Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, Leaf Invenergy Company, v. Invenergy Renewables LLC, Docket No. 308, 2018

Series B Investment Round

Series B Notes

Agreement Governing the Series B Notes

Noteholders’ Right to Convert to Equity and Incorporated an LLC Agreement

Series B Noteholders Could Convert Their Series B Notes into Equity before the Conversion Deadline

To Facilitate a Conversion, the Series B Note Agreement Incorporated an LLC Agreement (“the Series B LLCA”) That Would Come into Effect upon Conversion

The Series B LLCA Also Included Reciprocal Call and Put Rights that Invenergy and the Converted Noteholders Could Exercise Between December 22, 2013 and December 22, 2014

Damages for Breach of Contract

Expectation Interest

Delaware Contract Law

Court Below—Court of Chancery § of the State of Delaware
C.A. No. 11830-VCL

In 2008, Invenergy Wind LLC (“Invenergy”), a wind energy developer, was raising money for a Series B investment round, and Leaf Clean Energy Company (“Leaf Parent”), an investment fund, expressed interest. After extensive negotiations, Leaf Parent invested $30 million in Invenergy Series B notes through a vehicle called Leaf Invenergy Company (“Leaf”). The agreement governing the Series B notes (“Series B Note Agreement”) gave noteholders such as Leaf the right to convert to equity and incorporated an LLC agreement (“Series B LLCA”) that the noteholders and Invenergy would execute upon conversion.

The Series B Note Agreement and the Series B LLCA also included provisions that prohibited Invenergy from conducting a “Material Partial Sale”—a defined term—without Leaf’s consent unless Invenergy paid Leaf a premium called a “Target Multiple”—another defined term. Although the parties renegotiated several aspects of their agreements with one another over the next few years, the consent provisions persisted in substantially similar form into the Third Amended and Restated LLC Agreement (the “LLC Agreement”), which is the operative agreement in this dispute. Those consent provisions form the crux of this litigation.

Leaf filed suit after Invenergy closed a $1.8 billion asset sale—a transaction that Invenergy concedes was a Material Partial Sale—without first obtaining Leaf’s consent or redeeming Leaf’s interest for the Target Multiple.

The consent provisions unambiguously require Invenergy to pay Leaf the Target Multiple if it conducts a Material Partial Sale without Leaf’s consent, and the concept of efficient breach does not permit Invenergy to circumvent that requirement. Because Invenergy conducted a Material Partial Sale without Leaf’s consent and without paying Leaf the Target Multiple, Leaf is entitled to the Target Multiple as contractual damages. We thus award Leaf the Target Multiple in damages on condition that it surrenders its membership interests in Invenergy.

(…) Essentially, Invenergy could conduct a large asset sale with or without the noteholders’ consent. But in exchange for the right to conduct a sale without the noteholders’ consent, the noteholders were afforded the ability to cash out with a handsome agreed-upon return on their investment upon Invenergy’s exercise of that right.

The Series B notes matured on December 22, 2014, but Series B noteholders could convert their Series B notes into equity before the conversion deadline, which was initially set for December 22, 2011. As a practical matter, if Invenergy did poorly, the Series B noteholders would stay in the notes and preserve their debt covenant rights. On the other hand, if Invenergy did well, the Series B noteholders would convert into equity and capture an upside on their investment.

To facilitate a conversion, the Series B Note Agreement incorporated an LLC agreement (“the Series B LLCA”) that would come into effect upon conversion. The Series B LLCA gave the converted noteholder-members many rights similar to what they had as Series B noteholders.

The Series B LLCA also included reciprocal call and put rights that Invenergy and the converted noteholders could exercise between December 22, 2013 and December 22, 2014. Under Section 11.09 of the Series B LLCA, converted noteholders could “require that [Invenergy] purchase all but not less than all” of its interest. The same section provided that Invenergy could “redeem all but not less than all” of the converted noteholders’ interests. These rights collectively ensured that the Series B investors would either exit or renegotiate their investment by December 22, 2014.

