U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. FCA US LLC, Docket No. 21-35561

Trademark

 

First Sale Doctrine

 

 

The first sale doctrine applies when a trademarked product has been incorporated in a new product

 

Certification Marks

 

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington

 

Interlocutory Appeal

 

Per Curiam Opinion

 

 

 

This interlocutory appeal concerns the scope of the first sale doctrine in trademark law. Defendant-appellant FCA US LLC invoked the first sale doctrine as a defense to trademark claims asserted against it by plaintiff-appellee Bluetooth SIG Inc.  (“the SIG”). After granting summary judgment for the SIG on the first sale issue, the district court certified the following question to us:  does the first sale doctrine apply “when a trademarked product has been incorporated in a new product?”  We answer “yes,” and we accordingly vacate the district court’s summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

 

 

The SIG is a nonprofit that administers standards for short-range wireless technology. The SIG owns the word mark, “Bluetooth,” the design mark, and the composite.

 

 

To use any of these marks, a product manufacturer must join the SIG, execute a licensing agreement, submit declarations of compliance, and pay fees. Manufacturers of technological components are subject to     testing requirements, but end product manufacturers may not need further testing if they incorporate a previously qualified product. FCA makes cars under the brands Fiat, Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, and Ram.

 

 

FCA vehicles contain Bluetooth-equipped head units. Those head units are manufactured by third-party suppliers and have been qualified by the SIG, but FCA has not taken the further steps required by the SIG to qualify the Bluetooth capabilities of its cars. FCA uses the SIG’s marks on its head units and in product publications. The SIG brought trademark claims against FCA, and FCA asserted numerous defenses, including under the first sale doctrine. Ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found triable issues on whether (1) the Bluetooth word mark is generic, (2) there was a likelihood of confusion under the nominative fair use doctrine, (3) the SIG had abandoned its marks in the automotive industry through naked licensing, and (4) laches applied.

 

 

1 The word and composite are certification marks, which are “owned by one person and used by others in connection with their goods and services to certify quality, regional or other origin.”  McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:91 (5th ed. 2022).

 

 

After vacating a trial date set in September 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the district court certified for interlocutory appeal whether the first sale doctrine applies “when a trademarked product has been incorporated into a new product.” A motions panel of this court granted FCA’s petition for interlocutory appeal. The district court then stayed proceedings pending resolution of this appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

 

 

Under the first sale doctrine, “with certain well-defined exceptions, the right of a producer to control the distribution of its trademarked product does not extend beyond the first sale of the product.” Sebastian Int’l, Inc.  v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). “Trademark rights are ‘exhausted’ as to a given item upon the first authorized sale of that item.” McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 25:41. The district court’s narrow view of the first sale doctrine was based on our statement in Sebastian that “it is the essence of the ‘first sale’ doctrine that a purchaser who does no more than stock, display, and resell a producer’s product under the producer’s trademark violates no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act.” 53 F.3d at 1076.

 

 

Sebastian never purported to articulate the outer bounds of the first sale doctrine. It simply captured that the unauthorized resale of genuine goods presents an easy case for protecting a downstream seller. See id. (explaining that “when a purchaser resells a trademarked article under the producer’s trademark, and nothing more, there is no actionable misrepresentation under the statute.”).

 

 

