U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Rubies Costume Company, v. United States, Docket No. 2018-1305

Customs

Import

Tariff Classification

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States

HTSUS

Binding Pre-importation Ruling from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) on the Tariff Classification

Ruling Letter

Protest

Domestic Interested Party Petition

Informed Compliance Publication (ICP)

Duty-Free Entry

Tariff Classification of Textile Costumes

Ejusdem Generis

Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in No. 1:13-cv-00407-MAB, Judge Mark A. Barnett.

Rubies Costume Company appeals the grant of summary judgment by the Court of International Trade in favor of the Government as to the tariff classification of certain imported merchandise. The imported merchandise consists of a nine-piece Santa Claus costume packaged and sold together as a set. The Santa Claus costume is customarily worn in connection with the celebration of the Christmas holiday. The parties argue as to the implications of the “festive” nature of the costume. The merchandise, however, is excluded from classification as “festive articles” by the notes to chapter 95 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States. The correct classification of the merchandise is under HTSUS 6110.30.30, 6103.43.15, 6116.93.94, and 4209.92.30. On that basis, we affirm the judgment of the Court of International Trade.

On June 20, 2012, Rubies requested a binding pre-importation ruling from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) on the tariff classification of the Santa Suit. Exactly one year later, Customs issued Ruling Letter HQ H237067 in which it classified the Santa Suit under several tariff classifications of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”). See Customs Ruling HQ H237067 (June 20, 2013), 2013 WL 3783025, at *1. On October 25, 2013, after Rubies entered the subject merchandise, Customs applied its HQ H237067 ruling and liquidated the entry of the Santa Suit according to the following classifications and duty rates for each piece: (…).

Rubies protested the liquidation of the entry pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Rubies contended that all nine pieces of the Santa Suit fall under HTSUS chapter 95 as “festive . . . articles,” requiring duty-free entry, and requested an accelerated disposition of the protest. Customs did not render a decision on the protest within thirty days, so the protest was deemed denied under 19 U.S.C. § 1515(b) on December 14, 2013. On December 27, 2013, Rubies filed suit in the CIT, challenging the denied protest.

The classification of goods under the HTSUS requires a two-step process. First, the court “determines the proper meaning of specific terms in the tariff provisions, which is a question of law that we review without deference.” Gerson, 898 F.3d at 1235. Second, the court determines whether the subject merchandise falls within the description of such terms as properly construed, which is a question of fact that we review for clear error. La Crosse Tech., Ltd. v. United States, 723 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2013). If there is “no dispute as to the nature of the merchandise, the two-step classification analysis collapses entirely into a question of law.” Gerson, 898 F.3d at 1235.

The HTSUS comprises a hierarchical structure that separates goods by headings and subheadings. Otter Prods., 834 F.3d at 1375. The General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”) of the HTSUS and the Additional United States Rules of Interpretation govern the classification of goods. Id. We apply the GRIs in numerical order, starting with GRI 1. Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

GRI 1 provides that “classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any relative Section or Chapter notes.” “We apply GRI 1 as a substantive rule of interpretation, such that when an imported article is described in whole by a single classification heading or subheading, then that single classification applies, and the succeeding GRIs are inoperative.” La Crosse Tech., 723 F.3d at 1358 (quoting CamelBak Prods., LLC v. United States, 649 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). We interpret HTSUS terms according to their common and commercial meaning unless there is contrary legislative intent and may consult dictionaries, scientific authorities, and other reliable sources to ascertain the common meaning. Otter Prods., 834 F.3d at 1375.

(…) We cite to the 2013 version of the HTSUS in effect on the date of importation. See LeMans Corp. v. United States, 660 F.3d 1311, 1314 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

(…) This court previously addressed the tariff classification of textile costumes in Rubie’s Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Rubies I”).

In Rubies I, Rubies, the largest manufacturer of costumes in the United States, filed a Domestic Interested Party Petition, asserting that Customs should classify certain textile Halloween costumes manufactured by others being imported into the United States as articles of apparel under chapter 61 or 62. Rubies contended that these costumes were virtually identical to those manufactured by Rubies, and that Customs had erroneously classified them as duty-free “festive articles.”

Following Rubies I, Customs issued an Informed Compliance Publication, identifying factors that distinguish flimsy, nondurable costumes classified in chapter 95 from those that are well-made, comparable to normal wearing apparel classified in chapters 61 and 62. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Classification of Textile Costumes Under the HTSUS (2008), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/icp077_3.pdf (“Textile Costume ICP”). The Textile Costume ICP establishes four distinguishing factors to consider in determining whether the costume is flimsy or well made: styling, construction, finishing touches, and embellishments. Customs relied on the Textile Costume ICP in classifying the Santa Suit in Ruling Letter HQ H237067. Although not binding on this court, the ICP provides examples for each factor and guidance as to Customs’ analysis in this matter.

Classification of the Santa Suit requires a two-step process: (1) determining the meaning of terms in the HTSUS, a legal question, Gerson, 898 F.3d at 1235; and (2) determining whether the subject merchandise falls within the description of such terms as properly construed, a factual question, La Crosse Tech., 723 F.3d at 1358. The two-step classification inquiry ends at step one and remains solely a legal question if the nature of the merchandise is not in dispute. See Gerson, 898 F.3d at 1235.

