OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897

Trademark: Designation of origin: Passing off: Reverse passing off: Trade dress: Confusion: Competition law: Consumer law: Packaging: Design: Copyright:

(…) OTR sells tires for industrial use. One of OTR’s products is a tire called the “Outrigger.” OTR obtained a registered trademark on the Outrigger name and a registered trade dress on the Outrigger tire tread design.

OTR Wheel and Samuel West are competitors in the business of selling industrial tires. West asked one of OTR’s suppliers to provide him with sample tires from OTR’s molds, and he asked the supplier to remove OTR’s identifying information from the tires. West wanted to use the tires to obtain business from one of OTR’s customers. OTR sued West, asserting various claims under the Lanham Act and state law.

(…) The primary issue before us is whether West can be found liable for reverse passing off under the Lanham Act. (…) (False Designation of Origin: Reverse Passing Off) (…) Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), a claim for reverse passing off cannot be brought to prevent the copying of intellectual property. We conclude that West did not simply copy OTR’s intellectual property but passed off genuine OTR products as his own, so we affirm the judgment holding him liable for reverse passing off ((…) The jury could therefore conclude that the development tires were taken from part of an anticipated OTR (Solideal) order and were genuine OTR products, not just copies).

(…) The panel affirmed the district court’s rejection of a proposed jury instruction asserting a claim for infringement of an unregistered trade dress. The panel explained that a registered claim converts to an unregistered claim if the registration is invalidated; thus, a plaintiff does not need to separately plead the identical unregistered claim. But where the unregistered claim would cover something more than the registered claim, a plaintiff must put a defendant on notice of such through the pleadings.

The Lanham Act prohibits conduct that would confuse consumers as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services. See Slep-Tone Entm’t Corp. v. Wired for Sound Karaoke & DJ Servs., LLC, 845 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2017); see also TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001). To prevent consumer confusion, the Act allows the producers of goods and services to enforce trademark rights. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209–10 (2000). A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device. . . used or intended to be used to identify and distinguish goods from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. In addition, the Lanham Act protects more than words and symbols. It also protects a product’s “trade dress,” which includes the packaging, dressing, and design of a product. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 28; Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209.

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits a person from using “in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device. . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the origin. . . of his or her goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The term “origin” in section 43(a) lends itself to two causes of action for “passing off” based on false designation of origin: passing off and reverse passing off. “Passing off . . . occurs when a producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s. ‘Reverse passing off,’ as its name implies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as his own.” Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27 n.1.

(…) In Dastar, the Supreme Court explained that the term “origin” in section 43 “refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.” Id. at 37. Thus, a reverse passing off claim cannot be brought to prevent the copying of intellectual property. Copying is dealt with through the copyright and patent laws, not through trademark law. Id. At 33–34.

(…) To prove a claim under section 43(a), a plaintiff must establish a likelihood of consumer confusion. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992). Thus, in order to prevail on its claim for reverse passing off, OTR was required to prove that consumers would likely be confused as to the origin of Outrigger tires that had their identifying information removed. The likelihood of confusion inquiry “generally considers whether a reasonably prudent consumer in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin or source of the goods or services.” Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9^th Cir.2012). Thus, the jury had to determine whether a hypothetical consumer would likely be confused. Evidence of actual confusion was not required. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011). The jury was shown pictures of an OTR production tire and the West development tire. Comparing the two tires, a reasonable jury could conclude that consumers would be confused by tires that lack the identifying information.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 24, 2018, OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897, J. Clifton)

1 ) Trade dress : terme juridique qui se rapporte à des caractéristiques de l'aspect visuel d'un produit ou de son emballage, donnant une indication de l'origine du produit aux consommateurs. Trade dress peut être enregistré, comme une marque (ici une partie du design d’un pneu).

2 ) Les bases légales des actions en violation du droit à la marque. Le Lanham Act ne protège pas que la marque comprise comme combinaison de mots et de symboles. Il protège aussi le « trade dress » du produit, notion qui inclut le « packaging », le « dressing » et le design du produit.

3 ) Un exemple de « reverse passing off ». Notions et bases légales de « passing off » et de « reverse passing off » : ces concepts juridiques visent à combattre la confusion portant sur l’origine d’un produit.

4 ) Notion de confusion du consommateur.

5 ) Si dans la procédure en violation du droit à la marque l’enregistrement de celle-ci est déclaré invalide, la procédure peut se poursuivre, la marque dont la violation est alléguée n’étant plus considérée comme enregistrée. Le demandeur ne pourra cependant faire valoir que les allégués et les moyens de droit qui découlent de ses mémoires.

Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., Docket 15-866

Copyright: Designs: Industrial designs: Design patent:

Congress has provided copyright protection for original works of art, but not for industrial designs. The line between art and industrial design, however, is often diffi­cult to draw. This is particularly true when an industrial design incorporates artistic elements. Congress has af­forded limited protection for these artistic elements by providing that “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features” of the “design of a useful article” are eligible for copyright protection as artistic works if those features “can be iden­tified separately from, and are capable of existing inde­pendently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” 17 U. S. C. §101.

(…) Granted certiorari to resolve widespread disagree­ment over the proper test for implementing §101’s separate-identification and independent-existence requirements. 578 U. S. ___ (2016).

A feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be per­ceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protecta­ble pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expres­sion—if it were imagined separately from the useful arti­cle into which it is incorporated.

The first element of a copyright-infringement claim is “ownership of a valid copyright.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 361 (1991). A valid copyright extends only to copyrightable subject matter. See M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright §13.01[A] (2010) (Nimmer). The Copyright Act of 1976 defines copyrightable subject matter as “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U. S. C. §102(a).

“Works of authorship” include “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” §102(a)(5), which the statute defines to include “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans,” §101. And a work of authorship is “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when it is embodied in a mate­rial object . . . from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” Ibid. (defini­tions of “fixed” and “copies”).

The statute does not protect useful articles as such. Rather, “the design of a useful article” is “considered a pictorial, graphical, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of exist­ing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” Ibid.

We must now decide when a feature incorporated into a useful article “can be identified separately from” and is “capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects” of the article. This is not a free-ranging search for the best copyright policy, but rather “depends solely on statutory interpretation.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 214 (1954).

The statute provides that a “pictorial, graphic, or sculp­tural feature” incorporated into the “design of a useful article” is eligible for copyright protection if it (1) “can be identified separately from,” and (2) is “capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” §101. The first requirement—separate identification—is not onerous. The decisionmaker need only be able to look at the useful article and spot some two- or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities. See Patry §3:146, at 3–474 to 3–475.

The independent-existence requirement is ordinarily more difficult to satisfy. The decisionmaker must deter­mine that the separately identified feature has the capacity to exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article. See 2 OED 88 (def. 5) (defining “capable” of as “having the needful capacity, power, or fitness for”). In other words, the feature must be able to exist as its own pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work as defined in §101 once it is imagined apart from the useful article. If the feature is not capable of existing as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work once separated from the useful article, then it was not a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature of that arti­cle, but rather one of its utilitarian aspects.

Of course, to qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its own, the feature cannot itself be a useful article or “an article that is normally a part of a useful article” (which is itself considered a useful article). §101.

The ultimate separability question, then, is whether the feature for which copyright protection is claimed would have been eligible for copyright protection as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work had it originally been fixed in some tangi­ble medium other than a useful article before being ap­plied to a useful article.

Applying this test to the surface decorations on the cheerleading uniforms is straightforward. First, one can identify the decorations as features having pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities. Second, if the arrange­ment of colors, shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the sur­face of the cheerleading uniforms were separated from the uniform and applied in another medium—for example, on a painter’s canvas—they would qualify as “two-dimensional . . . works of . . . art,” §101. And imaginatively removing the surface decorations from the uniforms and applying them in another medium would not replicate the uniform itself. Indeed, respondents have applied the designs in this case to other media of expression—different types of clothing—without replicating the uniform. See App. 273– 279. The decorations are therefore separable from the uniforms and eligible for copyright protection.

We do not today hold that the surface decorations are copyrightable. We express no opinion on whether these works are sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection, see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 358–359 (1991), or on whether any other prerequisite of a valid copyright has been satisfied.

A shovel, like a cheerleading uniform, even if displayed in an art gallery, is “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U. S. C. §101. It therefore cannot be copyrighted. A drawing of a shovel could, of course, be copyrighted. And, if the shovel included any artistic features that could be perceived as art apart from the shovel, and which would qualify as protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works on their own or in another medium, they too could be copyrighted. But a shovel as a shovel cannot.

