U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Emilio Braun v. America-CV Station Group, Inc., et al., Docket No. 21-13774

Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

 

Modification to a Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan

 

New Disclosure Statement and Another Opportunity to Vote Required

 

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3019(a)

 

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-23120-DPG

 

 

 

Just before the Chapter 11 reorganization plans of Caribevision Holdings, Inc. and Caribevision TV Network, LLC were set to be confirmed, the debtors filed an emergency motion to modify the plans under 11 U.S.C. § 1127(a). The initial plans called for equity in the reorganized companies to be split between four shareholders: Ramon Diez-Barroso, Pegaso Television Corp., Emilio Braun, and Vasallo TV Group. The modification, after being approved by the bankruptcy court, stripped the first three of their equity and allocated full ownership to the fourth—a company controlled by the debtors’ Chief Executive Officer. Taken by surprise, the three ousted shareholders, who collectively call themselves the Pegaso Equity Holders, now challenge the bankruptcy court’s order granting the debtors’ emergency motion to modify the reorganization plans. They contend that they were entitled to a revised disclosure statement and a second opportunity to vote on the plans under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3019(a)—a procedural protection the bankruptcy court did not provide them. We agree. When a modification to a Chapter 11 reorganization plan materially and adversely affects the treatment of a class of claim or interest holders, those claim or interest holders are entitled to a new disclosure statement and another opportunity to vote. Because the modification materially and adversely affected the Pegaso Equity Holders, we reverse and remand to the bankruptcy court.

 

 

(…) In May 2019, the holding companies—along with two operating companies they own—filed voluntary petitions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The Chapter 11 proceeding would restructure the companies’ debt obligations while maintaining ongoing operations. Each company authorized Carlos Vasallo, the networks’ President and Chief Executive Officer, to make all decisions regarding the Chapter 11 petitions.

 

 

To finance the discharge of debt obligations and maintain operations, the proposed reorganization plans called for the post-petition holding companies’ equity holders to make a new $500,000 capital contribution and execute a $1.6 million line of credit. The new equity in the reorganized holding companies was to be allocated in proportion to the amount of capital each post-petition shareholder contributed. To achieve this, the plans “cancelled and extinguished” the equity interests in the pre-petition entities and “simultaneously” issued new equity interests in the reorganized holding companies. The three Pegaso Equity Holders were each to receive individual shares that collectively amount to 65.8% of the equity interests in each reorganized holding company—50.1% to Diez-Barroso, 11.9% to Pegaso Television Corp., and 3.8% to Braun. The remainder was to go to the Vasallo TV Group, LLC—a company owned by Carlos Vasallo. The plans classified all the equity interest holders together into the same class—Class 3.

 

 

At first this bankruptcy case was proceeding like any other. The debtors submitted the plans to the bankruptcy court along with a disclosure statement. Minor objections were made; an amended disclosure statement was filed. The bankruptcy court approved it, votes on the reorganization plans were solicited, and ballots were filed. A year into the bankruptcy, everything was going according to plan. Until it wasn’t. Two weeks before the confirmation hearing, the same day as the deadline to cast a ballot, the debtors informed the Pegaso Equity Holders that they needed the exit financing three days before the confirmation hearing. The debtors believed that this was necessary to comply with their view of the bankruptcy court’s requirement to certify that funding was available. But the Pegaso Equity Holders assert that this was unexpected. The reorganization plans, along with the disclosure statement, provided that the financial contributions were to be made “on the Effective Date”—a date that would not occur until after the Confirmation Order became a final order.

 

 

(…) The court immediately proceeded to consider confirmation. Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan typically requires the impaired classes of creditors and equity interest holders to accept the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). When it came time to count the votes, no one in Class 3—the equity interest holders of the pre-petition holding companies—had cast a ballot. But under the Code, if a plan provides that the interests of a class do not entitle the interest holders to “receive or retain any property under the plan on account of” their interests, then they are “deemed not to have accepted a plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g). The court read the initial reorganization plans to extinguish the pre-petition equity interests without giving those interest holders anything in return. So the court’s solution was to “deem” that Class 3 had rejected the plans. It then confirmed the modified plans via a “cramdown” over the deemed dissent of the Class 3 interest holders. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).

 

 

Modifying a Chapter 11 reorganization plan before confirmation is relatively easy: the “proponent of a plan may modify such plan at any time before confirmation.” 11 U.S.C. § 1127(a). This is by design. The Bankruptcy Code seeks to facilitate negotiation between the debtor and its creditors, equity holders, and other interested parties. Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1127.03[1] (16th ed. 2022). Easy modification allows negotiated outcomes to quickly become part of the plan. But there are a few constraints. The modified plan must still comply with the Code’s substantive requirements for any reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1127(a). This means that the modification must comply with § 1122’s restrictions on the classification of claims and interests and § 1123’s requirements for the contents of a reorganization plan. Id. An important substantive requirement for our purposes is found in § 1123(a)(4). Unless the disfavored class members consent, the modified plan must “provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class.” Id. § 1123(a)(4). There are also procedural constraints. A modification must comply with § 1125’s requirement that claim and interest holders be given “adequate information” about the contents of a plan. Id. § 1127(c). Before a modification is filed, this is accomplished in a disclosure statement, which must be approved by the bankruptcy court as containing adequate information. Id. § 1125(b); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3016(b). A sufficient statement ensures that investors can make an informed vote. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).

 

 

Under certain circumstances, when a modification is made after votes are cast based on an old disclosure statement, the debtor must provide a new disclosure statement and call for another round of voting. In re New Power Co., 438 F.3d 1113, 1117–18 (11th Cir. 2006). But not all modifications trigger this requirement. A claim or interest holder is entitled to this procedural protection only if, after a hearing, the bankruptcy court finds that the modification “materially and adversely changes the way that claim or interest holder is treated.” Id. Because these determinations are mixed questions of law and fact, we review them de novo. Id. at 1117.

