Wednesday, February 21, 2024

U.S. Supreme Court, Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty CO., LLC, Docket No. 22-500


Maritime Insurance Contract

 

Maritime Law

 

Choice-of-Law Provisions in Maritime Contracts

 

Federal Common Law Court

 

Circuit Split

 

 

 

“Federalism in admiralty and the scope of application of state law in maritime cases is one of the most perplexing issues in the law”.

 

 

 

 

 

This Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the Courts of Appeals regarding the enforceability of choice-of law provisions in maritime contracts.

 

 

Maritime contracts often contain choice-of-law provisions that designate the law of a particular jurisdiction to control future disputes. The enforceability of those choice-of-law provisions is governed by federal maritime law. Applying federal maritime law in this case, we conclude that choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable, with certain narrow exceptions not applicable here.

 

 

Under the Constitution, federal courts possess authority to create and apply maritime law. Article III of the Constitution extends the federal judicial power to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” U. S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. That grant of jurisdiction contemplates a system of maritime law “‘coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country.’” Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U. S. 14, 28 (2004) (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U. S. 443, 451 (1994)). The purposes of that uniform system include promoting “the great interests of navigation and commerce” and maintaining the United States’ “diplomatic relations.” 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1666, p. 533 (1st ed. 1833); see also Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 28; Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500 U. S. 603, 608 (1991). To maintain that uniform system, federal courts “make decisional law” for maritime cases. Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 23. When a federal court decides a maritime case, it acts as a “federal common law court, much as state courts do in state common-law cases.” Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U. S. 446, 452 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Dutra Group v. Batterton, 588 U. S. 358, 360 (2019). “Subject to direction from Congress,” the federal courts fashion maritime rules based on, among other sources, “judicial opinions, legislation, treatises, and scholarly writings.” Air & Liquid Systems, 586 U. S., at 452; see also Exxon Co., U. S. A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U. S. 830, 839 (1996); East River S. S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U. S. 858, 864 (1986). Exercising that authority, federal courts follow previously “established” maritime rules. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 314 (1955).

 

 

No bright line exists for determining when a federal maritime rule is “established,” but a body of judicial decisions can suffice. See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U. S. 85, 89–90 (1955). In the absence of an established rule, federal courts may create uniform maritime rules. See, e.g., Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 23. When no established rule exists, and when the federal courts decline to create a new rule, federal courts apply state law. See Wilburn Boat, 348 U. S., at 320–321. For purposes of this general overview, we will stop there, as the “issue of federalism in admiralty and the scope of application of state law in maritime cases is one of the most perplexing issues in the law.” 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §4:4, p. 268 (6th ed. 2018).

 

 

The initial question here is whether there is an established federal maritime rule regarding the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions. The answer is yes. Longstanding precedent establishes a federal maritime rule: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable. As a leading treatise says, it is “well established in admiralty that choice of law clauses” will “normally be enforced.” 1 Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §5:19, at 427; see also id., §4:4, at 275; 2 id., §19:6, at 431–432 (similar).

 

 

The Court has pronounced that forum-selection clauses in maritime contracts are “prima facie valid” under federal maritime law and “should be enforced unless” doing so would be “‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, 10 (1972); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U. S. 585, 593–594 (1991).

 

 

(…) Moreover, by supplying some advance assurance about the governing law, choice-of-law provisions help maritime shippers decide on the front end “what precautions to take” on their boats, American Dredging, 510 U. S., at 454, and enable marine insurers to better assess risk, see Brief for American Institute of Marine Underwriters et al. as Amici Curiae 12–13. Choice-of-law provisions therefore can lower the price and expand the availability of marine insurance. In those ways, choice-of-law provisions advance a fundamental purpose of federal maritime law: the “‘protection of maritime commerce.’” Exxon Corp., 500 U. S., at 608 (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U. S. 358, 367 (1990)).

 

 

Rather, the Wilburn Boat Court simply determined what substantive rule applied when a party breached a warranty in a marine insurance contract. See id., at 311–316. The Court concluded that no “established federal admiralty rule” governed the warranty issue. Id., at 314; see also id., at 314–316. And the Court declined to create a federal maritime rule on that question, both because States historically regulated insurance and because federal courts were poorly positioned to “unify insurance law on a nationwide basis.” Id., at 319; see also id., at 316–320. The Court therefore ordered that the warranty issue be tried “under appropriate state law.” Id., at 321.