The Court of Chancery’s damages discussion recognized the well-settled rule that damages for breach of contract are based on the non-breaching party’s— here Leaf’s—expectation interest. As the Court of Chancery correctly noted, “expectation” is a term of art. When determining expectation damages, courts determine an amount that will give the injured party “the benefit of its bargain by putting that party in the position it would have been but for the breach.” The primary element of expectation damages is the “the value that the performance would have had to the injured party,” or the “loss in value” caused by the deficient performance compared to what had been expected. And on this point, the Court of Chancery laid out the extensive evidence showing beyond any shadow of a doubt that Leaf and Invenergy both harbored the belief—one that persisted until after the court entered its Liability Order—that Leaf was entitled to payment of the Target Multiple if Invenergy engaged in Material Partial Sale without Leaf’s consent, as it did here.

We review questions of contract interpretation and questions of law de novo.

Because the Court of Chancery’s award of only nominal damages instead of the Target Multiple hinged upon its interpretation of Section 8.04, our analysis starts there. When we interpret contracts, our task is to fulfill the “parties’ shared expectations at the time they contracted.” But because Delaware adheres to an objective theory of contracts, the contract’s construction should be that which would be understood by an objective, reasonable third party.

(…) Because it is only the combination of the TerraForm deal plus the failure to obtain consent plus the failure to pay the Target Multiple that constituted the breach, the Court of Chancery should have considered the combination of all of those things when assessing what injury Leaf suffered from Invenergy’s breach and thus what amount of damages will return Leaf to the position it would have been in had Invenergy not breached Section 8.04.

(Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, May 2, 2019, Leaf Invenergy Company, v. Invenergy Renewables LLC, Docket No. 308, 2018)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv

Procedure

Injunctive Relief

Permanent Injunction

Mootness

Damages

Polyvore’s website appears to no longer exist. (…) Even if that is the case, however, BWP’s core claims for damages are unaffected because, “unlike claims for injunctive relief challenging ongoing conduct, a claim for damages cannot evade review” since “it remains live until it is settled, judicially resolved, or barred by a statute of limitations.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 77 (2013). On the other hand, BWP’s request for a permanent injunction would now be moot because Polyvore’s defunct website no longer displays plaintiffs’ photos. See Bank of New York Co. v. Ne. Bancorp, Inc., 9 F.3d 1065, 1067 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that requests for injunctions are “mooted by the occurrence of the action sought to be enjoined”). (John M. Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in the result).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, April 17, 2019, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv, Per Curiam)

Flethez v. San Bernardino Co. Employees Retirement Assn., S226779

Interest (California law): Interest (administrative proceedings): Damages: Vested rights: Mandamus action:

The Civil Code defines “damages” as monetary compensation for one “who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another.”  (Civ. Code, § 3281.)  Under specified conditions, an award of damages may include an award of prejudgment interest pursuant to section 3287(a).

Section 3287(a) provides that “a person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt.  This section is applicable to recovery of damages and interest from any debtor, including the state or any county, city, city and county, municipal corporation, public district, public agency, or any political subdivision of the state.” 

(…) This is “an exception to the general rule that interest cannot be recovered against a state or municipality.”  (Sanders v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 3 Cal.3d 252, 262 (Sanders).)

We have recognized that an employee who brings a successful mandamus action to recover wrongfully withheld salary payments may satisfy the requirements of section 3287(a).  In Mass v. Bd. of Education (1964) 61 Cal.2d 612 (Mass), we concluded that a wrongfully suspended teacher was entitled to prejudgment interest as an element of his damages when the local board of education was ordered to reinstate him with full back pay.  We stated that section 3287(a) “authorizes prejudgment interest on salary payments from the date of accrual to the entry of judgment.”  (Mass, supra, at p. 624.)  We rejected the argument of the board that interest accrued only “from the date when the board bore the legal duty to reinstate plaintiff because until that time the ‘right to recover’ did not ‘vest’ in him” as required by section 3287(a).  (Mass, supra, at p. 625.)  We explained as follows: “The Civil Code requires vesting . . . only in order to fix with sufficient certainty the time when the obligation accrues so that interest should not be awarded on an amount before it is due.  Each salary payment in the instant case accrued on a date certain.  Unless the suspension itself can be sustained and the board thus relieved of any obligation whatsoever, the salary payments became vested as of the dates they accrued.  If plaintiff had not been wrongfully suspended, he would have obtained the benefit of the moneys paid as of those dates; he has thus lost the natural growth and productivity of the withheld salary in the form of interest.”  (Ibid.) 

