U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Plixer International, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GMBH, Docket No. 18-1195

Jurisdiction: Specific personal jurisdiction: Trademark infringement: Internet: Websites: Due Process: Fifth Amendment: Interlocutory appeal:

Given the particular facts of this case, we affirm the thoughtful holding of the district court that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction against a German corporation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) does not offend the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. We note that this is an area in which the Supreme Court has not yet had the occasion to give clear guidance, and so we deliberately avoid creating any broad rules.

Scrutinizer GmbH (Scrutinizer) is a German corporation with its principal place of business in Kassel, Germany. Through its interactive, English-language website, Scrutinizer runs a "selfservice platform" that helps customers build better software. Scrutinizer brings its customers' code from a third-party hosting service like GitHub2 to its "controlled cloud environment," where it runs "software analysis tools" meant to "improve source-code quality, eliminate bugs, and find security vulnerabilities."

Customers who contract to use Scrutinizer's online service can pay only in euros. Scrutinizer's standard contract with those customers contains a forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law clause that provide that all lawsuits relating to the contract be brought in German courts and under German law. Scrutinizer maintains no U.S. office, phone number, or agent for service of process; it directs no advertising at the United States; and its employees do not go to the United States on business.

Scrutinizer provides its service globally.

Plixer International, Inc. (Plixer), a Maine corporation, sued Scrutinizer in federal district court in Maine on November 21, 2016, for trademark infringement.

(…) Scrutinizer moved for permission to file an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court granted that motion. The district court found that the matter met the standard for such an appeal: it involved a controlling question of law on which there was substantial ground for difference of opinion and the resolution of which would help bring an end to the litigation.

We granted this interlocutory appeal on the district court's recommendation.

Plixer's basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over Scrutinizer is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2).

Rule 4(k)(2) states: For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.

Rule 4(k)(2) has three requirements: (1) the cause of action must arise under federal law; (2) the defendant must not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of general jurisdiction; and (3) the federal court's exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with due process.

All parties agree that the first two requirements are met here. The question is whether personal jurisdiction comports with due process.

This is a federal question case, so constitutional limits on jurisdiction come from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires the plaintiff to "show that the defendant has adequate contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with a particular state."

To see if Scrutinizer's nationwide contacts are adequate, we turn to the familiar "minimum contacts" framework.

Plixer has asserted specific personal jurisdiction over Scrutinizer, so the minimum contacts inquiry has three prongs: relatedness, purposeful availment, and reasonableness.

That is, Plixer must show that (1) its claim directly arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum activities; (2) the defendant's forum contacts represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in that forum, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the forum's laws and rendering the defendant's involuntary presence in the forum's courts foreseeable; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. A Corp., 812 F.3d at 59.

Scrutinizer has conceded the first requirement; we hold that Plixer has met the remaining two.

A Corp., 812 F.3d at 61 (holding that "the mere availability of a passive website" cannot by itself subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in the forum).

Cossaboon v. Maine Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that the running of a "website that is visible in a forum and that gives information about a company and its products" cannot alone support the exercise of jurisdiction).

The district court held that Scrutinizer had not merely made its website available in the United States; it had used that website to engage "in sizeable and continuing commerce with United States customers." Plixer, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 242. As a result, Scrutinizer "should not be surprised at United States-based litigation." Id. We agree.

(…) An objectively clearer picture of Scrutinizer's intent to serve the forum, the crux of the purposeful availment inquiry. See C.W. Downer, 771 F.3d at 66.

(…) Scrutinizer can take steps to limit access to its website. For instance, Scrutinizer could design its site to not interact with U.S. users, cf. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2006), but it has not done so.

And Scrutinizer could take the low-tech step of posting a disclaimer that its service is not intended for U.S. users. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997); cf. Illinois v. Hemi Group LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 755 (7^th Cir. 2010). Again, it has not done so. Instead, Scrutinizer's website (https://scrutinizer-ci.com/) is globally accessible.

In contrast, Scrutinizer did take a step to deal with foreign contract-based litigation -- it included a forum-selection clause and a choice-of-law clause in its standard customer contract. Those clauses provide that all lawsuits be brought in German courts and under German law. But Scrutinizer never suggests that Plixer could bring this suit in an alternate forum, whether Germany or elsewhere. And the clauses do not apply here; Plixer is not a party to Scrutinizer's contract, and Scrutinizer does not suggest that Plixer is bound by the contract. As the district court correctly noted, those clauses suggest that Scrutinizer "knew it was extending its reach outside Germany." Plixer, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 241.

(…) Second, Scrutinizer voluntarily served U.S. customers. Specific personal jurisdiction must be based on a defendant's voluntary contact with the forum.

Third, Scrutinizer's purposeful U.S. contacts were sufficient to put Scrutinizer on notice that it should expect to be haled into U.S. court. Scrutinizer has "targeted the world" by making its website globally accessible. See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring). But Scrutinizer says that it could not reasonably anticipate specific jurisdiction because it did not specifically target the United States with its business. We disagree.

