U.S. Supreme Court, Kousisis v. United States, Docket No. 23-909

Fraud

 

Rescission of Contract

 

Common Law

 

 

 

When Congress uses a term with origins in the common law, we generally presume that the term “‘brings the old soil with it.’” Sekhar v. United States, 570 U. S. 729, 733 (2013). As petitioners note, we have long interpreted the statutory term “fraud” (and its variations) this way—that is, by reference to its common-law pedigree. See Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 21–22 (1999); Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U. S. 176, 187 (2016) (“The term ‘fraudulent’ is a paradigmatic example of a statutory term that incorporates the common-law meaning of fraud”).

 

This old-soil principle applies, however, only to the extent that a common-law term has “‘accumulated a settled meaning.’” Neder, 527 U. S., at 21; Kemp v. United States, 596 U. S. 528, 539 (2022). So to show that economic loss is necessary to securing a federal fraud conviction, Alpha and Kousisis must show that such loss was “widely accepted” as a component of common-law fraud. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952). They cannot.

 

At common law, “fraud” was a term with expansive reach. Rather than settle on a single form of liability, courts recognized at least three, and the particular elements and remedies turned on the nature of the plaintiff ’s alleged injury. To appreciate how the three forms differed, it may help to consider a variation of the facts here. Imagine that PennDOT discovered petitioners’ scheme soon after Alpha and Kousisis had begun work on the Girard Point and 30th Street projects. In such a circumstance, law and equity provided at least three avenues for relief: PennDOT could (1) seek to rescind the contracts; (2) refer the matter for indictment under the crime of false pretenses; or (3) bring a tort action against the fraudsters for the damages incurred. If PennDOT had wanted to rescind the fraud-infected contracts, most courts would historically have permitted it to do so even without a showing of economic loss. To obtain a rescission, PennDOT would have needed to establish only that it had “received property of a different character or condition than it was promised” (“although of equal value”) or, more relevant here, that the transaction had “proved to be less advantageous than as represented” (“although there was no actual loss”). W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §110, p. 766 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton). Put differently, many courts would have awarded the equitable remedy of rescission simply because Alpha and Kousisis had tricked PennDOT into a bargain materially different from the one they had promised. See Hirschman v. Healy, 162 Minn. 328, 331, 202 N. W. 734, 735 (1925) (“It is to be noted that it was not indispensable to prove damages in dollars and cents to have cancellation or rescission of the contract and note for misrepresentations”); Williams v. Kerr, 152 Pa. 560, 565, 25 A. 618, 619 (1893); Spreckels v. Gorrill, 152 Cal. 383, 391, 92 P. 1011, 1015 (1907). To borrow a summary from Black (of Black’s Law Dictionary fame) many “decisions repudiated altogether a rule requiring a showing of actual damage.” 1 H. Black, Rescission of Contracts and Cancellation of Written Instruments §112, p. 314 (1916).

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, May 22, 2025, Kousisis v. United States, Docket No. 23-909, J. Barrett)

 

Supreme Court of Texas, Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services of Nevada, Inc. v. Triex Texas Holdings, LLC, Docket No. 21-0913

Statute of Limitations

 

Accrual and Limitations

 

Tolling

 

Discovery Rule

 

Fraudulent Concealment Distinguished from the Discovery Rule

 

Fraud Distinguished from the Discovery Rule

 

Equitable Estoppel

 

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

 

Texas Law

 

 

 

 

A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty generally accrues, and limitations begins to run, when the claimant knows or should know of the wrongful injury. See Berry v. Berry, 646 S.W.3d 516, 525-26 (Tex. 2022). The court of appeals held that the discovery rule delays accrual and limitations until the claimant also knows of the wrongful acts and actors, without requiring the plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence. 2021 WL 4318406 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 23, 2021). Because that holding conflicts with the established rule, and because respondents’ actions for fraud and conspiracy are also barred by limitations, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s summary judgment for respondents.

 

 

Taylor’s and Dorris’s deposition testimony caused Triex to suspect that Marcus & Millichap misrepresented the sale to Triex by omitting key details about the nature of the lease and overvaluing the property in order to raise its commission. As a result, Triex added Marcus & Millichap to the lawsuit in March 2017—more than four years after Taylor Petroleum breached the lease and more than eight years after Marcus & Millichap brokered the sale. In its amended petition, Triex asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud by nondisclosure, and conspiracy.

 

 

Actions for breach of fiduciary duty are governed by a four-year statute of limitations.1 TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.004(a)(5). Generally, a claim accrues when the defendant’s wrongful conduct causes the claimant to suffer a legal injury. Am. Star Energy & Mins. Corp. v. Stowers, 457 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex. 2015). This is true “even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred.” S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996).

