California Court of Appeal, Yaffee v. Skeen, Docket No. C097746

Principles of Statutory Construction

 

Interpretation (Statute)

 

California Law

 

 

“We review questions of statutory construction de novo.” (John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91, 95.) “‘“Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.”’ [Citations.] ‘“‘We begin with the plain language of the statute, affording the words of the provision their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing them in their statutory context, because the language employed in the Legislature’s enactment generally is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ [Citations.] The plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. [Citation.] If, however, ‘the statutory language may reasonably be given more than one interpretation, “‘“courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.”’”’”’” (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Conservation, etc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 210, 231-232.)

 

 

“Statutory language susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation is regarded as ambiguous .... Whether statutory language is ambiguous is a question of law subject to an independent determination on appeal.” (Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 916, 925.) “When statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, courts must (1) select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute and (2) avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” (Ibid.)

 

 

(…) (People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 199 [courts must assume that when enacting a statute the Legislature was aware of existing related laws and intended to maintain a consistent body of rules].)

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Dec. 17, 2024, Yaffee v. Skeen, Docket No. C097746, Certified for Publication)

 

P. v. Manzo, S191400

Lenity: rule of lenity: Penal Code section 246 (section 246) makes it unlawful for any person to maliciously and willfully discharge a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle.  In this case, defendant was convicted of violating section 246 by standing outside his truck and shooting Jose Valadez, a passenger.  Defendant argues that because the gun had crossed the threshold of the truck at the time of the shooting, the gun was not “discharged ‘at’ the vehicle” but was instead discharged “within” the vehicle.   According to defendant, “what matters under section 246 is what the shooting is ‘at,’ a determination that depends on the location of the discharge (the tip of the gun), not the location of the shooter.”  The Court of Appeal decided this was a reasonable construction of section 246 and invoked the rule of lenity to reverse defendant’s conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle.   

Although we agree that the statutory text alone is susceptible of more than one interpretation, including an interpretation favoring defendant, reliable extrinsic aids to statutory construction convince us that the Legislature intended section 246 to apply to a person standing outside an occupied motor vehicle and shooting into it, even if the gun has crossed the plane of the vehicle.  Because we can discern the Legislature’s intent in enacting section 246, there is no need to invoke the rule of lenity as “a tie-breaking principle” in this case.  (Lexin v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1102, fn. 30.)  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it reversed defendant’s section 246 conviction and the accompanying true findings on the firearm and great bodily injury allegations (Cal. S. Ct., 08.03.12, P. v. Manzo, S191400).

Règle de l’interprétation la moins défavorable en droit pénal : la Section 246 du Code pénal de Californie prévoit que commet une infraction celui qui, avec intention et malice, tire avec une arme à feu contre un véhicule à moteur occupé. Dans cette affaire, le prévenu a été condamné pour violation de la Section 246, sur la base du fait qu’il se tenait à l’extérieur de son véhicule et qu’il avait tiré sur son passager. Le condamné soutient que la Section 246 ne peut s’appliquer, du fait que l’arme était tenue à l’intérieur du véhicule au moment du tir, même s’il se trouvait personnellement debout à l’extérieur dudit véhicule. Par conséquent, toujours selon le condamné, il n’aurait pas tiré contre le véhicule, mais il aurait tiré à l’intérieur de celui-ci. La cour d’appel estime qu’il s’agit là d’une interprétation raisonnable de la Section 246 et annule la condamnation en application de la règle de Lenity, qui permet au juge pénal de retenir l’interprétation d’une loi pénale la moins défavorable au prévenu lorsque la loi est susceptible de plusieurs interprétations. La Cour Suprême de Californie renverse le jugement de la cour d’appel. Elle convient que considéré isolément, le texte légal est susceptible de plus d’une interprétation, y compris une interprétation en faveur du condamné. Mais après avoir mené sa propre interprétation, la Cour juge que l’intention du législateur était de considérer la Section 246 comme également applicable à une personne qui se trouve à l’extérieur du véhicule au moment du tir, même si l’arme elle-même se trouve à l’intérieur. Comme il est possible de discerner l’intention du législateur, il n’est nul besoin de recourir à la règle de Lenity.