(…) Ultimately, although a close call, we conclude that the German company could have "reasonably anticipated" the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction based on its U.S. contacts. Scrutinizer's "regular flow or regular course of sales" in the United States show that it has purposefully availed itself of the U.S. forum. The record does not reveal what percentage of Scrutinizer's business came from the United States. Nor does the record reveal whether Scrutinizer ever did an online trademark search for the term "Scrutinizer," either before or after it sought U.S. customers.

(Since 2000, the public has been able to search and retrieve for free "the almost millions of pending, registered, abandoned, cancelled or expired trademark registrations" online. McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:6 (5th ed.)).

(…) The record does show that Scrutinizer used its website to obtain U.S. customer contracts. Those contracts yielded nearly $200,000 in business over three-and-a-half years. This is not a situation where a defendant merely made a website accessible in the forum.

In contrast, a New Jersey federal district court found no regular course of sales when, over about a year, fewer than ten in-state sales brought the defendant "less than $3,383 in revenue." Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d 501, 514-15 (D. N.J. 2011). "Such scant sales activity" did not "justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction" there.

Reasonableness: Though Plixer has satisfied the first two prongs of the analysis, we must still see whether the exercise of jurisdiction here is fair and reasonable. We consider five "gestalt" factors: (1) the defendant's burden of appearing in the forum, (2) the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in promoting substantive social policies.

We consider first the burden on Scrutinizer. (…) For further support, Scrutinizer points to the burden of cross-Atlantic travel. (…) and modern travel "creates no especially ponderous burden for business travelers," (…) A defendant hoping to show that travel burdens should make the difference must show that those burdens are "special or unusual." (…) many of the case's logistical challenges "can be resolved through the use of affidavits and video devices."

On the second factor, Scrutinizer does not dispute that the United States has an interest in adjudicating a dispute over the application of U.S. trademark law. (…) Further, the United States has an interest in remedying an alleged injury that occurs in the United States.

(…) "When minimum contacts have been established, often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the alien defendant."

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Sept. 13, 2018, Plixer International, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GMBH, Docket No. 18-1195, Circuit Judge Lynch)

Une entreprise allemande propose ses services (dans le domaine digital) par le biais de son site Internet. Le site et les services sont accessibles dans le monde entier. Un certain nombre de clients sont domiciliés dans divers états U.S. Ils rapportent à l’entreprise un chiffre d’affaire non négligeable.

L’entreprise n’a pas davantage de présence aux Etats-Unis. Elle n’y a ni présence physique ni employé. Elle n’a pas nommé d’agent auquel un envoi officiel pourrait être notifiée.

Une entreprise de l’état du Maine ouvre action devant la cour de district fédérale pour violation du droit des marques.

La question de la compétence de la cour est litigieuse.

En application du Cinquième Amendement de la Constitution fédérale (Due Process Clause), et tout en reconnaissant l’absence de jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême fédérale sur les questions précises que pose le cas d’espèce, le Premier Circuit fédéral juge que les conditions de la juridiction personnelle spécifique sont données, en précisant que la décision se limite aux faits de la cause et ne doit pas être interprétée largement. Le critère déterminant au sens du Cinquième Amendement est celui des contacts suffisants avec les Etats-Unis plutôt qu’avec l’un de ses états en particulier.

L’entreprise allemande n’a pas bloqué l’accès de son site aux clients U.S., n’a même pas posté un disclaimer refusant les clients U.S., mais, au contraire, leur propose, ainsi qu’au reste du monde, de contracter avec elle par le biais d’un site Internet en anglais. Elle a exécuté contre paiement nombre de prestations en faveur de nombre de clients U.S., et devait ainsi s’attendre à être actionnée devant une cour U.S. Le fait d’avoir inséré dans ses conditions contractuelles la loi allemande comme droit applicable et une cour allemande comme Tribunal compétent n’est d’aucun secours à l’entreprise allemande : bien au contraire, ces indications démontrent une volonté de s’engager internationalement, et la demanderesse à l’action en violation du droit à la marque n’est pas en rapport contractuel avec l’entreprise allemande.

Enfin, reconnaître la compétence de la cour de district fédérale satisfait aussi la condition d’une reconnaissance équitable : les voyages transatlantiques ne sont pas un fardeau qui ne saurait être exigé. D’autant que les productions de pièces et l’usage de moyens vidéos peuvent permettre d’éviter le déplacement de personnes. Un voyage transatlantique qui serait spécialement problématique peut permettre une décision d’incompétence de la cour U.S.

Children's Online Privacy

Children's Online Privacy: Privacy: Data security: Competition: Internet: Safe WEB Act.

FTC, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Jan. 8, 2018.

