U.S. Supreme Court, Amina Bouarfa v. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, Docket No. 23-583

Judicial Review

 

Discretionary Agency Decisions

 

After Chevron Deference

 

Circuit Split

 

 

 

 

 

8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of decisions “made discretionary by legislation.” Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 246–247.

 

 

 

(…) Nor is it unreasonable to suggest that Congress created a system in which a sham-marriage determination is subject to judicial review when an agency denies a visa petition but not when the agency revokes a prior approval. That distinction “reflects Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 345.

 

 

(…) Because the presumption that administrative action is subject to judicial review may be overcome by “‘clear and convincing evidence’ of congressional intent to preclude judicial review,” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 229, there is no need to resort to the presumption of reviewability where, as here, “the statute is clear,” Patel, 596 U. S., at 347.

 

 

The Secretary points to 8 U. S. C. §1155 as the source of the agency’s revocation authority; that provision states that the Secretary “may, at any time,” revoke approval of a visa petition “for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” The issue we address today is whether revocation under §1155 qualifies as a decision “in the discretion of” the Secretary such that it falls within the purview of a separate statute §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—that strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain discretionary actions. We hold that it does.

 

 

Through §1252(a)(2)(B), Congress stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review two categories of discretionary agency decisions. First, Congress precluded review of “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” five listed statutory provisions that empower the Attorney General to grant certain relief to noncitizens. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Second, in the provision at issue here, Congress barred review of “any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary.” §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).

 

 

We granted certiorari to resolve a question that has split the courts of appeals: Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s revocation of the agency’s prior approval of a visa petition.

 

 

It is clear on the face of §1155 that the revocation provision is a quintessential grant of discretion to the Secretary. Once again, that provision provides that the Secretary “may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any visa petition.” §1155. As “this Court has ‘repeatedly observed,’” “‘the word “may” clearly connotes discretion.’” Biden v. Texas, 597 U. S. 785, 802 (2022) (quoting Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U. S. 418, 428 (2020)). Moreover, here, Congress has in no way prescribed how that discretion must be exercised. There are no conditions that the Secretary must satisfy before he can revoke the agency’s approval; he may do so “at any time,” for whatever reason “he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” That broad grant of authority “fairly exudes deference” to the Secretary and is similar to other statutes that we have held “‘commit’” a decision “‘to agency discretion.’” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600 (1988) (holding that a statute permitting the agency to terminate an employee whenever it “‘deems such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States’” was discretionary).

 

 

That discretion is a two-way street. By granting the Secretary discretion to revoke the agency’s approval of visa petitions, Congress has also vested the Secretary with discretion to decline to revoke an approval the agency previously gave. So, if the Secretary determines that the agency’s approval of a visa petition was erroneous, he can revoke that approval—or he can let the error stand. As a general matter, then, this discretion may work to the benefit of visa-petition beneficiaries, since rather than tying the agency’s hands by forcing revocation, Congress created “room for mercy.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 331 (2022).

 

 

Nor is it unreasonable, as Bouarfa protests, to suppose that Congress created a system in which a sham-marriage determination is reviewable if it is the reason for the agency’s denial of a petition, but not if it is the reason for the agency’s revocation. That distinction “reflects Congress’ choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief.” Patel, 596 U. S., at 345. In the interest of finality, Congress vested the Secretary with the discretion to allow the agency’s mistakes to inure to the benefit of the noncitizen. At the same time, Congress did not want this discretion to open up a new source of litigation. Cf. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 230 (2020) (observing Congress’s goal of “‘consolidating judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action’” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313 (2001)). “The context in which” the agency makes the sham-marriage determination thus “explains the difference in protection afforded.” Patel, 596 U. S., at 345.

 

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, Dec. 10, 2024, Amina Bouarfa v. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, Docket No. 23-583, J. Jackson, Unanimous)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Milos Product Tanker Corp. v. Valero, Docket No. 23-55655

Incoterms

 

CFR

 

 

 

(…) On July 14, Valero agreed to purchase the jet fuel from Koch on “cost and freight” (“CFR”) terms. Under CFR terms, the seller arranges and pays for transportation to the port of delivery, while the buyer assumes title and risk of loss as soon as the cargo is loaded onto the carrier at the port of origin. See, e.g., BP Oil Int'l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2003).