Because we reject the view that a useful article must remain after the artistic feature has been imaginatively separated from the article, we necessarily abandon the distinction between “physical” and “conceptual” separabil­ity, which some courts and commentators have adopted based on the Copyright Act’s legislative history. See H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, p. 55 (1976). According to this view, a feature is physically separable from the underlying useful article if it can “be physically separated from the article by ordinary means while leaving the utilitarian aspects of the article completely intact.” Compendium §924.2(A); see also Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F. 3d 324, 329 (CA2 2005). Conceptual separability applies if the feature physically could not be removed from the useful article by ordinary means. See Compendium §924.2(B); but see P. Goldstein, Copyright §2.5.3, p. 2:77 (3d ed. 2016) (…) Because separability does not re­quire the underlying useful article to remain, the physical-conceptual distinction is unnecessary.

Finally, petitioner argues that allowing the surface decorations to qualify as a “work of authorship” is incon­sistent with Congress’ intent to entirely exclude industrial design from copyright. Petitioner notes that Congress refused to pass a provision that would have provided limited copyright protection for industrial designs, includ­ing clothing, when it enacted the 1976 Act, see id., at 9–11 (citing S. 22, Tit. II, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 Cong. Rec. 3856–3859 (1976)), and that it has enacted laws protecting designs for specific useful articles—semiconductor chips and boat hulls, see 17 U. S. C. §§901–914, 1301–1332—while declining to enact other industrial design statutes, Brief for Petitioner 29, 43. From this history of failed legislation petitioner reasons that Congress intends to channel intellectual property claims for industrial design into design patents. It therefore urges us to approach this question with a presumption against copyrightability.

We do not share petitioner’s concern. As an initial matter, “congressional inaction lacks persuasive signifi­cance” in most circumstances. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990). Moreover, we have long held that design patent and copyright are not mutually exclusive. See Mazer, 347 U. S., at 217. Congress has provided for limited copyright protection for certain fea­tures of industrial design, and approaching the statute with presumptive hostility toward protection for industrial design would undermine Congress’ choice.

We hold that an artistic feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other medium if imagined separately from the useful article. Because the designs on the surface of respondents’ cheerleading uniforms in this case satisfy these requirements, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Secondary sources: Compendium of U. S. Copyright Office Practices §924.2(B) (3d ed. 2014); M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright §13.01[A] (2010); W. Patry, Copyright §3:151, p. 3–485 (2016); Web­ster’s Third New International Dictionary 105 (1976); Random House Dictionary 73 (1966); P. Goldstein, Copyright §2.5.3, p. 2:77 (3d ed. 2016).

(U.S.S.C., March 22, 2017, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., Docket 15-866, J. Thomas).

Copyright : œuvre, protégée par le copyright, fixée à une chose utilitaire :

Le Congrès fédéral a accordé la protection du copyright aux œuvres d'art originales, mais pas aux designs industriels. La ligne entre art et design industriel est cependant souvent difficile à tracer, particulièrement quand un design industriel incorpore des éléments artistiques. Le Congrès a conféré une protection limitée à ces éléments artistiques en disposant que les éléments picturaux, graphiques ou sculpturaux du design d'une chose utilitaire sont susceptibles de bénéficier de la protection du copyright en tant qu'œuvre d'art si ces éléments peuvent être identifiés séparément de la partie utilitaire de la chose, et si ces éléments peuvent exister indépendamment de dite partie utilitaire. 

Un élément incorporé dans le design d'une chose utilitaire ne peut bénéficier de la protection du copyright que si l'élément (1) peut être perçu comme une œuvre d'art à deux ou trois dimensions, séparée de la chose utilitaire et (2) pourrait être qualifié d'œuvre picturale, graphique ou sculpturale protégée, soit en lui-même, soit attaché à un autre medium d'expression, s'il était imaginé séparé de la chose utilitaire.

La première condition d'une action en violation du copyright consiste en l'existence d'un copyright valide. La loi fédérale de 1976 sur le copyright définit la chose pouvant bénéficier de ce droit comme une œuvre originale attachée à un medium d'expression. Il peut s'agir d'une œuvre picturale, graphique, sculpturale, incluant les œuvres à deux ou trois dimensions, et comprenant par exemple les photographies, cartes, globes, cartes, diagrammes, modèles, dessins techniques, et plan d'architectes. Par ailleurs, l'œuvre est attachée à un medium d'expression quand elle est attachée à un objet matériel duquel l'œuvre peut être perçue, reproduite ou autrement communiquée.

La loi ne protège pas la chose utilitaire en tant que telle.