Electronic toy manufacturer VTech Electronics Limited and its U.S. subsidiary have agreed to settle charges by the Federal Trade Commission that the company violated a U.S. children’s privacy law by collecting personal information from children without providing direct notice and obtaining their parent’s consent, and failing to take reasonable steps to secure the data it collected. VTech will pay $650,000 as part of the settlement with the FTC.

In a complaint filed by the Department of Justice on behalf of the FTC, the Commission alleges that the Kid Connect app used with some of VTech’s electronic toys collected the personal information of hundreds of thousands of children, and that the company failed to provide direct notice to parents or obtain verifiable consent from parents concerning its information collection practices, as required under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). In its first children’s privacy case involving Internet-connected toys, the FTC also alleges that VTech failed to use reasonable and appropriate data security measures to protect personal information it collected.

COPPA requires that companies collecting personal information from children under 13 online follow steps to ensure that children’s information is protected, including clearly disclosing to parents the information it collects, how the information will be used, and seeking verifiable parental consent. Companies also must take reasonable measures to protect the confidentiality, security and integrity of the personal information they collect about children.

According to the complaint against VTech, the company collected personal information from parents on its Learning Lodge Navigator online platform, where the Kid Connect app was available for download, and also through a now-defunct web-based gaming and chat platform called Planet VTech. Before using Kid Connect or Planet VTech, parents were required to register and provide personal information including their name, email address as well as their children’s name, date of birth and gender. VTech also collected personal information from children when they used the Kid Connect app.

With respect to Kid Connect, VTech failed to provide direct notice of its information collection and use practices to parents and did not link to its privacy policy in each area where personal information was collected from children.

At the same time, the complaint alleges that the company did not take reasonable steps to protect the information it collected through Kid Connect, such as implementing adequate safeguards and security measures to protect transmitted and stored information and implementing an intrusion prevention or detection system to alert the company of an unauthorized intrusion of its network. In November 2015, VTech was informed by a journalist that a hacker accessed its computer network and personal information about consumers including children who used its Kid Connect app.

The FTC also alleges that VTech violated the FTC Act by falsely stating in its privacy policy that most personal information submitted by users through the Learning Lodge and Planet VTech would be encrypted. The company, however, did not encrypt any of this information.

In addition to the monetary settlement, VTech is permanently prohibited from violating COPPA in the future and from misrepresenting its security and privacy practices as part of the proposed settlement. It also is required to implement a comprehensive data security program, which will be subject to independent audits for 20 years.

The FTC collaborated with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, which is releasing its own Report of Findings. To facilitate cooperation with its Canadian partner, the FTC relied on key provisions of the U.S. SAFE WEB Act, which allows the FTC to share information with foreign counterparts to combat deceptive and unfair practices that cross national borders.

The Commission vote authorizing the staff to file the complaint and stipulated final order was 2-0. The complaint and stipulated final order was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

NOTE: The Commission files a complaint when it has “reason to believe” that the law has been or is being violated and it appears to the Commission that a proceeding is in the public interest. Stipulated final orders have the force of law when approved and signed by the District Court judge.

Related Case

VTech Electronics Limited

For Consumers

• Blog: If your kids have electronic devices, read this
• Protecting Your Child’s Privacy Online
• FTC.gov/OnGuardOnline

For Businesses

• Blog: VTech settlement cautions companies to keep COPPA-covered data secure
• Children’s Privacy
• Data Security

Joint Statement of Acting FTC Chairman Maureen K. Ohlhausen and FCC Chairman Ajit Pai on Protecting Americans’ Online Privacy

Joint Statement of Acting FTC Chairman Maureen K. Ohlhausen and FCC Chairman Ajit Pai on Protecting Americans’ Online Privacy

Acting Federal Trade Commission Chairman Maureen K. Ohlhausen and Federal Communications Commission Chairman Ajit Pai issued the following statement today on the FCC’s issuance of a temporary stay of a data security regulation:
“The Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission are committed to protecting the online privacy of American consumers. We believe that the best way to do that is through a comprehensive and consistent framework. After all, Americans care about the overall privacy of their information when they use the Internet, and they shouldn’t have to be lawyers or engineers to figure out if their information is protected differently depending on which part of the Internet holds it.
“That’s why we disagreed with the FCC’s unilateral decision in 2015 to strip the FTC of its authority over broadband providers’ privacy and data security practices, removing an effective cop from the beat. The FTC has a long track record of protecting consumers’ privacy and security throughout the Internet ecosystem. It did not serve consumers’ interests to abandon this longstanding, bipartisan, successful approach.
“We still believe that jurisdiction over broadband providers’ privacy and data security practices should be returned to the FTC, the nation’s expert agency with respect to these important subjects. All actors in the online space should be subject to the same rules, enforced by the same agency.
“Until that happens, however, we will work together on harmonizing the FCC’s privacy rules for broadband providers with the FTC’s standards for other companies in the digital economy. Accordingly, the FCC today stayed one of its rules before it could take effect on March 2. This rule is not consistent with the FTC’s privacy framework. The stay will remain in place only until the FCC is able to rule on a petition for reconsideration of its privacy rules.
“Two years after the FCC stripped broadband consumers of FTC privacy protections, some now express concern that the temporary delay of a rule not yet in effect will leave consumers unprotected. We agree that it is vital to fill the consumer protection gap created by the FCC in 2015, and today’s action is a step toward properly filling that gap. How that gap is filled matters. It does not serve consumers’ interests to create two distinct frameworks—one for Internet service providers and one for all other online companies.
“The federal government shouldn’t favor one set of companies over another—and certainly not when it comes to a marketplace as dynamic as the Internet. So going forward, we will work together to establish a technology-neutral privacy framework for the online world. Such a uniform approach is in the best interests of consumers and has a long track record of success.”