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Sept. 18, 2024, Milos Product Tanker Corp. v. Valero, Docket No. 23-55655, for Publication)

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Milos Product Tanker Corp. v. Valero, Docket No. 23-55655

Transportation by Sea

 

Maritime Transportation Contract (or Charter Party)

 

Common Carrier v. Private-Carriage Case

 

Bill of Lading

 

Letter of Indemnity

 

Freight Costs

 

 

-       If a contract allocates freight liability to a nonparty

 

-       For common carriage contracts, the published rate forms an “offer,” which is “accepted” by receipt of the goods under a bill of lading, charter party, or default rules obligating a consignee (about default rules, see Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”), 49 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.; see also 49 C.F.R. §1035.1)

 

 

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

 

 

Defendant–Appellant Valero Marketing and Supply company (“Valero”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Plaintiff–Appellee Milos Product Tanker Corporation (“Milos”). In 2020, Milos transported by sea roughly 40,000 tons of jet fuel belonging to Valero. This transport cost a little over $1,000,000. But after Milos delivered, Valero refused to pay. Valero had already paid freight costs when it bought the fuel from a third company, Koch Refining International PTE Ltd., Co. (“Koch”), and had no intention of paying twice. Koch was also unwilling to pay Milos. Milos’s contract was with a fourth company, GP Global PTE Ltd. on behalf of Gulf Petrochem FCZ (“GP Global”), which arranged the voyage. But GP Global had “experienced financial difficulties” and could not pay. So Milos sued Valero for, relevant here, breach of contract.

 

 

Reviewing de novo, we agree with Valero. Valero was not party to the contract between Milos and GP Global. That contract specifically stated that GP Global would pay freight. Why Valero’s payment for freight to Koch never made it to Milos through GP Global is beyond the scope of this case. And States Marine (States Marine International, Inc. v. Seattle-First National Bank, 524 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1975)) does not support an implied obligation for Valero to pay. States Marine modestly extended freight rules established in railroad cases to ocean carriers “operating under tariffs”—that is, from railroad common carriers to ocean common carriers. In both railroad and ocean contexts, common carriers must publish their rates and are subject to default terms of a universal bill of lading. These distinctions permit a presumption that whoever accepts delivery of a shipment from a common carrier understands what they are liable to pay. But in a private-carriage case like this one, notice of shipping costs and default terms cannot be presumed. It was therefore error to find that Valero had an implied obligation to pay under States Marine, and we must reverse.

 

 

(…) The Charter Party authorized the ship captain to sign bills of lading for the cargo. A bill of lading is a document “issued by the shipowner when goods are loaded on its ship, and may, depending on the circumstances, serve as a receipt, a document of title, a contract for the carriage of goods, or all of the above.” Asoma Corp. v. SK Shipping Co., 467 F.3d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 2006). Ordinarily, a carrier like Milos is responsible for releasing cargo only to the party who presents an original bill of lading. See C-ART, Ltd. v. Hong Kong Islands Line Am., S.A., 940 F.2d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

 

(…) On July 14, Valero agreed to purchase the jet fuel from Koch on “cost and freight” (“CFR”) terms. Under CFR terms, the seller arranges and pays for transportation to the port of delivery, while the buyer assumes title and risk of loss as soon as the cargo is loaded onto the carrier at the port of origin. See, e.g., BP Oil Int'l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2003).

 

 

(…) We begin with the law governing maritime freight liability. It is “well settled” that the party who sends the goods—the “shipper” or “consignor”—is “primarily liable to the carrier for freight charges.” States Marine, 524 F.2d at 247 (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Cent. Iron & Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 67 (1924)). That is true even when a bill of lading purports to impose liability on the receiver of the goods (the “consignee”). Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 265 U.S. at 67. After all, “the shipper is presumably the consignor; the transportation ordered by him is presumably on his own behalf; and a promise by him to pay therefor is inferred.” Id. However, a contract or statute may form binding obligations that modify the general rule. See States Marine, 524 F.2d at 247–48. Of the two, a contract may be more significant because statutory default terms only come into play in the absence of a contract. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 265 U.S. at 65–67. That is natural because parties are generally free to negotiate and assign freight liability however they like. Id. (the shipper’s obligation to pay freight is not “absolute”—a “carrier and shipper are free to contract” as to “when or by whom the payment should be made”). If a contract allocates freight liability to a party, that ends the court’s inquiry. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 150–51 (2009) (citing 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:4 (4th ed. 1999)); see also C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 479 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Fikse & Co. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 200, 204 (1991)); In re Roll Form Prods., Inc., 662 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir.1981) (citing Consol. Freightways Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 442 F.2d 56, 62 (7^th Cir. 1971)).

