Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown

Arbitration: state and federal courts must enforce the Federal Arbi­tration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., with respect to all arbitration agreements covered by that statute. Here, the Supreme Court of Appeals of  West Virginia, by misreading and disregarding the precedents of this Court interpreting the FAA, did not follow controlling federal law implement­ing that basic principle. The state court held unenforceable all predispute arbitration agreements that apply to claims alleging personal injury or wrongful death against nursing homes. The statute’s text includes no exception for personal-injury or wrongful-death claims. It “requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate.” Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 217 (1985). It “reflects an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” KPMG LLP v. Coc­chi, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 631 (1985); internal quota­tion marks omitted). As this Court reaffirmed last Term, “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: the conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep­cion, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 6–7). That rule resolves these cases. West Virginia’s prohibition against predispute agreements to arbitrate personal-injury or wrongful-death claims against nursing homes is a categorical rule prohibiting arbitration of a particular type of claim, and that rule is contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA. See ibid. See also, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 356 (2008) (FAA pre-empts state law granting state commissioner exclusive jurisdiction to decide issue the parties agreed to arbitrate); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U. S. 52, 56 (1995) (FAA pre­empts state law requiring judicial resolution of claims involving punitive damages); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U. S. 483, 491 (1987) (FAA pre-empts state-law requirement that litigants be provided a judicial forum for wage dis­putes); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 10 (1984) (FAA pre-empts state financial investment statute’s prohibition of arbitration of claims brought under that statute)  (U.S. S. Ct., 21.02.12,  Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, Per Curiam).

Arbitrage : les cours des Etats et les cours fédérales sont tenues d'appliquer le Federal Arbitration Act (Act) s'agissant de toutes conventions d'arbitrages relevant de cet Act. En l'espèce, c'est à tort qu'une cour étatique a déclaré inapplicable toutes clauses arbitrales s'appliquant à des prétentions fondées sur des dommages corporels ou sur des décès. Or ces deux domaines ne sont pas exclus de la procédure arbitrale par l'Act, qui, par conséquent, s'applique, de sorte que les parties peuvent convenir d'un arbitrage. Les parties peuvent également conclure une convention d'arbitrage s'agissant de prétentions en punitive damages, ces prétentions n'étant pas exclues par l'Act. Il en va de même des prétentions en paiement d'un salaire. Dans touts ces cas, le droit fédéral l’emporte sur le droit étatique contraire.

KPMG LLP v. Cocchi

Arbitration: agreements to arbitrate that fall within the scope and coverage of the Federal Arbitration Act (Act), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., must be enforced in state and federal courts. State courts, then, “have a prominent role to play as enforcers of agreements to arbitrate.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U. S. 49, 59 (2009).

The Act has been interpreted to require that if a dispute presents multiple claims, some arbitrable and some not, the former must be sent to arbitration even if this will lead to piecemeal litigation. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 217 (1985). From this it fol­lows that state and federal courts must examine with care the complaints seeking to invoke their jurisdiction in order to separate arbitrable from nonarbitrable claims. A court may not issue a blanket refusal to compel arbitration merely on the grounds that some of the claims could be resolved by the court without arbitration. See ibid; the Federal Arbitration Act reflects an “emphatic fed­eral policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 631 (1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospi­tal v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24–25 (1983) (noting that “questions of arbitrability [must]. . . be ad­dressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favor­ing arbitration”). This policy, as contained within the Act, “requires courts to enforce the bargain of the parties to arbitrate,” Dean Witter, supra, at 217, and “cannot possi­bly require the disregard of state law permitting arbitra­tion by or against nonparties to the written arbitration agreement,” Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U. S. 624, 630, n. 5 (2009) (emphasis deleted); thus, when a complaint contains both arbitrable and nonarbi­trable claims, the Act requires courts to “compel arbitra­tion of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceed­ings in different forums.” Id., at 217. To implement this holding, courts must examine a complaint with care to assess whether any individual claim must be arbitrated. The failure to do so is subject to immediate review. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 6–7 (1984) (U.S. S. Ct., 07.11.11, KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, Per Curiam).

Arbitrage : les conventions d’arbitrage qui s’inscrivent dans le cadre du Federal Arbitration Act (Act) doivent être appliquées par les cours étatiques et par les cours fédérales. Les cours des états ont ainsi un rôle prééminent dans l’application des conventions d’arbitrage. L’Act a été interprété de tel sorte que si un litige présente des aspects arbitrables et d’autres qui ne le sont pas, ces premiers doivent être arbitrés, nonobstant le risque de procédures séparées devant divers forums. L’Act constitue le reflet d’une politique fédérale fortement favorable à l’arbitrage. Doivent en particulier être respectées les lois des Etats qui permettent l’arbitrage de litiges introduits par ou à l’encontre d’un tiers qui n’est pas partie à la convention d’arbitrage.

Les tribunaux doivent examiner avec soin la demande en justice pour déterminer si l’une des conclusions doit être arbitrée. Dans l’affirmative et si elle ne l’est pas, la cour fédérale peut être saisie par voie directe.