L'élément artistique susceptible d'être protégé par le copyright doit donc pouvoir être identifié séparément de la chose utilitaire. Il s'agit de regarder la chose utilitaire et d'être capable de distinguer un ou plusieurs éléments à deux ou trois dimensions, éléments qui présentent des qualités picturales, graphiques ou sculpturales.

L'élément artistique doit aussi pouvoir exister indépendamment de la partie utilitaire. La réalisation de cette exigence est plus délicate. Il s'agit ici de déterminer que l'élément séparé peut exister indépendamment de l'aspect utilitaire de la chose de base, qu'il peut exister pour lui-même comme œuvre picturale, graphique, ou sculpturale. Si tel n'est pas le cas, l'élément séparé n'est qu'un aspect utilitaire de la chose de base.

Bien entendu, pour être reconnu comme une œuvre picturale, graphique ou sculpturale en elle-même, l'élément ne doit pas être lui-même une chose utilitaire.

En l'espèce, il s'agit d'appliquer ces principes aux dessins qui décorent les uniformes des cheerleaders. Tout d'abord, il est possible d'identifier les motifs décoratifs comme éléments présentant des qualités picturales, graphiques ou sculpturales. Ensuite, si les arrangements de couleurs, formes, bandes et chevrons décorant la surface des uniformes étaient séparés de l'uniforme lui-même et appliqués sur un autre medium, ils s'analyseraient en une œuvre d'art à deux dimensions. Et retirer virtuellement ces décorations de l'uniforme pour les appliquer sur un autre medium ne répliquerait pas l'uniforme lui-même. Ces décorations sont dès lors séparables des uniformes et peuvent revendiquer la protection du copyright.

(Une pelle, comme un uniforme de cheerleader, même présentée dans une galerie d'art, est une chose pourvue d'une fonction intrinsèquement utilitaire, qui ne revient pas à décrire l'apparence de la chose ni à diffuser de l'information (cf. 17

U. S. C. §101). Elle ne saurait ainsi bénéficier d'un copyright. Le dessin d'une pelle pourrait bien entendu en bénéficier).

La Cour rejette ici l'opinion selon laquelle un article utilitaire doit demeurer après séparation virtuelle de l'élément artistique. Elle abandonne donc la distinction entre séparation physique et séparation virtuelle. L'opinion abandonnée soutenait qu'un élément est séparable physiquement de la chose utilitaire s'il peut être séparé par des moyens ordinaires tout en laissant complètement intact l'aspect utilitaire de la chose de base ; quant à elle, la séparation virtuelle s'applique si l'élément ne peut pas être séparé de la chose utilitaire de base par des moyens ordinaires.

Dès lors, comme la notion de séparation n'exige pas la pérennité de l'article utilitaire de base, la distinction entre séparation physique et séparation virtuelle n'est pas nécessaire.

La Cour n'entend pas opposer le copyright et le "design patent". Le Congrès a prévu un copyright limité s'agissant de certains éléments de design industriel, et il serait erroné de présumer une hostilité du Congrès envers la possibilité de conférer la protection du copyright aux designs industriels.

Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., Docket 15-777

Design: Patent infringement: Damages: Smartphone: Unanimous:

Section 289 of the Patent Act provides a damages remedy specific to design patent infringement. A person who manufactures or sells “any article of manufacture to which a patented design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit.” 35 U. S. C. §289. In the case of a design for a single-component product, such as a dinner plate, the product is the “article of manufacture” to which the design has been applied. In the case of a design for a multicomponent product, such as a kitchen oven, identifying the “article of manufacture” to which the design has been applied is a more difficult task.

This case involves the infringement of designs for smartphones. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified the entire smartphone as the only permissible “article of manufacture” for the purpose of calculating §289 damages because consumers could not separately purchase components of the smartphones. The question before us is whether that reading is consistent with §289. We hold that it is not.

The federal patent laws have long permitted those who invent designs for manufactured articles to patent their designs. See Patent Act of 1842, §3, 5 Stat. 543–544. Patent protection is available for a “new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” 35 U. S. C. §171(a). A patentable design “gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or to which it gives form.” Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511, 525 (1872). This Court has explained that a design patent is infringed “if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same.” Id., at 528.

Apple Inc. released its first-generation iPhone in 2007. The iPhone is a smartphone, a “cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.” Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 2). Apple secured many design patents in connection with the release. Among those patents were the D618,677 patent, covering a black rectangular front face with rounded corners, the D593,087 patent, covering a rectan­gular front face with rounded corners and a raised rim, and the D604,305 patent, covering a grid of 16 colorful icons on a black screen. App. 530–578.