 

 

If a contract allocates freight liability to a nonparty, then the court must determine whether the nonparty consented to be bound under the contract. In re M/V Rickmers Genoa Litig., 622 F. Supp. 2d 56, 71–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd sub nom. Chem One, Ltd. v. M/V Rickmers Genoa, 502 Fed. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2012). For example, a bill of lading might allocate freight liability to a consignee. But the consignee would not be obligated to pay freight without evidence the consignee consented to be bound under the bill of lading. That evidence can be supplied by context. See, e.g., Ingram Barge Co. v. Zen-Noh Grain Corp., 3 F.4th 275, 279 (6th Cir. 2021). Typically, consignees demonstrate consent to be bound by presenting the bill of lading and accepting the goods under it. See id. at 282 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Neilsen v. Jesup, 30 F. 138, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1887); Pacific Coast Fruit Distribs. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 217 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1954)). Similarly, consignees may show their consent to be bound under a bill of lading by suing on the bill of lading, or by silence in context of longstanding dealings, or by the consignee’s agent negotiating the bill of lading. See Ingram Barge, 3 F.4th at 279. Notice that all these contexts show the consignee is aware of the terms to which they are agreeing.

 

 

If no contract allocates freight liability, courts may still find an implied promise to pay in some circumstances. For example, common carriers must charge publicly posted rates and are subject to default terms of a uniform bill of lading. See Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”), 49 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.; see also 49 C.F.R. §1035.1. In that context, “where the parties fail to agree or where discriminatory practices are present, . . . the ICA's default terms bind the parties.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co., 213 F.3d at 479 (citing In re Roll Form Prods., Inc., 662 F.2d at 154).

 

 

A narrow reading of States Marine is in harmony with basic principles of contract formation. “The law of private carriage, now primarily charter parties, . . .  is still governed by the principle of freedom of contract.” Common Carriage and Private Carriage, 1 ADMIRALTY & MAR. LAW § 10:3 (6th ed.). Parties to a freight contract, like any other contract, are free to assign liability as they wish, provided their allocation does not run afoul of the law. See Oak Harbor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck, & Co., 513 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 265 U.S. at 66–67); C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co, 213 F.3d at 479. Beyond that, an offer generally must precede acceptance. See 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:16; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 23 (AM. L. INST.1981); see also Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2012). For common carriage contracts, the published rate forms an “offer,” which is “accepted” by receipt of the goods under a bill of lading, charter party, or default rules obligating a consignee. Without a published rate, it would be quite possible for a private consignee’s “acceptance” to precede the “offer” of the private carrier’s rates. And the consignee’s “acceptance” could only demonstrate a meeting of the minds if consignee liability was one of the terms of the transaction.

 

 

Any implied obligation for private-carrier consignees to pay freight must fit with foundational contract principles. Unlike common-carrier consignees, private-carrier consignees are not presumed to know key terms simply because they receive and accept goods. And they are certainly not expected to know they are liable for freight when an express contract says they are not. Therefore, private-carrier consignees cannot be under the same presumptive obligation to pay freight upon acceptance. A narrow reading of States Marine makes that clear.

 

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Sept. 18, 2024, Milos Product Tanker Corp. v. Valero, Docket No. 23-55655, for Publication)

 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Milos Product Tanker Corp. v. Valero, Docket No. 23-55655

Quantum Meruit

Quasi-Contract

Equity

Unjust Enrichment

 

 

(…) See In re De Laurentiis Ent. Grp., Inc., 963 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Quantum meruit (or quasi-contract) is an equitable remedy implied by the law under which a plaintiff who has rendered services benefiting the defendant may recover the reasonable value of those services when necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant.”). Valero paid cost and freight charges to Koch when it purchased the jet fuel under CFR terms. Because Valero was not unjustly enriched, Milos cannot recover from Valero under a quasi-contract.