9th Court of Appeals, Multi Time Machine v. Amazon.com, Opinion by Judge Silverman, Dissent by Judge Bea, No. 13-55575

Trademark infringement: Advertisement: Initial interest confusion: Confusion (trademark): Internet: Summary judgment: Lanham Act: Unfair competition: 9^th Circuit:

“The core element of trademark infringement” is whether the defendant’s conduct “is likely to confuse customers about the source of the products.” E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9^th Cir. 1992). Because Amazon’s search results page clearly labels the name and manufacturer of each product offered for sale and even includes photographs of the items, no reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online would likely be confused as to the source of the products.

The eight factors enumerated in Sleekcraft are as follows: “1. Strength of the mark; 2. proximity of the goods; 3. similarity of the marks; 4. evidence of actual confusion; 5. marketing channels used; 6. type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; 7. defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and 8. likelihood of expansion of the product lines.” 599 F.2d at 348–49.

“The decision to grant summary judgment in a trademark infringement claim is reviewed de novo, and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 630

(9th Cir. 2005). “Although disfavored in trademark infringement cases, summary judgment may be entered when no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. Indeed, in several trademark cases, we have concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion as a matter of law and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distrib., 578 F.3d 1154, 1162–65 (9th Cir. 2009); M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1080–85 (9th Cir. 2005); Surfvivor Media, 406 F.3d at 631–34.

To prevail on a claim of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, “a trademark holder must show that the defendant’s use of its trademark ‘is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.’” Fortune Dynamic, Inc.

v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)–(a)(1)(A)). “The test for likelihood of confusion is whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service bearing one of the marks.” Dreamwerks Prod. Group v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998). “The confusion must ‘be probable, not simply a possibility.’” Murray v. Cable NBC, 86 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, the district court was correct in ruling that there is no likelihood of confusion. Amazon is responding to a customer’s inquiry about a brand it does not carry by doing no more than stating clearly (and showing pictures of) what brands it does carry. To whatever extent the Sleekcraft factors apply in a case such as this – a merchant responding to a request for a particular brand it does not sell by offering

other brands clearly identified as such – the undisputed evidence shows that confusion on the part of the inquiring buyer is not at all likely. Not only are the other brands clearly labeled and accompanied by photographs, there is no evidence of actual confusion by anyone.

To analyze likelihood of confusion, we utilize the eight factor test set forth in Sleekcraft. However, “we have long cautioned that applying the Sleekcraft test is not like counting beans.” One Indus., 578 F.3d at 1162; see also Network

Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, 638 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Sleekcraft factors are intended as an adaptable proxy for consumer confusion, not a rote checklist.”). “Some factors are much more important than others, and the relative importance of each individual factor will be case-specific.” Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). Moreover, the Sleekcraft factors are not exhaustive and other variables may come into play depending on the particular facts presented. Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1145–46. This is particularly true in the Internet context. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 (“We must be acutely aware of excessive rigidity when applying the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies require a flexible approach.”). Indeed, in evaluating claims of trademark infringement in cases involving Internet search engines, we have found particularly important an additional factor that is outside of the eight-factor Sleekcraft test: “the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page.” Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154.

“Initial interest confusion is customer confusion that creates initial interest in a competitor’s product. Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore actionable trademark infringement.” Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004).

The goods in the present case are expensive. It is undisputed that the watches at issue sell for several hundred dollars. Therefore, the relevant consumer in the present case “is a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online.” Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010).

Turning to the second question, as MTM itself asserts, the labeling and appearance of the products for sale on Amazon’s web page is the most important factor in this case. This is because we have previously noted that clear labeling can eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion in cases involving Internet search terms.