Section 289 allows a patent holder to recover the total profit an infringer makes from the infringement. It does so by first prohibiting the unlicensed “application” of a “patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale” or the unli­censed sale or exposure to sale of “any article of manufac­ture to which a patented design or colorable imitation has been applied.” 35 U. S. C. §289. It then makes a person who violates that prohibition “liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250.” Ibid. “Total,” of course, means all. See American Heritage Dictionary 1836 (5th ed. 2011) (“the whole amount of something; the entirety”). The “total profit” for which §289 makes an infringer liable is thus all of the profit made from the prohibited conduct, that is, from the manu­facture or sale of the “article of manufacture to which the patented design or colorable imitation has been applied.”

Arriving at a damages award under §289 thus involves two steps. First, identify the “article of manufacture” to which the infringed design has been applied. Second, calculate the infringer’s total profit made on that article of manufacture.

This case requires us to address a threshold matter: the scope of the term “article of manufacture.” The only ques­tion we resolve today is whether, in the case of a multi­component product, the relevant “article of manufacture” must always be the end product sold to the consumer or whether it can also be a component of that product. Under the former interpretation, a patent holder will always be entitled to the infringer’s total profit from the end product. Under the latter interpretation, a patent holder will some­times be entitled to the infringer’s total profit from a component of the end product.

The text resolves this case. The term “article of manu­facture,” as used in §289, encompasses both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product.

This reading of article of manufacture in §289 is con­sistent with 35 U. S. C. §171(a), which makes “new, origi­nal and ornamental designs for an article of manufac­ture” eligible for design patent protection.

The Patent Office and the courts have understood §171 to permit a design patent for a design extending to only a component of a multicomponent product. See, e.g., Ex parte Adams, 84 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 311 (1898) (“The several articles of manufacture of peculiar shape which when combined produce a machine or structure having movable parts may each separately be patented as a design . . . ”)

This reading is also consistent with 35 U. S. C. §101, which makes “any new and useful . . . manufacture . . . or any new and useful improvement thereof ” eligible for utility patent protection. Cf. D. Chisum, Patents §23.03[2], pp. 23–12 to 23–13 (2014) (noting that “article of manufacture” in §171 includes “what would be considered a ‘manufacture’ within the meaning of Section 101”). “This Court has read the term ‘manufacture’ in §101 . . . to mean ‘the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.’” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting American Fruit Grow­ers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U. S. 1, 11 (1931)). The broad term includes “the parts of a machine considered sepa­rately from the machine itself.” (W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions §183, p. 270 (1890)).

The parties ask us to go further and resolve whether, for each of the design patents at issue here, the relevant article of manufacture is the smartphone, or a particular smartphone component. Doing so would require us to set out a test for identifying the relevant article of manufac­ture at the first step of the §289 damages inquiry and to parse the record to apply that test in this case. The United States as amicus curiae suggested a test, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27–29, but Samsung and Apple did not brief the issue. We decline to lay out a test for the first step of the §289 damages inquiry in the ab­sence of adequate briefing by the parties. Doing so is not necessary to resolve the question presented in this case, and the Federal Circuit may address any remaining issues on remand.

Secondary sources: American Heritage Dictionary 1836 (5th ed. 2011); J. Stormonth, A Dictionary of the English Language 53 (1885); D. Chisum, Patents §23.03[2], pp. 23–12 to 23–13 (2014); W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions §183, p. 270 (1890).

(U.S.S.C., December 6, 2016, Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., Docket 15-777, J. Sotomayor, unanimous).

Violation d'un design protégé par un brevet : celui qui fabrique ou vend un produit (fabriqué) qui intègre un design protégé par un brevet pourra être actionné par le titulaire du brevet, lequel pourra conclure à la restitution de l'entier du profit illicitement accumulé (cf. 35 U. S. C. §289). Dans le cas d'un design portant sur un produit en un seul tenant, comme une assiette, il est aisé de lier le design au produit. Dans le cas d'un design portant sur un produit comportant plusieurs parties, comme un four de cuisine, il est plus délicat de déterminer le "produit" sur lequel est appliqué le design protégé (le produit est-il une des parties intégrantes ou l'ensemble des parties intégrantes (p.ex. le four lui-même ou l'une de ses parties ?)).