 

 

(…) Moreover, Wilburn Boat held only that state law applied as a gap-filler in the absence of a uniform federal maritime rule on a warranty issue. 348 U. S., at 314–316. Here, however, no gap exists because a uniform federal rule governs the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts.

 

 

After Wilburn Boat, maritime actors realized that a lot would depend on which State’s law governed each individual maritime dispute—a question that would be unclear in advance. See 2 Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §19:9. Choice-of-law provisions soon emerged as a ready answer to that problem. See W. von Bittner, The Validity and Effect of Choice of Law Clauses in Marine Insurance Contracts, 53 Ins. Counsel J. 573, 573, 578–579 (1986).

 

 

(…) The bottom line: As a matter of federal maritime law, choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable.

 

Of course, to say that choice-of-law clauses are presumptively enforceable as a matter of federal maritime law means that there are exceptions when the clauses are not enforceable. The parties agree that the exceptions are narrow—indeed, Raiders “freely concedes that in most every instance, a choice-of-law provision contained in a maritime insurance contract will be effective.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 54. In particular, the parties agree that courts should disregard choice-of-law clauses in otherwise valid maritime contracts when the chosen law would contravene a controlling federal statute, see Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U. S. 69, 77 (1900), or conflict with an established federal maritime policy, see The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 269–271 (1902). For example, The Kensington declined to enforce a choice-of-law clause because the chosen law would have released a carrier from liability for negligence—a result that federal maritime law forbids. See ibid. The parties further agree that, as a matter of federal maritime law, courts may disregard choice-of-law clauses when parties can furnish no reasonable basis for the chosen jurisdiction. Cf. Carnival Cruise, 499 U. S., at 594–595; The Bremen, 407 U. S., at 10, 16–17. For example, it would be unreasonable to pick the law of a distant foreign country without some rational basis for doing so. That said, the “no reasonable basis” exception must be applied with substantial deference to the contracting parties, recognizing that maritime actors may sometimes choose the law of a specific jurisdiction because, for example, that jurisdiction’s law is “well developed, well known, and well regarded.” Brief for American Institute of Marine Underwriters et al. as Amici Curiae 17.

 

 

Unable to successfully invoke those exceptions, Raiders says that federal maritime law should recognize an additional exception when enforcing the law of the State designated by the contract would contravene the fundamental public policy of the State with the greatest interest in the dispute. We disagree with that argument. Indeed, Raiders’ request for that novel maritime exception is essentially a repackaged version of its initial argument that the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts should be determined by state law. The argument fares no better here, for essentially the same reasons.

 

 

(…) We disagree with Raiders’ related suggestion that we adopt the choice-of-law approach set forth in §187(2)(b) of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. In relevant part, that subsection says that choice-of-law provisions are enforceable unless they conflict with “a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §187(2)(b). As the commentary to the Restatement carefully explains, however, that rule arose out of interstate cases and does not deal directly with federal-state conflicts, including those that arise in federal enclaves like maritime law. See id. §2, Comment c; §3, Comment d; §10, Comment a.

 

 

 

 

Secondary sources: T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law §4:4, p. 268 (6th ed. 2018); J. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 631, 633, n. 6 (2017); M. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine Insurance: A Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J. Mar. L. & Com. 41, 45 (1998); G. Gilmore & C. Black, Law of Admiralty §§1–17, 2–8 (2d ed. 1975); W. von Bittner, The Validity and Effect of Choice of Law Clauses in Marine Insurance Contracts, 53 Ins. Counsel J. 573, 573, 578–579 (1986); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §187, Comment f, p. 567 (1969).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty CO., LLC, Feb. 21, 2024, Docket No. 22-500, J. Kavanaugh, Unanimous)

 

Thursday, January 4, 2024

California Court of Appeal, Gary Garner v. BNSF Railway Company, Docket No. D082229


Causation Experts

 

Expert Opinion Testimony

 