 

 

1 Triex’s claims for fraud and civil conspiracy also have a four-year limitations period. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.004(a)(4); see Agar Corp. v. Electro Cirs. Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. 2019) (holding that “civil conspiracy . . . shares a limitations period with that of its underlying tort”). “Generally, in a case of fraud the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the fraud is discovered or until it might have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Little v. Smith, 943 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1997). Like its breach of fiduciary duty claim, Triex based its fraud claim on allegations that Marcus & Millichap failed to disclose certain information despite its duty to do so. Accordingly, we apply the same analysis to all three claims.

 

 

The discovery rule is a “narrow exception” to the legal injury rule that “defers accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Tex. 1996)). It “applies when the injury is by its nature inherently undiscoverable.” Agar Corp., 580 S.W.3d at 139 (citing Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 36-37 (Tex. 1998)). “An injury is inherently undiscoverable if it is by nature unlikely to be discovered within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 25). “The determination of whether an injury is inherently undiscoverable is made on a categorical basis rather than on the facts of the individual case.” Archer v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d 281, 290 (Tex. 2018) (citing HECI Expl. Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998)). The question is whether the injury is “the type of injury that could be discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence.”BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Marshall, 342 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Tex. 2011) (citing Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734-35 (Tex. 2001)). We have held that “in the fiduciary context, . . . the nature of the injury is presumed to be inherently undiscoverable” because “fiduciaries are presumed to possess superior knowledge.” Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456. So “a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed may be unable to inquire into the fiduciary’s actions or may be unaware of the need to do so.” Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 231 (Tex. 2015). Accordingly, “even if inquiry is made, ‘facts which might ordinarily require investigation likely may not excite suspicion where a fiduciary relationship is involved.’” Id. (quoting Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988)). Here the discovery rule applies, but it does not save Triex’s claims. The rule applies because a fiduciary relationship existed, and before Taylor Petroleum’s breach, Triex was unaware of the need to inquire into its fiduciary’s actions. See S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 8 (explaining that the rationale for finding a fiduciary’s misconduct to be inherently undiscoverable is that “a person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed is either unable to inquire into the fiduciary’s actions or unaware of the need to do so”). When the discovery rule applies, the statute of limitations does not begin to run “until the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the wrongful act and resulting injury.” Id. at 4. We have stated this rule in slightly different ways. But last Term, we explained that this means the discovery rule defers accrual “until the claimant knew or should have known of facts that in the exercise of reasonable diligence would have led to the discovery of the wrongful act.” Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420). Or, in other words, accrual is deferred “until the plaintiff knew, or exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to the cause of action.” Id. (quoting Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 455). Consistent throughout our cases is the requirement of reasonable diligence. We have also explained that “the discovery rule does not linger until a claimant learns of actual causes and possible cures.” PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Hous. Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. 2004); see also KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. 1999). Nor does it defer accrual until the plaintiff knows “the specific nature of each wrongful act that may have caused the injury,”KPMG, 988 S.W.2d at 749, or “the exact identity of the wrongdoer.” Childs, 974 S.W.2d at 40; see also PPG Indus., 146 S.W.3d at 93.

 

 

In 2012, Triex had actual knowledge of its injuries and became aware of the need to inquire into Marcus & Millichap’s actions. The court of appeals concluded that “the evidence conclusively established that appellants were aware that they had sustained an injury by December 1, 2012,” the date Taylor Petroleum defaulted. 2021 WL 4318406, at *4. But it determined that a fact issue existed as to whether Triex “knew or should have known on December 1, 2012, that the injury was the result of wrongful acts committed by Marcus & Millichap.” Id. The court of appeals came to this conclusion by “relieving Triex of the responsibility of diligent inquiry” because of its fiduciary relationship with Marcus & Millichap. Id. at *3. But as we reiterated last Term, “those owed a fiduciary duty are not altogether absolved of the usual obligation to use reasonable diligence to discover an injury.”Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 526 (citing Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420); see also Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456. Recognizing that “the presence of a fiduciary relationship can affect application of the discovery rule,” we explained that “it remains the case that ‘a person owed a fiduciary duty has some responsibility to ascertain when an injury occurs.’ ‘When the fact of misconduct becomes apparent it can no longer be ignored, regardless of the nature of the relationship.’” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456, then quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 8). Had Triex exercised reasonable diligence, it would have discovered Marcus & Millichap’s allegedly wrongful acts. See Little, 943 S.W.2d at 420. Part of Triex’s claim against Marcus & Millichap is that it misrepresented that “this was a sure-fire and financially sound investment,” and that “rent would be coming in every month without any issues or risk.” When Taylor Petroleum defaulted on the lease, Triex “knew or should have known that something was amiss.” See Berry, 646 S.W.3d at 525. Indeed, Weiner’s affidavit in response to the summary judgment motion admitted that at the time of the breach, he knew Marcus & Millichap did a “poor job” of representing him. His awareness of his injury and of Marcus & Millichap’s poor representation “obligated him to make further inquiry on his own if he wanted to preserve a timely claim.” Id. Instead, Triex waited three years to sue the initial defendants, and an additional year to take depositions (…)

