Wednesday, June 26, 2013

U.S. v. Windsor



Marriage: same sex: the State of New York recognizes these marriages; (…) federal De­fense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which amended the Dictionary Act—a law providing rules of construction for over 1,000 federal laws and the whole realm of federal regulations—to define “marriage” and “spouse” as excluding same-sex partners; DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the equal liberty of persons that is protected by the Fifth Amendment; by history and tradition the definition and regulation of mar­riage has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate States; the State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. But the Federal Government uses the state-defined class for the opposite purpose—to impose re­strictions and disabilities. The question is whether the resulting in­jury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment; New York’s actions were a proper exercise of its sovereign authority. They reflect both the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots of the in­stitution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality; by seeking to injure the very class New York seeks to protect, DOMA violates basic due process and equal protection principles ap­plicable to the Federal Government; DOMA cannot survive under these principles. Its unusual deviation from the tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage operates to deprive same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with federal recognition of their marriages; DOMA’s avowed purpose and practical effect are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority  of the States; DOMA’s history of enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, conferred by the States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal statute. It was its essence (U.S.S.Ct., 26.06.2013, U.S. v. Windsor, J. Kennedy).

Mariages entre personnes de même sexe : l’état de New-York permet ces mariages, qu’une loi fédérale ne reconnaît pas. Cette loi fédérale est jugée inconstitutionnelle par la présente décision. Elle est en effet contraire au principe d’égale liberté garanti par le Cinquième Amendement. Historiquement et par tradition la définition et la règlementation du mariage sont des prérogatives des états. La législation de l’état de New York en cette matière reflète à la fois la compréhension des racines historiques du mariage et à la fois la compréhension de la notion évolutive du principe d’égalité. La loi fédérale précitée viole en outre les principes de « due process » et d’ « equal protection ».

Sekhar v. U.S.



Interpretation of a federal statute: absent other indication, “Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.” Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 23 (U.S.S.Ct., 26.06.2013, Sekhar v. U.S., J. Scalia).

Interprétation d’une loi fédérale au sens formel : sauf indication contraire, l’intention du Congrès fédéral est d’incorporer la signification bien établie des termes de la Common law qu’il utilise.

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

Shelby County v. Holder



Voting Rights: Held: Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional; its formula can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to pre­clearance.
State legislation may not contravene federal law. States re­tain broad autonomy, however, in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment re­serves to the States all powers not specifically granted to the Federal Government, including “the power to regulate elections.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 461–462. There is also a “fundamental prin­ciple of equal sovereignty” among the States, which is highly perti­nent in assessing disparate treatment of States.
The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic principles. It requires States to beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their own. And despite the tradition of equal sover­eignty, the Act applies to only nine States (and additional counties).
That is why, in 1966, this Court described the Act as “stringent” and “potent,” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308, 315, 337. The Court nonethe­less upheld the Act, concluding that such an “uncommon exercise of congressional power” could be justified by “exceptional conditions.” Id., at 334.
In 1966, these departures were justified by the “blight of racial discrimination in voting” that had “infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century,” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., at 308.
The Act was limited to areas where Congress found “evidence of actual voting discrimination,” and the covered ju­risdictions shared two characteristics: “the use of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential elec­tion at least 12 points below the national average” (U.S.S.Ct., 25.06.2013, Shelby County v. Holder, C.J. Roberts).

Loi fédérale sur le droit de vote : des discriminations raciales existaient dans certaines parties du pays pendant les années 1960 et au début des années 1970. Considérant ces discriminations, Le Congrès fédéral avait passé une loi, régulièrement confirmée depuis, contraignant certains états à soumettre leurs lois électorales pour approbation à une autorité fédérale. Lesdits états étaient ceux jugés discriminants par le Congrès (la discrimination se manifestait par des conditions à l’enregistrement, nécessaires pour voter, ainsi que par un taux de participation lors de l’élection présidentielle de 1964 d’au moins 12% inférieur à la moyenne nationale). Au vu de l’écoulement du temps, les raisons qui justifiaient cette procédure de soumission du droit électoral étatique à une autorité fédérale n’existent plus, de sorte que cette exigence de soumission est jugée contraire à la Constitution fédérale par la présente décision. Les deux principes constitutionnels qui sont ici violés sont le Dixième Amendement, qui réserve aux états tous les pouvoirs non spécifiquement attribués au Gouvernement fédéral (comme le pouvoir de réglementer les élections, qui est un pouvoir appartenant aux états), et le principe fondamental d’égale souveraineté entre les états.

Monday, June 24, 2013

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin



Racial discrimination: the University of Texas at Austin considers race as one of various fac­tors in its undergraduate admissions process. The University, which is committed to increasing racial minority enrollment, adopted its current program after this Court decided Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, upholding the use of race as one of many “plus factors” in an admissions program that considered the overall individual contri­bution of each candidate, and decided Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, holding unconstitutional an admissions program that automati­cally awarded points to applicants from certain racial minorities (…); Held: Because the Fifth Circuit did not hold the University to the de­manding burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, its decision affirming the Dis­trict Court’s grant of summary judgment to the University was incor­rect; Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter, which directly address the question considered here, are taken as given for purposes of deciding this case. In Bakke’s principal opinion, Justice Powell recognized that state university “decisions based on race or ethnic origin . . . are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment,” 438 U. S., at 287, using a strict scrutiny standard, id., at 299. He identified as a compelling interest that could justify the consideration of race the interest in the educa­tional benefits that flow from a diverse student body, but noted that this interest is complex, encompassing a broad array “of qualifica­tions and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a sin­gle though important element.” Id., at 315. (U.S.S.Ct., 24.06.2013, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, J. Kennedy).