Here, the products at issue are clearly labeled by Amazon to avoid any likelihood of initial interest confusion by a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to online shopping. When a shopper goes to Amazon’s website and searches for

a product using MTM’s trademark “mtm special ops,” the resulting page displays several products, all of which are clearly labeled with the product’s name and manufacturer in large, bright, bold letters and includes a photograph of the item. In fact, the manufacturer’s name is listed twice. For example, the first result is “Luminox Men’s 8401 Black Ops Watch by Luminox.” The second result is “Chase-Durer Men’s 246.4BB7-XL-BR Special Forces 1000XL Black Ionic-Plated Underwater Demolition Team Watch by Chase-Durer.” Because Amazon clearly labels each of the products for sale by brand name and model number

accompanied by a photograph of the item, it is unreasonable to suppose that the reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online would be confused about the source of the goods.

It is possible that someone, somewhere might be confused by the search results page. But, “unreasonable, imprudent and inexperienced web-shoppers are not relevant.” Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1176; see also Network Automation, 638 F.3d at

1153 (“We expect consumers searching for expensive products online to be even more sophisticated.”). To establish likelihood of confusion, MTM must show that

confusion is likely, not just possible. See Murray, 86 F.3d at 861.

In light of the clear labeling Amazon uses on its search results page, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Amazon’s search results page would likely confuse a reasonably prudent consumer accustomed to shopping online as to the source of the goods being offered. Cf. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1030 n.44 (Clear labeling “might eliminate the likelihood of initial interest confusion that exists in this case.”); Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154 (same). As Judge Berzon put it, “I do not think it is reasonable to find initial interest confusion when a consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, from the outset that a product or web link is not related to that of the trademark holder because the list produced by the search engine so informs him.” Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring).

(9th Court of Appeals, Multi Time Machine v. Amazon.com, Opinion by Judge Silverman, Dissent by Judge Bea, No. 13-55575, October 21, 2015).

L'élément central de la violation du droit à la marque : déterminer si la conduite du défendeur est vraisemblablement susceptible de provoquer la confusion du consommateur s'agissant de l'origine du produit. En l'espèce et en résumé, la page de résultat suite à une recherche online sur le site Amazon donne clairement le nom de chaque produit offert à la vente et le nom de son fabriquant, accompagné d'une photo dudit produit. De la sorte, sous l'angle de la vraisemblance, aucun consommateur raisonnablement prudent habitué à acheter par Internet ne sera dans la confusion s'agissant de l'origine des produits proposés.

Les huit facteurs décrits par la jurisprudence Sleekcraft sont à considérer dans une analyse de violation d'une marque : force de la marque, relation de proximité entre les biens, similarité des marques, preuve d'une confusion effective, canaux marketing utilisés, type de biens et degré d'attention vraisemblablement utilisé par l'acheteur, l'intention du défendeur, vraisemblance de l'expansion des lignes de produits.

La décision de rendre un Jugement sommaire dans une procédure en violation d'une marque est revue de novo, et toutes les inférences raisonnables sont considérées en faveur du défendeur. Bien que désapprouvé dans les affaires en violation du droit à la marque, le Jugement sommaire peut être rendu si les faits allégués ne peuvent impliquer de violation du droit. L'absence de vraisemblance d'une confusion doit pouvoir se déduire d'entrée de cause à la lecture des faits présentés.

Pour l'emporter, le demandeur, titulaire de la marque, qui invoque une violation de son droit à la marque au sens du Lanham Act, doit démontrer que l'usage de sa marque par le défendeur implique une probabilité de causer confusion, erreur ou tromperie (cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)–(a)(1)(A)); (15 U.S. Code § 1125 - False designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden). Le test relatif à la vraisemblance d'une confusion revient à se demander si un consommateur raisonnablement prudent sera vraisemblablement dans la confusion s'agissant de l'origine d'un bien ou d'un service portant la marque. La confusion doit être probable, et non seulement une possibilité.

En l'espèce, la cour de district fédérale a correctement nié l'existence d'une vraisemblance de confusion. Le site Internet Amazon répond à la requête d'un internaute portant sur une marque hors de son catalogue en indiquant clairement quelles autres marques sont proposées, photos à l'appui. Peu importe la mesure avec laquelle les facteurs Sleekcraft s'appliquent ici : les preuves administrées démontrent qu'une confusion de la part de l'acheteur n'est pas du tout vraisemblable. Les autres marques sont clairement identifiées et accompagnées de photographies. Aucune preuve ne serait-ce que d'un seul cas de confusion n'est rapportée.

Comme indiqué précédemment, l'analyse de la vraisemblance de la confusion se fait à la lumière des huit facteurs identifiés par la jurisprudence Sleekcraft. Mais ces huit facteurs ne sont pas considérés de manière rigide. Ils sont plutôt des intermédiaires adaptables permettant de mesurer la confusion du consommateur, au cas par cas. Certains facteurs peuvent être bien plus importants que d'autres, et l'importance relative de chacun des facteurs dépend du cas d'espèce. En outre, ces facteurs ne sont pas exhaustifs et d'autres variables peuvent entrer en considération selon les faits de la cause. Ce qui précède étant particulièrement vrai dans le domaine d'Internet. Le Juge doit éviter une rigidité excessive en appliquant la loi dans le domaine d'Internet. Les technologies émergentes demandent une approche flexible. Et précisément, en évaluant les prétentions en violation du droit des marques dans des affaires impliquant des moteurs de recherche Internet, le 9è Circuit a mis en évidence un facteur additionnel hors de la liste établie par Sleekcraft : l'étiquetage et l'apparence des produits proposés et du contexte qui apparaissent sur la page du résultat de la recherche.