That a person wears the Santa Suit or portions thereof during festive Christmas holiday occasions does not preclude it from classification as “fancy dress” of textile material. Indeed, the “fancy dress, of textiles, of chapter 61 or 62” exclusion under Note 1(e) of chapter 95 presumes that we may otherwise recognize the subject merchandise as a festive article, unless it qualifies as fancy dress, i.e., a costume, of textile material. Thus, an article classified as “fancy dress of textile material” can plainly constitute a costume worn on festive occasions without conflicting with the requirement set forth in Rubies I that a “festive article” is “not generally recognized as normal wearing apparel.”

The CIT determined that the classification for the Santa Suit jacket is HTSUS 6110.30.30, which covers “sweaters, pullovers, sweatshirts, waistcoats (vests) and similar articles, knitted or crocheted . . . of man-made fibers . . . other.” J.A. 39. Applying the styling, construction, and finishing touch factors noted above, the undisputed facts establish that the Santa Suit jacket has the features of a well-made textile costume, classifiable as wearing apparel under HTSUS chapter 61. The jacket has woven satin fabric lining and is constructed of an acrylic and polyester knit pile fabric. The jacket also has a double- layer collar with white faux fur fabric and a front snap closure, a full-length zipper concealed by white faux fur, finished edges with white faux fur cuffs, double-layer belt- loops, and well-sewn seams. The jacket does not have any embellishments, but that does not change the well-made nature of the jacket based on other factors.

Additionally, the record shows that Rubies manufactures the jacket so that it can be worn and cleaned multiple times throughout the Christmas season, such that the jacket may survive several Christmas seasons. The jacket requires “Dry Clean Only” care. These, along with the factors described above, are all characteristics of normal wearing apparel, and there is no dispute that the jacket is of durable and nonflimsy construction.

Although the precise term for the type of jacket included with the Santa Suit does not appear in the list of items in heading 6110, the jacket shares the characteristics of the named articles in the heading. Like a sweater or sweatshirt, the jacket covers the upper body and provides some warmth to the wearer but does not protect against wind, rain, or extreme cold. The wearer can also wear the jacket over either undergarments or other clothing. Thus, we hold that heading 6110 covers the Santa Suit jacket under the rule of ejusdem generis because the jacket shares the essential characteristics of the articles named in the heading. See Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC v. United States, 769 F.3d 1102, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The CIT therefore correctly found that the proper classification for the jacket is under HTSUS heading 6110, which excludes it from classification as a “festive article.”

(…) Based on the foregoing, we hold that the items of merchandise in question are articles of normal wearing apparel, and that the tariff classifications for the Santa Suit jacket, pants, and gloves are, respectively, HTSUS 6110.30.30, 6103.43.15, and 6116.93.94. The classification for the toy sack is HTSUS 4209.92.30. On that basis, the judgment of the CIT is affirmed.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, April 29, 2019, Rubies Costume Company, v. United States, Docket No. 2018-1305, Circuit Judge Reyna)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Hard Candy, LLC, v. Anastasia Beverly Hills, Inc., Docket No. 18-10877

Trademark Infringement

Remedy of an Accounting and Disgorgement of Profits

Remedies of Accounting, Constructive Trust, and Restitution

Injunctive Relief

Jury Trial

Seventh Amendment Right to Trial by Jury

Common Law

Equity

Monetary Damages Available to a Lanham Act Trademark Plaintiff

Fair Use Defense to Infringement

Likelihood of Confusion

Hard Candy filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Anastasia, claiming trademark infringement under § 32(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); common law trademark infringement; and common law unfair competition. Hard Candy sought an accounting and the disgorgement of Anastasia’s profits, statutory damages, a permanent injunction barring Anastasia’s use of its mark, declaratory relief, and fees and costs. The complaint included a request for actual damages, but, notably, Hard Candy dropped this application before trial. The district court then struck Hard Candy’s jury trial demand because all of the remaining remedies were equitable in nature.

To prevail on each of its claims, Hard Candy had to establish that Anastasia’s use of the words “hard candy” created a likelihood of confusion. See Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Cmty. Coll. Dist., 889 F.2d 1018, 1026 & n.14 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that the elements of trademark infringement under common law and the Lanham Act “are the same,” and that “an unfair competition claim based only upon alleged trademark infringement is practically identical to an infringement claim”). Applying our seven-factor likelihood of confusion test, the district court determined that Hard Candy had not met its burden. The court also concluded that even if Hard Candy could establish infringement, Anastasia had made out a fair use defense because it used the term “hard candy” in good faith as a description of the product, not as a mark.

This appeal requires us to decide whether the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury applies when a trademark plaintiff attempts to recover the profits the defendant made by selling the allegedly infringing goods.

A plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial in an action that is “analogous” to a claim that would have been brought in the English law courts at common law, but not if the claims sounded in equity or admiralty. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).

The remedy of an accounting and disgorgement of profits for trademark infringement is equitable in nature and has long been considered that way, so we hold that a plaintiff seeking the defendant’s profits in lieu of actual damages is not entitled to a jury trial.

(…) Injunctive relief is the quintessential form of equitable remedy; it does not entitle a plaintiff to a jury trial.

The monetary damages available to a Lanham Act trademark plaintiff can be divided into five rough categories: recovery of the defendant’s profits, actual business damages and out-of-pocket losses (like corrective advertising), lost profits, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.  “Actual damages” in this context covers everything from damages from lost sales or licensing fees due to the infringer’s sale of offending goods to intangible harm like reputational damage and loss of good will. As we have said, a trademark plaintiff “may recover for all elements of injury to the business of the trademark owner proximately resulting from the infringer’s wrongful acts.” Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 597 F.2d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1979).