(…) Vesting in the context of section 3287(a) must be understood in the framework of allowing prejudgment interest as a component of damages.  (§ 3287(a) [“A person who is entitled to recover damages . . . , is entitled also to recover interest thereon”].)  As such, it has long been settled that the primary purpose of section 3287(a) “is to provide just compensation to the injured party for loss of use of the [underlying] award during the prejudgment period — in other words, to make the plaintiff whole as of the date of the injury.”  (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 663; Uzyel v. Kadisha (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 866, 919.) 

(…) Unemployment insurance administrative process this court discussed in American Federation of Labor, 13 Cal.4th 1017.  In American Federation of Labor, we considered the “narrow question” of “whether an administrative law judge may award interest on a payment of retroactive unemployment insurance benefits.”  (Id., at p. 1021.)  We answered that question in the negative, finding no express or implied authority for such an award.  (Id., at pp. 1022-1023, 1042-1043.)  Of assistance here is our explanation that “under the administrative scheme of the Unemployment Insurance Code, the EDD has no underlying monetary obligation to the claimant until it determines the claimant is eligible for the benefits.”  (Id., at p. 1023.)  “The Unemployment Insurance Code allows the EDD, and unemployment insurance claimants, a reasonable time to process each legitimate claim.  Benefits are not due immediately after a claim is filed following employment termination.  Rather, they are due promptly only after a claimant has established benefit eligibility. The statutory scheme thus accounts for the fact that delays are inherent in the entitlement claim review process and are necessary to ensure that only those claimants who have established eligibility will receive benefits. . . .  The delays inherent in this system are not, however, tantamount to a ‘wrongful withholding’ of benefits giving rise to a right to section 3287(a) prejudgment interest once the Board rules in favor of the claimant.”  (Id., at p. 1026, italics added.)  Only if the Board wrongfully denies benefits, we explained, would the claimant be entitled to section 3287(a) interest as part of a court award of “compensation for the egregious delay in receiving benefits caused by the necessity of filing a mandamus action challenging the Board’s denial.”  (American Federation of Labor, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1022.)  “Claimants may not argue that their benefits have been wrongfully withheld until the Board erroneously determines they are ineligible . . . .”  (Id., at p. 1037.)  “Thus, ‘the central theme of [American Federation of Labor] … is that interest is not available absent an agency decision or action which has resulted in wrongful withholding of, and corresponding delay in receiving, benefits to which the claimant is entitled.’ ”  (Currie, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1118.) 

(Cal. S. C., March 2, 2017, Flethez v. San Bernardino Co. Employees Retirement Assn., S226779).

Les intérêts moratoires en droit privé et administratif : le Code civil de Californie définit la notion de dommages-intérêts comme une compensation monétaire au profit de celui qui subit un préjudice du fait de l'acte illicite ou de l'omission d'un tiers (cf. § 3281 du Code civil). Dans certaines circonstances, les dommages-intérêts comprendront l'allocation d'intérêts (cf. § 3287(a) du Code civil).

Dite Section 3287(a) stipule que celui qui peut prétendre à des dommages-intérêts certains, ou qui peuvent être déterminés par calcul, a droit à des intérêts à compter du premier jour à indemniser. C'est ce jour que naît le droit acquis ("vested right") aux dommages-intérêts. Le jour à partir duquel des intérêts sont dus sera différent si la loi ou les actes du créancier empêche le débiteur de régler sa dette. Cette Section s'applique au recouvrement des dommages-intérêts dus par n'importe quel débiteur, y compris l'état, un comté, une municipalité, un district public, une administration, ou une subdivision politique de l'état. Il s'agit d'une exception à la règle générale selon laquelle des intérêts ne peuvent être perçus d'un état ou d'une municipalité.