 

 

The rule provides that if the court finds that “the proposed modification does not adversely change the treatment of the claim of any creditor or the interest of any equity security holder who has not accepted in writing the modification, it shall be deemed accepted by all creditors and equity security holders who have previously accepted the plan.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3019(a) (emphasis added). The key word here is “any.” “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (citation omitted); accord Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997). The repeated use of the word “any” refers to creditors or equity security holders of whatever kind. The text does not permit any narrower interpretation. The rule therefore requires additional disclosure and voting if the modification materially and adversely affects any creditor or interest holder, not just those voting to accept the plan.

 

 

Our precedent likewise does not distinguish between classes. We have said that “the bankruptcy court may deem a claim or interest holder’s vote for or against a plan as a corresponding vote in relation to a modified plan unless the modification materially and adversely changes the way that claim or interest holder is treated.” New Power, 438 F.3d at 1117–18 (emphasis added). “If it does,” we continued, “the claim or interest holder is entitled to a new disclosure statement and another vote.” Id. at 1118. The text of the rule and our precedent thus both make clear that if a modification materially and adversely changes the treatment of any claim or interest holder who has not accepted the modification in writing, then that claim or interest holder is entitled to a new disclosure statement and resolicitation of votes. So too here.

 

 

To be sure, for a creditor or equity interest holder that already voted to reject a plan, a second rejection vote in response to a modification that materially and adversely affects its interest will have little effect. On the other hand, a creditor or equity interest holder that previously voted to accept a plan benefits from the added disclosure and revoting because it can change its vote to reject the plan—recourse not available to a creditor or equity interest holder that voted to reject the initial plan. But a dissenting vote on a Chapter 11 plan does not give the debtor a free pass to modify the plan to the detriment of that dissenting claim or interest holder. This case shows exactly why a new disclosure statement can protect a claim or interest holder who previously voted to reject the plans. A new disclosure statement with additional time to vote would have given the Pegaso Equity Holders an opportunity to object to the modification on substantive grounds.

 

 

 

Secondary Sources: Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1127.03[1] (16th ed. 2022)

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Jan. 5, 2023, Emilio Braun v. America-CV Station Group, Inc., et al., Docket No. 21-13774, Published)

U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, Docket No. 15-1509

Bankruptcy: Chapter 11: Reorganization: Cramdown plan: Clear error:

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code enables a debtor company to reorganize its business under a court-approved plan governing the distribution of assets to creditors. See 11 U. S. C. §1101 et seq. The plan divides claims against the debtor into discrete “classes” and specifies the “treatment” each class will receive. §1123; See §1122. Usually, a bankruptcy court may approve such a plan only if every affected class of creditors agrees to its terms. See §1129(a)(8). But in certain circumstances, the court may confirm what is known as a “cramdown” plan— that is, a plan impairing the interests of some non-consenting class. See §1129(b). Among the prerequisites for judicial approval of a cramdown plan is that another impaired class of creditors has consented to it. See §1129(a)(10). But crucially for this case, the consent of a creditor who is also an “insider” of the debtor does not count for that purpose. See ibid. (requiring “at least one” impaired class to have “accepted the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insider”).

The Code enumerates certain insiders, but courts have added to that number. According to the Code’s definitional section, an insider of a corporate debtor “includes” any director, officer, or “person in control” of the entity. §§101(31)(B)(i)–(iii). Because of the word “includes” in that section, courts have long viewed its list of insiders as non-exhaustive. See §102(3) (stating as one of the Code’s “rules of construction” that “‘includes’ and ‘including’ are not limiting”); A. Resnick & H. Sommer, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶101.31, p. 101–142 (16th ed. 2016) (discussing cases). Accordingly, courts have devised tests for identifying other, so-called “non-statutory” insiders. The decisions are not entirely uniform, but many focus, in whole or in part, on whether a person’s “transaction of business with the debtor is not at arm’s length.” Ibid. (quoting In re U. S. Medical, Inc., 531 F. 3d 1272, 1280 (CA10 2008)).

(…) The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed by a divided vote. According to the court, a creditor qualifies as a non-statutory insider if two conditions are met: “(1) the closeness of its relationship with the debtor is comparable to that of the enumerated insider classifications in the Code, and (2) the relevant transaction is negotiated at less than arm’s length.” In re Village at Lakeridge, LLC,814 F. 3d 993, 1001 (2016).

((…) This Court granted certiorari to decide a single question: Whether the Ninth Circuit was right to review for clear error (rather than de novo) the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that Rabkin does not qualify as a non-statutory insider because he purchased MBP’s claim in an arm’s length transaction).

(J. Sotomayor, with whom J. Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch join, concurring: The Court’s discussion of the standard of review thus begs the question of what the appropriate test for deter­mining non-statutory insider status is. I do not seek to answer that question, as the Court expressly declined to grant certiorari on it. I have some concerns with the Ninth Circuit’s test, however, that would benefit from additional consideration by the lower courts).

Secondary authority: A. Resnick & H. Sommer, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶101.31, p. 101–142 (16th ed. 2016).

(U.S.S.C., March 5, 2018, U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, Docket No. 15-1509, J. Kagan, unanimous)

Procédure de faillite selon le Chapitre 11, cas dans lesquels le plan de répartition peut être imposé même en l'absence du support d'au moins un créancier sans lien avec l'entreprise ou ses organes de décision.

Usuellement, une cour fédérale des faillites ne peut approuver un tel plan que s'il est ratifié par toutes les classes de créanciers (cf. 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(8)).

Ce n'est que dans certains cas que la cour peut imposer un plan à une classe de créanciers qui ne consentent pas (cf. §1129(b)). La première condition est qu'au moins une classe de créanciers (lésés par le plan) ait approuvé ledit plan. Le consentement d'un créancier qui est en même temps un "insider" n'est à cet égard pas compté.