 

 

(…) (Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 455). But in that case, we explained that although fraudulent concealment is “similar in effect” to the discovery rule, it is a different doctrine that exists for different reasons: “Unlike the discovery rule exception, deferral in the context of fraud or concealment resembles equitable estoppel. ‘Fraudulent concealment estops the defendant from relying on the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to the plaintiff’s claim.’” Comput. Assocs., 918 S.W.2d at 456 (alterations in original) (quoting Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983)); see also Wagner & Brown, 58 S.W.3d at 736 (distinguishing fraudulent concealment from the discovery rule); Draughon, 631 S.W.3d at 93 (collecting cases).

 

 

 

(Supreme Court of Texas, Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services of Nevada, Inc. v. Triex Texas Holdings, LLC, Jan. 13, 2023, Docket No. 21-0913, Per Curiam)

In The Supreme Court of Iowa, Roy Karon and Peddler LLC, v. Elliott Aviation, Docket No. 18-1199

Contractual Forum-Selection Clause

What Must Be Shown to Avoid Its Effects?

Venue

Fraud

(“Severability and Waiver” Clause)

(Integration Clause)

(Choice-of-Law Clause)

Contract Drafting

Iowa Law

This case, involving an alleged scheme to inflate the purchase price of a general aviation jet aircraft, presents the question of what must be shown to avoid the effects of a contractual forum-selection clause. Is fraud in general enough, or does the fraud have to relate specifically to the clause? Joining the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the United States Supreme Court, and a number of our fellow state supreme courts, we conclude that the fraud must relate to the clause itself. This is a logical corollary to our prior holding that the fraud necessary to set aside an agreement to arbitrate must relate to the arbitration clause itself. See Dacres v. John Deere Ins., 548 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1996).

In the present case, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants cheated them, but they have not alleged fraud with respect to the forum- selection clause in the written contract. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing this action without prejudice and requiring any future action to be brought in Kansas.

Karon wanted Peddler to sell the Bravo and purchase a Citation X in a tax-free exchange pursuant to § 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2012).

If Peddler did not use a § 1031 exchange, it would presumably be liable for income tax on recaptured depreciation when it sold the Bravo.

The Purchase Agreement contained the following paragraph: CHOICE OF LAW AND JURISDICTION. [Elliott Aviation Aircraft Sales] and [Peddler] agree this Agreement will be deemed made and entered into and will be performed wholly within the State of Kansas, and any dispute arising under, out of, or related in any way to this Agreement, the legal relationship between [Elliott Aviation Aircraft Sales] and [Peddler], or the transaction that is the subject of this Agreement will be governed and construed under the laws of the State of Kansas, USA, exclusive of conflicts of laws. Any dispute arising under, out of, or related in any way to this Agreement, the legal relationship between [Elliott Aviation Aircraft Sales] and [Peddler] or the transaction that is the subject of this Agreement will be adjudicated solely and exclusively in the United States District Court for the State of Kansas, in Wichita, Kansas, or, if that court lacks jurisdiction, Kansas state courts of the 18th Judicial District. Each of the parties consents to the exclusive, personal jurisdiction of these courts and, by signing this Agreement, waives any objection to venue of the Kansas courts.

The Purchase Agreement also had a “severability and waiver” clause:

If any provision of this Agreement is or becomes null or unenforceable by operation of law, the other provisions will remain valid and enforceable. The waiver by either party of a breach of any provision of this Agreement will not constitute a waiver of any subsequent breach of the same or any other provision nor will it be considered a waiver of the provision itself.

Furthermore, the Purchase Agreement contained an integration clause: “This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to its subject matter and supersedes all prior written or oral agreements, representations, negotiations, proposals or discussions between the parties with respect to its subject matter.”

(…) On June 13, the district court issued an order dismissing the case without prejudice based on improper venue.

