Tuesday, April 25, 2017

Lewis v. Clarke, Docket 15-1500


Immunity (personal): Sovereign immunity: Indian tribe: Eleventh Amendment: Real party in interest: Common law: Indemnification provision: Bivens:


This case presents an ordinary negligence action brought against a tribal em­ployee in state court under state law. We granted certio­rari to resolve whether an Indian tribe’s sovereign immu­nity bars individual-capacity damages actions against tribal employees for torts committed within the scope of their employment and for which the employees are indemnified by the tribe.

Two issues require our resolution: (1) whether the sov­ereign immunity of an Indian tribe bars individual-capacity damages against tribal employees for torts com­mitted within the scope of their employment; and (2) what role, if any, a tribe’s decision to indemnify its employees plays in this analysis.

Our cases establish that, in the context of lawsuits against state and federal employees or entities, courts should look to whether the sovereign is the real party in interest to determine whether sovereign immunity bars the suit. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U. S. 21, 25 (1991). (…) Must determine in the first instance whether the remedy sought is truly against the sovereign. (…) If, for example, an action is in essence against a State even if the State is not a named party, then the State is the real party in interest and is entitled to invoke the Eleventh Amend­ment’s protection. For this reason, an arm or instrumen­tality of the State generally enjoys the same immunity as the sovereign itself. E.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, 429–430 (1997). Similarly, lawsuits brought against employees in their official capacity “repre­sent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent,” and they may also be barred by sovereign immunity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 165–166 (1985).

“Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a govern­ment officer for actions taken under color of state law.” Hafer, 502 U. S., at 25. (…) See also id., at 27–31 (discharged employees entitled to bring personal damages action against state auditor general); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). “Officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals,” Hafer, 502 U. S., at 27, and the real party in interest is the individual, not the sovereign.

Defendants in an official-capacity action may assert sovereign immunity. Graham, 473 U. S., at 167. An officer in an individual-capacity action, on the other hand, may be able to assert personal immunity defenses, such as, for example, absolute prose­cutorial immunity in certain circumstances. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U. S. 335, 342–344 (2009). But sovereign immunity “does not erect a barrier against suits to impose individual and personal liability.” Hafer, 502 U. S., at 30– 31; see Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 757 (1996).

There is no reason to depart from these general rules in the context of tribal sovereign immunity. It is apparent that these general principles foreclose Clarke’s sovereign immunity defense in this case. This is a negligence action arising from a tort committed by Clarke on an interstate highway within the State of Connecticut. The suit is brought against a tribal employee operating a vehicle within the scope of his employment but on state lands, and the judgment will not operate against the Tribe. This is not a suit against Clarke in his official capacity. It is simply a suit against Clarke to recover for his personal actions, which “will not require action by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign’s property.” Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687 (1949). We are cognizant of the Supreme Court of Connecticut’s con­cern that plaintiffs not circumvent tribal sovereign im­munity. But here, that immunity is simply not in play. Clarke, not the Gaming Authority, is the real party in interest.

In ruling that Clarke was immune from this suit solely because he was acting within the scope of his employment, the court extended sovereign immunity for tribal employ­ees beyond what common-law sovereign immunity princi­ples would recognize for either state or federal employees. See, e.g., Graham, 473 U. S., at 167–168. The protection offered by tribal sovereign immunity here is no broader than the protection offered by state or federal sovereign immunity.

There are, of course, personal immunity defenses distinct from sov­ereign immunity. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 811–815 (1982). Clarke argues for the first time before this Court that one particular form of personal immunity is available to him here—official immunity. See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U. S. 292, 295–297 (1988). That defense is not properly before us now, however, given that Clarke’s motion to dismiss was based solely on tribal sovereign immunity. See Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U. S. 443, 455 (2007).

The conclusion above notwithstanding, Clarke argues that the Gaming Authority is the real party in interest here because it is required by Mohegan Tribe Code §4–52 to indemnify Clarke for any adverse judgment. We have never before had occasion to decide whether an indemnification clause is sufficient to extend a sovereign immunity defense to a suit against an employee in his individual capacity. We hold that an indemnification provision cannot, as a matter of law, extend sovereign immunity to individual employees who would otherwise not fall under its protective cloak.

