Friday, December 1, 2023

California Court of Appeal, Gutierrez v. Tostado, Docket No. H049983

Personal Injury Claims


Statute of Limitations


Personal Injury Action for Negligence: Two Years


Suits Against Health Care Providers for Professional Negligence: One Year


Does MICRA Applies Where the Plaintiff Is Injured During the Provision of Professional Services, as a Result of Those Services, But Was Not the Recipient of the Services?


(Action Against an Attorney for a Wrongful Act or Omission, Other Than for Actual Fraud: One Year)


Claims Time-Barred





Notice of Appeal


Appeal premature


Order to Show Cause




Judgment Filed


Notice of Submission of Judgment


Order to Show Cause Discharged



California Law




(Santa Clara County

Super. Ct. No. 20CV361400)



Francisco Gutierrez appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, on the basis that Gutierrez’s personal injury claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). Gutierrez contends that the trial court erred when it found MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence applicable. We conclude that because Tostado was a medical provider rendering professional services at the time the alleged negligence occurred, MICRA’s statute of limitations bars Gutierrez’s claims. We thus affirm the judgment.



Gutierrez was driving on Interstate 280 when he was forced to stop. Shortly after Gutierrez stopped, Tostado, who was driving an ambulance, rear-ended him.  At the time of the accident, Tostado was an emergency medical technician (EMT) employed by ProTransport-1, LLC and was transporting a patient from one medical facility to another. While Tostado drove, his partner attended to the patient in the rear of the ambulance.



Gutierrez was injured in the collision and visited a chiropractor for treatment within ten days of the incident. Almost two years later, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1, alleging various personal injury claims. The respondents filed a motion for summary judgment on the sole ground that Gutierrez’s claims were time barred under MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed that MICRA applied and granted the motion. The trial court concluded that because Tostado was transporting a patient at the time of the accident, he was rendering professional services. The trial court held that Gutierrez’s claims against the defendants were time-barred under the statute. Gutierrez timely appealed from the judgment.



(Gutierrez filed his notice of appeal on April 19, 2022, after the trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants but prior to judgment being entered. We issued an order to show cause as to why Gutierrez’s appeal should not be dismissed as premature. After the trial court filed the judgment and Gutierrez submitted a notice of submission of judgment, we discharged the order to show cause and deemed Gutierrez’s notice of appeal filed on July 11, 2022, the date judgment was entered. Fn. 1).



In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment based on its statutory construction of MICRA. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. (Aldana v. Stillwagon (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1, 6 (Aldana).)



The trial court granted summary judgment on the sole ground that Gutierrez’s action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in MICRA. Gutierrez contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims because MICRA does not apply to his personal injury claims. A personal injury action for negligence must generally be filed within two years of the date on which the injury occurred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.)



However, suits against health care providers for professional negligence must be filed within one year. (§ 340.5.) Gutierrez argues that the one-year statute of limitations does not apply to his action because his claims are for general negligence not professional negligence, and the duty that Tostado violated by crashing into his car was a duty of care generally owed to the public, not a professional duty owed by a medical provider to a patient.



MICRA defines professional negligence as “a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services.” (§ 340.5, subd. (2).) The parties do not dispute that an EMT transporting a patient in an ambulance is providing medical care to the patient for purposes of the statute. (Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 347; Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 407 (Canister).) However, only actions “alleging injury suffered as a result of. . .the provision of medical care to patients” are covered. (Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 88, (Flores).) In this appeal we must decide whether a driver in a separate vehicle, injured in a collision with an ambulance transporting a patient, was injured as a result of the provision of medical care, such that MICRA’s one year statute applies. Gutierrez urges us to find that any injury here was caused by ordinary negligence. He argues that where a medical provider owes no professional duty to the plaintiff and allegedly breaches only a duty owed to the general public, a claim for personal injuries should be governed by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to ordinary negligence. Conversely, respondent suggests that the critical question is not whether defendant owed plaintiff a professional duty, but simply whether plaintiff was injured as a result of the provision of medical services by defendant; in other words, was plaintiff’s injury a foreseeable consequence of defendant’s act of providing medical care?