Importantly, though, Plaintiffs’ fraud claims are about the transaction as a whole, through which they were allegedly “defrauded out of $400,000.” Plaintiffs make no claim that Paragraph 9 was induced by fraud. Nor do Plaintiffs claim that Paragraph 9 itself is otherwise invalid.

Thus, the problem before the Court is similar to one that sometimes arises in the context of arbitration: If a contract contains an arbitration clause, and if the plaintiff claims that the entire contract was fraudulently induced, should the arbitration clause be enforced?

In Prima Paint, the United States Supreme Court held that if the plaintiff’s allegations of fraud are directed to the total transaction, and not to the arbitration clause itself, then the arbitration clause should be enforced. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). Arbitrators, not judges, should resolve allegations of fraud in the transaction “as a whole.” See Madol v. Dan Nelson Auto. Grp., 372 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying Prima Paint).
Iowa has adopted the Prima Paint rule. [The court went on to quote from Dacres, 548 N.W.2d at 578].

Of course, Paragraph 9 is not an arbitration clause. Instead, it contains venue and choice of law provisions. Courts have held, however, that the Prima Paint rule applies with equal force to venue and choice of law provisions. See, e.g., Stamm v. Barclays Bank of N.Y., 960 F. Supp. 724, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Prima Paint and other authorities for the proposition that a “claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract is insufficient to invalidate a forum selection or choice-of-law clause found in that contract”). As Magistrate Judge Walters correctly observed, venue and choice of law provisions “would be practically unenforceable if they could be avoided simply by an allegation of fraud in the inducement.” Morris v. McFarland Clinic P.C., No. CIV. 4:03- CV-30439, 2004 WL 306110, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004).

The Court concludes, therefore, that the Prima Paint rule should be used to determine whether Paragraph 9 is enforceable. See Dacres, 548 N.W.2d at 578. As already explained, Plaintiffs’ claims of fraud are about the transaction as a whole. Plaintiffs do not claim that Paragraph 9 itself was fraudulently induced. Therefore, under the Prima Paint rule, Paragraph 9 should be enforced.

Unlike in the arbitration context, where the FAA applies, there is no federal legislation that governs state court proceedings when a forum-selection clause is at issue. Cf. Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 28–29, 108 S. Ct. at 2243 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) governs the enforceability of a forum-selection clause in a diversity case in federal court). Accordingly, enforcement of a forum-selection clause in state court is a matter of state law. See Perkins v. CCH Computax, Inc., 415 S.E.2d 755, 757 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (declining to apply federal law), rev’d, 423 S.E.2d 780, 781 (N.C. 1992), superseded in part by statute, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 436.


(In The Supreme Court of Iowa, January 10, 2020, Roy Karon and Peddler LLC, v. Elliott Aviation, Docket No. 18-1199, all justices concur except Appel, J., who dissents)

Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, Docket 13-435

Securities: issuance: disclosure requirements: the Securities Act of 1933 requires that a company wishing to issue securities must first file a registration statement containing specified information about the issuing company and the securities offered. See 15 U. S. C. §§77g, 77aa. The registration statement may also in­clude other representations of fact or opinion. To protect investors and promote compliance with these disclosure requirements, §11 of the Act creates two ways to hold issuers liable for a registration statement’s contents: a purchaser of securities may sue an issuer if the registration statement either “contains an untrue statement of a material fact” or “omits to state a material fact . . . necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” §77k(a). In either case, the buyer need not prove that the issuer acted with any intent to deceive or defraud. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 381–382. Petitioner Omnicare, a pharmacy services company, filed a regis­tration statement in connection with a public offering of common stock. In addition to the required disclosures, the registration state­ment contained two statements expressing the company’s opinion that it was in compliance with federal and state laws. After the Fed­eral Government filed suit against Omnicare for allegedly receiving kickbacks from pharmaceutical manufacturers, respondents, pension funds that purchased Omnicare stock (hereinafter Funds), sued Om­nicare under §11. They claimed that Omnicare’s legal-compliance statements constituted “untrue statements of . . . material fact” and that Omnicare “omitted to state material facts necessary” to make those statements not misleading. The District Court granted Omnicare’s motion to dismiss. Because the Funds had not alleged that Omnicare’s officers knew they were violating the law, the court found that the Funds had failed to state a §11 claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Acknowledging that the statements at issue expressed opinions, the court held that no show­ing of subjective disbelief was required. In the court’s view, the Funds’ allegations that Omnicare’s legal-compliance opinions were objectively false sufficed to support their claim.