Indeed, we have applied these same princi­ples to a different question before—whether a state in­strumentality may invoke the State’s immunity from suit even when the Federal Government has agreed to indem­nify that instrumentality against adverse judgments. In Regents of Univ. of Cal., an individual brought suit against the University of California, a public university of the State of California, for breach of contract related to his employ­ment at a laboratory operated by the university pursuant to a contract with the Federal Government. We held that the indemnification provision did not divest the state instrumentality of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 519 U. S., at 426. Our analysis turned on where the potential legal liability lay, not from whence the money to pay the damages award ultimately came. Because the lawsuit bound the university, we held, the Eleventh Amendment applied to the litigation even though the damages award would ultimately be paid by the federal Department of Energy. Id., at 429–431. Our reasoning remains the same. The critical inquiry is who may be legally bound by the court’s adverse judgment, not who will ultimately pick up the tab.

Here, the Connecticut courts exercise no jurisdiction over the Tribe or the Gaming Authority, and their judg­ments will not bind the Tribe or its instrumentalities in any way. The Tribe’s indemnification provision does not somehow convert the suit against Clarke into a suit against the sovereign; when Clarke is sued in his individ­ual capacity, he is held responsible only for his individual wrongdoing. Moreover, indemnification is not a certainty here. Clarke will not be indemnified by the Gaming Au­thority should it determine that he engaged in “wanton, reckless, or malicious” activity. Mohegan Tribe Code §4– 52.

((…) The concern that originally drove the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment—the protection of the States against involuntary liability. See Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30, 39, 48 (1994)).


Secondary sources: M. Fawcett, The Lasting of the Mohegans 7, 11–13 (1995); Native Hawaiian Law: A Treatise 303–324 (M. MacKenzie ed. 2015); F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law §§1.01–1.07 (2012 and Supp. 2015); V. Deloria & R. DeMallie, Documents of American Indian Diplomacy: Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions, 1775–1979 (1999).


(U.S.S.C., April 25, 2017, Lewis v. Clarke, Docket 15-1500, J. Sotomayor).


Immunité des employés publics, des employés d'institutions apparentées au secteur public, et des membres des Tribus indiennes, Onzième Amendement :

La présente espèce naît d'un cas de responsabilité civile ordinaire porté devant une cour d'un état, et non fédérale. Le droit applicable est celui de l'état du for. La partie défenderesse est membre d'une Tribu indienne reconnue par l'autorité fédérale. L'immunité dont bénéficie les Tribus indiennes prohibe-t-elle une action en dommages-intérêts dirigée contre un des membres de la Tribu, fondée sur un acte illicite commis dans l'exercice de son travail pour la Tribu, et pour lequel il sera indemnisé par dite Tribu ?

Selon la jurisprudence, dans le contexte de procédures contre des employés ou des entités de l'état ou fédéraux, les Tribunaux doivent établir si le souverain est la partie réellement intéressée ("real party in interest"), cela aux fins de juger si l'immunité prohibe l'action en justice au sens du Onzième Amendement. En particulier s'agit-il de déterminer si les conclusions sont en finalité dirigées contre le souverain, même s'il n'est pas en tant que tel partie au procès. Diverses institutions liées à l'entité publique peuvent invoquer l'immunité (par exemple une caisse-maladie dans le système Medicare). De la sorte, une action dirigée contre un employé public, fondée sur un acte relevant de ses fonctions, représente une autre manière d'agir directement contre l'entité publique. Une telle action peut être prohibée par le principe d'immunité.

Par contraste, une action dirigée contre l'employé public et nullement contre l'entité publique vise à le faire condamner pour un acte (illicite) commis prétendument dans le cadre de ses fonctions et prétendument selon la loi (cf. la jurisprudence Bivens bien connue). Ici, le real party in interest est l'employé à titre personnel, et non le souverain.

(Le défendeur dispose aussi de la possibilité d'invoquer une immunité dont il bénéficie peut-être à titre personnel, comme l'immunité de l'accusateur public en droit pénal).

Ces principes s'appliquent également dans le contexte de l'immunité au bénéfice des Tribus indiennes. En l'espèce, il est apparent qu'ils ne permettent pas à C. d'invoquer son immunité découlant de sa qualité de membre d'une Tribu indienne. La présente affaire est un cas de responsabilité civile découlant d'un accident de circulation survenu dans l'état du Connecticut (et non dans le territoire de la Tribu). Que le défendeur conduisît pour le compte de son employeur, la Tribu, ne lui est d'aucun secours. Le jugement en RC ne sera pas opposable à la Tribu. C., et non l'entité tribale, est le "real party in interest". La procédure n'est pas dirigée contre C. en sa qualité de membre et d'employé de la Tribu. Elle est dirigée contre C. et contre lui seul.

