargain, which is not the test for prejudice, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the trial court’s order denying relief and direct it to remand the matter to the trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with our opinion here (Cal. S. Ct., 08.08.2013, P. v. Martinez, S199495).

Peine pénale négociée et expulsion des Etats-Unis : état du droit californien à ce sujet : le Code pénal de l’état prévoit qu’avant que le prévenu n’accepte un plea bargain ou avant qu’il n’accepte de plaider « nolo contendere », il doit être informé par le Tribunal que s’il n’est pas un citoyen des Etats-Unis, un jugement condamnatoire est susceptible d’entraîner une expulsion, une exclusion d’admission sur le territoire U.S., ou un refus de naturalisation. Si ces informations n’ont pas été données et que le condamné parvient à démontrer que le jugement condamnatoire est susceptible de lui porter préjudice au sens de ce qui précède (expulsion, refus d’entrée, refus de naturalisation), le Tribunal doit, à la demande du condamné, annuler le jugement et permettre au prévenu de retirer son plea, tout en l’autorisant à plaider non coupable. Ces remèdes ne seront accordés au condamné que s’il établit un préjudice. Le préjudice est démontré à satisfaction si le condamné peut établir qu’il était raisonnablement probable qu’il n’aurait pas plaidé coupable s’il avait été informé correctement des conséquences.

L’élément décisif pour accorder l’annulation du jugement est de déterminer ce que le condamné aurait fait si les informations précitées lui avaient été données. Il est sans importance que le jugement aurait été le même dans l’hypothèse où le prévenu n’avait pas plaidé coupable.

De même, le jugement doit être annulé si le condamné non informé peut établir que si les informations lui avaient été données, il aurait rejeté l’accord en question pour tenter d’en négocier un autre ou pour en accepter un autre.

U.S. v. Davila

Plea bargain:  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 governs guilty pleas. Rule 11(c)(1) instructs that “the court must not participate in plea dis­cussions,” and Rule 11(h) states that a “variance from the require­ments of the rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial rights.” Rule 52(a), which covers trial court errors generally, similar­ly prescribes: “any error . . . that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Held: Under Rule 11(h), vacatur of the plea is not in order if the record shows no prejudice to Davila’s decision to plead guilty. Rule 11(h) was added in the 1983 Amendment to make clear that Rule 11 errors are not excepted from Rule 52(a)’s harmless-error inquiry. Rule 52 also states, in subsection (b), that a “plain error that affects substan­tial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the trial court’s attention.” When Rule 52(a) governs, the prosecution has the burden of showing harmlessness, but when Rule 52(b) con­trols, the defendant must show that the error affects substantial rights. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 62. Rule 11(c)(1) was adopted as a prophylactic measure, not one im­pelled by the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional re­quirement. Thus, violation of the Rule does not belong in the highly exceptional category of structural errors—e.g., denial of counsel of choice or denial of a public trial—that trigger automatic reversal be­cause they undermine the fairness of the entire criminal proceeding. United States v. Marcus, 560 U. S. 258, ___.(…) The Court again held that Rule 52(b) controlled, and prescribed the standard a defendant silent until appeal must meet to show “plain error,” namely, “a reasonable probability that, but for the Rule 11 error, he would not have en­tered the plea.” 542 U. S., at 83. The Court of Appeals, therefore, should not have assessed the Magistrate Judge’s comments in isolation. In­stead, it should have considered, in light of the full record, whether it was reasonably probable that, but for the Magistrate Judge’s com­ments, Davila would have exercised his right to go to trial. The Court decides only that the automatic-vacatur rule is incompatible with Rule 11(h) and leaves all remaining issues to be addressed on remand (U.S.S.Ct., 13.06.2013, U.S. v. Davila, J. Ginsburg).

Peine négociée : selon les Règles fédérales de procédure pénale, le Tribunal ne doit pas participer aux négociations en vue de déterminer une peine négociée. Cependant, si cette règle n'est pas respectée mais qu'elle n'affecte pas de droit substantiel, l'erreur ne cause pas de préjudice et reste sans conséquence. Cette conception est conforme à la Règle 52(a) relative aux erreurs commises par le Tribunal pénal de première instance, qui dispose de la même manière. Par ailleurs, la Règle 52(b) prévoit qu'une erreur manifeste qui affecte des droits substantiels peut être relevée d'office par le Tribunal. En cas d'application de la Règle 52(a), il appartient à l'accusation de démontrer que l'erreur n'a porté aucun préjudice à l'accusé. En cas d'application de la Règle 52(b), c'est à l'accusé de démontrer que l'erreur affecte ses droits substantiels. En l'espèce, en application de la Règle 52(b), l'accusé, qui est resté silencieux jusqu'à la procédure de recours, doit démontrer, pour l'emporter, qu'il existe une erreur manifeste dans la procédure, à savoir qu'il existe une probabilité raisonnable que sans l'erreur, il n'aurait pas convenu de la peine avec l'accusation (dans cette affaire, l'accusé avait demandé à pouvoir changer d'avocat d'office. Une audience in camera devant un Magistrat unique avait été appointée pour débattre de cette question, en l'absence de l'accusation. Lors de dite audience, le Magistrat a clairement encouragé l'accusé à accepter la peine négociée en indiquant que l'accusation disposait d'un dossier très solide. Mais le prévenu a eu le temps de la réflexion et a passé son Plea environ 3 mois après dite audience. Dès lors, probablement pas d'erreur manifeste en l'espèce, mais l'affaire est retournée à la juridiction précédente pour nouvelle décision).