La présente espèce traite de la violation de designs pour smartphones. La Cour d'appel pour le Circuit fédéral a retenu que le smartphone dans son entier doit être compris comme le "produit" dont le droit au design est violé, cela même si la protection ne porte que sur le design de l'une des parties intégrantes. De la sorte, le calcul du dommage au sens de la Section 289 revient à additionner les ventes des smartphones, sans procéder à une déduction qui pourrait être justifiée par une protection que partielle du droit au design. Cela au motif que les consommateurs ne peuvent pas acheter les composants d'un smartphone de manière séparée. La Cour Suprême juge ici que cette analyse juridique est erronée.

Le droit fédéral des brevets d'invention permet de longue date d'enregistrer un design, lui conférant la protection prévue par ce droit. Dite protection peut être donnée pour un design nouveau, original et ornemental, appliqué à un produit fabriqué par l'homme (cf. 35 U. S. C. §171(a)). La Cour Suprême fédérale a jugé depuis longtemps qu'un design breveté est violé si aux yeux d'un observateur ordinaire, prêtant une attention telle celle ordinairement d'un acheteur, deux designs sont substantiellement identiques.

La Section 289 permet au titulaire du brevet d'obtenir de l'auteur de la violation la totalité du profit dérivant de dite violation (cf. 35 U. S. C. §289). Le profit total est ainsi l'entier du profit résultant de la conduite illicite, soit résultant de la fabrication ou de la vente d'un produit auquel le design a été appliqué.

Pour déterminer le montant d'un dommage auquel le défendeur doit être condamné, un raisonnement en deux étapes est à suivre : tout d'abord s'agit-il d'identifier le "produit" auquel le design a été appliqué. En second lieu convient-il de calculer le profit déduit du produit tel que délimité à l'étape précédente.

La présente espèce n'implique que de répondre à la question préalable de l'étendue de la notion de "article of manufacture", soit de produit fabriqué. La seule question à laquelle répond la Cour est de savoir si, dans le cas d'un produit à multiple composants, l'"article of manufacture" doit toujours être le produit fini vendu au consommateur, ou s'il peut être l'un des composants du produit fini. Selon la première de ces deux théories, le titulaire du brevet pourra toujours obtenir la totalité du profit dérivé de la vente du produit fini. Selon la seconde théorie, le titulaire du brevet sera parfois bien-fondé à réclamer le profit découlant de la partie intégrante du produit fini.

Le texte même de la Section 289 est dispositif. La notion d'"article of manufacture" inclut aussi bien le produit fini vendu au consommateur que cas échéant un composant de ce produit fini. Cette conception est conforme à 35 U.S.C. §171(a), disposition selon laquelle les designs nouveaux, originaux, et à caractère ornemental, intégrés à un produit fabriqué, sont susceptibles de protection par le droit des brevets. Et aussi bien l'Office des brevets que les Tribunaux ont compris la Section 171 comme permettant l'octroi d'un brevet en faveur d'un design qui ne s'étend qu'à une partie d'un produit qui en contient plusieurs.

Les conceptions qui précèdent sont par ailleurs conformes à 35 U.S.C. §101, disposant que toute fabrication utile et nouvelle, ou toute amélioration nouvelle et utile d'un produit déjà fabriqué peut revendiquer la protection du droit des brevets ("utility patent protection"). Il est observé qu'un article fabriqué au sens de la Section 171 inclut ce qui est considéré comme produit fabriqué au sens de la Section 101. Et la présente Cour a lu les termes "produits fabriqués" au sens de la Section 101 comme signifiants la production d'articles pour un usage, à partir de matières "premières", ou à partir d'autres articles, dans ce cas en donnant à ces articles de nouvelles formes, qualités, propriétés ou combinaisons, que ce soit par un travail manuel ou par le travail d'une machine. Cette large terminologie inclut les parties d'une machine considérées séparément de la machine elle-même.

Dans cette affaire, les plaideurs ont en outre demandé à la Cour de juger, pour chacun des brevets en cause, si le produit fabriqué relevant était le smartphone lui-même, ou une partie intégrante de ce smartphone. La Cour observe que juger ainsi impliquerait préalablement de déterminer un test permettant d'identifier le produit fabriqué relevant à la première étape de l'examen de la question du dommage au sens de la Section 289. Le Gouvernement, en tant qu'amicus curiae, a suggéré un test, mais ni Samsung ni Apple ne se sont prononcés, de sorte que la Cour estime prématuré de juger à ce niveau. La cause est dès lors renvoyée à l'autorité précédente, le Circuit fédéral, pour juger les questions encore en suspens.