Held:

A statement of opinion does not constitute an “untrue statement of . . . fact” simply because the stated opinion ultimately proves incor­rect. The Sixth Circuit’s contrary holding wrongly conflates facts and opinions. A statement of fact expresses certainty about a thing, whereas a statement of opinion conveys only an uncertain view as to that thing. Section 11 incorporates that distinction in its first clause by exposing issuers to liability only for “untrue statements of . . . fact.” §77k(a). Because a statement of opinion ad­mits the possibility of error, such a statement remains true—and thus is not an “untrue statement of . . . fact”—even if the opinion turns out to have been wrong.

But opinion statements are not wholly immune from liability under §11’s first clause. Every such statement explicitly affirms one fact: that the speaker actually holds the stated belief. A statement of opinion thus qualifies as an “untrue statement of . . . fact” if that fact is untrue—i.e., if the opinion expressed was not sincerely held. In addition, opinion statements can give rise to false-statement liability under §11 if they contain embedded statements of untrue facts. Here, however, Omnicare’s sincerity is not contested and the state­ments at issue are pure opinion statements. The Funds thus cannot establish liability under §11’s first clause.

If a registration statement omits material facts about the issu­er’s inquiry into, or knowledge concerning, a statement of opinion, and if those facts conflict with what a reasonable investor, reading the statement fairly and in context, would take from the statement itself, then §11’s omissions clause creates liability.

For purposes of §11’s omissions clause, whether a statement is “misleading” is an objective inquiry that depends on a reasonable investor’s perspective. Cf. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438, 445. Omnicare goes too far by claiming that no reasonable person, in any context, can understand a statement of opinion to con­vey anything more than the speaker’s own mindset. A reasonable in­vestor may, depending on the circumstances, understand an opinion statement to convey facts about the speaker’s basis for holding that view. Specifically, an issuer’s statement of opinion may fairly imply facts about the inquiry the issuer conducted or the knowledge it had. And if the real facts are otherwise, but not provided, the opinion statement will mislead by omission.

An opinion statement, however, is not misleading simply because the issuer knows, but fails to disclose, some fact cutting the other way. A reasonable investor does not expect that every fact known to an issuer supports its opinion statement. Moreover, whether an omission makes an expression of opinion misleading always depends on context. Reasonable investors understand opinion statements in light of the surrounding text, and §11 creates liability only for the omission of material facts that cannot be squared with a fair reading of the registration statement as a whole. Omnicare’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.

These principles are not unique to §11: they inhere, too, in much common law respecting the tort of misrepresenta­tion. Section 11 is, of course, “not coextensive with common-law doctrines of fraud”; in particular, it establishes “a stringent standard of liability,” not dependent on proof of intent to defraud. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 381, 388–389 (1983). But we may still look to the common law for its insights into how a reasonable person understands statements of opinion. The Restatement of Torts, for example, recognizes that “a statement of opinion as to facts not disclosed and not otherwise known to the recipient may” in some cir­cumstances reasonably “be interpreted by him as an im­plied statement” that the speaker “knows facts sufficient to justify him in forming” the opinion, or that he at least knows no facts “incompatible with the opinion.” Re­statement (Second) of Torts §539, p. 85 (1976). The Restatement of Contracts, discussing misrepresentations that can void an agreement, says much the same: “The recipient of an assertion of a person’s opinion as to facts not disclosed” may sometimes “properly interpret it as an assertion (a) that the facts known to that person are not incompatible with his opinion, or (b) that he knows facts sufficient to justify him in forming it.” Restatement (Second) of Con­tracts §168, p. 455 (1979). When that is so, the Restatement explains, liability may result from omission of facts—for example, the fact that the speaker failed to conduct any investigation—that rebut the recipient’s predictable inference. Similarly, the leading trea­tise in the area explains that “it has been recognized very often that the expression of an opinion may carry with it an implied assertion, not only that the speaker knows no facts which would preclude such an opinion, but that he does know facts which justify it.” Prosser and Keeton §109, at 760. That is especially (and traditionally) the case, the treatise continues, where—as in a registration statement—a speaker “holds himself out or is understood as having special knowledge of the matter which is not available to the plaintiff.” Id., at 760–761; see Restatement (Second) of Torts §539, Comment b, at 86 (noting that omissions relating to an opinion’s basis are “particularly” likely to give rise to liability when the speaker has “special knowledge of facts unknown to the recipient”); Smith v. Land and House Property Corp.,[1884] 28 Ch. D. 7, 15 (App. Cas.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (opinion of Bowen, L. J.) (When “the facts are not equally known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by the one who knows the facts best . . . impliedly states that the speaker knows facts which justify his opinion”). And the purpose of §11 supports this understanding of how the omissions clause maps onto opinion statements. Congress adopted §11 to ensure that issuers “tell the whole truth” to investors. H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong.,1st Sess., 2 (1933) (quoting President Roosevelt’s message to Congress).