La Cour a jugé précédemment que satisfait aux conditions de la Section 3287(a) l'employé partie gagnante dans la procédure en mandamus par lui déposée aux fins de récupérer des salaires retenus à tort par son employeur. Par exemple, un enseignant suspendu à tort s'est vu allouer des intérêts portant sur une période précédant le Jugement, comme un élément de son dommage, le "board of education" local étant condamné au fond à le réintégrer et à lui verser l'ensemble de ses rémunérations échues. La Cour a rejeté l'argument du "board" : celui-ci soutenait que les intérêts n'étaient dus que du jour où le "board" était tenu de réintégrer l'employé parce que jusque-là le droit au salaire passé n'était pas un droit acquis ("vested right"). La Cour a exposé à cet égard que le Code civil prévoit la condition du droit acquis pour déterminer avec suffisamment de précision le jour auquel l'obligation de base est échue, de sorte que l'intérêt ne soit pas fixé pour une date antérieure. En l'espèce, chaque salaire était exigible à une date certaine. A moins que la suspension de fonction elle-même ne fut confirmée et que le "board" ne fut relevé de ses obligations envers l'employé, les salaires étaient dus à leurs échéances respectives. Chaque salaire est "vested" à son échéance. Si le demandeur n'avait pas été suspendu à tort, il aurait obtenu le bénéfice de ses rémunérations dès celles-ci dues et payées. Du fait de la rétention de ses rémunérations, il a perdu la productivité naturelle des salaires retenus, qui doit lui être restituée sous forme d'intérêts.

La règle générale est ensuite rappelée : la notion de "vesting" dans le contexte de la Section 3287(a) doit être comprise dans le cadre du droit à des intérêts antérieurs au Jugement comme partie du préjudice. Le but est d'indemniser le demandeur de manière complète, dès la date du dommage.

En assurance-chômage, la Cour s'est demandé si le Juge administratif peut allouer des intérêts en condamnant au versement d'indemnités de chômage rétroactives. La réponse fut négative, en l'absence d'autorité expresse ou tacite permettant une telle allocation. En effet, selon le schéma du Code de l'assurance-chômage, l'Employment Development Department (EDD) n'a pas d'obligation financière envers le requérant jusqu'au jour où il détermine que celui-ci a droit à une prestation. Le Code de l'assurance-chômage accorde à l'EDD et au requérant un délai raisonnable pour déposer une requête en prestations et pour la traiter. Les prestations de chômage ne sont pas dues immédiatement après le dépôt d'une requête suite à une résiliation des relations de travail. Bien plutôt, elles sont dues dès que le requérant établit qu'il remplit les conditions pour les percevoir.

La systématique de la loi tient compte du fait que des délais sont inhérents à la procédure administrative et sont nécessaires pour s'assurer que les prestations ne sont servies qu'à ceux qui remplissent les conditions. Les délais inhérents à ce système ne sont cependant pas équivalents à une rétention illicite de prestations donnant droit à des intérêts avant Jugement au sens de la Section 3287(a), une fois que le "board" a décidé en faveur du requérant. Ce n'est que si le "board" refuse les prestations à tort que le requérant peut percevoir des intérêts au sens de la Section 3287(a) comme partie d'une indemnisation judiciaire en raison d'un délai inadmissible causé par la nécessité de déposer une procédure en mandamus contre le refus du "board". Un requérant ne peut pas soutenir que des prestations ont été retenues à tort tant que le "board" n'a pas décidé à tort de refuser de les servir.

Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., Docket 15-777

Design: Patent infringement: Damages: Smartphone: Unanimous:

Section 289 of the Patent Act provides a damages remedy specific to design patent infringement. A person who manufactures or sells “any article of manufacture to which a patented design or colorable imitation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit.” 35 U. S. C. §289. In the case of a design for a single-component product, such as a dinner plate, the product is the “article of manufacture” to which the design has been applied. In the case of a design for a multicomponent product, such as a kitchen oven, identifying the “article of manufacture” to which the design has been applied is a more difficult task.

This case involves the infringement of designs for smartphones. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit identified the entire smartphone as the only permissible “article of manufacture” for the purpose of calculating §289 damages because consumers could not separately purchase components of the smartphones. The question before us is whether that reading is consistent with §289. We hold that it is not.

