Showing posts with label Registration (trademark). Show all posts
Showing posts with label Registration (trademark). Show all posts

Monday, May 2, 2022

Swiss Online Application for Trademark Protection

Swiss Online Application for Trademark Protection

 

https://www.easygov.swiss/easygov/#/en/brandprotection

 

 

Other Useful Online Functions:

 

 

  • Set Up a Company
  • Commercial Register
  • Tax
  • Social Insurances
  • Debt Enforcement Proceedings
  • Support with Financing
  • Salary Declarations
  • Create SOGC Publications
  • Protection Rights (IIP)
  • Working Conditions
  • Post Job
  • Reports and Permits under the Law on Foreign Nationals
  • Federal Supervisory Board for Foundations

 

https://www.easygov.swiss/easygov/#/

 

Monday, January 14, 2019

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In Re: Siny Corp., Docket No. 2018-1077


Trademark
Registration
Use in Commerce
Display Associated with the Goods
Webpage Printout
Substantial Evidence

Siny Corp. (“Siny”) appeals a decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) affirming the examining attorney’s refusal to register Siny’s proposed mark. We affirm.

Siny filed trademark application Serial No. 86754400 on September 11, 2015, seeking to register the mark CASALANA in standard characters for “Knit pile fabric made with wool for use as a textile in the manufacture of outerwear, gloves, apparel, and accessories” based on use in commerce under Section 1(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). Siny also submitted a specimen consisting of a webpage printout, which purported to show the mark in use in commerce for the goods.

The examining attorney initially refused registration because the specimen “appeared to be mere advertising material” and thus failed to show the requisite use in commerce for the goods. J.A. 74. The examining attorney noted in particular that the specimen did not include a means for ordering the goods.

(…) The examining attorney rejected (…) argument in a final refusal. He found that the cited text alone was insufficient for consumers to make a purchase; rather, it only indicated how consumers could obtain more information necessary to make a purchase. The examining attorney noted the absence of what he considered necessary ordering information, such as minimum quantities, cost, payment options, or shipping information. He therefore maintained the refusal based on the submitted specimen’s failure to show the requisite use in commerce for the goods.

Siny appealed the refusal to the Board. In a split decision, the Board affirmed. The Board initially noted that for a mark to be in use in commerce on goods, it may be “placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto.” J.A. 2 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). The Board observed that the Webpage Specimen was not an example of the mark being placed on the goods or their containers, tags, or labels. Rather, Siny contended that the Webpage Specimen constituted a “display associated with the goods.”

The Board then considered the Webpage Specimen in detail. It found that the Webpage Specimen lacked much of the information the Board would consider essential to a purchasing decision—e.g., a price (or even a range of prices) for the goods, the minimum quantities one may order, accepted methods of payment, or how the goods would be shipped. J.A. 8. The Board appreciated Siny’s contention that because the goods were industrial materials for use by customers in manufacture, the ultimate sales transaction may have to involve some assistance from Siny’s sales personnel. J.A. 9; see J.A. 3. Yet it found that, “while some details must be worked out by telephone, if virtually all important aspects of the transaction must be determined from information extraneous to the web page, then the web page is not a point of sale.” J.A. 9.

The Board added that in cases where the goods are technical and specialized and the applicant and examining attorney disagree on the point-of-sale nature of a submitted webpage specimen, “the applicant would be well advised to provide the examining attorney with additional evidence and information regarding the manner in which purchases are actually made through the webpage.” J.A. 9 (noting further that “attorney argument is not a substitute for reliable documentation of how sales actually are made . . . and verified statements from knowledgeable personnel as to what happens and how”). The Board ultimately affirmed the refusal because it found that the Webpage Specimen was not a display associated with the goods within the meaning of the Lanham Act. J.A. 10. The dissenter found that the Webpage Specimen was a valid “point of sale” display. J.A. 10–12.

Siny appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B).

We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. E.g., Royal Crown Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 892 F.3d 1358, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1365 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

The Lanham Act provides for registration of a mark based on use of the mark in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a). A mark is deemed in use in commerce on goods when, among other things, “it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto.” Id. § 1127. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) requires an applicant to submit a specimen of use “showing the mark as used on or in connection with the goods.” In re Sones, 590 F.3d 1282, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

The issue on appeal concerns whether the Webpage Specimen qualifies as a display associated with the goods under the Lanham Act. Mere advertising is not enough to qualify as such a display. See Powermatics, Inc. v. Globe Roofing Prods. Co., 341 F.2d 127, 130 (CCPA 1965) (“It is well settled that mere advertising and documentary use of a notation apart from the goods do not constitute technical trademark use.”); see also Avakoff v. S. Pac. Co., 765 F.2d 1097, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Lands’ End, Inc. v. Manback, 797 F. Supp. 511, 513 (E.D. Va. 1992). In determining whether a specimen qualifies as a display associated with the goods, one important consideration is whether the display is at a point-of-sale location. See In re Sones, 590 F.3d at 1289 (identifying the point-of-sale nature of a display as a relevant consideration); In re Marriott Corp., 459 F.2d 525, 527 (CCPA 1972) (likening the menus at issue to point-of-sale counter and window displays previously found acceptable); Lands’ End, 797 F. Supp. at 514 (“A crucial factor in the analysis is if the use of an alleged mark is at a point of sale location.”).