The Supreme Court has set out a two-part test to determine whether the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee applies to a particular claim: To determine whether a statutory action is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty, the Court must examine both the nature of the action and of the remedy sought. First, we compare the statutory action to 18th- century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.

We begin, then, by examining the nature of the action, here trademark infringement and unfair competition based on infringement. “Trademarks and their precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks were protected at common law and in equity at the time of the founding of our country.” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). Trademark infringement claims began as common law actions for fraud or “deceit.” Sandforth’s Case, heard in an English court of law in 1584, may be the earliest trademark infringement action at common law. See Keith M. Stolte, How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? An Answer to Schechter’s Conundrum, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 505, 509 (1998); 1 McCarthy § 5:2.

By the time the Seventh Amendment was ratified in 1791, the common law trademark infringement action was well established. See, e.g., Singleton v. Bolton (1783) 99 Eng. Rep. 661, 661; 3 Dougl. 293, 293 (stating that “if the defendant had sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiffs name or mark, that would be a fraud for which an action would lie”). Trademark actions also were brought in courts of equity during the same period. Blanchard v. Hill (1742) 26 Eng. Rep. 692; 2 Atk. 484, is the earliest reported trademark case brought in equity. See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1852 (2007). Shortly thereafter, the accepted rule was “that equity could be invoked to protect the plaintiff’s title to his marks.” See id. at 1854. Early American case law likewise demonstrates that trademark rights could be enforced at equity. See, e.g., Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742, 744 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784). Thus, because when the Seventh Amendment was ratified trademark rights had “been long recognized by the common law and the chancery courts of England,” Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879), this part of the Supreme Court’s test is indeterminate.

The second prong -- the nature of the remedy -- is the “more important” consideration and provides substantially more guidance here. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196. Hard Candy does not seek actual damages, and it is undisputed that a plaintiff seeking only injunctive relief, costs, and fees would not be entitled to a jury trial. Thus, our analysis centers on Hard Candy’s request for an accounting of Anastasia’s profits and for the accompanying disgorgement of those gains. Our review is necessarily broader than the origins of the statutory remedy contained in the Lanham Act. As the Second Circuit recently explained, “the ancient remedies of accounting, constructive trust, and restitution have compelled wrongdoers to ‘disgorge’ -- i.e., account for and surrender -- their ill-gotten gains for centuries.” S.E.C. v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 119 (2d Cir. 2006).

The remedy sought by Hard Candy, an accounting and disgorgement of profits, was historically a matter for courts of equity. (…) In other words, a court of law, limited to providing legal relief, would not be able to provide full redress to a trademark infringement plaintiff, but a court of equity could do so by providing an injunction along with ordering an accounting and disgorgement of the defendant’s profits -- precisely the remedy Hard Candy seeks here.

(…) Likelihood of confusion. The district court applied our seven-factor test (Op. III, A) (…) We look to the: (1) type of mark, (2) similarity of mark, (3) similarity of the products the marks represent, (4) similarity of the parties’ retail outlets and customers, (5) similarity of advertising media used, (6) defendant’s intent and (7) actual confusion.

(…) A defendant is entitled to the fair use defense if it establishes that it used the allegedly infringing term “(1) other than as a mark, (2) in a descriptive sense, and (3) in good faith.”

Secondary authorities: McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition (5th ed. 2018).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, April 23, 2019, Hard Candy, LLC, v. Anastasia Beverly Hills, Inc., Docket No. 18-10877, Circuit Judge Marcus, for Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., Total Produce, PLC, Docket No. 18-11595

Forum Non Conveniens

Conflicts of Laws

Dismissal

Jurisdiction

Enforcement of Judgments

Fresh Results, an American company, arranged bulk shipments of blueberries for ASF Holland, a Dutch company that repacks wholesale produce to sell to European customers.

ASF Holland created reports about the results of its inspection of the shipments, and those reports determined the final price it paid for the blueberries. Fresh Results filed a complaint against ASF Holland in the Southern District of Florida, alleging that it had falsified the reports and fraudulently deflated the price. ASF Holland moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the Netherlands was a more convenient forum for the suit, and the district court agreed.

Because we agree that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the relevant public factors and committed two errors in its analysis of the private factors, we vacate and remand.

(…) During the second season, one of the growers hired an auditor to make an unannounced inspection of a blueberry shipment at ASF Holland’s facility in the Netherlands. The auditor allegedly discovered that the blueberries were still in their original freight package, even though ASF Holland had reported to Fresh Results that the shipment had been inspected, sorted, and repacked. After learning of the auditor’s inspection, Fresh Results demanded that ASF Holland pay the market price for each shipment of blueberries it had received, but ASF Holland refused.

Fresh Results filed a complaint, which it later amended, against ASF Holland in the Southern District of Florida. Fresh Results asserted claims of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, conversion, and tortious interference with its business relationship with the growers. It alleged that ASF Holland fraudulently promised a high reference price but then deflated the actual price it paid by sending false reports. According to Fresh Results, ASF Holland manipulated the price by understating the amount paid by its European customers and by falsely inflating its expenses in the reports. ASF Holland informed the district court that it would pursue counterclaims against Fresh Results for sending substandard blueberries.

ASF Holland then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and forum non conveniens.