(La notion d'"initial interest confusion" est la confusion du consommateur qui crée un intérêt initial pour le produit d'un concurrent. Bien que dissipé avant que ne se produise la vente, l'"initial interest confusion" capitalise de manière inadmissible au détriment du goodwill associé à une marque, de sorte qu'il est actionnable en tant que violation du droit à la marque).

En l'espèce, les biens en question sont des produits chers. Il n'est pas contesté que ces produits horlogers se vendent à plusieurs centaines de dollars. C'est pourquoi ici le consommateur relevant doit être regardé comme un consommateur raisonnablement prudent habitué à faire ses achats en ligne.

La cour relève que l'étiquetage, ou la description du produit sur la page Internet, ainsi que l'apparence de ce produit telle qu'elle apparaît à l'écran, sont les facteurs les plus importants en l'espèce. Cela du fait qu'une description claire est susceptible d'éliminer la vraisemblance d'une "initial interest confusion" dans des cas impliquant des termes de recherche sur Internet.

Dans la présente affaire, les produits sont clairement décrits par Amazon, évitant ainsi toute vraisemblance d'une "initial interest confusion" par un consommateur raisonnablement prudent habitué à acheter en ligne. La recherche aboutit à une page Internet d'Amazon qui décrit clairement le nom des articles, le nom des fabricants, en grands caractères aisément lisibles, photographie de l'article à l'appui. Il n'est ainsi pas raisonnable de supposer que le consommateur précité pourrait être dans la confusion s'agissant de la source de l'article considéré online.

Il est certes possible que quelqu'un, quelque part, pourrait être confondu en consultant le résultat de la recherche Internet. Mais les acheteurs déraisonnables, imprudents et sans expérience ne sont pas des acteurs relevant dans notre analyse. Il est attendu des consommateurs qui recherchent des produits chers en ligne d'être encore plus sophistiqués. Pour établir une vraisemblance de confusion, le demandeur doit démontrer que la confusion est vraisemblable, et non seulement possible.

Paroline v. U.S., Docket 12-8561

Torts and criminal law: remedies: restitution: in favor of the victim of a tort, or as in this case, in favor of a victim of a criminal act: this case is thus mainly about the criminal restitution context.

The respondent victim in this case was sexually abused as a young girl in order to produce child pornography. When she was 17, she learned that images of her abuse were being trafficked on the Internet, in ef­fect repeating the original wrongs, for she knew that her humiliation and hurt would be renewed well into the future as thousands of addi­tional wrongdoers witnessed those crimes. Petitioner Paroline plead­ed guilty in federal court to possessing images of child pornography, which included two of the victim, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §2252. The victim then sought restitution under §2259, requesting nearly $3 million in lost income and about $500,000 in future treatment and counseling costs. The District Court declined to award restitution, concluding that the Government had not met its burden of proving what losses, if any, were proximately caused by Paroline’s offense. The victim sought a writ of mandamus, asking the Fifth Circuit to di­rect the District Court to order Paroline to pay restitution. Granting the writ on rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit held, inter alia, that §2259 did not limit restitution to losses proximately caused by the de­fendant, and that each defendant who possessed the victim’s images should be made liable for the victim’s entire losses from the trade in her images.