The Supreme Court in Flores examined what it means for a health care provider to render professional services under MICRA. There, a hospital patient sued the hospital for negligence after the latch on her bedrail broke, causing her to fall and injure herself. (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 89.) The court considered the difference between regular negligence arising out of the duty owed to the general public, the negligence in the maintenance of equipment and premises that are merely convenient for, or incidental to, the provision of medical care to a patient, and the negligence that arises from the duty owed to patients in the rendering of professional services. (Id. at pp. 88-89.) The court found that “Even those parts of a hospital dedicated primarily to patient care typically contain numerous items of furniture and equipment—tables, televisions, toilets, and so on—that are provided primarily for the comfort and convenience of patients and visitors, but generally play no part in the patient’s medical diagnosis or treatment. Although a defect in such equipment may injure patients as well as visitors or staff, a hospital’s general duty to keep such items in good repair generally overlaps with the ‘obligations that all persons subject to California’s laws have.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)



(Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1237 (Lee): In Lee, the Court considered “section 340.5’s neighboring provision imposing a one-year statute of limitations for ‘an action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services.’ [Citation.]” (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 87.) The court decided «that section 340.6(a) is properly read to apply to claims that ‘depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Explaining that the statute excludes services unrelated to the law or matters that entail violations of professional obligations that may overlap with obligations that all persons have, the court emphasized that the statute applies when an attorney violates a professional obligation as opposed to some generally applicable nonprofessional obligation. (Id. at pp. 87-88.)



(…) The court concluded that the hospital’s alleged negligence in the maintenance of plaintiff’s bedrail did not overlap with its general duty owed to the public because it was “integrally related to plaintiff’s medical diagnosis and treatment,” and was therefore professional negligence encompassed by MICRA. (Id. at p. 89.)



Flores and Lee both considered whether the injury to the patient or client was caused by negligence in the provision of professional services or whether the injury was the result of the breach of some broader overlapping duty owed to the public. Gutierrez asks us to conclude that the contrast drawn in those cases, between a professional duty and the general duty owed to the public, means that MICRA only applies where the defendant owes a professional duty to the plaintiff. However, neither Flores nor Lee considered whether MICRA applies where the plaintiff is injured during the provision of professional services, as a result of those services, but was not the recipient of the services. In both of those cases, the plaintiff was either the client or the patient. Multiple courts have considered injuries to third parties who were not patients and have concluded that MICRA applied to their claims.



(…) The Flores court concluded that by providing the bedrail the hospital was providing medical care, not just a convenience incidental to care. The question before the Flores court was what duty was owed to its patient, not to whom their professional duty of care extended.



(…) Because Gutierrez was not the recipient of the medical care, the question here is different from the one raised in Flores. It is not whether the injuries alleged were the result of general or professional negligence.  Instead, the question here is whether an injury to a third party, who is not a patient, is subject to MICRA’s statute of limitations because the injury occurred during, and as a result of, the provision of medical care by a medical provider.



(…) Because neither Flores nor Lee considered MICRA’s applicability to nonpatients, we must agree with Canister and Lopez and conclude that MICRA is not limited to suits by patients or to recipients of medical services as long as the plaintiff is injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services and his injuries were foreseeable.



The provision of ambulance services involves driving on the road, sometimes at a very high speed. Getting a patient to the hospital quickly is often as integral to the provision of this medical service as performing CPR or administering medication intravenously. It is, therefore, entirely foreseeable that collisions may occur where third parties are injured. The fact that Tostado was not driving quickly here or that Gutierrez was in a separate vehicle rather than in the ambulance does not change the analysis or our conclusion that third parties injured in a collision with an ambulance when it is rendering medical care are subject to MICRA.



(…) Fundamental intent of MICRA to “reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance ‘by limiting the amount and timing of recovery in cases of professional negligence.’ [Citations.]” (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.81.)