Medical Expert

 

Survival and Wrongful Death Action

 

General Causation – Specific Causation

 

Exposure Necessary to Cause Specific Harm to Humans

 

Motion in Limine

 

California Law

 

 

 

Plaintiff Gary Garner appeals from a judgment entered against him after the trial court granted BNSF Railway Company’s (BNSF) motions in limine to exclude his causation experts, which resulted in the dismissal of his wrongful death lawsuit before trial. Gary alleged that during the more than four decades his father Melvin Garner spent working for BNSF, Melvin was continuously exposed to toxic levels of diesel exhaust and its chemical constituents. According to Gary, this exposure was a cause of Melvin’s non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, which Melvin developed after retiring from BNSF and which led to his death in 2014. Gary retained several experts to perform a cancer risk assessment and opine on whether diesel exhaust and its constituents are capable of causing cancer, including non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and whether Melvin’s workplace exposure to diesel exhaust in this case was in fact a cause of his cancer. At the outset of trial, however, the trial court granted BNSF’s motions in limine to exclude Gary’s three causation experts from trial, finding that the science the experts relied on was inadequate and there was too great an analytical gap between the data and their opinions. The trial court then entered judgment in favor of BNSF and dismissed the case. Because the court’s in limine rulings resulted in the equivalent of a nonsuit, we conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether BNSF’s motions were properly granted. We conclude that the trial court erred in excluding Gary’s experts and therefore reverse the orders and judgment with instructions to the trial court to enter new orders denying BNSF’s motions in limine.

 

 

In October 2017, Melvin’s son, Gary Garner, filed this survival and wrongful death action against BNSF, alleging violation of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (45 U.S.C. §51, et seq.) (FELA).

 

 

After the court’s denial of BNSF’s summary judgment motion, the parties engaged in expert discovery in February and March 2021. The parties also began filing and opposing motions in limine in March 2021 in accord with the then-scheduled trial date.

 

 

“General causation” refers to whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition in the general population. “Specific causation” refers to whether the substance caused a particular individual’s injury or condition. (Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc. (5th Cir. 2007) 482 F.3d 347, 351.) (Fn. 3).

 

 

(…) In short, “section 801 governs judicial review of the type of matter” relied on by the expert, while “section 802 governs judicial review of the reasons for the opinion.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 771; see §§ 801, subd. (b), 802.) The Supreme Court has therefore explained that, under these sections, “the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to exclude expert opinion testimony that is (1) based on matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, (2) based on reasons unsupported by the material on which the expert relies, or (3) speculative.” (Sargon, at pp. 771–772; see §§801, subd. (b), 802.) The Court has warned, however, that trial courts must “be cautious in excluding expert testimony. The trial court’s gatekeeping role does not involve choosing between competing expert opinions.” (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 772.) “The gatekeeper’s focus ‘must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.’” (Ibid.) Nor should the court determine the persuasiveness of an expert’s opinion, weigh the opinion’s probative value, substitute its own opinion for the expert’s opinion, or resolve scientific controversies. (Ibid.) Rather, the goal “is simply to exclude ‘clearly invalid and unreliable’ expert opinion.” (Ibid.)

 

 

As Gary argues, there is no requirement that a causation expert rely on a specific study or other scientific publication expressing precisely the same conclusion at which the expert has arrived. (Kennedy v. Collagen Corp. (9th Cir. 1998) 161 F.3d 1226, 1229 (Kennedy) [“it is scientifically permissible to reach a conclusion on causation without [epidemiological or animal] studies” showing a causal link]; Wendell v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 858 F.3d 1227, 1237 (Wendell) [“Perhaps in some cases there will be a plethora of peer reviewed evidence that specifically shows causation. However, such literature is not required in each and every case.”]; Turner v. Iowa Fire Equipment Co. (8th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 1202, 1208–1209 [“‘we do not believe that a medical expert must always cite published studies on general causation in order to reliably conclude that a particular object caused a particular illness’”].)