Binding precedent extends the first sale doctrine beyond what Sebastian described as the doctrine’s “essence.” The first sale doctrine in trademark law derives from Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2010). Prestonettes itself applied the first sale doctrine to conduct exceeding the resale of genuine goods. In Prestonettes, the defendant was a cosmetics manufacturer that purchased genuine powder manufactured by the plaintiff, and then “subjected it to pressure, added a binder to give it coherence and sold the compact in a metal case.” 264 U.S. at 366. The Supreme Court held that trademark law did not prohibit the defendant from using the plaintiff’s mark “collaterally, not to indicate the goods, but to say that the trade-marked product is a constituent in the article now offered as new and changed.”  Id. at 369. So long as the public was “adequately informed” who modified the powder, the Court reasoned, the public was “likely to find it out” if the defendant’s process degraded the quality of the plaintiff’s powder. Id. Following Prestonettes, we applied the first sale doctrine to a retailer’s repackaging of a manufacturer’s trademarked goods. In Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., we held that the first sale doctrine protected a retailer that resold porcelain dolls in allegedly inadequate packaging to the extent the repackaging was disclosed. 146 F.3d 1083, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 1998). We explained that “if the public were adequately informed that Price/Costco repackaged the figurines and the figurines were subsequently chipped, the public would not likely be confused as to the cause of the chipping.” Id. at 1087 (citing Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 369).

 

 

Under Prestonettes and Enesco, the first sale doctrine applies when a mark is used to refer to a component incorporated into a new end product.

 

 

Both Prestonettes and Enesco focused on a seller’s disclosure of how a trademarked product was incorporated and explained that the first sale doctrine places limits on a seller’s liability to the extent that adequate disclosures are made. See Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 368 (explaining that a trademark “does not confer a right to prohibit the use of the word or words” and cannot be used “to prevent its being used to tell the truth”); Enesco, 146 F.3d at 1086–87 (holding that the first sale doctrine did not apply to the extent the product manufacturer sought to compel disclosure of how the product was repackaged but did apply to the extent further relief was sought); see also Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947) (citing Prestonettes and explaining that “full disclosure” of alterations to a manufacturer’s product “gives the manufacturer all the protection to which he is entitled”). In addressing the role of disclosure at oral argument, the parties disagreed about whether FCA had adequately disclosed its relationship with, and qualification to use, Bluetooth technology. Because the district court never reached this fact-intensive issue, we remand for the district court to address it in the first instance.

 

 

In addition to precedent, that conclusion is supported by influential treatises. See McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 25:35.50 (“Use of an ingredient trademark is proper so long as consumers are not confused or deceived into thinking that the maker of the ingredient is responsible for the nature or quality of the finished product.”); Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 22:51 (4th ed. 2021) (“The seller of the finished product is allowed to use the supplier’s mark to identify the source of such parts or materials. . . .  But the manufacturer of the new product or combination may not mislead the public regarding the extent of the new product composed of that ingredient. . . .”).

 

 

Relying on our statement in Au-Tomotive Goldthat the first sale doctrine is “generally focused on the likelihood of confusion among consumers,” 603 F.3d at 1136, the SIG also argues that summary judgment can be affirmed because the district court determined that a triable issue exists as to likelihood of confusion. The first sale doctrine “accommodates between the strong and potentially conflicting forces” of, on the one hand, protecting good will and preventing confusion, and on the other, “preserving an area for competition by limiting the producer’s power to control the resale of its product.”  Sebastian, 53 F.3d at 1075. In the context of pure resales, that balance is easily struck because “confusion ordinarily does not exist when a genuine article bearing a true mark is sold.” NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987). But under Prestonettes and Enesco, in the context of incorporated products, how those conflicting purposes are reconciled will depend in some way on how a seller uses the mark of the incorporated product in connection with a new product. While our jurisdiction is not strictly limited to the certified question, see Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996), the district court is better positioned to address these questions in the first instance with the benefit of briefing and specific analysis of how FCA uses the SIG’s marks.

 

 

Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the SIG on the first sale issue and we REMAND for further proceedings.

 

 

For the same reason, we decline to reach the other alternate ground on which the SIG asks us to affirm – the exceptions to the first sale doctrine.  Because the district court concluded that the first sale doctrine was categorically inapplicable in the incorporation context, it never addressed the SIG’s arguments on the exceptions. The district court may consider these arguments on remand.