Because neither court below considered the Funds’ omissions theory under the right standard, this case is remanded for a determi­nation of whether the Funds have stated a viable omissions claim. On remand, the court must review the Funds’ complaint to determine whether it adequately alleges that Omnicare omitted from the regis­tration statement some specific fact that would have been material to a reasonable investor. If so, the court must decide whether the al­leged omission rendered Omnicare’s opinion statements misleading in context.

Books: Webster’s New International Dictionary 782 (1927); 7 Oxford English Dictionary 151 (1933); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §109, p. 755 (5th ed. 1984).

(U.S.S.Ct., Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, Docket 13-435, March 24, 2015, J. Kagan).

Emission de papiers-valeurs, obligations de divulgation à charge de l’émetteur : le Securities Act de 1933 exige d’une entreprise qui entend émettre des titres de déposer préalablement de manière formelle une déclaration contenant des informations portant sur l’entreprise émettrice et portant sur les papiers-valeurs à offrir sur le marché. La déclaration peut également contenir d’autres représentations de faits ou des opinions. Pour protéger les investisseurs et promouvoir le respect des obligations de divulgations, la Section 11 de la loi précitée de 1933 met en place deux voies permettant d’engager la responsabilité de l’émetteur s’agissant du contenu de la déclaration telle qu’enregistrée. Un acheteur de papiers-valeurs peut actionner un émetteur si la déclaration enregistrée soit contient une fausse déclaration portant sur un fait matériel, soit omet de déclarer un fait matériel, la description conforme à la vérité de ces faits matériels étant nécessaire pour éviter que la déclaration ne soit trompeuse. Dans les deux cas, l’acheteur n’a pas besoin de prouver que l’émetteur avait agi avec une intention de tromper ou de frauder. Dans la présente affaire, une compagnie de services pharmaceutiques, O., dépose une déclaration d’enregistrement en relation avec une offre publique de papiers-valeurs. En plus des déclarations exigées par la loi, la déclaration d’enregistrement contient deux avis exprimant l’opinion de l’entreprise selon laquelle ses activités seraient de manière générale en conformité avec le droit fédéral et avec le droit des états. Après que le Gouvernement fédéral ait déposé une action contre dite compagnie pour avoir prétendument reçu des pots-de-vin de fabricants de produits pharmaceutiques, des fonds de pension qui avaient acheté des papiers-valeurs de dite compagnie ont actionné cette dernière sous l’angle de la Section 11 de la loi. Les fonds de pension ont fait valoir que les déclarations de la compagnie portant sur son respect du droit fédéral et étatique constituaient des déclarations inexactes portant sur des faits matériels, et que la compagnie avait omis de déclarer des faits nécessaires à ce que l’ensemble de la déclaration enregistrée ne soit pas trompeuse. La cour de district fédérale accepta de ne pas entrer en matière et jugea ainsi en faveur de la compagnie O. Du fait que les fonds de pension n’avaient pas allégué que les responsables de la compagnie savaient qu’ils portaient atteinte à la loi, la cour constata que les exigences de recevabilité de l’action des fonds de pension n’étaient pas satisfaits sous l’angle de la Section 11. Le Sixième Circuit fédéral renversa cette décision. Reconnaissant que les déclarations litigieuses exprimaient des opinions, le Sixième Circuit jugea qu’aucune intention de tromper n’avait à être alléguée. Selon la cour, les allégations des fonds selon lesquelles les déclarations de la compagnie O. portant sur son respect du droit fédéral et étatique étaient objectivement fausses suffisaient à accorder la recevabilité de l’action des fonds de pension.