Discrimination raciale : une université considère la race comme l’un des divers facteurs dans sa procédure d’admission. Le but de l’université est d’augmenter l’enrôlement de minorités raciales, pour assurer la diversité parmi les élèves, ce qui est en effet un « compelling interest » selon la jurisprudence de la Cour. Les précédentes décisions de la Cour soutiennent l’usage du critère de la race comme un facteur considéré comme un plus, parmi bien d’autres facteurs, l’important étant de considérer l’ensemble des qualités apportées par un candidat. Serait contraire à la Constitution un programme d’admission qui attribuerait automatiquement des points à un candidat issu d’une minorité raciale ou ethnique. Les décisions d’admission sont revues sous l’angle du 14è Amendement et doivent satisfaire le principe de « strict scrutiny », et non pas un principe de déférence à une décision d’admission prise sans autre motivation par l’établissement universitaire.

Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett



Supremacy Clause: the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) requires manufac­turers to gain Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval before marketing any brand-name or generic drug in interstate commerce. 21 U. S. C. §355(a). Once a drug is approved, a manufacturer is pro­hibited from making any major changes to the “qualitative or quanti­tative formulation of the drug product, including active ingredients, or in the specifications provided in the approved application.” 21 CFR §314.70(b)(2)(i). Generic manufacturers are also prohibited from making any unilateral changes to a drug’s label. See §§314.94(a)(8)(iii), 314.150(b)(10). Held: State-law design-defect claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings are pre-empted by federal law under PLIVA.
Under the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with fed­eral law are “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746. Even in the absence of an express pre-emption provision, a state law may be impliedly pre-empted where it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79. Here, it is impossible for Mu­tual to comply with both its federal-law duty not to alter sulindac’s label or composition and its state-law duty to either strengthen the warnings on sulindac’s label or change sulindac’s design.
Increasing a drug’s “usefulness” or reducing its “risk of danger” would require redesigning the drug, since those factors are direct results of a drug’s chemical design and active ingredients. Here, however, redesign was not possible for two reasons. First, the FDCA requires a generic drug to have the same active ingredients, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as its brand-name drug equivalent. Second, because of sulindac’s simple composition, the drug is chemically incapable of be­ing redesigned. Accordingly, because redesign was impossible, Mu­tual could only ameliorate sulindac’s “risk-utility” profile by strengthening its warnings. Thus, New Hampshire’s law ultimately required Mutual to change sulindac’s labeling.
But PLIVA makes clear that federal law prevents generic drug manufacturers from changing their labels. See 564 U. S., at ___. Accordingly, Mutual was prohibited from taking the remedial action required to avoid liability under New Hampshire law.
When federal law forbids an action required by state law, the state law is “without effect.” Maryland, supra, at 746. Because it was impossible for Mutual to comply with both state and federal law, New Hampshire’s warning-based design-defect cause of action is pre­empted with respect to FDA-approved drugs sold in interstate com­merce.
The First Circuit’s rationale—that Mutual could escape the im­possibility of complying with both its federal- and state-law duties by choosing to stop selling sulindac—is incompatible with this Court’s pre-emption cases, which have presumed that an actor seeking to sat­isfy both federal- and state-law obligations is not required to cease acting altogether. 678 F. 3d 30, reversed. (U.S.S.Ct., 24.06.2013, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, J. Alito).

Le droit fédéral l’emporte sur le droit étatique contraire (primauté du droit fédéral) : la loi fédérale sur les denrées alimentaires, les médicaments et les produits cosmétiques impose aux fabricants de ces produits d’obtenir une autorisation avant de les vendre dans le circuit commercial entre les états. Une fois approuvé, le produit ne peut plus être modifié. Ces exigences s’appliquent en particulier aux fabricants de médicaments originaux et aux fabricants de médicaments génériques. Ce corps de droit fédéral l’emporte sur des règles étatiques qui prescriraient de manière contradictoire. En l’espèce, se fondant sur des dispositions légales d’un état, la partie recourante procède contre un fabricant de médicament générique, en alléguant que la notice de ce générique omet de mettre en garde contre un risque particulier d’effet secondaire, dont elle a été victime. Dans la mesure où le produit tel qu’autorisé par l’administration fédérale ne mentionne pas dans sa notice ledit risque d’effet secondaire, la partie recourante ne peut se fonder sur des règles étatiques pour agir contre le fabricant du médicament générique, dont la commercialisation a été faite conformément au droit fédéral, lequel ici l’emporte sur des règles étatiques contraires. Peu importe que le droit fédéral mentionne expressément ou non que des règles étatiques contraires sont sans effet. Quand il est impossible pour un sujet de droit de satisfaire à la fois la règle fédérale et la règle étatique, la primauté du droit fédéral s’applique. En outre, un sujet de droit qui cherche à satisfaire à la fois le droit fédéral et le droit étatique contraire n’est pas tenu de mettre fin à ses affaires. La préemption s’applique et seul le droit fédéral doit être respecté.