 

 

 

 

Secondary authorities: McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 25:35.50; Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 22:51 (4th ed. 2021).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, April 6, 2022, Bluetooth SIG Inc. v. FCA US LLC, Docket No. 21-35561, for Publication)

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Plixer International, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GMBH, Docket No. 18-1195

Jurisdiction: Specific personal jurisdiction: Trademark infringement: Internet: Websites: Due Process: Fifth Amendment: Interlocutory appeal:

Given the particular facts of this case, we affirm the thoughtful holding of the district court that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction against a German corporation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) does not offend the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. We note that this is an area in which the Supreme Court has not yet had the occasion to give clear guidance, and so we deliberately avoid creating any broad rules.

Scrutinizer GmbH (Scrutinizer) is a German corporation with its principal place of business in Kassel, Germany. Through its interactive, English-language website, Scrutinizer runs a "selfservice platform" that helps customers build better software. Scrutinizer brings its customers' code from a third-party hosting service like GitHub2 to its "controlled cloud environment," where it runs "software analysis tools" meant to "improve source-code quality, eliminate bugs, and find security vulnerabilities."

Customers who contract to use Scrutinizer's online service can pay only in euros. Scrutinizer's standard contract with those customers contains a forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law clause that provide that all lawsuits relating to the contract be brought in German courts and under German law. Scrutinizer maintains no U.S. office, phone number, or agent for service of process; it directs no advertising at the United States; and its employees do not go to the United States on business.

Scrutinizer provides its service globally.

Plixer International, Inc. (Plixer), a Maine corporation, sued Scrutinizer in federal district court in Maine on November 21, 2016, for trademark infringement.

(…) Scrutinizer moved for permission to file an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court granted that motion. The district court found that the matter met the standard for such an appeal: it involved a controlling question of law on which there was substantial ground for difference of opinion and the resolution of which would help bring an end to the litigation.

We granted this interlocutory appeal on the district court's recommendation.

Plixer's basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over Scrutinizer is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

Rule 4(k)(2) states: For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.

Rule 4(k)(2) has three requirements: (1) the cause of action must arise under federal law; (2) the defendant must not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of general jurisdiction; and (3) the federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with due process.

All parties agree that the first two requirements are met here. The question is whether personal jurisdiction comports with due process.

This is a federal question case, so constitutional limits on jurisdiction come from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires the plaintiff to "show that the defendant has adequate contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with a particular state."

To see if Scrutinizer's nationwide contacts are adequate, we turn to the familiar "minimum contacts" framework.

Plixer has asserted specific personal jurisdiction over Scrutinizer, so the minimum contacts inquiry has three prongs: relatedness, purposeful availment, and reasonableness.

That is, Plixer must show that (1) its claim directly arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum activities; (2) the defendant's forum contacts represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in that forum, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the forum's laws and rendering the defendant's involuntary presence in the forum's courts foreseeable; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. A Corp., 812 F.3d at 59.

Scrutinizer has conceded the first requirement; we hold that Plixer has met the remaining two.

A Corp., 812 F.3d at 61 (holding that "the mere availability of a passive website" cannot by itself subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum).

Cossaboon v. Maine Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that the running of a "website that is visible in a forum and that gives information about a company and its products" cannot alone support the exercise of jurisdiction).

The district court held that Scrutinizer had not merely made its website available in the United States; it had used that website to engage "in sizeable and continuing commerce with United States customers." Plixer, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 242. As a result, Scrutinizer "should not be surprised at United States-based litigation." Id. We agree.

(…) An objectively clearer picture of Scrutinizer's intent to serve the forum, the crux of the purposeful availment inquiry. See C.W. Downer, 771 F.3d at 66.

(…) Scrutinizer can take steps to limit access to its website. For instance, Scrutinizer could design its site to not interact with U.S. users, cf. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2006), but it has not done so.

And Scrutinizer could take the low-tech step of posting a disclaimer that its service is not intended for U.S. users. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997); cf. Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 755 (7^th Cir. 2010). Again, it has not done so. Instead, Scrutinizer's website (https://scrutinizer-ci.com/) is globally accessible.