La Cour Suprême fédérale juge qu’une déclaration d’opinions ne constitue pas une déclaration inexacte portant sur un fait seulement parce que l’opinion émise se révèle ultimement incorrecte. L’opinion contraire du Sixième Circuit assimile à tort les faits et les opinions. Une déclaration de fait exprime une certitude au sujet d’une chose, tandis qu’une déclaration d’opinion n’exprime qu’une vue incertaine portant sur la chose. La Section 11 incorpore cette distinction dans sa première Clause en n’engageant la responsabilité de l’émetteur que pour de fausses déclarations portant sur des faits. Parce qu’une opinion implique la possibilité d’une erreur, une telle déclaration reste juridiquement vraie, et ne constitue ainsi pas une déclaration inexacte portant sur un fait, même si l’opinion se révèle finalement inexacte. Cependant une opinion n’est pas complètement immunisée de toute notion de responsabilité au sens de la première Clause de la Section 11. Toutes les opinions affirment explicitement un fait : le fait que l’auteur de l’opinion tient son opinion pour vraie. Une opinion sera ainsi qualifiée de déclaration de fait incorrecte si l’opinion n’a pas été sincèrement exprimée. Par ailleurs, une opinion peut donner lieu à responsabilité pour fausse déclaration d’un fait au sens de la Section 11 si dans l’opinion est incluse une déclaration de faits incorrects. En l’espèce, la sincérité des responsables de la compagnie émettrice n’est pas contestée et les déclarations litigieuses sont de pures opinions. Les fonds de pension échouent ainsi à établir une responsabilité sous l’angle de la première Clause de la section 11.

Si une déclaration d’enregistrement omet un fait matériel portant sur des investigations menées par l’émetteur concernant une déclaration d’opinion, ou si elle omet un fait matériel concernant la connaissance de l’émetteur d’une déclaration d’opinion, et si ces faits matériels se trouvent en conflit avec ce qu’un investisseur raisonnable, lisant la déclaration de bonne foi et dans son contexte, pourrait comprendre, alors la Clause d’omission de la Section 11 implique responsabilité.

Dans le cadre d’une analyse sous l’angle de la Clause d’omission de la Section 11, on applique un standard objectif qui dépend de la perspective d’un investisseur raisonnable pour déterminer si une déclaration est trompeuse. Un plaideur irait trop loin en soutenant qu’aucune personne raisonnable, quel que soit le contexte, ne peut comprendre une déclaration d’opinion comme contenant davantage que l’idée subjective du déclarant. Selon les circonstances, un investisseur raisonnable peut comprendre une déclaration d’opinion comme contenant des faits à la base de l’opinion du déclarant. Spécifiquement, une déclaration d’opinion d’un émetteur peut équitablement impliquer des faits concernant des investigations menées par dit émetteur, ou peut équitablement impliquer la connaissance que l’émetteur a de ces faits. Et si les faits réels sont autres, et qu’il ne sont pas divulgués, la déclaration d’opinion sera trompeuse par omission.

Cependant une déclaration d’opinion n’est pas trompeuse simplement parce que l’émetteur connaît, mais omet de divulguer, certains faits en porte-à-faux avec sa déclaration d’opinion. Un investisseur raisonnable ne s’attend pas à ce que chaque fait connu par un émetteur supporte sa déclaration d’intention. Par ailleurs, la question de savoir si une omission rend trompeuse l’expression d’une opinion dépend toujours du contexte. Un investisseur raisonnable comprend une déclaration d’opinion à la lumière du texte qui l’entoure, et la Section 11 ne crée une responsabilité que si l’omission porte sur un fait qui ne peut pas être compris par une lecture équitable de la déclaration d’enregistrement complète.

Ces principes ne sont pas applicables qu’à la Section 11. Ils apparaissent également dans le cadre de la Common law telle qu’elle s’applique à l’acte illicite de représentation erronée. La Section 11 n’est pourtant, et bien entendu, pas alignée exactement sur les doctrines de la Common law relatives au dol. En particulier, la Section 11 établit un strict standard de responsabilité qui ne dépend pas de la preuve de l’intention de tromper. Mais nous pouvons cependant nous référer à la Common law quand il s’agit de déterminer comment une personne raisonnable comprend une déclaration d’opinion. Par exemple, le Restatement of Torts reconnait qu’une déclaration d’opinion portant sur des faits non divulgués et par ailleurs non connus de celui qui écoute peut, dans certaines circonstances, raisonnablement être interprétée par l’auditeur comme une déclaration implicite du déclarant selon laquelle il connaît des faits qui suffisent à lui permettre son opinion, ou selon laquelle il ne connaît pas de faits incompatibles avec son opinion. Le Restatement of Contracts reconnaît les mêmes principes quand il décrit la représentation erronée qui peut rendre nul un accord : celui qui prend connaissance de l’expression de l’opinion d’une personne portant sur des faits non divulgués peut parfois adéquatement interpréter cette opinion comme constituant une assertion que les faits connus par le déclarant ne sont pas incompatibles avec son opinion, ou que le déclarant connaît des faits suffisants à justifier l’expression de l’opinion. Lorsqu’il en est ainsi, poursuit le Restatement, la responsabilité peut résulter de l’omission de la déclaration d’un fait, comme dans l’exemple où l’auteur de l’opinion n’a pas conduit d’investigation susceptible d’éviter que celui qui reçoit l’opinion n’en tire une inférence (fausse) qui était prévisible. Ces principes s’appliquent spécialement et traditionnellement lorsque l’auteur de l’opinion s’exprime dans le cadre d’une déclaration d’enregistrement ou dans un autre contexte où il est regardé comme une personne détenant une connaissance spéciale du domaine concerné, connaissance spéciale qui n’est pas à la disposition de celui qui s’estime lésé et qui agit en responsabilité. L’analyse téléologique de la Section 11 supporte les considérations qui précèdent : le Congrès a adopté la Section 11 pour s’assurer que les émetteurs « disent toute la vérité aux investisseurs » (selon le message délivré au Congrès par le Président Roosevelt).