The federal patent laws have long permitted those who invent designs for manufactured articles to patent their designs. See Patent Act of 1842, §3, 5 Stat. 543–544. Patent protection is available for a “new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.” 35 U. S. C. §171(a). A patentable design “gives a peculiar or distinctive appearance to the manufacture, or article to which it may be applied, or to which it gives form.” Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511, 525 (1872). This Court has explained that a design patent is infringed “if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same.” Id., at 528.

Apple Inc. released its first-generation iPhone in 2007. The iPhone is a smartphone, a “cell phone with a broad range of other functions based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.” Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 2). Apple secured many design patents in connection with the release. Among those patents were the D618,677 patent, covering a black rectangular front face with rounded corners, the D593,087 patent, covering a rectan­gular front face with rounded corners and a raised rim, and the D604,305 patent, covering a grid of 16 colorful icons on a black screen. App. 530–578.

Section 289 allows a patent holder to recover the total profit an infringer makes from the infringement. It does so by first prohibiting the unlicensed “application” of a “patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale” or the unli­censed sale or exposure to sale of “any article of manufac­ture to which a patented design or colorable imitation has been applied.” 35 U. S. C. §289. It then makes a person who violates that prohibition “liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250.” Ibid. “Total,” of course, means all. See American Heritage Dictionary 1836 (5th ed. 2011) (“the whole amount of something; the entirety”). The “total profit” for which §289 makes an infringer liable is thus all of the profit made from the prohibited conduct, that is, from the manu­facture or sale of the “article of manufacture to which the patented design or colorable imitation has been applied.”

Arriving at a damages award under §289 thus involves two steps. First, identify the “article of manufacture” to which the infringed design has been applied. Second, calculate the infringer’s total profit made on that article of manufacture.

This case requires us to address a threshold matter: the scope of the term “article of manufacture.” The only ques­tion we resolve today is whether, in the case of a multi­component product, the relevant “article of manufacture” must always be the end product sold to the consumer or whether it can also be a component of that product. Under the former interpretation, a patent holder will always be entitled to the infringer’s total profit from the end product. Under the latter interpretation, a patent holder will some­times be entitled to the infringer’s total profit from a component of the end product.

The text resolves this case. The term “article of manu­facture,” as used in §289, encompasses both a product sold to a consumer and a component of that product.

This reading of article of manufacture in §289 is con­sistent with 35 U. S. C. §171(a), which makes “new, origi­nal and ornamental designs for an article of manufac­ture” eligible for design patent protection.

The Patent Office and the courts have understood §171 to permit a design patent for a design extending to only a component of a multicomponent product. See, e.g., Ex parte Adams, 84 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 311 (1898) (“The several articles of manufacture of peculiar shape which when combined produce a machine or structure having movable parts may each separately be patented as a design . . . ”)

This reading is also consistent with 35 U. S. C. §101, which makes “any new and useful . . . manufacture . . . or any new and useful improvement thereof ” eligible for utility patent protection. Cf. D. Chisum, Patents §23.03[2], pp. 23–12 to 23–13 (2014) (noting that “article of manufacture” in §171 includes “what would be considered a ‘manufacture’ within the meaning of Section 101”). “This Court has read the term ‘manufacture’ in §101 . . . to mean ‘the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.’” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting American Fruit Grow­ers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U. S. 1, 11 (1931)). The broad term includes “the parts of a machine considered sepa­rately from the machine itself.” (W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions §183, p. 270 (1890)).

The parties ask us to go further and resolve whether, for each of the design patents at issue here, the relevant article of manufacture is the smartphone, or a particular smartphone component. Doing so would require us to set out a test for identifying the relevant article of manufac­ture at the first step of the §289 damages inquiry and to parse the record to apply that test in this case. The United States as amicus curiae suggested a test, see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27–29, but Samsung and Apple did not brief the issue. We decline to lay out a test for the first step of the §289 damages inquiry in the ab­sence of adequate briefing by the parties. Doing so is not necessary to resolve the question presented in this case, and the Federal Circuit may address any remaining issues on remand.