Even though Tostado may owe a duty to the public to drive the ambulance safely when not in use for medical care, the injury to Gutierrez occurred while Tostado, a medical provider, was performing the integral function of transporting a patient by ambulance. The trial court correctly concluded that MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations applied to Gutierrez’s negligence claims.






(California Court of Appeal, Dec. 1st, 2023, Gutierrez v. Tostado, Docket No. H049983, Certified for Publication)



Thursday, August 3, 2023

Customs (CH) - Certificate of Origin - Proof of Origin

Customs (CH)

Certificate of Origin

Proof of Origin

Conservation des preuves d’origine à l’importation à partir du 1er janvier 2024


Office fédéral de la douane et de la sécurité des frontières OFDF (CH)

3 août 2023



Accords de libre-échange et accords douaniers 

À l’heure actuelle, les preuves d’origine servant de base à une taxation préférentielle à l’importation doivent être conservées dans leur version originale, sur papier1

À partir du 1er janvier 2024, elles pourront être conservées, après la taxation, sous la forme de copies notamment numériques (tolérance). Pendant la durée de conservation, les originaux ou copies de ces preuves d’origine devront toujours pouvoir être présentés à l’Office fédéral de la douane et de la sécurité des frontières sur demande. 

Cette tolérance vaudra pour toutes les sortes de preuves d’origine (certificats d’origine, déclarations d’origine et certificats de circulation des marchandises), et ce peu importe que la taxation préférentielle conduise ou non à une réduction des droits de douane. 

En revanche, cette tolérance ne s’appliquera pas rétroactivement. Les preuves d’origine pour les taxations préférentielles antérieures au 1er janvier 2024 devront être conservées dans leur version originale, sur papier, pendant toute la durée de conservation même si celle-ci s’étend au-delà de cette date1

Les preuves d’origine ne servant pas de base à une taxation préférentielle à l’importation, mais faisant office de justificatifs préalables pour les preuves d’origine établies lors de l’exportation dans le cadre de réexportations ou de cumuls pourront également être conservées sous la forme de copies (numériques).


Pour autant que les simplifications en lien avec le COVID 19 (voir COVID-19; certificats de circulation des marchandises/certificats d’origine (CCM/CO) à l’importation) ne soient pas applicables. 


Customs (CH) - Industrial Products - HS 25 to 97

Customs (CH)

Industrial Products

HS 25 to 97

Suppression des droits de douane sur les produits industriels au 1er janvier 2024



Influence sur l’origine lors de l’exportation dans le cadre des accords de libre-échange (ALE)



Office fédéral de la douane et de la sécurité des frontières OFDF (CH)

3 août 2023

Accords de libre-échange et accords douaniers 






Valable à partir du 01.01.2024 

Suppression des droits de douane sur les produits industriels au 1er janvier 20241; influence sur l’origine lors de l’exportation dans le cadre des accords de libre-échange (ALE) 

1 Marchandises des chapitres 25 à 97 du Système harmonisé, à l’exclusion de certains produits des chapitres 35 et 38; voir aussi



·       Il ne sera plus nécessairede fournir des preuves d’origine (PO) pour bénéficier d’une importation en exonération de droits de douane. 

·       Si une PO valable est disponible, une taxation préférentielle pourra continuer d’être effectuée dans le cadre des accords de libre-échange (ALE), même si cela n’entraîne pas de modification de l’exonération des droits de douane (comme dans le cas des lignes tarifaires pour lesquelles l’exonération douanière s’applique déjà maintenant). 

·       Si une marchandise originaire d’un pays partenaire de libre-échange (par ex. l’UE) 

o doit être réexportée en l’état avec une PO (par ex. vers l’UE), ou 

o doit être utilisée comme matière en Suisse à des fins de cumul (par ex. pour le montage sur une machine qui doit être exportée vers l’UE avec une PO), 

l’origine de cette marchandise importée devra pouvoir être prouvée.
Ce principe s’appliquera également, mutatis mutandis, aux marchandises pour lesquelles une déclaration du fournisseur doit être délivrée en Suisse. 