La présente affaire est renvoyée à l’autorité inférieure du fait qu’aucune des deux instances précédentes n’a considéré la théorie de l’omission sous l’angle du standard correct. La cour inférieure devra déterminer si les fonds de pension ont adéquatement allégué que la compagnie émettrice avait omis, dans sa déclaration d’enregistrement, un ou plusieurs faits spécifiques susceptibles d’être qualifiés de matériels pour un investisseur raisonnable. Si tel est le cas, la cour doit décider si l’omission alléguée, dans son contexte, rend trompeuse la déclaration d’opinion de la compagnie émettrice.

Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A.

Bankruptcy: discharge from a debt: 11 U. S. C. §523(a)(4), which provides that an individual cannot obtain a bankruptcy discharge from a debt “for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embez­zlement, or larceny; the term “defalcation” in the Bankruptcy Code includes a culpa­ble state of mind requirement involving knowledge of, or gross reck­lessness in respect to, the improper nature of the fiduciary behavior; while “defalcation” has been an exception to discharge in a bankruptcy statute since 1867, legal authorities have long disagreed about its meaning. Broad definitions of the term in modern and older dictionaries are unhelpful, and courts of appeals have disagreed about what mental state must accompany defalcation’s definition; in Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S. 704, this Court interpreted the term “fraud” in the Bankruptcy Code’s exceptions to discharge to mean “positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or inten­tional wrong, as does embezzlement; and not implied fraud, or fraud in law, which may exist without the imputation of bad faith or immo­rality.” Id., at 709. The term “defalcation” should be treated similar­ly. Thus, where the conduct at issue does not involve bad faith, mor­al turpitude, or other immoral conduct, “defalcation” requires an intentional wrong. An intentional wrong includes not only conduct that the fiduciary knows is improper but also reckless conduct of the kind that the criminal law often treats as the equivalent. Where ac­tual knowledge of wrongdoing is lacking, conduct is considered as equivalent if, as set forth in the Model Penal Code, the fiduciary “con­sciously disregards,” or is willfully blind to, “a substantial and unjusti­fiable risk” that his conduct will violate a fiduciary duty; “embezzlement” requires conversion, “larceny” requires taking and carrying away another’s property, and “fraud” typically requires a false statement or omission; while “defalcation” can en­compass a breach of fiduciary obligation that involves neither conver­sion, nor taking and carrying away another’s property, nor falsity (U.S. S. Ct., 13.05.13, Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., J. Breyer, unanimous).

Faillite : décharge d'une dette : la loi fédérale sur la faillite prévoit qu'une personne ne peut obtenir d'être déchargée d'une dette dans la faillite si elle a commis une fraude ou une "défalcation" alors qu'elle agissait à titre fiduciaire, ou si elle a commis un "embezzlement" ou un "larceny". Le terme "défalcation" tel qu'utilisé dans la loi sur la faillite comporte un état d'esprit coupable impliquant la connaissance de la nature inappropriée du comportement en tant que fiduciaire, ou impliquant une absence de considération de ce comportement. Au plan subjectif, la "défalcation" implique donc l'intention (y compris "aurait dû savoir") ou à défaut une certaine mauvaise foi ou une certaine immoralité.

Nijhawan v. Holder

Immigration Law: an alien “convicted of an aggravated felony any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An “aggravated felony” includes “an offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the . . . victims exceeds $10,000.” §1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (U.S.S.Ct., 15.06.09, Nijhawan v. Holder, J. Breyer, unanimous).

Droit de l’immigration : cas dans lesquels un individu condamné pénalement peut être expulsé des Etats-Unis. Tel est notamment le cas si un étranger est condamné pour un crime aggravé. Est par exemple qualifié de crime aggravé une infraction qui implique une fraude ou une tromperie entraînant une perte de plus de 10'000 dollars pour la victime.