La protection offerte par l'immunité des Tribus n'est ici pas plus étendue que la protection offerte par l'immunité en faveur des états ou en faveur de l'autorité fédérale.

Par ailleurs, dans le cas où la loi (ici tribale) permet l'indemnisation de la partie responsable, il n'en découle nullement une extension de l'immunité de l'entité qui indemnise en faveur de la personne indemnisée (cette dernière étant recherchée personnellement en responsabilité, comme en l'espèce). Ce principe peut s'appliquer dans un autre contexte, tel celui de savoir si une instrumentalité de l'état peut encore invoquer l'immunité de l'état quand le Gouvernement fédéral a promis d'indemniser dite instrumentalité en cas de jugement défavorable : la jurisprudence Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U. S. 425, 429–430 (1997) est illustrative : une personne physique agit contre l'Université de Californie, une Université publique, pour violation contractuelle fondée sur un contrat de travail, l'activité ayant lieu dans un laboratoire de l'Université, et la partie employeur de ce contrat de travail étant non pas l'Université mais le Gouvernement fédéral. La Cour a jugé dans cette affaire que la disposition d'indemnisation ne privait pas l'Université de son immunité découlant du Onzième Amendement. Ainsi, en la matière, le critère décisif est de savoir qui sera juridiquement tenu par le jugement défavorable, et non qui finalement règlera compte au plan financier.

En l'espèce, les deux instances précédentes de l'état du Connecticut n'exercent aucune compétence envers la Tribu indienne. Leurs Jugements n'engageront nullement la Tribu. La disposition d'indemnisation n'implique pas conversion de l'action contre C. en une action contre la Tribu.

(L'adoption du Onzième Amendement était motivée par le souci d'éviter d'engager la responsabilité de l'état hors des cas prévus par la loi).




Lewis v. Clarke, Docket 15-1500


Joinder: Sovereign immunity: Immunity: Real party in interest:


(…) Our conclusion that indemnification provisions do not alter the real-party-in-interest analysis for purposes of sovereign immunity is consistent with the practice that applies in the contexts of diversity of citizenship and joinder. In assessing diversity jurisdiction, courts look to the real parties to the controversy. Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee, 446 U. S. 458, 460 (1980). Applying this principle, courts below have agreed that the fact that a third party indemnifies one of the named parties to the case does not, as a general rule, influence the diversity analysis. See, e.g., Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F. 3d 853, 865 (CA5 2003); E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F. 3d 925, 936–937 (CA2 1998). They have similarly held that a party does not become a required party for joinder purposes under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 simply by virtue of indemnifying one of the named parties. See, e.g., Gardiner v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Auth., 145 F. 3d 635, 641 (CA3 1998); Rochester Methodist Hospital v. Travelers Ins. Co., 728 F. 2d 1006, 1016–1017 (CA8 1984).


(U.S.S.C., April 25, 2017, Lewis v. Clarke, Docket 15-1500, J. Sotomayor).


Une cour fédérale peut être compétente si les parties résident dans des états différents ("diversity of citizenship"). Dans l'hypothèse où les parties résident dans le même état et que la compétence du système des cours fédérales n'est pas donnée, il est sans importance qu'une tierce partie résidant dans un autre état se soit engagée à indemniser l'une des parties au procès. Ce seul élément – l'indemnisation par un tiers domicilié hors de l'état du for – n'impliquera pas "diversity of citizenship". Seules les "real parties in interest" sont considérées pour cette analyse. Les mêmes principes s'appliquent dans les cas de consorité : un tiers qui indemnise l'une des parties au procès ne deviendra pas un consort nécessaire au sens de la Règle 19 des Règles fédérales de procédure civile.


Lewis v. Clarke, Docket 15-1500


Diversity of citizenship: Sovereign immunity: Immunity: Real party in interest:


(…) Our conclusion that indemnification provisions do not alter the real-party-in-interest analysis for purposes of sovereign immunity is consistent with the practice that applies in the contexts of diversity of citizenship and joinder. In assessing diversity jurisdiction, courts look to the real parties to the controversy. Navarro Savings Assn. v. Lee, 446 U. S. 458, 460 (1980). Applying this principle, courts below have agreed that the fact that a third party indemnifies one of the named parties to the case does not, as a general rule, influence the diversity analysis. See, e.g., Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F. 3d 853, 865 (CA5 2003); E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F. 3d 925, 936–937 (CA2 1998).