• L’origine de ce type de marchandises pourra être prouvée – comme à l’heure actuelle – 

o pour autant qu’une taxation préférentielle ait été effectuée lors de l’importation: au moyen d’une copie de la décision de taxation faisant état de la taxation préférentielle, ou 

o au moyen d’un original sur papier ou d’une copie de la PO valable correspondante (certificat de circulation des marchandises / déclaration d’origine / certificat d’origine). 

·       Les PO de ce type pourront être archivées sous forme électronique également et devront pouvoir être présentées jusqu’à trois ans (ou cinq ans dans le cadre de l’ALE conclu avec la Corée) après la délivrance de la preuve d’origine pour laquelle elles font office de pièce justificative. 

·       Aucune PO ne sera nécessairelors de l’importation s’il est déjà établi lors de celle-ci

 o qu’aucune PO ne doit être délivrée lors de la réexportation en l’état, ou 

o qu’une marchandise est utilisée comme matière pour une marchandise pour laquelle une PO doit être délivrée, mais que l’origine est obtenue sans l’application du cumul avec cette matière. 

• Aucune PO ne sera évidemment nécessairelors de l’importation si la marchandise importée reste «définitivement» en Suisse. Il convient cependant de noter que les principes susmentionnés s’appliqueront en cas de réexportation imprévue (par ex. en tant que marchandise en retour ou en cas de vente à l’étranger après un certain temps d’utilisation). 

Recommandations aux personnes qui délivrent des preuves d’origine ou des déclarations du fournisseur 

·       Lors de l’importation de marchandises pour lesquelles vous avez besoin d’une PO en raison de leur réexportation, assurez-vous que vos fournisseurs étrangers continuent d’établir des PO valables, même si celles-ci n’ont aucune influence sur le taux du droit applicable. 

·       Donnez les instructions nécessaires à vos prestataires de services de dédouanement si vous souhaitez qu’une taxation préférentielle soit effectuée à l’importation. 

Les règles ci-dessus s’appliqueront mutatis mutandis également si, en cas de réexportation en l’état, une preuve d’origine non préférentielle doit être établie sur la base de l’origine préférentielle d’une marchandise. 



Monday, July 31, 2023

IRS - Republication - Tax considerations for people who are separating or divorcing





Tax Tip 2023-97: Tax considerations for people who are separating or divorcing


July 31, 2023



Issue Number:  Tax Tip 2023-97


Tax considerations for people who are separating or divorcing


When couples separate or divorce, the change in their relationship status affects their tax situation. The IRS considers a couple married for tax filing purposes until they get a final decree of divorce or separate maintenance.


Update tax withholding

When a taxpayer divorces or separates, they usually need to update their proper tax withholding by filing with their employer a new 
Form W-4, Employee's Withholding Certificate. If they receive alimony, they may have to make estimated tax payments. Taxpayers can figure out if they’re withholding the correct amount with the Tax Withholding Estimator on


Tax treatment of alimony and separate maintenance

  • Amounts paid to a spouse or a former spouse under a divorce decree, a separate maintenance decree or a written separation agreement may be alimony or separate maintenance for federal tax purposes. 
  • Certain alimony or separate maintenance payments are deductible by the payer spouse, and the recipient spouse must include it in income.


Rules related to dependent children and support

Generally, the parent with custody of a child can claim that child on their tax return. If parents split custody fifty-fifty and aren't filing a joint return, they'll have to decide which parent claims the child. If the parents can’t agree, taxpayers should refer to the tie-breaker rules in 
Publication 504, Divorced or Separated Individuals. Child support payments aren't deductible by the payer and aren't taxable to the payee.