Missouri v. Frye

Attorney: ineffective assistance of counsel: the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel ex­tends to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected. That right applies to “all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 778, 786. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, established that Strickland’s two-part test governs ineffective assistance claims in the plea bargain context. There, the defendant had alleged that his counsel had given him inadequate advice about his plea, but he failed to show that he would have proceeded to trial had he received the proper advice. 474 U. S., at 60. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ___, where a plea offer was set aside because counsel had misinformed the defendant of its immigration conse­quences, this Court made clear that “the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical” stage for ineffective-assistance purposes, id., at ___, and rejected the argument made by the State in this case that a knowing and voluntary plea supersedes defense counsel’s errors; Respondent Frye was charged with driving with a revoked license. Be­cause he had been convicted of the same offense three times before, he was charged, under Missouri law, with a felony carrying a maxi­mum 4-year prison term. The prosecutor sent Frye’s counsel a letter, offering two possible plea bargains, including an offer to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor and to recommend, with a guilty plea, a 90 ­day sentence. Counsel did not convey the offers to Frye, and they ex­pired. Less than a week before Frye’s preliminary hearing, he was again arrested for driving with a revoked license. He subsequently pleaded guilty with no underlying plea agreement and was sentenced to three years in prison. Seeking postconviction relief in state court, he alleged his counsel’s failure to inform him of the earlier plea offers denied him the effective assistance of counsel, and he testified that he would have pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor had he known of the offer; 97 percent of federal con­victions and 94 percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas; here, as the result of counsel’s deficient performance, the offers lapsed. Under Strickland, the question then becomes what, if any, prejudice resulted from the breach of duty; to show prejudice where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s deficient performance, defendants must demon­strate a reasonable probability both that they would have accepted the more favorable plea offer had they been afforded effective assis­tance of counsel and that the plea would have been entered without the prosecution’s canceling it or the trial court’s refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under state law. This application of Strickland to uncommunicated, lapsed pleas does not alter Hill’s standard, which requires a defendant complaining that ineffective assistance led him to accept a plea offer instead of go­ing to trial to show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 474 U. S., at 59. Hill correctly applies in the context in which it arose, but it does not provide the sole means for demon­strating prejudice arising from counsel’s deficient performance dur­ing plea negotiations. Because Frye argues that with effective assis­tance he would have accepted an earlier plea offer as opposed to entering an open plea, Strickland’s inquiry into whether “the result of the proceeding would have been different,” 466 U. S., at 694, re­quires looking not at whether the defendant would have proceeded to trial but at whether he would have accepted the earlier plea offer. He must also show that, if the prosecution had the discretion to can­cel the plea agreement or the trial court had the discretion to refuse to accept it, there is a reasonable probability neither the prosecution nor the trial court would have prevented the offer from being accept­ed or implemented. This further showing is particularly important because a defendant has no right to be offered a plea, see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U. S. 545, 561, nor a federal right that the judge accept it, Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 262. Missouri, among other States, appears to give the prosecution some discretion to cancel a plea agreement; and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, some state rules, including Missouri’s, and this Court’s precedents give tri­al courts some leeway to accept or reject plea agreements.

Applying these standards here, the Missouri court correctly con­cluded that counsel’s failure to inform Frye of the written plea offer before it expired fell below an objective reasonableness standard, but it failed to require Frye to show that the plea offer would have been adhered to by the prosecution and accepted by the trial court. These matters should be addressed by the Missouri appellate court in the first instance. Given that Frye’s new offense for driving without a li­cense occurred a week before his preliminary hearing, there is reason to doubt that the prosecution would have adhered to the agreement or that the trial court would have accepted it unless they were re­quired by state law to do so. 311 S. W. 3d 350, vacated and remanded (U.S. S. Ct., 21.03.12, Missouri v. Frye, J. Kennedy).