La loi donne une définition exemplaire de l'"insider", que la jurisprudence a complété. A la notion de personne "qui contrôle l'entité" s'est ajoutée la notion de personne dont la transaction avec l'entreprise débitrice ne s'est pas faite dans un rapport d'égalité ("at arm's length"). Cependant, la Cour ne s'est pas occupée en l'espèce de l'adéquation de dite définition. Elle ne s'est occupée que de la question de savoir si l'autorité précédente, le 9è Circuit fédéral, avait appliqué un standard de révision correct de la décision de première instance (la cour fédérale des faillites). La Cour juge que le 9è Circuit a appliqué à juste titre le critère de la "clear error" et non le critère "de novo". S'agissant de la question, non résolue ici, de la définition de l'"insider", les Juges Sotomayor, Kennedy, Thomas et Gorsuch font part, dans une opinion concurrente, de leurs doutes s'agissant de la définition jurisprudentielle donnée à ce jour au terme "insider".

Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, S236208

Law partnerships: Partnership (dissolution): Property interest: Vested rights: Fees (contingency basis): Fees (hourly basis): Jewel Waiver: Chapter 11: Common law:

(…) Does a dissolved law firm retains a property interest in (…) legal matters (matters on an hourly basis) that are in progress –– but not completed –– at the time of dissolution?

(…) Under California law, a dissolved law firm has no property interest in legal matters handled on an hourly basis, and therefore, no property interest in the profits generated by its former partners’ work on hourly fee matters pending at the time of the firm’s dissolution. The partnership has no more than an expectation that it may continue to work on such matters, and that expectation may be dashed at any time by a client’s choice to remove its business. As such, the firm’s expectation — a mere possibility of unearned, prospective fees — cannot constitute a property interest. To the extent the law firm has a claim, its claim is limited to the work necessary for preserving legal matters so they can be transferred to new counsel of the client’s choice (or the client itself), effectuating such a transfer, or collecting on work done pretransfer.

Heller’s dissolution plan included a provision known as a Jewel waiver. Named after the case of Jewel v. Boxer (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 171 (Jewel), the provision purported to waive any rights and claims Heller may have had “to seek payment of legal fees generated after the departure date of any lawyer or group of lawyers with respect to non-contingency/non-success fee matters only.” The waiver was intended as “an inducement to encourage Shareholders to move their clients to other law firms and to move Associates and Staff with them, the effect of which will be to reduce expenses to the Firm-in-Dissolution.” By its express terms, the waiver governed only those matters billed on a non-contingency –– that is continual, or hourly –– basis.

(…) In the meantime, Heller filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. When Heller’s plan of liquidation was approved, the bankruptcy court appointed a plan administrator who became responsible for pursuing claims to recover assets for the benefit of Heller’s creditors.

(…) We granted the Ninth Circuit’s request that we resolve the question of what property interest, if any, a dissolved law firm has in the legal matters, and therefore the profits, of cases that are in progress but not completed at the time of dissolution.

(…) Our policy of encouraging labor mobility while minimizing firm instability. It accomplishes the former by making the pending matters, and those that work on them, attractive additions to new firms; it manages the latter by placing partners who depart after a firm’s dissolution at no disadvantage to those who leave earlier.

(…) In Osment v. McElrath (1886) 68 Cal. 466 and Little v. Caldwell (1894) 101 Cal. 553, we confronted situations in which law firms dissolved with contingency matters pending. In both cases, we held that the fees generated by one partner in completing the matters were to be shared equally with the former partner (or his estate). (Osment, supra, 68 Cal. at p. 470; Little, supra, 101 Cal. at p. 561.) We thus rejected the argument that the lawyers who personally completed the matters were entitled to a greater share of the fees than stipulated to in the partnership agreements.

California partnership law was codified in 1929 when the Legislature adopted the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA). The UPA preserved many common-law principles, including the rules elucidated in Osment and Little. (See Jacobson v. Wikholm (1946) 29 Cal.2d 24, 27–28 (Jacobson).) The First District Court of Appeal then added further gloss when it interpreted UPA in the case of Jewel v. Boxer, supra. In Jewel, partners of a dissolved law firm sued their former partners who had been handling “most of the active personal injury and workers’ compensation cases.” (Jewel, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 175.) The suing partners sought their shares of the fees from these cases, arguing that they were entitled to the same fees as prevailed during the partnership.

The Jewel court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. It reasoned that the former partners were not entitled “to extra compensation for services rendered in completing unfinished business,” where “extra compensation” was compensation “which is greater than would have been received as the former partner’s share of the dissolved partnership.” (Jewel, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 176 & fn. 2.) Accordingly, without an agreement to the contrary, any attorney fees generated from matters pending when the law firm dissolved were “to be shared by the former partners according to their right to fees in the former partnership, regardless of which former partner provides legal services in the case after the dissolution.” (Id. at p. 174.)

Subsequent Court of Appeal decisions consistently applied Jewel’s holding to contingency fee cases. (See, e.g., Fox v. Abrams (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 610, 612–613; Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1063.) Such widespread application of Jewel was confined to the contingency fee context, however. Only in 1993 did a Court of Appeal expressly interpret Jewel to encompass matters the dissolved law firm had been handling on an hourly basis. (See Rothman v. Dolin (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 755, 757–759.) To this day, Rothman remains the only published California opinion to apply Jewel to the hourly fee context, and it did so before UPA was revised. Three years after Rothman, the Legislature again revised partnership law by replacing UPA with RUPA. (See Corp. Code, § 16100 et. seq.) RUPA made several changes to the default rules of California partnership law.

(…) Since the enactment of RUPA, no California court has, in a published opinion, resolved whether there remains a basis for holding that a partnership has a property interest in legal matters pending at a firm’s dissolution. The last time we took up the issue was in Osment and Little. More recent is the intermediate appellate decision in Jewel, although that, too, was issued before the passage of RUPA and implicated only contingency fee matters. We thus consider with fresh eyes the question posed to us by the Ninth Circuit.