Secondary sources: American Heritage Dictionary 1836 (5th ed. 2011); J. Stormonth, A Dictionary of the English Language 53 (1885); D. Chisum, Patents §23.03[2], pp. 23–12 to 23–13 (2014); W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions §183, p. 270 (1890).

(U.S.S.C., December 6, 2016, Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., Docket 15-777, J. Sotomayor, unanimous).

Violation d'un design protégé par un brevet : celui qui fabrique ou vend un produit (fabriqué) qui intègre un design protégé par un brevet pourra être actionné par le titulaire du brevet, lequel pourra conclure à la restitution de l'entier du profit illicitement accumulé (cf. 35 U. S. C. §289). Dans le cas d'un design portant sur un produit en un seul tenant, comme une assiette, il est aisé de lier le design au produit. Dans le cas d'un design portant sur un produit comportant plusieurs parties, comme un four de cuisine, il est plus délicat de déterminer le "produit" sur lequel est appliqué le design protégé (le produit est-il une des parties intégrantes ou l'ensemble des parties intégrantes (p.ex. le four lui-même ou l'une de ses parties ?)).

La présente espèce traite de la violation de designs pour smartphones. La Cour d'appel pour le Circuit fédéral a retenu que le smartphone dans son entier doit être compris comme le "produit" dont le droit au design est violé, cela même si la protection ne porte que sur le design de l'une des parties intégrantes. De la sorte, le calcul du dommage au sens de la Section 289 revient à additionner les ventes des smartphones, sans procéder à une déduction qui pourrait être justifiée par une protection que partielle du droit au design. Cela au motif que les consommateurs ne peuvent pas acheter les composants d'un smartphone de manière séparée. La Cour Suprême juge ici que cette analyse juridique est erronée.

Le droit fédéral des brevets d'invention permet de longue date d'enregistrer un design, lui conférant la protection prévue par ce droit. Dite protection peut être donnée pour un design nouveau, original et ornemental, appliqué à un produit fabriqué par l'homme (cf. 35 U. S. C. §171(a)). La Cour Suprême fédérale a jugé depuis longtemps qu'un design breveté est violé si aux yeux d'un observateur ordinaire, prêtant une attention telle celle ordinairement d'un acheteur, deux designs sont substantiellement identiques.

La Section 289 permet au titulaire du brevet d'obtenir de l'auteur de la violation la totalité du profit dérivant de dite violation (cf. 35 U. S. C. §289). Le profit total est ainsi l'entier du profit résultant de la conduite illicite, soit résultant de la fabrication ou de la vente d'un produit auquel le design a été appliqué.

Pour déterminer le montant d'un dommage auquel le défendeur doit être condamné, un raisonnement en deux étapes est à suivre : tout d'abord s'agit-il d'identifier le "produit" auquel le design a été appliqué. En second lieu convient-il de calculer le profit déduit du produit tel que délimité à l'étape précédente.

La présente espèce n'implique que de répondre à la question préalable de l'étendue de la notion de "article of manufacture", soit de produit fabriqué. La seule question à laquelle répond la Cour est de savoir si, dans le cas d'un produit à multiple composants, l'"article of manufacture" doit toujours être le produit fini vendu au consommateur, ou s'il peut être l'un des composants du produit fini. Selon la première de ces deux théories, le titulaire du brevet pourra toujours obtenir la totalité du profit dérivé de la vente du produit fini. Selon la seconde théorie, le titulaire du brevet sera parfois bien-fondé à réclamer le profit découlant de la partie intégrante du produit fini.

Le texte même de la Section 289 est dispositif. La notion d'"article of manufacture" inclut aussi bien le produit fini vendu au consommateur que cas échéant un composant de ce produit fini. Cette conception est conforme à 35 U.S.C. §171(a), disposition selon laquelle les designs nouveaux, originaux, et à caractère ornemental, intégrés à un produit fabriqué, sont susceptibles de protection par le droit des brevets. Et aussi bien l'Office des brevets que les Tribunaux ont compris la Section 171 comme permettant l'octroi d'un brevet en faveur d'un design qui ne s'étend qu'à une partie d'un produit qui en contient plusieurs.

