U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Corcamore, LLC v. SFM LLC, Docket No. 2019-1526

Trademark

Cancellation of Trademark Registrations

15 U.S.C. § 1064

Lexmark Analytical Framework

 

False Advertising Provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)

 

Standing v. Statutory Cause of Action

 

 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No. 92060308.

 

(…) We conclude that appellee SFM was entitled to bring and maintain a petition under 15 U.S.C. § 1064, the statutory cause of action for cancellation of trademark registrations, and that the Board did not otherwise abuse its discretion in imposing default judgment as a sanction. We affirm.

 

SFM filed a petition with the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or “Board”) to cancel Corcamore’s registration for SPROUT. J.A. 98–104.

 

(…) Corcamore moved to dismiss SFM’s petition for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See J.A. 136–40. Corcamore argued that SFM lacked standing to bring a petition for cancellation of a registered trademark, citing the analytical framework established by the Supreme Court in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), for determining whether the requirements for maintaining a statutory cause of action have been satisfied.

 

(…) We first address the standing issue.

 

In this appeal, we review de novo whether SFM pleaded sufficient facts to establish entitlement to challenge Corcamore’s registered trademark under § 1064.

 

We first observe that there exists confusion in the law stirred by the inconsistent use of the term “standing.” As Justice Scalia observed, certain issues often discussed in terms of “standing” are more appropriately viewed as requirements for establishing a statutory cause of action. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 128 n.4. That is the case here. To be clear, this appeal does not involve the traditional legal notions of Article III standing. This appeal focuses instead on the requirements that a party must satisfy to bring or maintain a statutory cause of action, such as a petition to cancel a registered trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1064.

 

We hold that the Lexmark analytical framework is the applicable standard for determining whether a person is eligible under § 1064 to bring a petition for the cancellation of a trademark registration. However, because we discern no meaningful, substantive difference between the analytical frameworks expressed in Lexmark and Empresa Cubana, we do not agree that the Board reached the wrong result in this case.

 

In Lexmark, the Supreme Court established two requirements for determining whether a party is entitled to bring or maintain a statutory cause of action: a party must demonstrate (i) an interest falling within the zone of interests protected by the statute and (ii) proximate causation. 572 U.S. at 129–34. The Court explained that those two requirements “supply the relevant limits on who may sue” under a statutory cause of action. Id. at 134. The Court made clear that the zone-of-interests requirement applies to all statutory causes of action, and that proximate causation generally applies to all statutory causes of action. Id. at 129, 133.

 

In Lexmark, the Court addressed the cause of action for false advertising provided in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Id. at 129–37. The Court held that in order for a person to “come within a zone of interests in a suit for false advertising under § 1125(a), a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales.” Id. at 131–32. The Court explained that the zone-of-interests test is “not especially demanding,” and that “the benefit of any doubt goes to the plaintiff.” Id. at 130.

 

(…) While our precedent does not describe the causation requirement as one of “proximate causation,” it nonetheless requires petitioner’s belief of damage to have “a sufficiently close connection,” Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 133, to the registered trademark at issue.

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, October 27, 2020, Corcamore, LLC v. SFM LLC, Docket No. 2019-1526)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In re: Detroit Athletic Co., Docket 17-2361

Trademark: Classification: Registration (trademark): Likelihood of confusion: Ex parte proceeding: Cancellation proceeding:

(…) DACo objects to this analysis, pointing out that DACo’s application describes services in International Class 35, while the Detroit Athletic Club’s registration describes goods in International Class 25. But that difference does not alter our conclusion. Classification is solely for the “convenience of Patent and Trademark Office administration,” 15 U.S.C. § 1112, and “is wholly irrelevant to the issue of registrability under section 1052(d) (Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)), which makes no reference to classification,” Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1993). It is therefore well established that “confusion may be likely to occur from the use of the same or similar marks for goods, on the one hand, and for services involving those goods, on the other.” Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure ¶ 1207.01(a)(ii) (emphases added) (citing Hyper Shoppes, 837 F.2d at 464).

DACo next argues that consumers would have little problem distinguishing between DACo’s clothing store and the Detroit Athletic Club’s private social club. While this may be true, it is largely irrelevant. The relevant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding focuses on the goods and services described in the application and registration, and not on real-world conditions. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In reviewing the second factor, ‘we consider the applicant’s goods as set forth in its application, and the [registrant’s] goods as set forth in its registration.’” (quoting M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

The registration for the DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB mark describes clothing, not social clubs. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether consumers would believe that the Detroit Athletic Club—in its capacity as a seller of clothes—owns, sponsors, supplies, or is otherwise affiliated with DACo, a clothing store of a similar name.