(U.S.S.C., April 25, 2017, Lewis v. Clarke, Docket 15-1500, J. Sotomayor).


Une cour fédérale peut être compétente si les parties résident dans des états différents ("diversity of citizenship"). Dans l'hypothèse où les parties résident dans le même état et que la compétence du système des cours fédérales n'est pas donnée, il est sans importance qu'une tierce partie résidant dans un autre état se soit engagée à indemniser l'une des parties au procès. Ce seul élément – l'indemnisation par un tiers domicilié hors de l'état du for – n'impliquera pas "diversity of citizenship". Seules les "real parties in interest" sont considérées pour cette analyse.

Lewis v. Clarke, Docket 15-1500


Immunity: Sovereign immunity: Insurances (health): Real party in interest: Medicare:


Clarke notes that courts have extended sovereign im­munity to private healthcare insurance companies under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F. 3d 67, 71–72 (CA2 1998); Pine View Gardens, Inc. v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 485 F. 2d 1073, 1074–1075 (CADC 1973); Brief for Respondent 19, n. 4. But, these cases rest on the proposition that the fiscal intermediaries are essentially state instrumentali­ties, as the governing regulations make clear. See 42 CFR §421.5(b) (2016) (providing that the Medicare Administra­tor “is the real party of interest in any litigation involving the administration of the program”). It is well established in our precedent that a suit against an arm or instrumen­tality of the State is treated as one against the State itself. See Regents of Univ. of Cal., 519 U. S., at 429. We have not before treated a lawsuit against an individual employee as one against a state instrumentality, and Clarke offers no persuasive reason to do so now.


(U.S.S.C., April 25, 2017, Lewis v. Clarke, Docket 15-1500, J. Sotomayor).


Immunité selon le Onzième Amendement au bénéfice de l'assurance-maladie sociale Medicare, considérée comme un intermédiaire fiscal, donc comme une instrumentalité de l'administration, de laquelle l'immunité prend sa source. L'immunité peut aussi s'appliquer en faveur des acteurs Medicare du secteur privé.


Tuesday, April 18, 2017

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, Docket 15-1406


Discovery misconduct: Contempt of court: Frivolous claims: Bad faith: Attorney's fees (shifting): Punitive damages:

Federal courts possess certain “inherent powers,” not conferred by rule or statute, “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U. S. 626, 630–631 (1962). That authority includes “the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U. S. 32, 44–45 (1991). And one permissible sanction is an “assessment of attorney’s fees”—an order, like the one issued here, in­structing a party that has acted in bad faith to reimburse legal fees and costs incurred by the other side. Id., at 45. This Court has made clear that such a sanction, when imposed pursuant to civil procedures, must be compensa­tory rather than punitive in nature. See Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U. S. 821, 826–830 (1994) (distinguishing compensatory from punitive sanctions and specifying the procedures needed to impose each kind). In other words, the fee award may go no further than to redress the wronged party “for losses sustained”; it may not impose an additional amount as punishment for the sanctioned party’s misbehavior. Id., at 829 (quoting United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 304 (1947)). To level that kind of separate penalty, a court would need to provide procedural guarantees applicable in criminal cases, such as a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof. See id., at 826, 832–834, 838–839. When (as in this case) those criminal-type protections are missing, a court’s shifting of fees is limited to reimbursing the victim.

That means, pretty much by definition, that the court can shift only those attorney’s fees incurred because of the misconduct at issue. Compensation for a wrong, after all, tracks the loss resulting from that wrong. So as we have previously noted, a sanction counts as compensatory only if it is “calibrated to the damages caused by” the bad-faith acts on which it is based. A fee award is so calibrated if it covers the legal bills that the litigation abuse occasioned. But if an award extends further than that—to fees that would have been incurred without the misconduct—then it crosses the boundary from compensa­tion to punishment. Hence the need for a court, when using its inherent sanctioning authority (and civil proce­dures), to establish a causal link between the litigant’s misbehavior and legal fees paid by the opposing party.