Les conceptions qui précèdent sont par ailleurs conformes à 35 U.S.C. §101, disposant que toute fabrication utile et nouvelle, ou toute amélioration nouvelle et utile d'un produit déjà fabriqué peut revendiquer la protection du droit des brevets ("utility patent protection"). Il est observé qu'un article fabriqué au sens de la Section 171 inclut ce qui est considéré comme produit fabriqué au sens de la Section 101. Et la présente Cour a lu les termes "produits fabriqués" au sens de la Section 101 comme signifiants la production d'articles pour un usage, à partir de matières "premières", ou à partir d'autres articles, dans ce cas en donnant à ces articles de nouvelles formes, qualités, propriétés ou combinaisons, que ce soit par un travail manuel ou par le travail d'une machine. Cette large terminologie inclut les parties d'une machine considérées séparément de la machine elle-même.

Dans cette affaire, les plaideurs ont en outre demandé à la Cour de juger, pour chacun des brevets en cause, si le produit fabriqué relevant était le smartphone lui-même, ou une partie intégrante de ce smartphone. La Cour observe que juger ainsi impliquerait préalablement de déterminer un test permettant d'identifier le produit fabriqué relevant à la première étape de l'examen de la question du dommage au sens de la Section 289. Le Gouvernement, en tant qu'amicus curiae, a suggéré un test, mais ni Samsung ni Apple ne se sont prononcés, de sorte que la Cour estime prématuré de juger à ce niveau. La cause est dès lors renvoyée à l'autorité précédente, le Circuit fédéral, pour juger les questions encore en suspens.

Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds

Securities: damages in a private securities-fraud action under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b–5: to recover damages in a private securities-fraud action under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, reliance on a material misrepresentation or omission made by the de­fendant. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U. S. ___, ___. Requiring proof of direct reliance “would place an unnecessarily un­realistic evidentiary burden on a plaintiff who has traded on an im­personal market.” Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 245. Thus, this Court has endorsed a “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which per­mits securities-fraud plaintiffs to invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance on public, material misrepresentations regarding securities traded in an efficient market. Id., at 241–249. The fraud-on-the­ market theory facilitates the certification of securities-fraud class ac­tions by permitting reliance to be proved on a classwide basis. Invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory, respondent Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds (Connecticut Retirement) sought certification of a securities-fraud class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) against biotechnology company Amgen Inc. and several of its officers (collectively, Amgen). The District Court certified the class, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit rejected Amgen’s argument that Connecticut Retirement was re­quired to prove the materiality of Amgen’s alleged misrepresenta­tions and omissions before class certification in order to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The Ninth Circuit also held that the District Court did not err in refusing to consider rebuttal evidence that Amgen had presented on the issue of materiality at the class-certification stage. Held: proof of materiality is not a prerequisite to certification of a secu­rities-fraud class action seeking money damages for alleged violations of §10(b) and Rule 10b–5 (U.S.S.Ct., 27.02.13, Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, J. Ginsburg).

Papiers- valeurs (securities) : action en dommages-intérêts basée sur une fraude en matière de transactions portant sur des papiers-valeurs. Pour se faire adjuger ses conclusions en dommages-intérêts, le demandeur doit notamment prouver s'être fié à une fausse représentation ou à une fausse omission de nature matérielle faite par le défendeur. N'est pas requise la preuve d'un lien de causalité direct entre la tromperie et l'acte ou l'omission du demandeur sur le marché. Ainsi, la Cour retient la théorie de la "fraude sur le marché", selon laquelle le demandeur peut invoquer la présomption réfragable qu'il s'est fié à de fausses déclarations matérielles et publiques relatives à des papiers-valeurs échangés sur un marché effectif. Cette théorie facilite la certification d'actions de classe en matière de papiers-valeurs, en permettant d'apporter la preuve de "s'être fié à" au niveau de la classe elle-même et non au niveau d'un demandeur individuel. Est rejeté l'argument consistant à soutenir que les demandeurs sont tenus de prouver la matérialité de la représentation frauduleuse pour obtenir la certification de la classe.