The registration contains no restrictions on the channels of trade or classes of customers. As a result, the Detroit Athletic Club’s clothing is presumed to be sold in all normal trade channels to all the normal classes of purchasers. See i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1327 (“In the absence of meaningful limitations in either the application or the cited registrations, the Board properly presumed that the goods travel through all usual channels of trade and are offered to all normal potential purchasers.”).

(…) As described above, the registration does not set forth any restrictions on use and therefore “cannot be narrowed by testimony that the applicant’s use is, in fact, restricted to a particular class of purchasers.” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1323 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the owner of an unrestricted registration is entitled to change its current trade channels at any time. See CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Thus, we may not assume that the club will never sell clothing online or through third-party distributors.

To the extent DACo objects to the breadth of the goods or channels of trade described in the Detroit Athletic Club’s registration, that objection amounts to an attack on the registration’s validity, an attack better suited for resolution in a cancellation proceeding. See 15 U.S.C. § 1068 (stating that, in such proceedings, the Patent and Trademark Office may “modify the application or registration by limiting the goods or services specified therein”). “The present ex parte proceeding is not the proper forum from which to launch such an attack.” In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 598 (CCPA 1971); see also Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1408 (refusing to let an ex parte applicant narrow the scope of goods described in the cited registration).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Sept. 10, 2018, In re: Detroit Athletic Co., Docket 17-2361, Circuit Judge O’Malley)

L’examen du risque de confusion créé par une marque se fait en analysant le contenu de son enregistrement et le contenu de la requête d’enregistrement, et non pas en analysant la confusion réelle sur le marché.

De la sorte, si ni la requête ni l’enregistrement ne décrivent la clientèle visée ou les canaux de distribution, il sera retenu que les biens ou services sont supposés être offerts à tous les clients usuels par tous les canaux commerciaux usuels. La preuve (ici par témoins) n’est pas admise pour tenter de renverser cette présomption.

La classification internationale des produits et services est sans relevance s’agissant de l’examen d’un risque de confusion.

La présente procédure ("ex parte proceeding") porte sur la question de l’analyse du risque de confusion d’une marque, et non pas sur l’exactitude des descriptions de l’enregistrement de la marque, pour laquelle une autre procédure est à disposition ("cancellation proceeding", par laquelle le "Patent and Trademark Office" peut modifier le contenu de la requête d’enregistrement ou le contenu de l’enregistrement lui-même).

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., Docket No. 18-1688

Trademark: Trade name: Likelihood of confusion: DuPont factors: Cancellation:

Appellant Zheng Cai DBA Tai Chi Green Tea Inc. (“Mr. Cai”) appeals an opinion of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) cancelling registration of his mark “WU DANG TAI CHI GREEN TEA” due to a likelihood of confusion with Appellee Diamond Hong, Inc.’s (“Diamond Hong”) registered mark, “TAI CHI,” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012). See Diamond Hong, Inc. v. Zheng Cai, Cancellation No. 92062714, 2018 WL 916315, at *5–8 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2018); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (providing a mark may not be placed on the principal register if it so resembles a mark already registered “as to be likely . . . to cause confusion”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B) (2012).

We affirm.

Diamond Hong petitioned for cancellation of Mr. Cai’s mark based on a likelihood of confusion with its registered TAI CHI mark. See Appellee’s Suppl. App. 23. The TTAB found likelihood of confusion, giving limited consideration to Mr. Cai’s briefing because it “contravened” certain provisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (“TBMP”). Diamond Hong, 2018 WL 916315, at *3, *5−7.

Section 1052(d) provides that a trademark may be refused if it consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the USPTO, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).

In Application of E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., our predecessor court articulated thirteen factors to consider when determining likelihood of confusion (“DuPont factors”). See 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). “Not all of the DuPont factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.” In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

The thirteen factors are as follows: (1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity and nature of goods described in the marks’ registrations; (3) similarity of established trade channels; (4) conditions of purchasing; (5) fame of the prior mark; (6) number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) nature and extent of actual confusion; (8) length of time and conditions of concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; (9) variety of goods on which mark is used; (10) market interface between applicant and owner of a prior mark; (11) extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark; (12) extent of potential confusion; and (13) any other established probative fact on effect of use. See Application of E.I. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.

A showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.

The Opinion of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and

Appeal Board is

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Aug. 27, 2018, Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., Docket No. 18-1688, Circuit Judge Wallach)

Requête en annulation de l’enregistrement d’une marque concurrente, pour risque de confusion. Description des étapes procédurales. Analyse du risque de confusion selon les treize facteurs DuPont. Ces treize conditions n’ont nullement besoin d’être réalisées pour aboutir à la reconnaissance d’une confusion contraire au droit des marques : seuls les facteurs relevant dans chaque espèce sont à considérer.

L’existence d’une confusion effective n’est pas nécessaire pour reconnaître un risque de confusion illicite.