 

 

This makes sense for several reasons. First, “publication...is not the sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability [citation], and in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published. [Citation.] Some propositions, moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published.” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (1993) 509 U.S. 579, 593 (Daubert); see also Primiano v. Cook (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3d 558, 565 [“Peer reviewed scientific literature may be unavailable because the issue may be too particular, new, or of insufficiently broad interest, to be in the literature.”].) As Dr. Salmon explained, this is such a case because few studies of the potential link between diesel exhaust and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma have been conducted. “‘The first several victims of a new toxic tort should not be barred from having their day in court simply because the medical literature, which will eventually show the connection between the victims’ condition and the toxic substance, has not yet been completed.’” (Wendell, supra, 858 F.3d at p. 1237.) Second, although “epidemiology focuses on the question of general causation,” it “cannot prove causation; rather, causation is a judgment for epidemiologists and others interpreting the epidemiologic data.” (Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 2011) 549, 552, 598.) Epidemiological studies merely identify associations, which do not equate to causation. (See id. at pp.551– 553.) It is up to the expert to “bridge the gap between association and causation” and make that informed judgment. (Kaye and Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 2011) 211, 217–218 (Statistics); accord Amador v. 3M Co. (In re Bair Hugger Forced Air Warming Devices Prods.Liab.Litig.) (8th Cir. 2021) 9F.4th 768, 778–780 [concluding it was not unreliable for an expert to rely on a study to draw an inference of causation even though the study found that the association did not establish causation, “so long as the expert does the work ‘to bridge the gap between association and causation’”].) “Whether an inference of causation based on an association is appropriate is a matter of informed judgment, not scientific methodology....” (Rest.3d Torts, § 28 (2010) (Restatement), com. (c), subd. (3), p. 406; see also id. at subd. (1), p. 403 [“An evaluation of data and scientific evidence to determine whether an inference of causation is appropriate requires judgment and interpretation.”]; Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Group, Inc. (1st Cir. 2011) 639 F.3d 11, 18–19 (Milward) [same]; Statistics, supra, at p. 222 [“In the end, deciding whether associations are causal typically is not a matter of statistics alone, but also rests on scientific judgment.”].) And “scientific inference typically requires consideration of numerous findings, which, when considered alone, may not individually prove the contention.... In applying the scientific method, scientists do not review each scientific study individually for whether by itself it reliably supports the causal claim being advocated or opposed. Rather, as the Institute of Medicine and National Research Council noted, ‘summing, or synthesizing, data addressing different linkages [between kinds of data] forms a more complete causal evidence model and can provide the biological plausibility needed to establish the association’ being advocated or opposed.” (Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 2011) 11, 19–20; see also Milward, at pp. 17–19 [discussing use of scientific judgment applying “weight of the evidence” approach for determining general causation].) It was therefore appropriate for Gary’s experts to use their experience and judgment to interpret the available epidemiological and other data they reviewed in reaching their causation opinions.

 

 

Dr. Salmon gave a reasonable scientific explanation for his causation opinions, including his reliance on the overall cancer risk, and he cited objective, verifiable evidence supporting his opinions. BNSF submitted no evidence that his reasoning or methodology was scientifically invalid. The trial court also found no fault with his methodology. The mere fact that a cause-effect relationship between exposure to diesel exhaust and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma “in particular” has not been conclusively established in the scientific literature does not render Dr. Salmon’s opinions inadmissible. (Kennedy, supra, 161 F.3d at p.1230; see also Milward, supra, 639 F.3d at pp. 16, 19–20 [causation expert properly relied on scientific evidence that benzene can cause acute myeloid leukemia (AML) “as a class” as support for his opinion that workplace exposure to benzene caused plaintiff’s specific rare type of AML].)

 

 

On this record, leaving adequate space for the exercise of reasonable scientific judgment based on the available data, we conclude that the analytical gap was not “too great” for Dr. Salmon to bridge using his own scientific training and expertise. (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 771.) The trial court strayed beyond its gatekeeping role by weighing the probative value of Dr. Salmon’s opinion, and the studies on which he relied, rather than merely excluding a clearly invalid and unreliable expert opinion. (See id. at p. 772; Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 555, 592 (Cooper).)