In contrast, Scrutinizer did take a step to deal with foreign contract-based litigation -- it included a forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law clause in its standard customer contract. Those clauses provide that all lawsuits be brought in German courts and under German law. But Scrutinizer never suggests that Plixer could bring this suit in an alternate forum, whether Germany or elsewhere. And the clauses do not apply here; Plixer is not a party to Scrutinizer's contract, and Scrutinizer does not suggest that Plixer is bound by the contract. As the district court correctly noted, those clauses suggest that Scrutinizer "knew it was extending its reach outside Germany." Plixer, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 241.

(…) Second, Scrutinizer voluntarily served U.S. customers. Specific personal jurisdiction must be based on a defendant's voluntary contact with the forum.

Third, Scrutinizer's purposeful U.S. contacts were sufficient to put Scrutinizer on notice that it should expect to be haled into U.S. court. Scrutinizer has "targeted the world" by making its website globally accessible. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring). But Scrutinizer says that it could not reasonably anticipate specific jurisdiction because it did not specifically target the United States with its business. We disagree.

(…) Ultimately, although a close call, we conclude that the German company could have "reasonably anticipated" the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction based on its U.S. contacts. Scrutinizer's "regular flow or regular course of sales" in the United States show that it has purposefully availed itself of the U.S. forum. The record does not reveal what percentage of Scrutinizer's business came from the United States. Nor does the record reveal whether Scrutinizer ever did an online trademark search for the term "Scrutinizer," either before or after it sought U.S. customers.

(Since 2000, the public has been able to search and retrieve for free "the almost millions of pending, registered, abandoned, cancelled or expired trademark registrations" online. McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:6 (5th ed.)).

(…) The record does show that Scrutinizer used its website to obtain U.S. customer contracts. Those contracts yielded nearly $200,000 in business over three-and-a-half years. This is not a situation where a defendant merely made a website accessible in the forum.

In contrast, a New Jersey federal district court found no regular course of sales when, over about a year, fewer than ten in-state sales brought the defendant "less than $3,383 in revenue." Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 514-15 (D. N.J. 2011). "Such scant sales activity" did not "justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction" there.

Reasonableness: Though Plixer has satisfied the first two prongs of the analysis, we must still see whether the exercise of jurisdiction here is fair and reasonable. We consider five "gestalt" factors: (1) the defendant's burden of appearing in the forum, (2) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies.

We consider first the burden on Scrutinizer. (…) For further support, Scrutinizer points to the burden of cross-Atlantic travel. (…) and modern travel "creates no especially ponderous burden for business travelers," (…) A defendant hoping to show that travel burdens should make the difference must show that those burdens are "special or unusual." (…) many of the case's logistical challenges "can be resolved through the use of affidavits and video devices."

On the second factor, Scrutinizer does not dispute that the United States has an interest in adjudicating a dispute over the application of U.S. trademark law. (…) Further, the United States has an interest in remedying an alleged injury that occurs in the United States.

(…) "When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant."

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Sept. 13, 2018, Plixer International, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GMBH, Docket No. 18-1195, Circuit Judge Lynch)

Une entreprise allemande propose ses services (dans le domaine digital) par le biais de son site Internet. Le site et les services sont accessibles dans le monde entier. Un certain nombre de clients sont domiciliés dans divers états U.S. Ils rapportent à l’entreprise un chiffre d’affaire non négligeable.

L’entreprise n’a pas davantage de présence aux Etats-Unis. Elle n’y a ni présence physique ni employé. Elle n’a pas nommé d’agent auquel un envoi officiel pourrait être notifiée.

Une entreprise de l’état du Maine ouvre action devant la cour de district fédérale pour violation du droit des marques.

La question de la compétence de la cour est litigieuse.