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Sept. 18, 2024, Milos Product Tanker Corp. v. Valero, Docket No. 23-55655, for Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Infanzon v. Allstate Insurance Company, Docket No. 22-56070

Insurance Law

Insurance Agent’s Liability

Joinder

Diversity

California Law

 

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

 

The district court correctly found that Leticia Pomes, the Allstate Insurance Sales Agent who was named as a codefendant in Infanzon’s state court complaint, was fraudulently joined. See Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001). “Joinder of a non-diverse defendant is deemed fraudulent, and the defendant’s presence in the lawsuit is ignored for purposes of determining diversity, ‘if the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according to the settled rules of the state.’” Id. (quoting McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987)). Under California law, an insurance agent acting in the name of a disclosed principal is not personally liable for acts committed within the scope of his or her employment, Lippert v. Bailey, 241 Cal. App. 2d 376, 382 (1966), “unless an agent or employee acts as a dual agent.” Mercado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, there is no dispute that Pomes acted on behalf of Allstate, her disclosed principal; that she always held herself out as Allstate’s agent to Infanzon and to others; and that she acted within the scope of her employment. Therefore, because Pomes acted as Allstate’s exclusive agent, Infanzon has no cognizable claim against her under California law, and complete diversity exists.

 

 

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Aug. 2, 2024, Infanzon v. Allstate Insurance Company, Docket No. 22-56070, Not for Publication)

 

 

U.S. Supreme Court, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, Docket No. 22-451

 

Chevron Deference

 

Statute Interpretation

 

Silent or Ambiguous Statute

 

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq.

 

Article III of the Constitution

 

Stare Decisis

 

 

 

 

The Court granted certiorari in these cases limited to the question whether Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, should be overruled or clarified. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts have sometimes been required to defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of the statutes those agencies administer—even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently. Id., at 843. In each case below, the reviewing courts applied Chevron’s framework to resolve in favor of the Government challenges by petitioners to a rule promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U. S. C. §1801 et seq., which incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq.

 

 

Held: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled.

 

 

Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases” and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences for the parties involved.

The Framers appreciated that the laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those disputes would not always be clear, but envisioned that the final “interpretation of the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province of the courts.” The Federalist No. 78, p. 525 (A. Hamilton). As Chief Justice Marshall declared in the foundational decision of Marbury v. Madison, “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177. In the decades following Marbury, when the meaning of a statute was at issue, the judicial role was to “interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.” Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515.

 

 

Congress in 1946 enacted the APA “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.” Morton Salt, 338 U. S., at 644. The APA prescribes procedures for agency action and delineates the basic contours of judicial review of such action. And it codifies for agency cases the unremarkable, yet elemental proposition reflected by judicial practice dating back to Marbury: that courts decide legal questions by applying their own judgment. As relevant here, the APA specifies that courts, not agencies, will decide “all relevant questions of law” arising on review of agency action, 5 U. S. C. §706—even those involving ambiguous laws. It prescribes no deferential standard for courts to employ in answering those legal questions, despite mandating deferential judicial review of agency policymaking and factfinding. See §§706(2)(A), (E). And by directing courts to “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions” without differentiating between the two, §706, it makes clear that agency interpretations of statutes—like agency interpretations of the Constitution—are not entitled to deference. The APA’s history and the contemporaneous views of various respected commentators underscore the plain meaning of its text.

 

 

Courts exercising independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions, consistent with the APA, may—as they have from the start—seek aid from the interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular statutes. See Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140. And when the best reading of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits. The court fulfills that role by recognizing constitutional delegations, fixing the boundaries of the delegated authority, and ensuring the agency has engaged in “ ‘reasoned decisionmaking’ ” within those boundaries. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 750 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U. S. 359, 374). By doing so, a court upholds the traditional conception of the judicial function that the APA adopts.

 

 

The deference that Chevron requires of courts reviewing agency action cannot be squared with the APA.