 

 

“While precise information concerning the exposure necessary to cause specific harm to humans and exact details pertaining to the plaintiff’s exposure are beneficial, such evidence is not always available, or necessary, to demonstrate that a substance is toxic to humans given substantial exposure and need not invariably provide the basis for an expert’s opinion on causation.” (Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB (4th Cir. 1999) 178 F.3d 257, 264; accord Sarkees v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. (2d Cir. 2021) 15 F.4th Cir. 584, 593; Clausen v. M/V New Carissa (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3d 1049, 1059–1060; Hardyman v. Norfolk & W.Ry.Co.(6th Cir. 2001) 243 F.3d 255, 265–266.)

 

 

 

 

Secondary sources: Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 2011) 549, 552, 598; Kaye and Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 2011) 211, 217–218; Berger, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (3d ed. 2011) 11, 19–20; Rest. 3d Torts, § 28 (2010); Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17960, 17993 (Apr. 23, 1996); Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence from the Federal Judicial Center.

 

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Jan. 4, 2024, Gary Garner v. BNSF Railway Company, Docket No. D082229, Certified for Publication)

 

 

Friday, December 1, 2023

California Court of Appeal, Gutierrez v. Tostado, Docket No. H049983


Personal Injury Claims

 

Statute of Limitations

 

Personal Injury Action for Negligence: Two Years

 

Suits Against Health Care Providers for Professional Negligence: One Year

 

Does MICRA Applies Where the Plaintiff Is Injured During the Provision of Professional Services, as a Result of Those Services, But Was Not the Recipient of the Services?

 

(Action Against an Attorney for a Wrongful Act or Omission, Other Than for Actual Fraud: One Year)

 

Claims Time-Barred

 

 

Procedure:

 

Notice of Appeal

 

Appeal premature

 

Order to Show Cause

 

Dismissal

 

Judgment Filed

 

Notice of Submission of Judgment

 

Order to Show Cause Discharged

 

 

California Law

 

 

 

(Santa Clara County

Super. Ct. No. 20CV361400)

 

 

Francisco Gutierrez appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, on the basis that Gutierrez’s personal injury claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). Gutierrez contends that the trial court erred when it found MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence applicable. We conclude that because Tostado was a medical provider rendering professional services at the time the alleged negligence occurred, MICRA’s statute of limitations bars Gutierrez’s claims. We thus affirm the judgment.

 

 

Gutierrez was driving on Interstate 280 when he was forced to stop. Shortly after Gutierrez stopped, Tostado, who was driving an ambulance, rear-ended him.  At the time of the accident, Tostado was an emergency medical technician (EMT) employed by ProTransport-1, LLC and was transporting a patient from one medical facility to another. While Tostado drove, his partner attended to the patient in the rear of the ambulance.

 

 

Gutierrez was injured in the collision and visited a chiropractor for treatment within ten days of the incident. Almost two years later, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1, alleging various personal injury claims. The respondents filed a motion for summary judgment on the sole ground that Gutierrez’s claims were time barred under MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed that MICRA applied and granted the motion. The trial court concluded that because Tostado was transporting a patient at the time of the accident, he was rendering professional services. The trial court held that Gutierrez’s claims against the defendants were time-barred under the statute. Gutierrez timely appealed from the judgment.

 

 

(Gutierrez filed his notice of appeal on April 19, 2022, after the trial court had granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants but prior to judgment being entered. We issued an order to show cause as to why Gutierrez’s appeal should not be dismissed as premature. After the trial court filed the judgment and Gutierrez submitted a notice of submission of judgment, we discharged the order to show cause and deemed Gutierrez’s notice of appeal filed on July 11, 2022, the date judgment was entered. Fn. 1).

 

 

In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment based on its statutory construction of MICRA. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. (Aldana v. Stillwagon (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1, 6 (Aldana).)

 

 

The trial court granted summary judgment on the sole ground that Gutierrez’s action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in MICRA. Gutierrez contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims because MICRA does not apply to his personal injury claims. A personal injury action for negligence must generally be filed within two years of the date on which the injury occurred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.)