(…) The circumstances giving rise to a property interest, in turn, include not only familiar arm’s-length transactions but also certain sufficiently reliable expectations, such as unvested retirement benefits. (E.g., In re Marriage of Green (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1130, 1140– 1141 [“Nonvested retirement benefits are certainly contingent on various events occurring — such as continued employment — but this does not prevent them from being a property right for these purposes.”].) In this case, we consider the question of whether a sufficiently strong expectation exists in the context of a law firm partnership performing hourly work on legal matters. We find that it does not. A property interest grounded in such an expectation requires a legitimate, objectively reasonable assurance rather than a mere unilaterally-held presumption (See Bd. of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577).

(…) (See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1174–1175, 1172 (General Dynamics) [stating that it is “bedrock law” that a client has the right “to sever the professional relationship [with its attorney] at any time and for any reason,” although carving out a limited exception for in-house counsel whose relationship with the client is not a “ ‘one shot’ undertaking”].)

While Heller was a viable, ongoing business, it no doubt hoped to continue working on the unfinished hourly fee matters and expected to receive compensation for its future work. But such hopes were speculative, given the client’s right to terminate counsel at any time, with or without cause. As such, they do not amount to a property interest. (Civ. Code, § 700; In re Thelen LLP (2014) 20 N.E.3d 264, 270–271 [“no law firm has a property interest in future hourly legal fees because they are ‘too contingent in nature and speculative to create a present or future property interest’ ”].) Dissolution does not change that fact, as dissolving does not place a firm in the position to claim a property interest in work it has not performed — work that would not give rise to a property interest if the firm were still a going concern. A dissolved law firm therefore has no property interest in the fees or profits associated with unfinished hourly fee matters. The firm never owned such matters, and upon dissolution, cannot claim a property interest in the income streams that they generate. This is true even when it is the dissolved firm’s former partners who continue to work on these matters and earn the income — as is consistent with our partnership law.

So, with the exception of fees paid for work fitting the narrow category of winding up activities that a former partner might perform after a firm’s dissolution, a dissolved law firm’s property interest in hourly fee matters is limited to the right to be paid for the work it performs before dissolution. Consistent with our statutory partnership law, winding up includes only tasks necessary to preserve the hourly fee matters so that they can be transferred to new counsel of the client’s choice (or the client itself), to effectuate such a transfer, and to collect on the pretransfer work. Beyond this, the partnership’s interest, like the partnership itself, dissolves.

(Cal. S.C., March 5, 2018, Heller Ehrman LLP v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, S236208)

Une étude d'avocats est-elle titulaire, après sa dissolution, d'un "property interest" portant sur les affaires en cours (facturées selon un tarif horaire), et sur les honoraires qu'elles génèrent après dissolution ?

En droit californien, une étude d'avocats dissoute, en phase de liquidation, n'est pas titulaire d'un "property interest" s'agissant des affaires traitées à un tarif horaire. De la sorte, elle n'est pas non plus titulaire d'un tel intérêt sur les honoraires générés après dissolution, dans ces dossiers, par les anciens associés. Même avant dissolution, l'étude n'a que l'expectative de pouvoir continuer à travailler dans les affaires en cours, et cette expectative peut être contrariée en tout temps par le choix du client de résilier le mandat. Dite expectative ne saurait constituer un "property interest" : elle ne permet, après dissolution, que d'entreprendre contre rémunération le travail nécessaire au bon transfert du dossier et de procéder au recouvrement des honoraires dus avant le transfert.

Dans deux décisions anciennes, Osment v. McElrath (1886) 68 Cal. 466 et Little v. Caldwell (1894) 101 Cal. 553, la Cour Suprême de Californie a jugé que dans des dossiers rémunérés autrement que selon le système du tarif horaire, l'avocat qui continuait de traiter le dossier après dissolution de l'ancienne étude devait partager ses honoraires avec l'avocat (ou sa succession) qui le traitait avant dissolution. Les honoraires devaient ainsi être partagés comme si l'étude n'avait pas été dissoute, en conformité avec le contrat de collaboration des anciens associés de l'étude dissoute. Cela sauf accord contraire entre les anciens associés (cf. Jewel v. Boxer (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 171 (Jewel)).

Le "partnership law" californien a été codifié en 1929, et a conservé de nombreux principes de la Common law, y compris les principes énoncés par les deux décisions précitées Osment et Little.

La décision Jewel a été reprise de manière réitérée par les cours d'appel, mais seulement dans le contexte d'honoraires calculés autrement que selon le tarif horaire. Une seule décision d'une seule cour d'appel a repris Jewel dans le cadre du tarif horaire (Rothman v. Dolin (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 755, 757–759). Trois ans après Rothman, le législateur a révisé le droit du "partnership", remplaçant UPA par RUPA.

Depuis l'entrée en vigueur de ce nouveau droit, aucune décision publiée des cours de Californie n'a jugé si le droit révisé permettait de retenir l'existence d'un "property interest" en faveur d'une étude dissoute et portant, après dissolution, sur les affaires en cours et sur les honoraires générés après dissolution.

La Cour juge en l'espère qu'un "property interest" peut être reconnu si l'expectative du droit qui lui est lié est suffisamment solide. Tel est le cas par exemple d'un droit futur reconnu par un contrat bilatéral, ou de rentes de retraite dont les montants ne sont pas encore certains. Mais tel n'est pas le cas s'agissant d'honoraires d'avocats à verser selon un tarif horaire. Des honoraires futurs pour un travail qui n'a pas encore été accompli ne sont en rien acquis. Le client peut en effet résilier le mandat en tout temps, avec ou sans motif (est citée la fameuse décision Bd. of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577). Dès lors, une étude en dissolution n'est pas titulaire d'un "property interest" s'agissant des honoraires portant sur du travail effectué après dissolution. Elle n'était déjà pas titulaire d'un tel intérêt avant dissolution, et la dissolution ne change pas cet absence d'intérêt. Cela même si le travail après dissolution est entrepris par un ancien associé du "partnership" en dissolution. Le "partnership" en dissolution a tout de même droit au paiement de ses honoraires pour le travail, après dissolution, lié au transfert du dossier au nouveau conseil ou au client lui-même. Les honoraires liés au travail accompli avant la dissolution sont également dus.

Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, Docket 14-103

Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, attorney’s fees: compensation of fee-defense litigation:  Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows bank­ruptcy trustees to hire attorneys, accountants, and other professionals to assist them in carrying out their statutory duties. 11 U. S. C. §327(a). Another provision, §330(a)(1), states that a bankruptcy court “may award . . . reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by” those professionals. The question before us is whether §330(a)(1) permits a bankruptcy court to award attorney’s fees for work performed in defending a fee application in court. We hold that it does not and therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

In 2005, respondent ASARCO LLC, a copper mining, smelting, and refining company, found itself in financial trouble. Faced with falling copper prices, debt, cash flow deficiencies, environmental liabilities, and a striking workforce, ASARCO filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. As in many Chapter 11 bankruptcies, no trustee was appointed and ASARCO—the “‘debtor in possession’”—administered the bankruptcy estate as a fiduciary for the estate’s credi­tors. §§1101(1), 1107(a).

Relying on §327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which per­mits trustees to employ attorneys and other professionals to assist them in their duties, ASARCO obtained the Bankruptcy Court’s permission to hire two law firms, petitioners Baker Botts L.L.P. and Jordan, Hyden, Wom­ble, Culbreth & Holzer, P.C., to provide legal representa­tion during the bankruptcy.  Among other services, the firms prosecuted fraudulent-transfer claims against ASARCO’s parent company and ultimately obtained a judgment against it worth between $7 and $10 billion. This judgment contributed to a successful reorganization in which all of ASARCO’s creditors were paid in full. After over four years in bankruptcy, ASARCO emerged in 2009 with $1.4 billion in cash, little debt, and resolution of its environmental liabilities.

Although §327(a) directly applies only to trustees, §1107(a) gives Chapter 11 debtors in possession the same authority as trustees to retain §327(a) professionals. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to §327(a) alone throughout this opinion.

The law firms sought compensation under §330(a)(1), which provides that a bankruptcy court “may award . . .reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by” professionals hired under §327(a). As re­quired by the bankruptcy rules, the two firms filed fee applications. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 2016(a). ASARCO, controlled once again by its parent company, challenged the compensation requested in the applications. After extensive discovery and a 6-day trial on fees, the Bank­ruptcy Court rejected ASARCO’s objections and awarded the firms approximately $120 million for their work in the bankruptcy proceeding plus a $4.1 million enhancement for exceptional performance. The court also awarded the firms over $5 million for time spent litigating in defense of their fee applications.

Held: Section §330(a)(1) does not permit bankruptcy courts to award fees to §327(a) professionals for defending fee applications.

“Our basic point of reference when considering the award of attorney’s fees is the bedrock principle known as the American Rule: each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 252–253 (2010). The American Rule has roots in our common law reaching back to at least the 18th century, see Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306 (1796), and “statutes which invade the common law are to be read with a presumption favor­ing the retention of long-established and familiar legal principles,” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U. S. 517, 534 (1994). We consequently will not deviate from the American Rule “‘absent explicit statutory authority.’” Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 602 (2001) (quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U. S. 809, 814 (1994)).

We have recognized departures from the American Rule only in “specific and explicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys’ fees under selected statutes.” Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 260 (1975). Although these “statutory changes to the Amer­ican Rule take various forms,” Hardt, supra, at 253, they tend to authorize the award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee,” “fees,” or “litigation costs,” and usually refer to a “prevailing party” in the context of an adversarial “action,” see, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §2412(d)(1)(A); 42 U. S. C. §§1988(b), 2000e–5(k); see generally Hardt, supra, at 253, and nn. 3– 7 (collecting examples).

The attorney’s fees provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act offers a good example of the clarity we have required to deviate from the American Rule. See 28

U. S. C. §2412(d)(1)(A). That section provides that “a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort) . . . brought by or against the United States” under certain conditions. Ibid. As our decision in Commissioner  v. Jean, 496 U. S. 154 (1990), reveals, there could be little dispute that this provision—which mentions “fees,” a “prevailing party,” and a “civil action”—is a “fee-shifting statute” that trumps the American Rule, id., at 161.

Section 330(a)(1) in turn authorizes compensation for these professionals as follows:

“After notice to the parties in interest and the United States Trustee and a hearing, and subject to sections 326, 328, and 329, the court may award to a trustee, a consumer privacy ombudsman appointed under section 332, an examiner, an ombudsman ap­pointed under section 333, or a professional person employed under section 327 or 1103”, “(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the trustee, examiner, ombuds­man, professional person, or attorney and by any paraprofessional person employed by any such person”; and

“(B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”

This text cannot displace the American Rule with respect to fee-defense litigation. To be sure, the phrase “reason­able compensation for actual, necessary services rendered” permits courts to award fees to attorneys for work done to assist the administrator of the estate, as the Bankruptcy Court did here when it ordered ASARCO to pay roughly $120 million for the firms’ work in the bankruptcy pro­ceeding. No one disputes that §330(a)(1) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees for that kind of work. See Alyeska Pipeline, supra, at 260, and n. 33 (listing §330(a)(1)’s predecessor as an example of a provision authorizing attorney’s fees). But the phrase “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered” neither specifi­cally nor explicitly authorizes courts to shift the costs of adversarial litigation from one side to the other—in this case, from the attorneys seeking fees to the administrator of the estate—as most statutes that displace the American Rule do.