Held:  Restitution is proper under §2259 only to the extent the defend­ant’s offense proximately caused a victim’s losses; to say one event proximately caused another means, first, that the former event caused the latter, i.e., actual cause or cause in fact; and second, that it is a proximate cause, i.e., it has a sufficient connection to the result. The concept of proximate causation is applicable in both criminal and tort law, and the analysis is parallel in many in­stances (…) as a proximate result of the offense, §2259(b)(3)(F)—clearly states that the causal requirement is one of proximate cause. This reading is supported by the canon of construc­tion that, “when several words are followed by a clause which is ap­plicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natu­ral construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.” Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U. S. 345, 348; applying the statute’s causation requirements in this case, vic­tims should be compensated and defendants should be held to ac­count for the impact of their conduct on those victims, but defendants should only be made liable for the consequences and gravity of their own conduct, not the conduct of others; the victim and the Government urge the Court to read §2259 to require a less re­strictive causation standard in child-pornography cases like this. They endorse the theory of “aggregate causation,” one formulation of which finds factual causation satisfied where a wrongdoer’s conduct, though alone “insufficient . . . to cause the plaintiff ’s harm,” is, “when combined with conduct by other persons,” “more than sufficient to cause the harm.” 1 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm §27, Comment f. Tort law teaches that such al­ternative causal tests, though a kind of legal fiction, may be neces­sary to vindicate the law’s purposes, for it would be anomalous to turn away a person harmed by the combined acts of many wrongdo­ers simply because none of those wrongdoers alone caused the harm, and nonsensical to adopt a rule whereby individuals hurt by the com­bined wrongful acts of many would have no redress, while those hurt by the acts of one person alone would. These are sound principles; taken too far, however, such alternative causal standards would treat each possessor as the cause in fact of all the trauma and at­tendant losses incurred as a result of all the ongoing traffic in the vic­tim’s images. Aggregate causation logic should not be adopted in an incautious manner in the context of criminal restitution, which dif­fers from tort law in numerous respects. Paroline’s contribution to the causal process underlying the victim’s losses was very minor, both compared to the combined acts of all other relevant offenders and compared to the contributions of other individual offenders, par­ticularly distributors and the initial producer of the child pornogra­phy; Congress gave no indication that it intended the statute to be applied in an expansive manner so starkly contrary to the principle that restitution should reflect the consequences of the defendant’s own conduct. The victim claims that holding each possessor liable for her entire losses would be fair and practical in part because offenders can seek contribution from one another, but there is no general fed­eral right to contribution and no specific statutory authorization for contribution here. Her severe approach could also raise questions under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment; while the victim’s expansive reading must be rejected, that does not mean the broader principles underlying aggregate causation theories are irrelevant to determining the proper outcome in cases like this. The cause of the victim’s general losses is the trade in her images, and Paroline is a part of that cause. Just as it undermines the purposes of tort law to turn away plaintiffs harmed by several wrongdoers, it would undermine §2259’s purposes to turn away vic­tims in cases like this; thus, where it can be shown both that a defendant possessed a victim’s images and that a victim has outstanding losses caused by the continuing traffic in her images but where it is impossible to trace a particular amount of those losses to the individual defendant utilizing a more traditional causal in­quiry, a court should order restitution in an amount that comports with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process underlying the victim’s general losses; District courts should use discretion and sound judgment in deter­mining the proper amount of restitution. A variety of factors may serve as guideposts. Courts might, as a start, determine the amount of the victim’s losses caused by the continuing traffic in the victim’s images, and then base an award on factors bearing on the relative causal significance of the defendant’s conduct in producing those losses. The victim finds this approach untenable because her losses are “indivisible,” but the Court is required to define a causal standard that effects the statute’s purposes, not to apply tort-law concepts in a mechanical way in the criminal restitution context. She also argues she will be consigned to “piecemeal” restitution that may never lead to full recovery, but Congress has not promised victims full and swift restitution at the cost of holding a defendant liable for an amount drastically out of proportion to his individual causal relation to those losses.

Though this approach is not without difficulties, courts can only do their best to apply the statute as written in a workable man­ner, faithful to the competing principles at stake: that victims should be compensated and that defendants should be held to account for the impact of their own conduct, not the conduct of others. District courts, which routinely exercise wide discretion both in sentencing generally and in fashioning restitution orders, should be able to apply the causal standard defined here without further detailed guidance (U.S.S.Ct., 23.04.2014, Paroline v. U.S., Docket 12-8561, J. Kennedy).

Responsabilité civile et droit pénal : remèdes judiciaires disponibles : cas de la restitution, en faveur de la victime d’un acte illicite de nature civile, ou comme en l’espèce en faveur de la victime d’une infraction pénale : dans cette affaire, la victime a été abusée sexuellement dans son enfance afin de produire de la pornographie. A l’âge de 17 ans, elle a appris que des images la concernant et résultant des infractions circulaient sur Internet, répétant ainsi dans les faits le mal qui avait été fait pendant son enfance. Le recourant dans la présente procédure a plaidé coupable devant le Tribunal pénal fédéral de possession d’images pornographiques de mineurs. Deux de ces images se rapportent à la victime précitée. Fondée sur la possession illicite de ses images, la victime réclame au recourant un paiement (remède de la restitution en droit pénal) de près de 3 millions de dollars pour perte de gain, et un paiement de 500'000 dollars au titre de frais de traitements médicaux futurs. La cour de district fédérale refuse d’allouer ces montants, concluant que le lien de causalité adéquat n’a pas été établi entre les actes délictueux du recourant et les montants allégués à titre de dommages. La victime dépose alors une requête visant à l’octroi d’un writ of mandamus, par lequel elle demande au Cinquième circuit fédéral d’ordonner à la cour de district fédérale d’accorder le remède de la restitution. Le Cinquième circuit accorde le writ, concluant que le droit fédéral applicable dans ce type d’affaires ne limite pas le remède de restitution aux pertes en lien de causalité adéquate avec les actes du délinquant, et précisant que chaque délinquant détenant des images interdites est responsable pour l’ensemble du dommage occasionné à la victime.