Whether a specimen qualifies as a display associated with the goods is a factual question. See In re Marriott Corp., 459 F.2d at 526 (“In our view, ‘association with the goods’ is a relative term amenable to proof.”); Lands’ End, 797 F. Supp. at 514 (“The determination of whether a specimen is mere advertising or a display associated with the goods is a factual question amenable to proof.”); accord In re Valenite Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1346 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (“Whether a specimen is mere advertising or whether it is a display associated with the goods is a question of fact which must be determined in each case based on the evidence in that particular case.” (citing In re Shipley Co., 230 U.S.P.Q. 691 (T.T.A.B. 1986))).

(…) We disagree that the Board applied improperly rigid requirements here. Rather, the Board carefully considered the Webpage Specimen’s contents and determined, on the record before it, that the specimen did not cross the line from mere advertising to an acceptable display associated with the goods. We cannot say that the Board’s determination lacked substantial evidence.


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Jan. 14, 2019, In Re: Siny Corp., Docket No. 2018-1077, Precedential)

Monday, September 10, 2018

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In re: Detroit Athletic Co., Docket 17-2361


Trademark: Classification: Registration (trademark): Likelihood of confusion: Ex parte proceeding: Cancellation proceeding:

(…) DACo objects to this analysis, pointing out that DACo’s application describes services in International Class 35, while the Detroit Athletic Club’s registration describes goods in International Class 25. But that difference does not alter our conclusion. Classification is solely for the “convenience of Patent and Trademark Office administration,” 15 U.S.C. § 1112, and “is wholly irrelevant to the issue of registrability under section 1052(d) (Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)), which makes no reference to classification,” Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1993). It is therefore well established that “confusion may be likely to occur from the use of the same or similar marks for goods, on the one hand, and for services involving those goods, on the other.” Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure ¶ 1207.01(a)(ii) (emphases added) (citing Hyper Shoppes, 837 F.2d at 464).

DACo next argues that consumers would have little problem distinguishing between DACo’s clothing store and the Detroit Athletic Club’s private social club. While this may be true, it is largely irrelevant. The relevant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding focuses on the goods and services described in the application and registration, and not on real-world conditions. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In reviewing the second factor, ‘we consider the applicant’s goods as set forth in its application, and the [registrant’s] goods as set forth in its registration.’” (quoting M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

The registration for the DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB mark describes clothing, not social clubs. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether consumers would believe that the Detroit Athletic Club—in its capacity as a seller of clothes—owns, sponsors, supplies, or is otherwise affiliated with DACo, a clothing store of a similar name.

The registration contains no restrictions on the channels of trade or classes of customers. As a result, the Detroit Athletic Club’s clothing is presumed to be sold in all normal trade channels to all the normal classes of purchasers. See i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1327 (“In the absence of meaningful limitations in either the application or the cited registrations, the Board properly presumed that the goods travel through all usual channels of trade and are offered to all normal potential purchasers.”).

(…) As described above, the registration does not set forth any restrictions on use and therefore “cannot be narrowed by testimony that the applicant’s use is, in fact, restricted to a particular class of purchasers.” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1323 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the owner of an unrestricted registration is entitled to change its current trade channels at any time. See CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Thus, we may not assume that the club will never sell clothing online or through third-party distributors.

To the extent DACo objects to the breadth of the goods or channels of trade described in the Detroit Athletic Club’s registration, that objection amounts to an attack on the registration’s validity, an attack better suited for resolution in a cancellation proceeding. See 15 U.S.C. § 1068 (stating that, in such proceedings, the Patent and Trademark Office may “modify the application or registration by limiting the goods or services specified therein”). “The present ex parte proceeding is not the proper forum from which to launch such an attack.” In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 598 (CCPA 1971); see also Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1408 (refusing to let an ex parte applicant narrow the scope of goods described in the cited registration).


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Sept. 10, 2018, In re: Detroit Athletic Co., Docket 17-2361, Circuit Judge O’Malley)


L’examen du risque de confusion créé par une marque se fait en analysant le contenu de son enregistrement et le contenu de la requête d’enregistrement, et non pas en analysant la confusion réelle sur le marché.
De la sorte, si ni la requête ni l’enregistrement ne décrivent la clientèle visée ou les canaux de distribution, il sera retenu que les biens ou services sont supposés être offerts à tous les clients usuels par tous les canaux commerciaux usuels. La preuve (ici par témoins) n’est pas admise pour tenter de renverser cette présomption.
La classification internationale des produits et services est sans relevance s’agissant de l’examen d’un risque de confusion.
La présente procédure ("ex parte proceeding") porte sur la question de l’analyse du risque de confusion d’une marque, et non pas sur l’exactitude des descriptions de l’enregistrement de la marque, pour laquelle une autre procédure est à disposition ("cancellation proceeding", par laquelle le "Patent and Trademark Office" peut modifier le contenu de la requête d’enregistrement ou le contenu de l’enregistrement lui-même).