Instead, §330(a)(1) provides compensation for all §327(a) professionals—whether accountant, attorney, or auc­tioneer—for all manner of work done in service of the estate administrator. More specifically, §330(a)(1) allows “reasonable compensation” only for “actual, necessary services rendered.” That qualification is significant. The word “services” ordinarily refers to “labor performed for another.” Webster’s New Interna­tional Dictionary 2288 (def. 4) (2d ed. 1934); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1607 (3d ed. 1933) (“duty or labor to be rendered by one person to another”); Oxford English Dictionary 517 (def. 19) (1933) (“action of serving, helping or benefiting; conduct tending to the welfare or advantage of another”).  Thus, in a case addressing §330(a)’s prede­cessor, this Court concluded that the phrase “‘reasonable compensation for services rendered’ necessarily implies loyal and disinterested service in the interest of ” a client. Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 312 U. S. 262, 268 (1941); accord, American United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Avon Park, 311 U. S. 138, 147 (1940). Time spent litigating a fee application against the administrator of a bankruptcy estate cannot be fairly described as “labor performed for”—let alone “disinterested service to”—that administrator. Congress added the phrase “reasonable compensation for the ser­vices rendered” to federal bankruptcy law in 1934. Act of June 7, 1934, §77B(c)(9), 48 Stat. 917. We look to the ordinary meaning of those words at that time.

The Government’s argument is also unpersuasive. Its theo­ry—that fees for fee-defense litigation must be understood as a com­ponent of the “reasonable compensation for the underlying services rendered” so that compensation for the “actual . . . services rendered” will not be diluted by unpaid time spent litigating fees—cannot be reconciled with the relevant text. Section 330(a)(1) does not author­ize courts to award “reasonable compensation,” but “reasonable com­pensation for actual, necessary services rendered,” and the Govern­ment properly concedes that litigation in defense of a fee application is not a “service.” And §330(a)(6), which presupposes compensation “for the preparation of a fee application,” does not suggest that time spent defending a fee application must also be compensable. Com­missioner v. Jean, 496 U. S. 154, distinguished. By way of analogy, it would be natural to describe a car mechanic’s preparation of an itemized bill as part of his “services” to the customer because it allows a customer to understand—and, if necessary, dispute—his expenses. But it would be less natural to describe a sub­sequent court battle over the bill as part of the “services rendered” to the customer.

To the extent the United States harbors any concern about the pos­sibility of frivolous objections to fee applications, we note that “Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011—bankruptcy’s analogue to Civil Rule 11—authorizes the court to impose sanctions for bad-faith litiga­tion conduct, which may include ‘an order directing payment . . . of some or all of the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses in­curred as a direct result of the violation.’ ” Law v. Siegel, 571 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 12).

More importantly, we would lack the authority to re­write the statute even if we believed that uncompensated fee litigation would fall particularly hard on the bank­ruptcy bar. “Our unwillingness to soften the import of Con­gress’ chosen words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh outcome is longstanding,” and that is no less true in bankruptcy than it is elsewhere. Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 538 (2004). Whether or not the Government’s theory is desirable as a matter of policy, Congress has not granted us “roving authority . . . to allow counsel fees . . . whenever we might deem them warranted.” Alyeska Pipeline, supra, at 260. Our job is to follow the text even if doing so will supposedly “undercut a basic objective of the statute,” post, at 3. Section 330(a)(1) itself does not authorize the award of fees for defending a fee application, and that is the end of the matter.

Books: Webster’s New Interna­tional Dictionary 2288 (def. 4) (2d ed. 1934); also Black’s Law Dictionary 1607 (3d ed. 1933); Oxford English Dictionary 517 (def. 19) (1933)

(U.S.S.C., June 15, 2015, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, Docket 14-103,  J. Thomas. J. Breyer, filed a dissenting opinion, in which J. Ginsburg and J. Kagan joined).

Faillites selon Chapitre 11, indemnité en faveur de l’avocat qui a assisté le trustee appointé : indemnité pour compenser le travail de l’avocat dans la procédure en reconnaissance du montant de ses honoraires ? La réponse donnée in casu est négative. (Le mémoire de recours de l’étude Baker Botts L.L.P. est donné comme exemple dans la partie lien de ce blog).

La Section 327(a) du Code des faillites permet au trustee de la masse de mandater des avocats, comptables et autres professionnels pour l’assister dans l’exécution de ses tâches légales (11 U.S.C. §327(a)). Une autre disposition, la Section 330(a)(1) dispose que le Tribunal des faillites peut allouer une indemnité raisonnable pour les services effectifs et nécessaires rendus par ces professionnels. La question que pose la présente affaire est de savoir si la Section 330(a)(1) autorise un Tribunal des faillites à accorder une indemnisation pour rémunérer le Travail effectué par l’avocat dans le cadre de la procédure de contestation de ses honoraires (si contestation il y a). La Cour Suprême juge que tel n’est pas le cas.

En 2005, l’intimée ASARCO LLC, une entreprise minière dans le domaine du cuivre, comprenant une fonderie et un département de raffinage, fit face à des difficultés financières. Confrontée à la baisse des prix du cuivre, à des dettes, à une insuffisance de cash-flow, à des procédures environnementales, et à des grèves internes, ASARCO déposa une requête de faillite selon le Chapitre 11. Comme dans de nombreuses faillites selon la procédure du Chapitre 11, aucun trustee ne fut nommé et ASARCO, restée « débitrice en possession », administra la masse en faillite en tant que fiduciaire en faveur des créanciers de la masse. Sur la base de la Section 327(a) du Code des faillites, qui permet au trustee de mandater des avocats et d’autres professionnels pour l’assister dans l’exécution de ses devoirs, ASARCO obtint la permission du Tribunal des faillites de mandater deux études d’avocats, dont la recourante Baker Botts L.L.P., dans le cadre de la liquidation de la faillite.