Avocat : violation de son devoir de diligence dû à son client : le Sixième amendement de la Constitution fédérale prévoit que le droit à une assistance effective de son avocat s'étend à toutes les étapes critiques de la procédure pénale, y compris la procédure dans laquelle la culpabilité et la peine sont négociées avec l'accusation. La jurisprudence Strickland prévoit un test en deux parties s'agissant d'apprécier si le travail de l'avocat était ou non suffisant dans le contexte de ces peines négociées. La question, en dernière analyse, est celle de savoir si un préjudice résulte de l'assistance déficiente de l'avocat. Pour établir l'existence d'un dommage dans le cas d'une offre d'accord avec l'accusation, offre qui a expiré, le client de l'avocat doit démontrer, selon le critère de la probabilité raisonnable, qu'il aurait accepté l'accord, que l'accusation n'aurait pas retiré l'offre, et que le Tribunal aurait accepté l'accord (bien entendu si le droit étatique accorde ces possibilités de retrait et d'acceptation). De même, si un client se plaint d'avoir été mal conseillé et d'avoir ainsi accepté un accord avec l'accusation, il appartient à ce client d'établir selon le critère de la probabilité raisonnable que sans le conseil de son avocat, il aurait choisi le procès plutôt que l'accord. En outre, si le client soutient que s'il avait été conseillé correctement il aurait accepté un accord avant procès plutôt qu'un accord ultérieur (open plea), la jurisprudence Strickland implique d'établir que le client aurait accepté l'accord avant procès. Un prévenu n'a pas un droit de se voir offrir un accord, ni un droit (fédéral, découlant des Règles fédérales de procédure pénale) qui imposerait au Tribunal d'accepter l'accord.

Padilla v. Kentucky

Attorney: Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel: advices linked to deportation: petitioner Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United States for over 40 years, faces deportation after pleading guilty to drug distribution charges in Kentucky. In postconviction proceedings, he claims that his counsel not only failed to advise him of this consequence before he entered the plea, but also told him not to worry about deportation since he had lived in this country so long. He alleges that he would have gone to trial had he not received this incorrect advice; because counsel must inform a client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation, Padilla has sufficiently alleged that his counsel was constitutionally deficient. Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter not addressed here; as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, applies to Padilla’s claim. Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to “the effective assistance of competent counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771. The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla’s ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about deportation concerned only collateral matters. However, this Court has never distinguished between direct and collateral consequences in defining the scope of constitutionally “reasonable professional assistance” required under Strickland, 466 U. S., at 689; to satisfy Strickland’s two-prong inquiry, counsel’s representation must fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 466 U. S., at 688, and there must be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”; whether he can satisfy the second prong, prejudice, is left for the Kentucky courts to consider in the first instance (U.S. S. Ct., 31.03.10, Padilla v. Kentucky, J. Stevens).

Avocat : assistance ineffective de l’avocat au sens du Sixième Amendement : conseils liés au risque d'exécution du renvoi : le recourant Padilla, au bénéfice du statut de résident permanent aux U.S. durant les 40 dernières années, fait face à un risque de renvoi après avoir plaidé coupable dans une affaire de distribution de drogue au Kentucky. Dans une procédure subséquente à sa condamnation, il soutient que son avocat ne l’a pas informé du risque de déportation avant qu’il ne plaide coupable et qu’il lui a dit de ne pas se faire de souci à ce sujet, considérant la durée de sa résidence aux U.S. Il soutient aussi que sans ces conseils défectueux, il n’aurait pas plaidé coupable et aurait choisi le procès. Selon la Cour, l’avocat doit informer du risque de renvoi en cas de reconnaissance de culpabilité, de sorte que Padilla a démontré que les conseils de son avocat étaient constitutionnellement insuffisants. Il a droit à compensation s’il parvient à démontrer qu’il a subi un préjudice, une question qui n’est pas présente devant la Cour en l’espèce. Selon le droit fédéral, le renvoi constitue une partie de la peine que doit subir un prévenu qui plaide coupable dans des cas tels la présente espèce, si ce prévenu n’est pas au bénéfice de la citoyenneté U.S. La jurisprudence Strickland s’applique à la prétention de Padilla. Avant de décider de plaider coupable, un prévenu a droit à une assistance effective et compétente de l’avocat. La cour suprême du Kentucky a rejeté la prétention de Padilla en considérant que les conseils relatifs à la question du renvoi ne sont que de nature collatérale. Mais la présente Cour n’a jamais fait de distinction entre des conséquences directes et des conséquences collatérales en définissant l’étendue constitutionnelle de l’assistance professionnelle raisonnable imposée par la jurisprudence Strickland. Pour satisfaire aux exigences de la jurisprudence Strickland, le recourant doit démontrer que la qualité de représentation de l’avocat était au-dessous d’un standard objectif raisonnable, et doit démontrer la probabilité raisonnable que, sans les erreurs professionnelles de l’avocat, le résultat de la procédure aurait été différent. S’agissant de cette seconde exigence, il appartient aux tribunaux du Kentucky de se prononcer en premier lieu.