La Cour Suprême fédérale juge que le délinquant, recourant dans la présente affaire, ne peut être tenu à restitution que dans la mesure du dommage en lien de causalité avec sa propre activité criminelle, à l’exclusion de celles commises par d’autres personnes. Le lien de causalité adéquate implique une causalité naturelle comme dans les systèmes juridiques de droit civil. La causalité devient adéquate si un acte et son résultat (le dommage) sont liés par une connexion suffisante. Par conséquent, s’agissant de la victime,  le recourant doit être tenu responsable des conséquences de la détention des deux images de dite victime.

Le concept de causalité adéquate est applicable aussi bien en droit pénal qu’en droit de la responsabilité civile, et son analyse est souvent parallèle.

Toujours est-il que dans le cadre du type d’infractions commises dans cette affaire, le droit fédéral parle bien de responsabilité du délinquant selon le principe de la causalité adéquate. Dès lors, chaque délinquant est tenu responsable des conséquences et de la gravité de sa propre conduite, non de la conduite d’autres délinquants. La victime et le Gouvernement suggèrent à la Cour un standard de causalité moins restrictif s’agissant des cas de pornographie enfantine comme celui-ci. Ils proposent d’adopter la théorie de l’agrégation de la causalité des divers auteurs, qui s’appliquerait lorsque la conduite d’un délinquant, insuffisante en elle-même à créer la restitution de la totalité du dommage subi par la victime, serait suffisante lorsque dite conduite serait combinée à la conduite des autres délinquants. Le droit de la responsabilité enseigne qu’une telle notion de causalité, alternative à la notion habituelle de causalité, peut être nécessaire pour accomplir le but de la loi, considérant qu’il serait anormal de laisser sans remède une victime dont le dommage aurait été causé par les actes combinés de plusieurs délinquants, cela du seul fait qu’aucun de ces délinquants, pris individuellement, n’est à la base de l’entier du dommage, tandis que la victime de l’acte d’un seul délinquant serait, elle, pleinement indemnisée. Mais en l’espèce cette théorie conduit trop loin. Elle reviendrait à impliquer que chaque délinquant, au sens de la causalité naturelle, est responsable de l’entier du dommage, ce qui n’est pas le cas. La contribution du recourant au processus causal entrainant le dommage est relativement de peu d’importance comparée aux autres délinquants impliqués, notamment le producteur des images et les distributeurs de celles-ci. Le Congrès fédéral n’a pas indiqué qu’il entendait faire appliquer la loi de manière aussi expansive, de manière tellement contraire au principe selon lequel la restitution doit être le reflet des conséquences de la conduite propre du recourant. Le raisonnement de la victime consiste à dire que chaque possesseur d’image responsable de l’entier du dommage serait une solution équitable et pratique : chaque délinquant responsable disposerait d’un droit de recours contre les autres, de sorte que le dommage serait équitablement alloué entre eux. Cependant la Cour précise qu’il n’existe pas de droit fédéral général à une « contribution » et il n’existe pas davantage de loi permettant d’organiser la « contribution » des uns et des autres comme le propose la victime. Son approche, sévère, pourrait en outre s’avérer problématique sous l’angle de la Clause des amendes excessives déduite du Huitième Amendement. Le raisonnement juridique de la victime doit par conséquent être rejeté, ce qui ne signifie pas que les principes sous-jacents à la théorie de la causalité agrégée soient irrelevants pour trouver la solution correcte aux questions que posent des affaires de ce type. La cause du dommage subi par la victime consiste dans le commerce des images de sa personne, et le recourant est inclus dans cette cause. Ainsi, lorsqu’il peut être démontré que l’accusé possédait des images de la victime, que la victime subit un dommage dû au trafic des images (par Internet), qu’il n’est pas possible de déterminer une part de ce dommage à un accusé particulier en utilisant la théorie habituelle de la causalité, alors le Tribunal doit ordonner restitution d’un montant en rapport avec le rôle relatif de l’accusé. Les cours de première instance sont ainsi invitées à faire usage de leur bon jugement en déterminant le montant du dommage à charge de chaque délinquant. La victime soutient que cette approche la contraint à une multitude de procédures dont le résultat pourrait bien ne jamais compenser intégralement son dommage, mais le Congrès fédéral n’a pas promis aux victimes pleine et rapide restitution en permettant que l’un des accusés soit tenu à verser un montant drastiquement sans proportion à la relation causale qui le lie au dommage total.

Bien que l’approche retenue par la Cour ne soit pas sans présenter des difficultés, les Tribunaux ne peuvent que faire de leur mieux pour appliquer la loi telle qu’elle est rédigée. Les cours de première instance, qui exercent de manière routinière une large discrétion en prononçant des pénalités et des ordres de restitution, sont aptes à appliquer le standard de causalité retenu en l’espèce sans davantage de guidance.