Parmi d’autres services juridiques, les deux études ont actionné la société-mère d’ASARCO, contestant des transferts frauduleux. A été obtenu un jugement condamnant la société-mère à verser une somme comprise entre 7 et 10 milliards de dollars. Ce jugement contribua à la réussite de la réorganisation d’ASARCO. Tous ses créanciers ont été désintéressés pour l’intégralité de leurs créances. Après une procédure de faillite de plus de quatre ans, ASARCO émergea en 2009 avec dans ses comptes un montant de 1,4 milliard en cash, guère de dettes, et ses responsabilités environnementales furent résolues.

Bien que la Section 327(a) ne s’applique directement qu’aux trustees, la Section 1107(a) attribue aux « débiteurs en possession » dans une faillite Chapitre 11 la même compétence que celle attribuée aux trustees de mandater les professionnels précités.

Les deux études d’avocats demandèrent que leurs diligences soient honorées selon la Section 330(a)(1), disposant qu’un Tribunal des faillites peut allouer une indemnisation raisonnable pour les services effectifs et nécessaires rendus par les professionnels mandatés selon la Section 327(a). Comme requis par les règles de procédure en matière de faillite, les deux études d’avocats ont déposé leurs listes de frais et honoraires (Règle 2016(a) de la loi fédérale de procédure en matière de faillite). ASARCO, une fois de plus contrôlée par sa société-mère, contesta ces listes de frais et honoraires. Après une procédure probatoire extensive et des audiences pendant six jours, la Cour des faillites rejeta les objections d’ASARCO et octroya aux deux études approximativement 120 millions de dollars pour leur travail dans la procédure de faillite, somme à laquelle s’est ajouté un montant additionnel de 4,1 million pour une performance jugée exceptionnelle. Le Tribunal alloua aussi aux études plus de 5 millions de dollars pour le temps passé en procédure de contestation des honoraires.

La Cour Suprême fédérale juge que la Section 330(a)(1) n’autorise pas le Tribunal des faillites à allouer une indemnisation aux professionnels selon la Section 327(a) dans le cadre de la procédure en contestation des honoraires et frais.

En considérant la question de l’allocation des honoraires d’avocat, le point de référence de base est le principe fermement établi connu sous le nom d’ »American Rule » : chaque partie est débitrice de ses propres frais d’avocat, qu’elle ait été ou non victorieuse dans la procédure, à moins qu’une loi au sens formel ou qu’un contrat n’en dispose autrement. L’ »American Rule plonge ses racines dans la Common law et son origine remonte au 18è siècle, éventuellement plus tôt encore. Les lois en contradiction avec la Common law doivent être interprétées selon une présomption qui favorise le maintien de principes juridiques familiers, établis depuis longtemps. La Cour n’entend par conséquent pas dévier de l’ »American Rule » sans en avoir la compétence, attribuée par une disposition légale expresse. Ces modifications légales apportées à l’ »American Rule » prennent des formes diverses, mais de manière générale elles sont reconnaissables en ce qu’elles autorisent l’allocation d’ »honoraires d’avocats pour un montant raisonnable », de « frais et honoraires », ou de « frais de procédure », et en ce qu’elles se réfèrent à une « partie qui l’emporte » dans le contexte d’une « procédure litigieuse ».

La disposition légale sur l’allocation des frais d’avocat contenue dans la loi fédérale sur un égal accès à la justice offre un bon exemple du degré de clarté exigé par la Cour Suprême pour permettre d’éviter l’application de l’ »American Rule ». Cette disposition légale prévoit qu’un Tribunal ne peut accorder à la partie qui l’emporte (…) ses honoraires d’avocat et ses autres dépenses découlant d’une procédure civile (autre qu’une procédure civile en responsabilité délictuelle) initiée par le gouvernement fédéral ou à l’encontre de celui-ci (…). Comme l’indique la jurisprudence Commissioner v. Jean (1990), il ne fait guère de doute que cette disposition légale, qui mentionne les « honoraires », une « partie qui l’emporte », et une « action civile », constitue valablement une disposition qui réglemente l’allocation des frais et honoraires de procédure d’une manière différente de l’ »American Rule ».

Précisément, la Section 330(a)(1) autorise l’indemnisation des professionnels précités, dont en l’espèce les deux études d’avocats recourantes, dans la mesure où les honoraires sont raisonnables et se rapportent à des services nécessaires, effectivement rendus. L’indemnisation comprend en outre les dépenses effectives et nécessaires.

Une telle formulation ne saurait modifier l’ »American Rule » s’agissant de l’indemnisation du travail fourni dans le cadre de la procédure en contestation des honoraires.

Il n’est pas douteux que la phrase « indemnisation raisonnable pour les services nécessaires et effectifs rendus » autorise les Tribunaux à allouer aux avocats le montant de  leurs frais et honoraires pour le travail effectué dans le cadre de l’assistance apportée à l’administrateur de la faillite, ainsi que l’a fait en l’espèce le Tribunal des faillites en ordonnant à ASARCO de payer quelque 120 millions de dollars pour le travail des deux études dans la procédure de faillite. Nul ne conteste que la Section 330(a)(1) autorise l’allocation des frais d’avocat pour ce type de travail. Mais la phrase « indemnisation raisonnable pour les services nécessaires et effectifs rendus » n’autorise ni spécifiquement ni explicitement les Tribunaux à transférer les coûts d’une procédure contentieuse d’une partie (en l’espèce les deux études d’avocats) à l’autre (en l’espèce l’administrateur de la faillite), une telle autorisation étant prévue par la plupart des dispositions légales qui départent de l’ »American Rule ».

Il est déterminant de noter que la Section 330(a)(1) autorise la rémunération des professionnels tels les deux études d’avocats pour l’ensemble de leur travail effectué au service de l’administrateur de la faillite. Plus spécifiquement, dite Section ne permet une rémunération raisonnable que pour les services effectifs et nécessaires rendus. Le mot « services » se réfère ordinairement au travail effectué pour quelqu’un d’autre. Il se réfère ainsi à des services loyaux dans l’intérêt d’un client. Le temps passé en procédure de contestation des honoraires – la procédure opposant l’avocat à l’administrateur de la masse en faillite – ne saurait équitablement être décrit comme du temps consacré à des services en faveur de dit administrateur.