Because “the forum non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” we review for abuse of discretion.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a district court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction when a foreign forum is better suited to adjudicate the dispute. See Kolawole v. Sellers, 863 F.3d 1361, 1369 (11th Cir. 2017). The “central purpose” of forum non conveniens is “to ensure that the trial is convenient.” Id. The doctrine should not be invoked “lightly . . . because it effectively deprives the plaintiff of his favored forum,” id., and so a defendant bears the burden of justifying dismissal based on forum non conveniens, La Seguridad, 707 F.2d at 1309. To satisfy this burden, the defendant must establish that “(1) an adequate alternative forum is available, (2) the public and private factors weigh in favor of dismissal, and (3) the plaintiff can reinstate his suit in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2001)).

The second part of the forum non conveniens analysis—the balancing of the private and public factors—is a “comparative inquiry that requires the district court to weigh the ‘relative’ advantages and disadvantages of each respective forum.” The private factors “pertain to the interests of the participants in the litigation.” One of these factors is “the relative ease of access to sources of proof,” which includes the “availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see also Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6. Other factors are the “possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action” and the enforceability of a judgment, if one is obtained, Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. And a court may consider “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. The public factors “pertain to the relative interests of the two fora.” Tazoe, 631 F.3d at 1333. Among other things, the public factors consider “the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion,” “the ‘local interest in having localized controversies decided at home,’” and “the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509). A court may also consider what law will govern the action, including “the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of laws” and “the application of foreign law.” Id.

Fresh Results argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider all relevant public factors after concluding that the private factors were not in equipoise. The equipoise standard employed by the district court comes from dicta in our caselaw. Although our holdings are precedential, our dicta are not. See United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017). Dicta refer to “those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us.” Id. In contrast, our holdings “constitute the precedent, as a point necessarily decided” in that case. Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 4, at 44 (2016); accord Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “a holding is comprised both of the result of the case and those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound”). And we have explained that, “regardless of what a court says in its opinion, the decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that case.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010).

(…) We clarified that the public factors do not “enter the equation only when the private interest factors are at or near equipoise.” Leon, 251 F.3d at 1311. Although “the private factors are generally considered more important than the public factors,” we explained that the public factors are not superfluous, even when the private factors are far from equipoise. Id. And we opined that “the better rule is to consider both factors in all cases,” which “has been our approach in recent cases.” Id.; see also SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.5 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have clarified that . . . courts should consider both public and private factors in all cases.”)

(…) Enforcement of Judgments, U.S. Dep’t of State,

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/internl-judicial-asst/Enforcement-of-Judges.html

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, a Delaware LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., a Dutch Corporation, Total Produce, PLC, an Irish Public Limited Company, April 22, 2019, Docket No. 18-11595, Circuit Judge William Pryor, for Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., Total Produce, PLC, Docket No. 18-11595

Dicta

Judicial Precedent

(…) Fresh Results argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider all relevant public factors after concluding that the private factors were not in equipoise. The equipoise standard employed by the district court comes from dicta in our caselaw. Although our holdings are precedential, our dicta are not. See United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017). Dicta refer to “those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us.” Id.  In contrast, our holdings “constitute the precedent, as a point necessarily decided” in that case. Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 4, at 44 (2016); accord Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “a holding is comprised both of the result of the case and those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound”). And we have explained that, “regardless of what a court says in its opinion, the decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that case.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, a Delaware LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., a Dutch Corporation, Total Produce, PLC, an Irish Public Limited Company, April 22, 2019, Docket No. 18-11595, Circuit Judge William Pryor, for Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv

Copyright

Direct Infringement

Volitional Conduct Requirement

Internet Law

Internet Service Provider (ISP)

Metadata

URL

Secondary Liability

DMCA Safe Harbor

Abusive Litigation

Contempt of Court

A Per Curiam Opinion.

John M. Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in the result: Polyvore is an internet service provider that ran a website, Polyvore.com, that allowed users to create and share digital photo collages devoted to fashion, art, and design. Polyvore.com’s “Clipper” tool let users “clip” images from other websites and collect them on Polyvore’s site.

When a user uploaded an image to Polyvore.com, it triggered a series of automatic technical processes: Polyvore (1) attached a hyperlink to that image that linked back to the image’s original site; (2) gave the image a unique Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) that identified its precise location on Polyvore’s website, Polyvore.com; and (3) indexed the photo so it was searchable on Polyvore.com. All posted images were displayed automatically by software—meaning Polyvore employees did not review or interact with user‐posted images before they appeared on the site. Based on these user uploads, Polyvore.com had an extensive library of searchable images—118 million when the complaint was filed.

Because some photos clipped by users were copyrighted images, Polyvore had policies in place that were designed to combat copyright infringement, including terms of service that prohibited users from posting copyrighted images, a repeat‐infringer policy, and a notice‐and‐takedown system.

BWP owns copyrights in celebrity photographs, which it licenses to online and print publications for a fee.

The Volitional Conduct Requirement:

Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives copyright holders an exclusive bundle of rights, including the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,” and the right to “display the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (5). The Copyright Act makes parties who infringe on those rights liable for damages, regardless of whether they had knowledge that the content was infringing. See 17 U.S.C. § 504. In other words, the Copyright Act is a strict liability regime. See EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter “MP3tunes”], cert. denied sub nom. Robertson v. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2269 (2017).

The advent of the internet posed a problem for this regime, however, since applying strict liability to infringing content posted online meant that websites could be held liable for infringing content posted by their users based solely on the existence of the website—an outcome that could be unfair. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On‐Line Commcʹn Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368–70 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In response, beginning in the mid‐1990s, courts began to read into the Copyright Act an implicit requirement that for a service provider to be liable for direct infringement, it must have taken some affirmative, volitional step to infringe. See id. The doctrine posits that to hold a service provider liable for direct copyright infringement, that infringement must have resulted from the provider’s own volitional conduct. See id.