Not all payments under a divorce or separation instrument – including a divorce decree, a separate maintenance decree or a written separation agreement – are alimony or separate maintenance. Alimony and separate maintenance doesn’t include:

  • Child support
  • Noncash property settlements – whether in a lump-sum or installments
  • Payments that are your spouse's part of community property income
  • Payments to keep up the payer's property
  • Use of the payer's property
  • Voluntary payments


Child support is never deductible and isn't considered income. Additionally, if a divorce or separation instrument provides for alimony and child support and the payer spouse pays less than the total required, the payments apply to child support first. Only the remaining amount is considered alimony.


Report property transfers, if needed

Usually, if a taxpayer transfers property to their spouse or former spouse because of a divorce, there’s no recognized gain or loss on the transfer. People may have to report the transaction on a gift tax return.


More information:
Topic No. 452 Alimony and Separate Maintenance



Tuesday, July 18, 2023

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. v. EVA Airways Corporation, Docket No. 21-2867

Personal Jurisdiction


Treaty Jurisdiction


Montreal Convention


International Convention





Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 20-cv-2818



Appellant UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. was sued in the Southern District of New York and filed a third-party complaint against Appellee EVA Airways Corporation, seeking indemnification and contribution. The district court granted EVA’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. UPS now appeals, arguing that EVA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction based on both New York’s long-arm statute and the Montreal Convention. We hold that UPS has failed to allege the in-state injury required for specific jurisdiction in New York, that the Montreal Convention does not confer personal jurisdiction, and that the record does not establish that EVA consented to personal jurisdiction in light of the Convention or its contract with UPS. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.



The Montreal Convention, a multilateral treaty which entered into force in 2003, governs claims arising out of the international transportation of persons, baggage, and cargo by air.1 The treaty includes jurisdictional articles providing where such claims can be brought. This appeal presents a question of first impression: whether the Montreal Convention confers personal jurisdiction.


1 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13,038.



In particular, we must determine whether by enabling actions arising under the treaty to be brought in the courts of certain countries, the Montreal Convention provides those courts with personal jurisdiction over the parties. Consistent with our decisions interpreting the Montreal Convention’s predecessor, we conclude that it does not. The Montreal Convention’s jurisdictional provisions place a limit on when courts of the United States, as opposed to courts of other signatory nations, may exercise jurisdiction over a claim arising under the treaty. Under U.S. law, this is referred to as treaty jurisdiction, which is a form of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Montreal Convention does not, however, alter our domestic personal jurisdiction requirements, which must be independently established. Because the Montreal Convention does not confer personal jurisdiction, and because Appellant has not otherwise established a basis for personal jurisdiction over Appellee in this action, we affirm the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.



This case began with the shipment of 24 pallets of vitamins from Chicago to South Korea. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA insured the vitamins, and UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. contracted for them to be carried by EVA Airways Corporation, an airline headquartered in Taiwan. EVA carried the shipment on non-stop flights from Chicago to Taiwan and then from Taiwan to South Korea. The vitamins allegedly arrived damaged, and this litigation ensued.



Next, we must answer whether the Montreal Convention provides a separate basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over EVA in this action. The Montreal Convention sets forth the types of claims that can be brought relating to international air carriage. It is well established that the treaty “preempts state law and provides the sole avenue for damages claims that fall within the scope of its provisions.” Cohen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 13 F.4th 240, 246 (2d Cir. 2021). The treaty also includes jurisdictional provisions dictating where such claims can be brought. Pointing to these jurisdictional provisions, UPS argues that in enabling certain nation-states’ courts to adjudicate a claim arising under the treaty, the Montreal Convention provides those courts with personal jurisdiction over the defendant against whom the claim is brought. By this logic, UPS contends that because the treaty authorizes it to bring a third-party claim against EVA for indemnification and contribution, and because it authorizes courts in the United States to hear that third-party claim, we should interpret the Montreal Convention to establish personal jurisdiction over EVA in this action. For the reasons explained below, we hold that the Montreal Convention’s jurisdictional provisions speak only to treaty jurisdiction as a form of subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. Therefore, the Montreal Convention does not confer personal jurisdiction on United States courts in actions arising under the treaty. The power to assert jurisdiction over a claim is distinct from the power to assert jurisdiction over a party, which must be separately established.