Rule-based and statutory sanction regimes similarly require courts to find such a causal connection before shifting fees. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a district court may order a party to pay attorney’s fees “caused by” discovery misconduct, Rule 37(b)(2)(C), or “directly resulting from” misrepresentations in pleadings, motions, and other papers, Rule 11(c)(4). And under 28 U. S. C. §1927, a court may require an attorney who unreasonably multiplies proceedings to pay attorney’s fees incurred “because of” that misconduct. Those provisions confirm the need to establish a causal link between misconduct and fees when acting under inherent authority, given that such undelegated powers should be exercised with especial “restraint and discretion.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U. S. 752, 764 (1980).

That kind of causal connection, as this Court explained in another attorney’s fees case, is appropriately framed as a but-for test: The complaining party (here, the Haegers) may recover “only the portion of his fees that he would not have paid but for” the misconduct. Fox v. Vice, 563 U. S. 826, 836 (2011); see Paroline v. United States, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 12).

In Fox, a prevailing defendant sought reim­bursement under a fee-shifting statute for legal expenses incurred in defending against several frivolous claims. See 563 U. S., at 830; 42 U. S. C. §1988.

Substitute “discovery abuse” for “frivolous claim” (…), and the same thing goes in this case.

Bagwell (Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U. S. 821) also addressed “coercive” sanctions, designed to make a party comply with a court order. 512 U. S., at 829. That kind of sanction is not at issue here.


(U.S.S.C., April 18, 2017, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, Docket 15-1406, J. Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except J. Gorsuch, who took no part in the considera­tion or decision of the case).


Aux cours fédérales sont attachées certaines compétences inhérentes, conférées non par la loi, de gérer leurs affaires internes ou le cours des procédures, pour permettre une résolution diligente et sans retard des dossiers. Parmi ces compétences, on compte l'autorité de déterminer une sanction appropriée pour une conduite qui abuse du système judiciaire. L'une de ces sanctions est la condamnation d'une partie qui s'est comportée de mauvaise foi au paiement des honoraires d'avocat et des frais de l'autre partie. Ce type de condamnation, dans le cadre de procédures civiles, doit être de nature compensatoire et non punitive. Elle ne peut que compenser la partie de ses pertes effectives, et ne permet pas d'imposer un montant additionnel comme punition du comportement abusif. Si elle entendait condamner à des dommages punitifs, la cour devrait conférer à la partie à condamner les garanties de procédure applicables aux procédures pénales, telles que l'exigence de la condamnation possible qu'en cas de "preuve au-delà d'un doute raisonnable".

(Une décision de 1994 distingue les dommages compensatoires des dommages punitifs et spécifie les procédures nécessaires pour condamner à payer ces deux types de dommage).

De ce qui précède découle que la cour ne peut condamner à payer que la fraction des honoraires et frais de la cause due en raison de la conduite inadmissible de l'autre partie. La cour doit établir le lien de causalité à cet égard.

Ce qui précède concerne certes le pouvoir inhérent du Tribunal de sanctionner, mais dans le cas où le pouvoir de sanctionner découle de la loi, la cour devra aussi établir un tel lien de causalité avant de condamner à payer les honoraires d'avocat de l'autre partie. Par exemple, les Règles fédérales de procédure civile disposent qu'une cour de district peut condamner une partie aux frais d'avocat en cas d'inconduite dans la phase de "discovery", ou résultant d'un défaut de diligence dans la préparation et le dépôt des mémoires, requêtes, et autres pièces (Rules 37(b)(2)(C) et 11(c)(4)). Et selon 28 U.S.C. §1927, une cour peut condamner au paiement des honoraires adverse un avocat qui multiplie sans raison les procédures. Ces dispositions confirment la nécessité d'établir un lien causal entre la conduite répréhensible et les honoraires de l'adverse partie, considérant que les pouvoirs inhérents doivent être exercés avec une retenue toute spéciale.

Le lien de causalité est de type "but-for" : la partie ne peut obtenir paiement de son adversaire que de la fraction des honoraires qui n'aurait pas été due en l'absence du comportement inadmissible.

(Un exemple qui traite de la prise en charge des frais et honoraires de celui qui l'emporte contre son adversaire qui avait procédé témérairement : Fox v. Vice, 563 U. S. 826, 830 (2011) ; cf. U.S.C. §1988). La procédure téméraire et l'abus de la procédure de "discovery" sont des notions de même nature s'agissant de la question de la prise en charge des frais et honoraires par la partie adverse.

(Quant à elle, la décision Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U. S. 821 porte sur les mesures de contrainte qu'une cour peut prendre en vue d'obtenir l'exécution de ses ordonnances).