En application du Cinquième Amendement de la Constitution fédérale (Due Process Clause), et tout en reconnaissant l’absence de jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême fédérale sur les questions précises que pose le cas d’espèce, le Premier Circuit fédéral juge que les conditions de la juridiction personnelle spécifique sont données, en précisant que la décision se limite aux faits de la cause et ne doit pas être interprétée largement. Le critère déterminant au sens du Cinquième Amendement est celui des contacts suffisants avec les Etats-Unis plutôt qu’avec l’un de ses états en particulier.

L’entreprise allemande n’a pas bloqué l’accès de son site aux clients U.S., n’a même pas posté un disclaimer refusant les clients U.S., mais, au contraire, leur propose, ainsi qu’au reste du monde, de contracter avec elle par le biais d’un site Internet en anglais. Elle a exécuté contre paiement nombre de prestations en faveur de nombre de clients U.S., et devait ainsi s’attendre à être actionnée devant une cour U.S. Le fait d’avoir inséré dans ses conditions contractuelles la loi allemande comme droit applicable et une cour allemande comme Tribunal compétent n’est d’aucun secours à l’entreprise allemande : bien au contraire, ces indications démontrent une volonté de s’engager internationalement, et la demanderesse à l’action en violation du droit à la marque n’est pas en rapport contractuel avec l’entreprise allemande.

Enfin, reconnaître la compétence de la cour de district fédérale satisfait aussi la condition d’une reconnaissance équitable : les voyages transatlantiques ne sont pas un fardeau qui ne saurait être exigé. D’autant que les productions de pièces et l’usage de moyens vidéos peuvent permettre d’éviter le déplacement de personnes. Un voyage transatlantique qui serait spécialement problématique peut permettre une décision d’incompétence de la cour U.S.

Blueford v. Arkansas

Double Jeopardy Clause: after deliberating for a few hours, the jury reported that it could not reach a verdict. The court inquired about the jury’s progress on each offense. The foreperson disclosed that the jury was unanimous against guilt on the charges of capital murder and first-degree-murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not voted on negligent homicide. The court told the jury to continue to deliberate. The jury did so but still could not reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. When the State subsequently sought to retry Blueford, he moved to dismiss the capital and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the motion, and the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed on interlocutory appeal.

Held: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrying Blueford on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder; the jury did not acquit Blueford of capital or first-degree murder. Blueford contends that the foreperson’s report that the jury was unanimous against guilt on the murder offenses represented a resolution of some or all of the elements of those offenses in his favor. But the report was not a final resolution of anything. When the foreperson told the court how the jury had voted on each offense, the jury’s deliberations had not yet concluded. The jurors in fact went back to the jury room to deliberate further, and nothing in the court's instructions prohibited them from reconsidering their votes on capital and first-degree murder as deliberations continued. The foreperson’s report prior to the end of deliberations therefore lacked the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those offenses. That same lack of finality undermines Blueford’s reliance on Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, and Price v. Georgia, 398 U. S. 323. In both of those cases, the verdict of the jury was a final decision; here, the report of the foreperson was not;

as permitted under Arkansas law, the jury’s options in this case were limited to two: either convict on one of the offenses, or acquit on all. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to add another option—that of acquitting on some offenses but not others (U.S.S.Ct., 24.05.12, Blueford v. Arkansas, C.J. Roberts).