“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008). The Montreal Convention’s primary jurisdictional provision, Article 33, provides that “an action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the States Parties . . . before the court of” [1] the carrier’s domicile, [2] the carrier’s principal place of business, [3] the place where the contract was made, [4] the place of destination, or [5] in certain actions, a passenger’s principal and permanent residence. Montreal Convention art. 33(1)–(2). Article 33 also dictates that “questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court seised of the case.” Id. art. 33(4). Where one carrier (the “contracting carrier”) contracted with a party to provide air carriage and a different carrier (the “actual carrier”) performed the actual carriage, the Montreal Convention permits either carrier to implead the other in the event that it is sued. See id. art. 45 (authorizing “the defendant carrier to seek to have the remaining carrier joined in the proceedings according to the procedural requirements of the forum in which the action is brought”). A special jurisdictional provision, Article 46, applies in actions involving carriage arranged by a contracting carrier. Article 46 provides that such actions “must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the States Parties, either before a court in which an action may be brought against the contracting carrier, as provided in Article 33, or before the court having jurisdiction at the place where the actual carrier has its domicile or its principal place of business.” Id. art. 46. In effect, Article 46 expands Article 33’s list of fora to encompass both the contracting carrier’s and actual carrier’s domicile and principal place of business.



An examination of this treaty text leads us to conclude that its jurisdictional provisions pertain to treaty jurisdiction. In the United States, federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over claims arising under the Montreal Convention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which gives federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under . . . treaties of the United States.” Articles 33 and 46 operate as a limit on this treaty jurisdiction. By stating where a damages action “must be brought,” the provisions delimit which nation-states’ courts can hear a claim arising under the treaty. Specifically, the provisions dictate that for the courts of a given nation-state to have jurisdiction over a claim arising under the treaty, the nation-state must be both one of the “States Parties” to the Convention and one of the fora listed in Article 33 (or Article 46, when applicable). Therefore, in a damages action governed by the Montreal Convention, if the United States is not one of the designated fora, then courts in the United States cannot exercise treaty jurisdiction over the action.



To begin, nothing in the text of the Montreal Convention says or implies that it gives rise to personal jurisdiction—that is, a court’s power to exercise control over a particular party. While Articles 33 and 46 state that actions “must be brought” in one of the specified fora, they do not state that the courts of those fora must entertain such actions without regard for other potential barriers to jurisdiction. To the contrary, as noted above, Article 33 specifies that “questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court seised of the case.” Montreal Convention art. 33(4). Likewise, while Article 45 allows a defendant contracting carrier to implead an actual carrier, or vice versa, the provision explicitly states that “the procedure and effects” remain “governed by the law of the court seised of the case.” Id. art. 45. The inclusion of these clauses indicates that while the Montreal Convention permits claims arising under the treaty to be brought in particular nations, it does not guarantee plaintiffs the unconditional right to litigate in those nations’ courts. Rather, the treaty expressly leaves room for nation-states to impose their own venue, jurisdictional, or other procedural requirements. We conclude that personal jurisdiction is such a requirement.



In sum, based on our analysis of the Montreal Convention’s text and our Warsaw Convention precedent, we conclude that the Montreal Convention speaks to jurisdiction only in the treaty sense. In cases arising under the Montreal Convention, personal jurisdiction must be separately established in accordance with domestic laws and practice.




LOHIER, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to emphasize that, while UPS failed to meet its burden of showing a “meeting of the minds” in this case, Majority Op. at 23, our decision does not definitively foreclose a contract-based theory of consent to personal jurisdiction under the Montreal Convention. There may be cases in which the defendant carrier impliedly or expressly consented to personal jurisdiction in, for example, “the court of the domicile of the carrier” or “the court at the place of destination” by doing business as an international air carrier governed by the treaty. See Montreal Convention, art. 33.




(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, July 19, 2023, UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. v. EVA Airways Corporation, Docket No. 21-2867)