U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, In re: Detroit Athletic Co., Docket 17-2361

Trademark: Classification: Registration (trademark): Likelihood of confusion: Ex parte proceeding: Cancellation proceeding:

(…) DACo objects to this analysis, pointing out that DACo’s application describes services in International Class 35, while the Detroit Athletic Club’s registration describes goods in International Class 25. But that difference does not alter our conclusion. Classification is solely for the “convenience of Patent and Trademark Office administration,” 15 U.S.C. § 1112, and “is wholly irrelevant to the issue of registrability under section 1052(d) (Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)), which makes no reference to classification,” Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1993). It is therefore well established that “confusion may be likely to occur from the use of the same or similar marks for goods, on the one hand, and for services involving those goods, on the other.” Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure ¶ 1207.01(a)(ii) (emphases added) (citing Hyper Shoppes, 837 F.2d at 464).

DACo next argues that consumers would have little problem distinguishing between DACo’s clothing store and the Detroit Athletic Club’s private social club. While this may be true, it is largely irrelevant. The relevant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding focuses on the goods and services described in the application and registration, and not on real-world conditions. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“In reviewing the second factor, ‘we consider the applicant’s goods as set forth in its application, and the [registrant’s] goods as set forth in its registration.’” (quoting M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

The registration for the DETROIT ATHLETIC CLUB mark describes clothing, not social clubs. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether consumers would believe that the Detroit Athletic Club—in its capacity as a seller of clothes—owns, sponsors, supplies, or is otherwise affiliated with DACo, a clothing store of a similar name.

The registration contains no restrictions on the channels of trade or classes of customers. As a result, the Detroit Athletic Club’s clothing is presumed to be sold in all normal trade channels to all the normal classes of purchasers. See i.am.symbolic, 866 F.3d at 1327 (“In the absence of meaningful limitations in either the application or the cited registrations, the Board properly presumed that the goods travel through all usual channels of trade and are offered to all normal potential purchasers.”).

(…) As described above, the registration does not set forth any restrictions on use and therefore “cannot be narrowed by testimony that the applicant’s use is, in fact, restricted to a particular class of purchasers.” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1323 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the owner of an unrestricted registration is entitled to change its current trade channels at any time. See CBS Inc. v. Morrow, 708 F.2d 1579, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Thus, we may not assume that the club will never sell clothing online or through third-party distributors.

To the extent DACo objects to the breadth of the goods or channels of trade described in the Detroit Athletic Club’s registration, that objection amounts to an attack on the registration’s validity, an attack better suited for resolution in a cancellation proceeding. See 15 U.S.C. § 1068 (stating that, in such proceedings, the Patent and Trademark Office may “modify the application or registration by limiting the goods or services specified therein”). “The present ex parte proceeding is not the proper forum from which to launch such an attack.” In re Calgon Corp., 435 F.2d 596, 598 (CCPA 1971); see also Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1408 (refusing to let an ex parte applicant narrow the scope of goods described in the cited registration).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Sept. 10, 2018, In re: Detroit Athletic Co., Docket 17-2361, Circuit Judge O’Malley)

L’examen du risque de confusion créé par une marque se fait en analysant le contenu de son enregistrement et le contenu de la requête d’enregistrement, et non pas en analysant la confusion réelle sur le marché.

De la sorte, si ni la requête ni l’enregistrement ne décrivent la clientèle visée ou les canaux de distribution, il sera retenu que les biens ou services sont supposés être offerts à tous les clients usuels par tous les canaux commerciaux usuels. La preuve (ici par témoins) n’est pas admise pour tenter de renverser cette présomption.

La classification internationale des produits et services est sans relevance s’agissant de l’examen d’un risque de confusion.

La présente procédure ("ex parte proceeding") porte sur la question de l’analyse du risque de confusion d’une marque, et non pas sur l’exactitude des descriptions de l’enregistrement de la marque, pour laquelle une autre procédure est à disposition ("cancellation proceeding", par laquelle le "Patent and Trademark Office" peut modifier le contenu de la requête d’enregistrement ou le contenu de l’enregistrement lui-même).