Wednesday, April 12, 2017

Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield


Privacy: Data: Shield: Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield:

Protecting Privacy in Transatlantic Data Flows:

As of April 12, 2017, companies can join a Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield for transfers from Switzerland.

At the first annual review, the Department of Commerce will work with the Swiss Government to put in place the binding arbitration option in Annex I of the Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework.

Privacy Shield is a program with a set of Principles to which U.S. companies can self-certify. Those companies can then transfer data from the European Union to the United States in compliance with EU data protection requirements. The U.S. government and the European Commission negotiated the Privacy Shield Principles to enhance and replace the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework. Privacy Shield also includes safeguards and limitations, addressed by other parts of the U.S. government, about national security and law enforcement data access.


The substantive requirements of the EU-U.S. and Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield are the same. The full text of the Swiss-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework is available here ( http://trade.gov/td/services/odsi/swiss-us-privacyshield-framework.pdf )

The Department of Commerce maintains a list of companies that have joined. Each entry includes a company’s covered subsidiaries, a description of the covered data, and dispute resolution information. Currently about 1,900 companies have joined the Privacy Shield program.

Thursday, April 6, 2017

McGill v. Citibank, S224086


Arbitration: enforceability, invalidation:


The high court has stated that section 2 of the FAA requires courts to “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and to enforce them according to their terms.”  (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339 (Concepcion)).  However, the high court has qualified this statement by reference to “the final phrase of § 2,” which is known as the FAA’s “saving clause” and which “permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ ”  (Concepcion, at p. 339.) This clause, the high court has stated, “indicates” that Congress’s “purpose” in enacting the FAA “was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.”  (Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin (1967) 388 U.S. 395, 404, fn. 12, (Prima Paint).)  Thus, arbitration agreements, “like other contracts,” “may be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’ ”  (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 68.)  They may not, however, be invalidated “by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”  (Concepcion, at p. 339.)

We have held that the FAA does not require enforcement of a provision in an arbitration agreement that, in violation of generally applicable California contract law, “limits statutorily imposed remedies such as punitive damages and attorney fees.”  (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 99-100, 103.) 

The FAA does not require enforcement of a provision in a predispute arbitration agreement that, in violation of generally applicable California contract law, waives the right to seek in any forum public injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, or the false advertising law.

The contract defense to the waiver at issue here — “a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement” (Civ. Code, § 3513) — is a “ground” that “exists” under California law “for the revocation of any contract”  (9 U.S.C. § 2).  Thus, applying this defense to invalidate the waiver does not “modify the FAA,” as Citibank asserts; it implements the FAA as written.

Our conclusion is consistent with the high court’s statement that, “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”  (Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 614, 628.)



(Cal. S.C., April 6, 2017, McGill v. Citibank, S224086).



Validité et invalidation d'une clause arbitrale :


La Cour suprême fédérale a jugé que la Section 2 de la loi fédérale sur l'arbitrage imposait aux Tribunaux de considérer les clauses arbitrales à égalité avec les autres contrats, et d'exécuter ces clauses conformément à leurs termes. Cela dans le contexte de la Section 2 in fine, qui permet de nier le caractère exécutoire d'une clause pour les raisons qui permettent la révocation d'un contrat "at law" ou "in equity". En promulguant la loi fédérale sur l'arbitrage, l'objectif du Congrès était de conférer aux clauses arbitrales le même caractère exécutoire que celui attaché aux contrats en général. Ainsi, les clauses arbitrales, comme les autres contrats, peuvent être invalidées par l'invocation d'un moyen de défense contractuel, tels le dol, la crainte fondée, et le caractère léonin. Ces clauses ne peuvent cependant pas être invalidées par des moyens de défense qui ne s'appliquent qu'en arbitrage.

La Cour suprême de Californie a jugé que la loi fédérale sur l'arbitrage n'exigeait nullement l'exécution d'une disposition arbitrale limitant, contrairement au droit général des contrats de cet état, le choix des remèdes légaux imposés par la loi de l'état, tels les dommages punitifs ou les dépens.

Et la loi fédérale sur l'arbitrage n'impose pas davantage l'exécution d'une disposition arbitrale conclue avant litige par laquelle il est renoncé, contrairement au droit californien, à solliciter une injonction fondée sur la loi contre la concurrence déloyale ou sur la loi prohibant la publicité mensongère notamment. Renoncer à solliciter une injonction devant certains fora est possible, mais pas devant tous les fora.