Ne bis in idem : après avoir délibéré pendant quelques heures, le jury reporta à la cour qu’il n’avait pu se mettre d’accord sur la condamnation. La cour demanda au représentant du jury quel était le stade d’avancement des discussions. Le représentant répondit que le jury estimait de manière unanime que le prévenu était innocent s’agissant de la prévention de meurtre (capital et first-degree) mais qu’il était bloqué s’agissant des charges de manslaughter, et qu’il n’avait pas voté sur la charge d’homicide par négligence. La cour demanda au jury de continuer à délibérer. Le jury poursuivit ainsi ses délibérations mais ne parvint pas à décider. La cour déclara ainsi un mistrial. L’état tenta ultérieurement de poursuivre à nouveau le prévenu. Celui-ci déposa alors une requête en annulation des préventions de meurtre sur la base de la clause ne bis in idem. La Cour juge dans la présente affaire que la clause ne bis in idem n’empêche nullement la tenue d’un second procès portant sur les mêmes charges que le précédent, y compris la prévention de meurtre. En effet, le jury n’a pas acquitté le prévenu des charges de meurtre. Le rapport du représentant du jury ne représente pas une décision de celui-ci. Quand le représentant du jury a informé la cour de l’état de l’avancement des délibérations, dites délibérations n’avaient nullement pris fin. La cour n’a pas instruit le jury de mettre fin à ses délibérations sur la prévention de meurtre lorsque les délibérations ont repris. Ainsi, le rapport à la cour du représentant du jury manque de finalité pour être considéré comme un acquittement s’agissant de la prévention de meurtre. Ainsi que le prévoit le droit de l’Arkansas, les options du jury dans cette affaire sont les suivantes : soit condamner le prévenu sur la base de l’une des préventions, soit l’acquitter de toutes les charges. La cour de première instance n’a dès lors pas abusé de sa discrétion en refusant d’ajouter une autre option en faveur du jury : acquitter le prévenu de certaines charges mais pas d’autres charges.

Mohawk v. Carpenter

Collateral order appeal (= collateral order doctrine) (here linked to the attorney-client privilege) distinguished from interlocutory appeal and for writ of mandamus: disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine; Courts of Appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U. S. C. §1291. “Final decisions” encompass not only judgments that “terminate an action,” but also a “small class” of prejudgment orders that are “collateral to” an action’s merits and “too important” to be denied immediate review, Cohen, supra, at 545–546. “That small category includes only decisions that are . . . effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 42. The decisive consideration in determining whether a right is effectively unreviewable is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest” or “some particular value of a high order.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345, 352–353; effective appellate review of disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege can be had by means other than collateral order appeal, including postjudgment review. Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence. Moreover, litigants confronted with a particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling have several potential avenues of immediate review apart from collateral order appeal. First, a party may ask the district court to certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an interlocutory appeal involving “a controlling question of law” the prompt resolution of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” §1292(b). Second, in extraordinary circumstances where a disclosure order works a manifest injustice, a party may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 380. Another option is for a party to defy a disclosure order and incur court-imposed sanctions that, e.g., “direct that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established,” “prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses,” or “strike pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2). Alternatively, when the circumstances warrant, a district court may issue a contempt order against a noncomplying party, who can then appeal directly from that ruling, at least when the contempt citation can be characterized as a criminal punishment. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11; any further avenue for immediate appeal of adverse attorney client privilege rulings should be furnished, if at all, through rulemaking, with the opportunity for full airing it provides; our admonition reflects a healthy respect for the virtues of the final-judgment rule; (“The rule remains settled that most discovery rulings are not final”); the crucial question, however, is not whether an interest is important in the abstract; it is whether deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders. We routinely require litigants to wait until after final judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our adversarial system. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 426 (holding an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case did not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 260 (1984) (reaching the same result in a criminal case, notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment rights at stake); moreover, protective orders are available to limit the spillover effects of disclosing sensitive information (U.S.S.Ct., 08.12.09, Mohawk v. Carpenter, J. Sotomayor).