 

 

However, suits against health care providers for professional negligence must be filed within one year. (§ 340.5.) Gutierrez argues that the one-year statute of limitations does not apply to his action because his claims are for general negligence not professional negligence, and the duty that Tostado violated by crashing into his car was a duty of care generally owed to the public, not a professional duty owed by a medical provider to a patient.

 

 

MICRA defines professional negligence as “a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services.” (§ 340.5, subd. (2).) The parties do not dispute that an EMT transporting a patient in an ambulance is providing medical care to the patient for purposes of the statute. (Lopez, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 347; Canister v. Emergency Ambulance Service, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 388, 407 (Canister).) However, only actions “alleging injury suffered as a result of. . .the provision of medical care to patients” are covered. (Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75, 88, (Flores).) In this appeal we must decide whether a driver in a separate vehicle, injured in a collision with an ambulance transporting a patient, was injured as a result of the provision of medical care, such that MICRA’s one year statute applies. Gutierrez urges us to find that any injury here was caused by ordinary negligence. He argues that where a medical provider owes no professional duty to the plaintiff and allegedly breaches only a duty owed to the general public, a claim for personal injuries should be governed by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to ordinary negligence. Conversely, respondent suggests that the critical question is not whether defendant owed plaintiff a professional duty, but simply whether plaintiff was injured as a result of the provision of medical services by defendant; in other words, was plaintiff’s injury a foreseeable consequence of defendant’s act of providing medical care?

 

 

The Supreme Court in Flores examined what it means for a health care provider to render professional services under MICRA. There, a hospital patient sued the hospital for negligence after the latch on her bedrail broke, causing her to fall and injure herself. (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 89.) The court considered the difference between regular negligence arising out of the duty owed to the general public, the negligence in the maintenance of equipment and premises that are merely convenient for, or incidental to, the provision of medical care to a patient, and the negligence that arises from the duty owed to patients in the rendering of professional services. (Id. at pp. 88-89.) The court found that “Even those parts of a hospital dedicated primarily to patient care typically contain numerous items of furniture and equipment—tables, televisions, toilets, and so on—that are provided primarily for the comfort and convenience of patients and visitors, but generally play no part in the patient’s medical diagnosis or treatment. Although a defect in such equipment may injure patients as well as visitors or staff, a hospital’s general duty to keep such items in good repair generally overlaps with the ‘obligations that all persons subject to California’s laws have.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

 

 

(Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1237 (Lee): In Lee, the Court considered “section 340.5’s neighboring provision imposing a one-year statute of limitations for ‘an action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services.’ [Citation.]” (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 87.) The court decided «that section 340.6(a) is properly read to apply to claims that ‘depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Explaining that the statute excludes services unrelated to the law or matters that entail violations of professional obligations that may overlap with obligations that all persons have, the court emphasized that the statute applies when an attorney violates a professional obligation as opposed to some generally applicable nonprofessional obligation. (Id. at pp. 87-88.)

 

 

(…) The court concluded that the hospital’s alleged negligence in the maintenance of plaintiff’s bedrail did not overlap with its general duty owed to the public because it was “integrally related to plaintiff’s medical diagnosis and treatment,” and was therefore professional negligence encompassed by MICRA. (Id. at p. 89.)

 

 

Flores and Lee both considered whether the injury to the patient or client was caused by negligence in the provision of professional services or whether the injury was the result of the breach of some broader overlapping duty owed to the public. Gutierrez asks us to conclude that the contrast drawn in those cases, between a professional duty and the general duty owed to the public, means that MICRA only applies where the defendant owes a professional duty to the plaintiff. However, neither Flores nor Lee considered whether MICRA applies where the plaintiff is injured during the provision of professional services, as a result of those services, but was not the recipient of the services. In both of those cases, the plaintiff was either the client or the patient. Multiple courts have considered injuries to third parties who were not patients and have concluded that MICRA applied to their claims.

 

 

(…) The Flores court concluded that by providing the bedrail the hospital was providing medical care, not just a convenience incidental to care. The question before the Flores court was what duty was owed to its patient, not to whom their professional duty of care extended.

 

 

(…) Because Gutierrez was not the recipient of the medical care, the question here is different from the one raised in Flores. It is not whether the injuries alleged were the result of general or professional negligence.  Instead, the question here is whether an injury to a third party, who is not a patient, is subject to MICRA’s statute of limitations because the injury occurred during, and as a result of, the provision of medical care by a medical provider.

