Default (ITC practice v. federal court practice)
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (g) (1) (ITC)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (federal court)
Order to show cause
Exclusion order
Cease and desist order
Export
Despite being served with the amended complaint
and notice of investigation, no respondent submitted any response, appeared, or
otherwise participated in any way in any of the proceedings. J.A. 2478–99. On
October 20, 2016, therefore, Laerdal moved for an order requiring Respondents
to show cause why they should not be found in default under § 1337(g)(1). J.A.
2550–59. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) granted Laerdal’s motion and issued
the Order to Show Cause on November 7, 2016. J.A. 2584–86. Respondents again
failed to respond to or acknowledge that order. Two weeks later, the ALJ issued
an initial determination finding all respondents in default. J.A. 2589–95.
(We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(6)).
We conclude that the statute, on its face,
unambiguously requires the Commission to grant relief against defaulting
respondents, subject only to public interest concerns, if all prerequisites of
§ 1337(g)(1) are satisfied. The statute’s plain text, surrounding context,
purpose, and legislative history, as well as the Commission’s own prior decisions,
support this conclusion.
(…) Important distinction between district court
and ITC practice—the Commission must conduct a preliminary review that district
courts do not, and only then may institute an investigation. Rule 55, moreover,
governing default judgment in district court litigation, is unlike §
1337(g)(1); it does not require the court to grant relief, it grants the
court discretion to “conduct hearings or make referrals” in evaluating whether
to “enter or effectuate judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). We presume that
Congress was aware of the discretion granted to district courts under Rule 55
when it later drafted subsection (g) to § 1337. See Miles v. Apex
Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“We assume that Congress is aware of
existing law when it passes legislation”).
Here, it is undisputed that Laerdal met the
prerequisites for § 1337(g)(1). The amended complaint and notice of
investigation were served on all respondents, the respondents failed to respond
or appear in any way and failed to show good cause why they should not be found
in default, and Laerdal limited the relief it sought to exclusion orders and
cease and desist orders against only the respondents. J.A. 2478–99, 2550–59,
2584–86, 2589–95, 2599, 2609–12. Subject only to public interest concerns, therefore,
the Commission was required under § 1337(g)(1) to presume all facts alleged in
the complaint as true and issue an exclusion order, cease and desist order, or
both.
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
Dec. 7, 2018, Laerdal Medical Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Docket
17-2445, Circuit Judge O’Malley)
Le défaut dans les procédures
devant l’ITC, comparé au défaut en procédure devant les cours fédérales. Devant
l’ITC, la partie adverse qui ne répond pas sera sommée de justifier son
omission par un « Order to show cause ». Sans justification ou si la
justification est insuffisante, le défaut sera prononcé et les conclusions de
la demande seront adjugées. La Règle 55 de procédure civile fédérale laisse davantage
de souplesse à la cour, qui n’est pas tenue, dans de telles circonstances, de
rendre de ces faits son jugement au fond.
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