(…) An ISP acts volitionally when it creates a program designed to infringe copyrighted material and selects the copyrighted material that it copies. See MP3tunes, 1 844 F.3d at 96.

(…) In contrast, the volitional conduct requirement is not satisfied when an ISP simply displays user‐uploaded images and plays no role in selecting the images.

(…) This principle is also articulated by Justice Scalia in his Aereo dissent: “The defendant may be held directly liable only if the defendant itself ‘trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.’” Aereo, 573 U.S. at 454 (quoting CoStar, 373 F.3d at 550). “Most of the time that issue will come down to who selects the copyrighted content: the defendant or its customers.” Id. at 454–55 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131–132).

(…) Likewise, an ISP does not act volitionally when it automatically makes a single copy of content selected by the user in response to a user’s request. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123, 132. (…) “Dish’s program created the copy only in response to the user’s command”.

(…) ISPs that provide additional unrequested copies of copyrighted material in response to a user’s request for a single copy, however, may be liable for direct infringement. See MP3tunes, 844 F.3d at 96.

(…) accord Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9^th Cir. 2007) (holding that copyright holders who challenged Google’s creation of a thumbnail version of their copyrighted images, which the user had not specifically requested be made, had made out a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement).

In this case, there is no evidence that Polyvore designed the Clipper to retrieve exclusively a specific kind of image that Polyvore knew to be copyrighted. Instead, the evidence shows that Polyvore designed a tool that its users could use to clip images generally, whether copyrighted or not. Thus the single act of designing the Clipper does not amount to volitional conduct that can be said to “cause the copy to be made” each time its users selected the image and used the Clipper to create a single copy of the image. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 1 131. Accordingly, Polyvore cannot be liable for direct copyright infringement for designing the Clipper to simply retrieve photos picked out by users from other websites (before Polyvore makes any copies).

Likewise, the undisputed record in this case shows that one copy of user‐uploaded images on Polyvore’s website was displayed automatically by Polyvore’s software. Like the defendant ISP in CoStar, Polyvore simply served as a “conduit” that allowed the user to display his clipped images. 373 F.3d at 551. This “conduit” function aligns Polyvore with the hypothetical ISP that only displayed user supplied content that we discussed in Cablevision. 536 F.3d at 132. At the user’s direction, Polyvore simply displayed the image its user directed it to display. As to that one copy, it is clear to me that the user, who selected the item to be copied, and not Polyvore, “caused the copy to be made.” Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131. Thus, in accordance with Cablevision, Polyvore is not liable for displaying the images its users uploaded.

(…) And, by stripping its resized images of their metadata and housing them at separate URLs where they were able to be viewed by anyone, Polyvore is alleged to have gone further than the defendant in Perfect 10, who only made temporary thumbnail versions of the relevant images. 508 F.3d at 1160‐61.

(…) I think secondary liability is the proper framework for holding an ISP liable for copyright infringement when the ISP does not select the copyrighted material and make the infringing copy itself but is aware of it and encourages or contributes to the infringement by the direct volitional infringer.

(…) Polyvore next argues that even if a jury could find that it directly infringed BWP’s exclusive rights to display and reproduce its copyrighted images, Polyvore cannot be held liable for direct infringement because it qualifies for the safe harbor of § 512(c) found in Title II of the DMCA. Congress passed Title II of the DMCA in 1998 to “clarify the liability faced by service providers who transmit potentially infringing material over their networks.” Viacom Intʹl, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105–190 at 2 (1998)). The act established four safe harbors to spare ISPs from liability for “claims of copyright infringement based on (a) ‘transitory digital network communications,’ (b) ‘system caching,’ (c) ‘information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users,’ and (d) ‘information location tools.’” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)‐(d)). (…) A service provider that meets all of these criteria is shielded from copyright liability as long as it also “has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and . . . accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1). Since the DMCA safe harbors are affirmative defenses, a defendant generally has the initial burden of establishing that it meets the statutory requirements. See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 14 F.3d 78, 94 (2d Cir. 2016).

In response, BWP argues that Polyvore is not eligible for any safe harbor under the DMCA because (1) by altering the metadata of 26 images uploaded to its site it interfered with “standard technical measures” in contravention of § 512(i), and (2) the copying of the additional images was not infringement “at the direction of the user.” Appellant’s Br. at 41. I agree with Polyvore that BWP has not raised an issue of material fact as to whether preserving metadata is a “standard technical measure,” but other questions of material fact still prevent me from saying that Polyvore has shown that the copying here was done “at the direction of the user.”

Metadata as a standard technical measure

Because the district court held that Polyvore’s conduct was not infringing, it did not address whether Polyvore’s stripping of metadata interfered impermissibly with “standard technical measures” such that Polyvore was not eligible for the DMCA safe harbor. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). Because the proper interpretation of the statutory phrase “standard technical measures” is a question of law, I address it even though the district court did not. The DMCA defines “standard technical measures” as “technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). To qualify as a standard technical measure, a practice must (1) “have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi‐industry standards process,” (2) be “available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms,” and (3) “not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or networks.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). When a measure meets these qualifications, “refusing to accommodate or implement a ‘standard technical measure’ exposes a service provider to liability.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 41. In other words, section 512(i) encourages copyright owners and ISPs to work together to establish technical means by which service providers can cheaply and easily identify infringing material. See Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc., 885 F.3d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 2018) (“One can imagine a digital version of the old c in a circle (©) automatically triggering the uploading software to exclude material so marked by the copyright owner.”). At issue here is whether metadata such as that used in the images in this case has become a “standard technical measure.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).