 

 

(1) Chevron, decided in 1984 by a bare quorum of six Justices, triggered a marked departure from the traditional judicial approach of independently examining each statute to determine its meaning. The question in the case was whether an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation was consistent with the term “stationary source” as used in the Clean Air Act. 467 U. S., at 840. To answer that question, the Court articulated and employed a now familiar two-step approach broadly applicable to review of agency action. The first step was to discern “whether Congress had directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id., at 842. The Court explained that “if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter,” ibid., and courts were therefore to “reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent,” id., at 843, n. 9. But in a case in which “the statute [was] silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at hand, a reviewing court could not “simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.” Id., at 843 (footnote omitted). Instead, at Chevron’s second step, a court had to defer to the agency if it had offered “a permissible construction of the statute,” ibid., even if not “the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding,” ibid., n. 11. Employing this new test, the Court

concluded that Congress had not addressed the question at issue with the necessary “level of specificity” and that EPA’s interpretation was “entitled to deference.”

 

 

(…) It therefore makes no sense to speak of a “permissible” interpretation that is not the one the court, after applying all relevant interpretive tools, concludes is best.

 

 

(…) Congress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions, and courts did so without issue in agency cases before Chevron. After all, in an agency case in particular, the reviewing court will go about its task with the agency’s “body of experience and informed judgment,” among other information, at its disposal. Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140. An agency’s interpretation of a statute “cannot bind a court,” but may be especially informative “to the extent it rests on factual premises within the agency’s expertise.” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 98, n. 8. Delegating ultimate interpretive authority to agencies is simply not necessary to ensure that the resolution of statutory ambiguities is well informed by subject matter expertise.

 

 

By overruling Chevron, though, the Court does not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite the Court’s change in interpretive methodology. See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 457. Mere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute a “ ‘special justification’ ” for overruling such a holding. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443).

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 28, 2024, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, Docket No. 22-451)

U.S. Supreme Court, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, Docket No. 22-451

 

Article III of the Constitution

 

Chevron Deference

 

APA

 

 

 

Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases” and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences for the parties involved. The Framers appreciated that the laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those disputes would not always be clear. Cognizant of the limits of human language and foresight, they anticipated that “all new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation,” would be “more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning” was settled “by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.” The Federalist No. 37, p. 236 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The Framers also envisioned that the final “interpretation of the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province of the courts.” Id., No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton). Unlike the political branches, the courts would by design exercise “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment.” Id., at 523. To ensure the “steady, upright and impartial administration of the laws,” the Framers structured the Constitution to allow judges to exercise that judgment independent of influence from the political branches. Id., at 522; see id., at 522–524; Stern v. Marshall, 564 U. S. 462, 484 (2011).

 

 

This Court embraced the Framers’ understanding of the judicial function early on. In the foundational decision of Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall famously declared that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). And in the following decades, the Court understood “interpreting the laws, in the last resort,” to be a “solemn duty” of the Judiciary. United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J., for the Court). When the meaning of a statute was at issue, the judicial role was to “interpret the act of Congress, in order to ascertain the rights of the parties.” Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515 (1840). The Court also recognized from the outset, though, that exercising independent judgment often included according due respect to Executive Branch interpretations of federal statutes. (…) “Respect,” though, was just that. The views of the Executive Branch could inform the judgment of the Judiciary, but did not supersede it. Whatever respect an Executive Branch interpretation was due, a judge “certainly would not be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a department.” Decatur, 14 Pet., at 515; see also Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, 16 (1932). Otherwise, judicial judgment would not be independent at all. As Justice Story put it, “in cases where a court’s own judgment . . . differed from that of other high functionaries,” the court was “not at liberty to surrender, or to waive it.” Dickson, 15 Pet., at 162.

 

 

(…) Congress in 1946 enacted the APA “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.” Morton Salt, 338 U. S., at 644. It was the culmination of a “comprehensive rethinking of the place of administrative agencies in a regime of separate and divided powers.” Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670–671 (1986).

 

 

(…) The deference that Chevron requires of courts reviewing agency action cannot be squared with the APA.

 

 

 

 

(U.S. Supreme Court, June 28, 2024, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, Docket No. 22-451, C.J. Roberts)