L’argumentation du Gouvernement fédéral n’est pas convaincante. Sa théorie selon laquelle les coûts de la procédure en contestation des honoraires doivent être compris comme une partie de l’indemnisation raisonnable pour les services rendus, de telle sorte que l’indemnisation pour ces services ne soit pas diluée par du temps non rémunéré passé dans la procédure en contestation, est une théorie incompatible avec le texte statutaire. La Section 330(a)(1) ne permet pas aux Tribunaux d’allouer une « indemnisation raisonnable » de manière générale, mais une indemnisation raisonnable pour les services effectifs et raisonnables rendus, et le Gouvernement fédéral concède à juste titre que la procédure en défense de la note d’honoraires ne se rapporte nullement à un service rendu au client. Par ailleurs, la section 330(a)(6), qui autorise l’indemnisation pour la préparation d’une requête en paiement des honoraires, ne suggère nullement que le temps passé à défendre ses honoraires dans le cadre d’une procédure en contestation serait également compensable.

Par analogie, il est naturel de considérer que la préparation d’une facture par un garagiste fait partie du travail effectué pour son client. La facture permet en effet au client de comprendre l’activité du garagiste, et cas échéant de contester le prix de son travail. Mais il est moins naturel de décrire une contestation de la facture comme constituant une part des services rendus au client.

Pour soutenir sa position, le Gouvernement fédéral expose encore que nier le droit aux honoraires pour le travail effectué dans le cadre de la procédure en contestation de la facturation des services rendus serait inéquitable en regard des contestations téméraires des honoraires. Mais la Cour Suprême observe que la Règle 9011 des Règles de procédure fédérale en matière de faillite, de manière similaire à la Règle de procédure civile 11, autorise le Tribunal à imposer des sanctions pour conduite de mauvaise foi dans la procédure, lesquelles peuvent comprendre une ordonnance en paiement de tout ou partie des honoraires d’avocat et d’autres frais résultant de la conduite de mauvaise foi.

Plus important encore, la Cour ne dispose pas de la compétence de réécrire la loi, même si elle estimait que le principe des honoraires non dus dans le cadre de la procédure en contestation est particulièrement pénible pour les avocats spécialisés en droit de la faillite. Cette absence de compétence vaut pour tous les domaines du droit, et non seulement pour celui de la faillite. La Cour doit se conformer au texte de la loi, même si, en agissant de la sorte, elle ignore un objectif de base de dite loi.

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank

Bankruptcy: to finance the purchase of a commercial property and associated reno­vation and construction costs, petitioners (debtors) obtained a se­cured loan from an investment fund, for which respondent (Bank) serves as trustee. The debtors ultimately became insolvent, and sought relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §1129(b)(2)(A), the debtors sought to confirm a “cramdown” bankruptcy plan over the Bank’s objection. That plan proposed selling substantially all of the debtors’ property at an auc­tion, and using the sale proceeds to repay the Bank. Under the debt­ors’ proposed auction procedures, the Bank would not be permitted to bid for the property using the debt it is owed to offset the purchase price, a practice known as “credit-bidding.” The Bankruptcy Court denied the debtors’ request, concluding that the auction procedures did not comply with §1129(b)(2)(A)’s requirements for cramdown plans. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that §1129(b)(2)(A) does not permit debtors to sell an encumbered asset free and clear of a lien without permitting the lien holder to credit-bid.

Held: The debtors may not obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 cramdown plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of the Bank’s lien, but does not permit the Bank to credit-bid at the sale. A Chapter 11 plan proposed over the objection of a “class of se­cured claims” must meet one of three requirements in order to be deemed “fair and equitable,” and therefore confirmable. The secured creditor may retain its lien on the property and receive deferred cash payments, §1129(b)(2)(A)(i); the debtors may sell the property free and clear of the lien, “subject to section 363(k)”—which permits the creditor to credit-bid at the sale—and provide the creditor with a lien on the sale proceeds, §1129(b)(2)(A)(ii); or the plan may provide the secured creditor with the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim, §1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (U.S. S. Ct., 29.05.12, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, J. Scalia).

Faillite : en vue de financer l'achat d'un immeuble commercial ainsi que les frais de constructions et rénovations associés à cet achat, les débiteurs de ces coûts ont obtenu un prêt d'un fond d'investissement garanti par gage. La banque X. fonctionne comme trustee dans le cadre de cette relation de prêt. Par la suite, les débiteurs sont devenus insolvables et se sont prévalus du Chapitre 11 du Code des faillites. Le plan proposé par les débiteurs a été contesté par la banque. Ce plan prévoyait la vente aux enchères des biens des débiteurs, le produit de la vente étant versé à la banque (qui retrouvera ainsi moins que sa créance, le plan lui interdisant en outre de miser librement dans la vente aux enchères). La Cour juge que les débiteurs ne sont pas en droit d'obtenir confirmation de leur "cramdown" plan fondé sur le Chapitre 11 (par lequel les créanciers obtiennent moins que le montant de leurs créances) considérant que dit plan concerne un objet grevé d'un gage. En effet, pour qu'un tel plan puisse être accepté, il doit satisfaire l'une des trois conditions permettant de le qualifier de "juste et équitable" : 1 ) Le gage du créancier-gagiste est maintenu et le créancier est remboursé par acomptes, 2 ) le débiteur peut vendre le bien immobilier dépourvu de son gage si le créancier-gagiste peut miser ; en outre, un lien est maintenu en sa faveur sur le produit de la vente, 3 ) le plan pourvoit en faveur du créancier un avantage irrévocable d'un montant équivalent à la créance.