Appel contre une ordonnance collatérale (doctrine de l’ordonnance collatérale) (ici liée au privilège de confidentialité des communications entre l’avocat et son client), à distinguer de l’appel interlocutoire, et du « writ of mandamus » : les ordonnances judiciaires de divulgation contraires à l’ »attorney client privilege » ne peuvent pas faire l’objet d’un appel immédiat selon la « collateral order doctrine ». Les cours d’appel fédérales connaissent des appels dirigés contre les décisions finales des courts de districts. Par décision finale, on entend non seulement les jugements qui terminent une action, mais également une petite classe d’ordonnances préjudicielles collatérales au fond du litige et trop importantes pour ne pas mériter d’être revues par l’instance supérieure. Cette petite catégorie n’inclut seulement les décisions qui ne peuvent être revues dans le cadre de la procédure d’appel contre le jugement final de la précédente instance. L’élément décisif qui permet de déterminer si un droit ne peut être revu est le suivant : si le fait pour l’autorité supérieure de ne pas pouvoir se prononcer avant l’entrée du jugement final peut mettre en péril un intérêt public substantiel ou peut mettre en péril une valeur particulière d’un ordre supérieur. Un appel effectif contre une ordonnance de divulgation contraire à l’ »attorney client privilege » peut être garanti autrement que par un appel contre une ordonnance collatérale, soit par un moyen de droit postérieure au jugement final. Les cours d’appel peuvent remédier à la divulgation inappropriée d’éléments soumis au privilège de la même manière qu’elles peuvent remédier à toute une série d’autres décisions de procédure en matière de preuves : en annulant le jugement final contesté et en renvoyant la cause à l’autorité inférieure pour qu’elle statue à nouveau dans un nouveau procès où les éléments protégés et leurs fruits ne sont pas admis comme preuves. En outre, les parties confrontées à une décision de procédure particulièrement préjudiciable ou inhabituelle disposent potentiellement de plusieurs voies de recours immédiat, autres que l’appel dirigé contre une ordonnance collatérale. Tout d’abord, une partie peut demander à la cour de district de certifier, et à la cour d’appel d’accepter, un appel interlocutoire impliquant une question de droit relevante, dont la résolution rapide pourrait matériellement avancer la terminaison du litige. Deuxièmement, dans des circonstances extraordinaires où une ordonnance de divulgation implique une injustice manifeste, une partie peut requérir de la cour d’appel un « writ of mandamus ».  Une autre option, pour une partie, consiste à défier une ordonnance de divulgation puis se voir imposer des sanctions par la cour, laquelle peut en effet ordonner que l’objet de l’ordonnance, ou d’autres faits, soient considérés comme établis, ou interdire à la partie récalcitrante de soutenir ou de s’opposer à des revendications ou des défenses spécifiques, ou rejeter en tout ou en partie le contenu d’un mémoire. Alternativement, le cas échéant, une cour de district peut rendre un « contempt order » (ordonnance qui constate l’irrespect de la cour par la partie récalcitrante) à l’encontre d’une partie qui ne se soumet pas aux directives de la cour, la partie pouvant alors directement recourir contre dite ordonnance, à tout le moins lorsqu’elle peut être assimilée à une punition à caractère pénal. Toute autre voie de recours immédiat contre une ordonnance qui porte atteinte à l’ »attorney client privilege » doit être instituée, le cas échéant, par la voie législative, laquelle permet aux intéressés de faire part de leur avis. Les considérants de la Cour reflètent ainsi un respect sain des vertus de la règle du jugement final (« final-judgment rule »). Reste établie la règle selon laquelle la plupart des décisions procédurales ne sont pas finales. Cependant, la question déterminante n’est pas de savoir si un intérêt est important dans l’abstrait. La question cruciale est de savoir si la contrainte d’empêcher un recours avant le jugement final met à tel point en péril un intérêt que se justifie le coût de permettre un recours immédiat contre une classe entière d’ordonnances de procédure. La Cour requiert usuellement les parties d’attendre le jugement final avant de faire valoir des droits essentiels, comprenant des droits qui sont centraux dans notre système contentieux. Par exemple, la Cour a considéré qu’une ordonnance destituant un conseil dans une affaire civile ne peut pas faire l’objet d’un recours immédiat selon la doctrine de l’ordonnance collatérale. Il en est de même dans une affaire pénale, malgré les droits résultant du 6è Amendement. En outre, des ordonnances protectives sont à disposition pour limiter le débordement résultant de la divulgation d’informations sensibles.