 

 

(…) Because neither Flores nor Lee considered MICRA’s applicability to nonpatients, we must agree with Canister and Lopez and conclude that MICRA is not limited to suits by patients or to recipients of medical services as long as the plaintiff is injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services and his injuries were foreseeable.

 

 

The provision of ambulance services involves driving on the road, sometimes at a very high speed. Getting a patient to the hospital quickly is often as integral to the provision of this medical service as performing CPR or administering medication intravenously. It is, therefore, entirely foreseeable that collisions may occur where third parties are injured. The fact that Tostado was not driving quickly here or that Gutierrez was in a separate vehicle rather than in the ambulance does not change the analysis or our conclusion that third parties injured in a collision with an ambulance when it is rendering medical care are subject to MICRA.

 

 

(…) Fundamental intent of MICRA to “reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance ‘by limiting the amount and timing of recovery in cases of professional negligence.’ [Citations.]” (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.81.)

 

 

Even though Tostado may owe a duty to the public to drive the ambulance safely when not in use for medical care, the injury to Gutierrez occurred while Tostado, a medical provider, was performing the integral function of transporting a patient by ambulance. The trial court correctly concluded that MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations applied to Gutierrez’s negligence claims.

 

 

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Dec. 1st, 2023, Gutierrez v. Tostado, Docket No. H049983, Certified for Publication)

 

 

Thursday, August 3, 2023

Customs (CH) - Certificate of Origin - Proof of Origin


Customs (CH)

Certificate of Origin

Proof of Origin



Conservation des preuves d’origine à l’importation à partir du 1er janvier 2024

 

Office fédéral de la douane et de la sécurité des frontières OFDF (CH)

3 août 2023

Republication

https://www.bazg.admin.ch/dam/bazg/fr/dokumente/verfahren-betrieb/grundlagen-und-wirtschaftsmassnahmen/ursprung-und-fha/aufvewahrung_von_einfuhr_ursprungsnachweisen_ab_01012024.pdf

Information

Bases
Accords de libre-échange et accords douaniers 

À l’heure actuelle, les preuves d’origine servant de base à une taxation préférentielle à l’importation doivent être conservées dans leur version originale, sur papier1

À partir du 1er janvier 2024, elles pourront être conservées, après la taxation, sous la forme de copies notamment numériques (tolérance). Pendant la durée de conservation, les originaux ou copies de ces preuves d’origine devront toujours pouvoir être présentés à l’Office fédéral de la douane et de la sécurité des frontières sur demande. 

Cette tolérance vaudra pour toutes les sortes de preuves d’origine (certificats d’origine, déclarations d’origine et certificats de circulation des marchandises), et ce peu importe que la taxation préférentielle conduise ou non à une réduction des droits de douane. 

En revanche, cette tolérance ne s’appliquera pas rétroactivement. Les preuves d’origine pour les taxations préférentielles antérieures au 1er janvier 2024 devront être conservées dans leur version originale, sur papier, pendant toute la durée de conservation même si celle-ci s’étend au-delà de cette date1

Les preuves d’origine ne servant pas de base à une taxation préférentielle à l’importation, mais faisant office de justificatifs préalables pour les preuves d’origine établies lors de l’exportation dans le cadre de réexportations ou de cumuls pourront également être conservées sous la forme de copies (numériques).

 

Pour autant que les simplifications en lien avec le COVID 19 (voir COVID-19; certificats de circulation des marchandises/certificats d’origine (CCM/CO) à l’importation) ne soient pas applicables. 