La défense contractuelle permettant de contester la renonciation à solliciter une injonction est le principe selon lequel une loi d'intérêt public ne peut pas être contournée par un accord privé (cf. Section 3513 du Code civil de Californie). Ce moyen de défense permettant de révoquer une disposition contractuelle est à disposition en droit californien général des contrats, de sorte qu'il peut être invoqué pour annuler une clause arbitrale, comme le permet 9 U.S.C. § 2, une disposition contenue dans la loi fédérale sur l'arbitrage. Ainsi, appliquer ce moyen de défense pour invalider la renonciation ne "modifie" pas les exigences de la loi fédérale sur l'arbitrage, mais bien exécute cette loi fédérale.

Ces considérations sont conformes à la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême fédérale, qui a rappelé qu'en choisissant d'arbitrer une dispute portant sur un droit déduit de la loi, les parties ne renoncent pas à l'application du droit de fond. Elles se limitent à choisir de soumettre le litige à l'arbitre plutôt qu'au Juge.






McGill v. Citibank, S224086


Unfair competition: False advertising: Injunction:


The UCL addresses “unfair competition,” which “means and includes any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by the false advertising law.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)  Its purpose “is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.”  (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949.)  “Actions for relief” under the UCL may be brought by various government officials and “by a person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.)  “The primary form of relief available under the UCL to protect consumers from unfair business practices is an injunction.”  (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 319.)  In this regard, the UCL provides:  “Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction.  The court may make such orders or judgments . . . as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203.)

The false advertising law makes unlawful “untrue or misleading” statements designed to “induce the public to enter into any obligation” to purchase various goods and services.  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500.)  Like the UCL, the false advertising law allows an action for relief to be brought by specified government officials and “by any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of a violation.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17535.)  It also authorizes injunctive relief, stating:  “Any person, corporation, firm, partnership, joint stock company, or any other association or organization which violates or proposes to violate this chapter may be enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction.  The court may make such orders or judgments . . . as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person, corporation, firm, partnership, joint stock company, or any other association or organization of any practices which violate this chapter, or which may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of any practice in this chapter declared to be unlawful.”  (Ibid.)

(…) Do not preclude a private individual who has “suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of” a violation of the UCL or the false advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17204, 17535) — and who therefore has standing to file a private action — from requesting public injunctive relief in connection with that action.  A person who meets these requirements is “filing” the “lawsuit” or “action” on his or her own behalf, not “on behalf of the general public.”  (Prop. 64, § 1, subds. (b)(4), (f))  This remains true even if the person seeks, as one of the requested remedies, injunctive relief “the primary purpose and effect of” which is “to prohibit and enjoin conduct that is injurious to the general public.”  (Broughton, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1077.)  We find nothing in the ballot materials for Proposition 64 suggesting that voters, in stating their intent “that only the California Attorney General and local public officials be authorized to file and prosecute actions on behalf of the general public” (Prop. 64, § 1, subd. (f)), meant to preclude individuals who meet the standing requirements for bringing a private action from requesting such relief.



(Cal. S.C., April 6, 2017, McGill v. Citibank, S224086).



Concurrence déloyale :

La législation californienne contre la concurrence déloyale prévoit l'injonction comme moyen de choix pour mettre fin à un acte de concurrence déloyale ou de publicité mensongère. Les moyens prévus par dite législation sont à disposition de l'autorité et des particuliers lésés.

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Decision and Order In the Matter of China National Chemical Corporation, FTC Matter/File Number: 1610093, Docket Number: C-4610


Contract drafting

Confidentiality agreement

(From Decision and Order In the Matter of China National Chemical Corporation, a corporation; ADAMA Agricultural Solutions Ltd., a corporation; and Makhteshim Agan of North America, Inc., doing business as ADAMA, a corporation, FTC Matter/File Number: 1610093, Docket Number: C-4610 (last updated April 4, 2017)).


M.

