Friday, December 7, 2018

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Laerdal Medical Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Docket 17-2445


Default (ITC practice v. federal court practice)
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (g) (1) (ITC)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (federal court)
Order to show cause
Exclusion order
Cease and desist order
Export

Despite being served with the amended complaint and notice of investigation, no respondent submitted any response, appeared, or otherwise participated in any way in any of the proceedings. J.A. 2478–99. On October 20, 2016, therefore, Laerdal moved for an order requiring Respondents to show cause why they should not be found in default under § 1337(g)(1). J.A. 2550–59. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) granted Laerdal’s motion and issued the Order to Show Cause on November 7, 2016. J.A. 2584–86. Respondents again failed to respond to or acknowledge that order. Two weeks later, the ALJ issued an initial determination finding all respondents in default. J.A. 2589–95.

(We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6)).

We conclude that the statute, on its face, unambiguously requires the Commission to grant relief against defaulting respondents, subject only to public interest concerns, if all prerequisites of § 1337(g)(1) are satisfied. The statute’s plain text, surrounding context, purpose, and legislative history, as well as the Commission’s own prior decisions, support this conclusion.

(…) Important distinction between district court and ITC practice—the Commission must conduct a preliminary review that district courts do not, and only then may institute an investigation. Rule 55, moreover, governing default judgment in district court litigation, is unlike § 1337(g)(1); it does not require the court to grant relief, it grants the court discretion to “conduct hearings or make referrals” in evaluating whether to “enter or effectuate judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). We presume that Congress was aware of the discretion granted to district courts under Rule 55 when it later drafted subsection (g) to § 1337. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation”).

Here, it is undisputed that Laerdal met the prerequisites for § 1337(g)(1). The amended complaint and notice of investigation were served on all respondents, the respondents failed to respond or appear in any way and failed to show good cause why they should not be found in default, and Laerdal limited the relief it sought to exclusion orders and cease and desist orders against only the respondents. J.A. 2478–99, 2550–59, 2584–86, 2589–95, 2599, 2609–12. Subject only to public interest concerns, therefore, the Commission was required under § 1337(g)(1) to presume all facts alleged in the complaint as true and issue an exclusion order, cease and desist order, or both.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Dec. 7, 2018, Laerdal Medical Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Docket 17-2445, Circuit Judge O’Malley)

Le défaut dans les procédures devant l’ITC, comparé au défaut en procédure devant les cours fédérales. Devant l’ITC, la partie adverse qui ne répond pas sera sommée de justifier son omission par un « Order to show cause ». Sans justification ou si la justification est insuffisante, le défaut sera prononcé et les conclusions de la demande seront adjugées. La Règle 55 de procédure civile fédérale laisse davantage de souplesse à la cour, qui n’est pas tenue, dans de telles circonstances, de rendre de ces faits son jugement au fond.

No comments:

Post a Comment