The caselaw provides little guidance on how to know when a widely followed practice has evolved into a “standard technical measure.”

(…) I need not expound upon what may or may not constitute a “standard technical measure” because BWP has not come close to establishing that there is a broad consensus among copyright owners and service providers that preserving metadata should be so considered.

(…) 17 16 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1204, which establish civil and criminal penalties for removing “copyright management information”.

(…) More broadly, Congress did not leave it to the courts to simply pronounce out of thin air that a given technical measure has become a “standard” in the industry such that interfering with it prevents an ISP from claiming the protection of the § 512(c) safe harbors. It is plain from § 512(i) itself that such a pronouncement can only come from “a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi‐industry standards process.” 17 U.S.C. §512(i)(2)(A). I see nothing to show, to date, that such a consensus or such a process has developed. For these reasons, BWP has failed to proffer evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that altering or destroying metadata disqualifies a service provider from the safe harbor protections of § 512(c).

(…) “The § 512(c) safe harbor is only available when the infringement occurs ‘by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.’” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (emphasis added) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)) (…) Making copies of user‐uploaded materials solely to facilitate user access does not disqualify an ISP from availing itself of the § 512(c) safe harbor.

(…) However, notwithstanding the district court’s denial of legal fees, I cannot let pass my concern over BWP’s record of aggressive litigation, which entails filing hundreds of lawsuits directed at ISPs without even attempting to substantiate its claims in discovery (…) Here, the fact that BWP filed a lawsuit before simply asking Polyvore to take its images down suggests that BWP has a business model that involves abusing the federal courts (Op., p. 37).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, April 17, 2019, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv, Per Curiam)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv

Procedure

Injunctive Relief

Permanent Injunction

Mootness

Damages

Polyvore’s website appears to no longer exist. (…) Even if that is the case, however, BWP’s core claims for damages are unaffected because, “unlike claims for injunctive relief challenging ongoing conduct, a claim for damages cannot evade review” since “it remains live until it is settled, judicially resolved, or barred by a statute of limitations.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 77 (2013). On the other hand, BWP’s request for a permanent injunction would now be moot because Polyvore’s defunct website no longer displays plaintiffs’ photos. See Bank of New York Co. v. Ne. Bancorp, Inc., 9 F.3d 1065, 1067 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that requests for injunctions are “mooted by the occurrence of the action sought to be enjoined”). (John M. Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in the result).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, April 17, 2019, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv, Per Curiam)

Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur - Update to Form I-526

Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur

USCIS Forms Update Notice

Update to Form I-526, Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur; New Edition Dated 04/15/19.

https://www.uscis.gov/i-526?utm_source=rss-feed&utm_campaign=Forms%20Updates

Contains:

Form I-526

Instructions for Form I-526

Form G-1145, E-Notification of Application/Petition Acceptance

Where to file instructions

Filling Fee

Forms Updates Link: https://www.uscis.gov/forms-updates

Entry Barriers (Antitrust - Swiss Law)

Barrières à l’entrée (droit suisse)

Marchés publics suisses (cantonaux et communaux)

Emoluments de protection en vue de protéger secret d’affaires et savoir-faire

La perception d’émoluments ne satisfait pas au principe de la proportionnalité. D’autres moyens existent : conclusion d’un accord de confidentialité, le choix d’une procédure sélective, la diffusion graduelle des informations ou le refus d’accès sur la base de l’interdiction de l’abus de droit

Droit d’auteur et concurrence déloyale peuvent être ici invoqués par le titulaire d’un secret d’affaires ou du savoir-faire


26. Les pouvoirs adjudicateurs interrogés ont justifié la perception d’émoluments de protection principalement par la volonté de protéger les secrets d’affaires contenus dans les documents d’appel d’offres. Ni la LMI ni l’AIMP ne proposent une définition de la notion de secret d’affaires. La violation du secret de fabrication ou du secret d’affaires (« secret commercial ») est mentionnée à l’art. 162 du code pénal suisse du 21 décembre 1937 (CP; RS 311.0). Plusieurs domaines juridiques se basent sur les critères définis par la jurisprudence pénale pour constater l’existence de secrets d’affaires. La notion de secret telle que précisée dans la jurisprudence du Tribunal fédéral recouvre toutes les informations qui ne sont pas publiques ou librement accessibles et que le détenteur du secret souhaite garder confidentielles en raison d’un intérêt légitime23. Un intérêt légitime au maintien du secret existe lorsque les informations en question sont importantes pour le succès commercial.24

Selon les avis reçus, la perception d’émoluments de protection est également justifiée par la protection du savoir-faire. L’interprétation juridique de la notion de savoir-faire présente des similitudes avec celle de la notion de secret de fabrication et de secret d’affaires au sens de l’art. 162 CP. Dans la pratique, le savoir-faire est défini comme les connaissances acquises par une entreprise en vue de résoudre des problèmes de fabrication de produits, de développement de services ou d’organisation de l’entreprise. L’entreprise détient l’exclusivité de ces connaissances tant qu’elle peut les garder secrètes.25