“Confidential Information” means any and all of the following information:

1.all information that is a trade secret under applicable trade secret or other law;

2.all information concerning product specifications, data, know-how, formulae, compositions, processes, designs, sketches, photographs, graphs, drawings, samples, inventions and ideas, past, current and planned research and development, current and planned manufacturing or distribution methods and processes, customer lists, current and anticipated customer requirements, pricelists, market studies, business plans, software and computer software and database technologies, systems, structures, and architectures;

3.all information concerning the relevant business, which includes historical and current financial statements, financial projections and budgets, tax returns and accountants’ materials, historical, current and projected sales, capital spending budgets and plans, business plans, strategic plans, marketing and advertising plans, publications, client and customer lists and files, contracts, the names and backgrounds of key personnel and personnel training techniques and materials; and

4.all notes, analyses, compilations, studies, summaries and other material to the extent containing or based, in whole or in part, upon any of the information described above;

Provided, however, that Confidential Information shall not include information that (i) was, is, or becomes generally available to the public other than as a result of a breach of this Order; (ii) was or is developed independently of and without reference to any Confidential Information; or (iii) was available, or becomes available, on a non-confidential basis from a third party not bound by a confidentiality agreement or any legal, fiduciary or other obligation restricting disclosure.

Decision and Order In the Matter of China National Chemical Corporation, FTC Matter/File Number: 1610093, Docket Number: C-4610


Contract drafting

Meaning of "records"

(From Decision and Order In the Matter of China National Chemical Corporation, a corporation; ADAMA Agricultural Solutions Ltd., a corporation; and Makhteshim Agan of North America, Inc., doing business as ADAMA, a corporation, FTC Matter/File Number: 1610093, Docket Number: C-4610 (last updated April 4, 2017).

FF.

“Record(s)” means information, data, books, records, files, databases, printouts, and documents of any kind, whether stored or maintained in hard copy paper format, by means of electronic, optical, or magnetic media or devices, photographic or video images, or any other format or media, directly relating to the CP Products or the CP Business, including: customer files, customer lists, customer purchasing histories; correspondence; sales and purchase order information and records; referral sources; supplier, vendor, and procurement files and lists; specifications and information for all materials, ingredients, and components used in product formulation; process and production formulas, instructions, and guidelines, including Confidential Statements of Formulas; product data sheets and specifications; production reports; research and development data and information; quality control and quality assurance specifications, testing methods, and reports; labeling specifications; packaging specifications; Material Data Safety Sheets; advertising, marketing, display, and promotional materials; sales materials; marketing analyses and research data; educational and training materials; employee lists and contracts, salary and benefits information, and personnel files and records (to the extent permitted by law) for CP Employees; financial and accounting records and documents, financial statements; studies and reports; product registration data; registrations, licenses, and permits; regulatory compliance records and data; applications, filings, submissions, communications and correspondence with Government Agencies; operating guides, technical information, manuals, policies and procedures; service and warranty records, maintenance logs, equipment logs; and all other Records that are necessary for the Acquirer to operate the CP Business in a manner consistent with the purposes of this Order.

Monday, April 3, 2017

McLane Co. v. EEOC, Docket 15-1248


Subpoena: Fourth Amendment:


(…) We have described a subpoena as a “‘constructive search,” Oklahoma Press, 327 U. S., at 202, and implied that the Fourth Amendment is the source of the requirement that a subpoena not be “too indefinite,” Morton Salt, 338 U. S., at 652. But not every decision that touches on the Fourth Amendment is subject to searching review. Subpoenas in a wide variety of other contexts also implicate the privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, but courts routinely review the enforcement of such subpoenas for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 702 (1974) (pretrial subpoenas duces tecum); In re Grand Jury Sub­poena, 696 F. 3d 428, 432 (CA5 2012) (grand jury subpoe­nas); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F. 3d 1186, 1201 (CA10 2010) (same). And this Court has emphasized that courts should pay “great deference” to a magistrate judge’s determination of probable cause, Gates, 462 U. S., at 236—a decision more akin to a district court’s preenforcement review of a subpoena than the warrantless searches and seizures we considered in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690 (1996).

(…) A district court’s decision to enforce an EEOC subpoena should be reviewed for abuse of discre­tion, not de novo.

(…) As part of its analysis, the Court of Appeals may also consider, as and to the extent it deems appropriate, any arguments made by McLane regarding the burdens imposed by the subpoena.


(U.S.S.C., April 3, 2017, McLane Co. v. EEOC, Docket 15-1248, J. Sotomayor).


Subpoena, comprise comme une injonction, a été mise en parallèle avec la perquisition pénale. De la sorte, le Quatrième Amendement demande que cette injonction ne soit pas trop indéfinie. L'exécution de ces injonctions est revue judiciairement sous l'angle de l'abus de discrétion, et non de novo. En particulier, la Cour a insisté dans sa jurisprudence qu'une grande déférence soit accordée à la détermination du Juge administratif portant sur l'existence ou non d'une "probable cause".