 

Customs (CH) - Industrial Products - HS 25 to 97

Customs (CH)


Industrial Products


HS 25 to 97




Suppression des droits de douane sur les produits industriels au 1er janvier 2024

 

 

Influence sur l’origine lors de l’exportation dans le cadre des accords de libre-échange (ALE)

 

 

Office fédéral de la douane et de la sécurité des frontières OFDF (CH)

3 août 2023

Bases
Accords de libre-échange et accords douaniers 

 

 

Republication

 

https://www.bazg.admin.ch/dam/bazg/fr/dokumente/verfahren-betrieb/grundlagen-und-wirtschaftsmassnahmen/ursprung-und-fha/industriezollabbau_per_010124_einfluss_auf_den_ursprung_bei_der_ausfuhr_im_rahmen_der_fha.pdf

 

 

Valable à partir du 01.01.2024 

Suppression des droits de douane sur les produits industriels au 1er janvier 20241; influence sur l’origine lors de l’exportation dans le cadre des accords de libre-échange (ALE) 

1 Marchandises des chapitres 25 à 97 du Système harmonisé, à l’exclusion de certains produits des chapitres 35 et 38; voir aussi 

https://www.seco.admin.ch/seco/fr/home/Aussenwirtschaftspolitik_Wirtschaftliche_Zusammenarbeit/Wirtschaftsbeziehungen/warenhandel/aufhebung_industriezoelle.html/

 

Généralités

·       Il ne sera plus nécessairede fournir des preuves d’origine (PO) pour bénéficier d’une importation en exonération de droits de douane. 

·       Si une PO valable est disponible, une taxation préférentielle pourra continuer d’être effectuée dans le cadre des accords de libre-échange (ALE), même si cela n’entraîne pas de modification de l’exonération des droits de douane (comme dans le cas des lignes tarifaires pour lesquelles l’exonération douanière s’applique déjà maintenant). 

·       Si une marchandise originaire d’un pays partenaire de libre-échange (par ex. l’UE) 

o doit être réexportée en l’état avec une PO (par ex. vers l’UE), ou 

o doit être utilisée comme matière en Suisse à des fins de cumul (par ex. pour le montage sur une machine qui doit être exportée vers l’UE avec une PO), 

l’origine de cette marchandise importée devra pouvoir être prouvée.
Ce principe s’appliquera également, mutatis mutandis, aux marchandises pour lesquelles une déclaration du fournisseur doit être délivrée en Suisse. 

• L’origine de ce type de marchandises pourra être prouvée – comme à l’heure actuelle – 

o pour autant qu’une taxation préférentielle ait été effectuée lors de l’importation: au moyen d’une copie de la décision de taxation faisant état de la taxation préférentielle, ou 

o au moyen d’un original sur papier ou d’une copie de la PO valable correspondante (certificat de circulation des marchandises / déclaration d’origine / certificat d’origine). 

·       Les PO de ce type pourront être archivées sous forme électronique également et devront pouvoir être présentées jusqu’à trois ans (ou cinq ans dans le cadre de l’ALE conclu avec la Corée) après la délivrance de la preuve d’origine pour laquelle elles font office de pièce justificative. 

·       Aucune PO ne sera nécessairelors de l’importation s’il est déjà établi lors de celle-ci

 o qu’aucune PO ne doit être délivrée lors de la réexportation en l’état, ou 

o qu’une marchandise est utilisée comme matière pour une marchandise pour laquelle une PO doit être délivrée, mais que l’origine est obtenue sans l’application du cumul avec cette matière. 

• Aucune PO ne sera évidemment nécessairelors de l’importation si la marchandise importée reste «définitivement» en Suisse. Il convient cependant de noter que les principes susmentionnés s’appliqueront en cas de réexportation imprévue (par ex. en tant que marchandise en retour ou en cas de vente à l’étranger après un certain temps d’utilisation). 

Recommandations aux personnes qui délivrent des preuves d’origine ou des déclarations du fournisseur 

·       Lors de l’importation de marchandises pour lesquelles vous avez besoin d’une PO en raison de leur réexportation, assurez-vous que vos fournisseurs étrangers continuent d’établir des PO valables, même si celles-ci n’ont aucune influence sur le taux du droit applicable. 

·       Donnez les instructions nécessaires à vos prestataires de services de dédouanement si vous souhaitez qu’une taxation préférentielle soit effectuée à l’importation. 

Les règles ci-dessus s’appliqueront mutatis mutandis également si, en cas de réexportation en l’état, une preuve d’origine non préférentielle doit être établie sur la base de l’origine préférentielle d’une marchandise.