28. La majorité des pouvoirs adjudicateurs a invoqué la protection des secrets d’affaires contenus dans la documentation d’appel d’offres pour justifier la perception d’émoluments de protection. Il convient par conséquent de déterminer si cet argument constitue un motif valable au sens de l’art. 3 LMI. Les documents d’appel d’offres doivent présenter les biens ou services requis au moyen soit d’une description complète des produits ou des tâches, soit d’une liste détaillée des prestations; ils doivent en outre préciser les exigences à satisfaire. Au niveau fédéral, le contenu des documents d’appel d’offres est décrit à l’art. 18 de l’ordonnance du 11 décembre 1995 sur les marchés publics (OMP; RS 172.056.11). Il en ressort que la documentation doit contenir les informations nécessaires à la soumission d’une offre. Ces documents ainsi que les informations qu’ils fournissent sont destinés à tous les offreurs intéressés et, par conséquent, au grand public, étant donné que le pouvoir adjudicateur recherche un fournisseur de prestations et qu’il a en principe intérêt à recevoir plusieurs offres. Comme mentionné plus haut, l’existence d’un secret d’affaires présuppose les éléments suivants: il doit s’agir d’informations qui ne sont pas publiques ou librement accessibles et pour lesquelles il existe un intérêt subjectif ou objectif au maintien du secret. La grande majorité des informations régulièrement communiquées dans les documents d’appel d’offres ne sont pas des faits qui doivent rester confidentiels. Toutefois, selon le mandat, les documents d’appel d’offres peuvent ponctuellement contenir des secrets d’affaires qui doivent, dans certains cas, être protégés contre des offreurs potentiels.

(…) La perception d’émoluments ne satisfait pas au principe de la proportionnalité énoncé à l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI.


(…) Conditionner la transmission des documents d’appel d’offres au paiement d’un émolument ne protège pas les éventuels secrets commerciaux, puisque ces derniers sont communiqués après versement de l’émolument. La perception d’un émolument peut certes réduire le nombre de personnes qui demandent la documentation d’appel d’offres, mais il ne s’agit pas d’un moyen adéquat pour garantir la protection des secrets d’affaires.

31. Même si la perception d’émoluments de protection constituait un moyen adéquat pour protéger les secrets commerciaux, il faudrait, en vertu du principe de proportionnalité énoncé à l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI, qu’elle représente le moyen le moins lourd pour y parvenir. Or, ce n’est pas le cas. Il est par exemple d’usage de conclure au préalable un accord visant à protéger les secrets d’affaires (accord de confidentialité prévoyant une peine conventionnelle). Il est en outre possible de mener une procédure sélective (art. 12, al. 1, let. b, AIMP). Dans ce type de procédure, les personnes intéressées ne déposent pas directement une offre à l’adjudicateur, mais présentent une demande de participation. L’adjudicateur détermine ensuite quels candidats répondent aux critères d’aptitude. Seuls ceux qui satisfont aux exigences reçoivent ensuite les documents d’appel d’offres et sont invités à soumissionner. Une autre possibilité, parfois mise à profit, consiste à diffuser les informations gra- duellement, en fournissant des informations essentielles et détaillées dès la publication du marché sur SIMAP, ce qui permet de transmettre ensuite les documents d’appel d’offres contenant des secrets d’affaires uniquement aux offreurs intéressés. En dernier recours, il serait également possible, en cas de demande indue, de refuser l’accès aux documents d’appels d’offres sur la base de l’interdiction de l’abus de droit. Il ressort de ce qui précède qu’il existe plusieurs possibilités moins contraignantes pour protéger les secrets d’affaires. Par conséquent, la perception d’émoluments de protection ne constitue pas la méthode la moins lourde et ne répond pas au principe de proportionnalité prévu à l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI.

32. En conclusion, il ressort de la présente section que la perception d’émoluments pour protéger les éventuels secrets d’affaires (et le savoir-faire) n’est pas conforme au principe de proportionnalité prévu à l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI, dès lors que les émoluments ne sont pas adéquats et ne constituent pas le moyen le moins lourd à cette fin (d’autres possibilités moins contraignantes existent).

5.3.1 Application de la loi sur le droit d’auteur

Le droit d’auteur ne protège pas les décisions, procès-verbaux et rapports qui émanent des autorités ou des administrations publiques (art. 5, al. 1, let. c, LDA). En revanche, il s’applique aux documents internes à l’administration, comme les avis et les rapports d’expert.

En l’absence de dispositions dérogatoires et de pratique ou doctrine divergentes, la possibilité de protéger les dossiers d’appel d’offres par le droit d’auteur doit par conséquent être évaluée à l’aune des principes énoncés à l’art. 2 LDA. Un pouvoir adjudicateur public peut donc invoquer la protection des droits d’auteur de ses documents d’appel d’offres pour autant que ces derniers constituent une œuvre au sens de l’art. 2 LDA. Dans ce contexte, les plans et les dessins présentent un intérêt particulier, étant donné qu’ils constituent une œuvre au sens de la LDA s’ils ont un caractère individuel et si leur contenu est de nature scientifique ou technique.

35. Comme expliqué plus haut, les documents d’appel d’offres peuvent être protégés par le droit d’auteur si les conditions de l’art. 2 LDA sont remplies. Dans ce cas, l’auteur de l’œuvre est le pouvoir adjudicateur, c’est-à-dire la collectivité publique, qui est dotée de la personnalité juridique. La distribution des documents d’appel d’offres ne constitue pas une aliénation au sens de l’art. 12, al. 1, LDA, ni un transfert des droits au sens de l’art. 16, al. 1, LDA, et le pouvoir adjudicateur conserve en principe les droits d’auteur sur cette documentation. En cas de violation du droit d’auteur, le pouvoir adjudicateur peut notamment intenter une action civile (art. 61 ss. LDA) ou une action pénale (art. 67 LDA).

36. En ce qui concerne la justification d’un émolument de protection selon la LMI, il convient de rappeler les principes susmentionnés. L’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI prévoit que les restrictions doivent prendre la forme de charges ou de conditions et ne sont autorisées que si elles répondent au principe de la proportionnalité. Étant donné que la LDA met à disposition des moyens de recours pour les documents d’appel d’offres protégés par le droit d’auteur, il n’est en principe pas nécessaire de prévoir des mesures supplémentaires. Par conséquent, la protection des droits d’auteur ne saurait justifier la perception d’émoluments de protection au regard de l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI.

37. S’agissant spécifiquement des plans, il convient de relever qu’outre les moyens de recours prévus par la LDA, la loi fédérale du 19 décembre 1986 contre la concurrence déloyale (LCD; RS 241) peut s’appliquer à l’utilisation des documents d’appel d’offres. Selon l’art. 5, let. a, LCD, agit de façon déloyale celui qui, notamment, exploite de façon indue le résultat d’un travail qui lui a été confié, par exemple des offres, des calculs ou des plans.

38. Il y a lieu, par ailleurs, de se demander pourquoi les documents d’appel d’offres devraient être mis à disposition uniquement de façon restreinte en cas de craintes fondées d’une éventuelle violation des droits d’auteur. Les autres possibilités mentionnées plus haut seraient là aussi envisageables, à savoir la conclusion d’un accord de confidentialité, le choix d’une procédure sélective, la diffusion graduelle des informations ou le refus d’accès sur la base de l’interdiction de l’abus de droit.

39. S’agissant de l’admissibilité de la protection des droits d’auteur pour justifier la perception d’émoluments de protection, on retiendra ce qui suit: étant donné que le pouvoir adjudicateur conserve le droit d’auteur même après la diffusion des documents d’appel d’offres, la perception d’un émolument de protection ne constitue pas un moyen adéquat pour préserver ce droit. Comme dans le cas de la protection des secrets d’affaires, la protection des droits d’auteur ne peut donc pas être invoquée pour justifier la perception d’émoluments, le critère de proportionnalité de l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI n’étant pas rempli.

41. Il ressort de ce qui précède que la perception d’émoluments de protection constitue en général une restriction discriminante à la liberté d’accès au marché au sens de l’art. 5, al. 1, LMI, qui ne saurait être justifiée par la protection des secrets d’affaires ou des droits d’auteur selon l’art. 3 LMI.

43. Un marché est considéré comme ouvert lorsqu’il offre un accès aussi libre que possible et que les barrières à l’entrée sont réduites au minimum. La perception d’émoluments de protection dans le cadre de marchés publics constitue une barrière financière à l’entrée.

(…) L’intensité de la concurrence tend à s’accroître avec le nombre d’offres. Une large palette d’offres et la concurrence entre les offreurs profitent à l’entité adjudicatrice, car cette dernière peut faire son choix parmi un grand nombre de propositions comparables. À l’inverse, un nombre d’offres réduit nuit à la concurrence, l’entité adjudicatrice devant alors baser son choix sur moins d’offres comparables, ce qui limite ses chances de sélectionner la meilleure offre.


8. Recommandation
50. En résumé, la COMCO parvient aux conclusions suivantes:
A Constatations

1.   A-1  La perception d’émoluments de protection pour la mise à disposition de documents dans les marchés publics cantonaux ou communaux constitue de manière générale une discrimination au sens de l’art. 5, al. 1, LMI et donc une violation de cette norme.

2.   A-2  Sur la base de l’art. 3, al. 1, LMI, la protection des secrets d’affaires et des droits d’auteur ne constituent pas des motifs pouvant justifier la restriction de la liberté d’accès au marché, étant donné que, conformément au principe de proportionnalité, d’autres mesures moins contraignantes sont également possibles.

Dans la mesure où les motifs avancés ne remplissent pas les conditions posées à l’art. 3 al. 1, LMI, la restriction à la liberté d’accès au marché constitue une violation de l’art. 5 LMI. Il appartient aux pouvoirs adjudicateurs de fournir d’autres motifs valables selon l’art. 3, al. 1, LMI.

A-3 Des mesures moins contraignantes peuvent être examinées:

·       -  accords contractuels (accord de confidentialité, p. ex.);

·       -  choix d’une procédure sélective;

·       -  mise à disposition graduelle des documents d’appel d’offres;

·       -  refus de l’accès aux documents d’appel d’offres fondé sur l’interdiction de l’abus de droit.

B Recommandation
B-1 La COMCO recommande de renoncer aux émoluments de protection pour la mise à disposition des documents d’appel d’offres dans les marchés publics cantonaux ou communaux.

23 ATF 142 II 268 consid. 5.2.1.
24 ISABELLE HÄNER, « Zugang zu Informationen, Öffentlichkeitsprinzip – Geschäftsgeheimnis », in: Zeitschrift für Datenrecht und Informationssicherheit, 2016, p. 119 s.
25 KAMEN TROLLER, Grundzüge des schweizerischen Immaterialgüterrechts, 2001, p. 170 s.


(COMCO - Recommandation du 8 avril 2019, DCP 2019-4, p. 1278-1282: Recommandation au sens de l’art. 8, al. 3, de la loi fédérale du 6 octobre 1995 sur le marché intérieur concernant les émoluments de protection dans les marchés publics à l’intention des gouvernements cantonaux)