California Court of Appeal, Prickett v. Bonnier Corp., Docket No. G058575

Admiralty Law

Admiralty Jurisdiction (Over a Tort Claim)

Scuba Diving Accident

Loss of Consortium

Loss of Society

 

Maintenance and Cure

Punitive Damages

State Territorial Waters

 

California Law

 

(…) Admiralty law has evolved since the days when it was entirely judge-made and mariners were practically wards of the court. Since the early 20th century, when Congress began legislating in this area, the role of the courts has changed from leader to follower, from promulgation to interpretation. As the United States Supreme Court has explained in its most recent opinion on the matter, the courts must now leave the development of novel claims and remedies to the legislatures. For that reason, we must affirm the judgment in this case.

 

Prickett, like her father a Hawaii resident, sued Bonnier in Orange County Superior Court for gross negligence, for “peculiar risk,” and “rescue doctrine” under general maritime law. She asked for compensatory damages for loss of her father’s society and also for punitive damages.

 

California state law does not permit recovery by a child for loss of consortium. (Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 399.)

 

In actions founded on federal law, state law governs in procedural matters unless a federal statute provides otherwise. (Simmons v. Ware (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1047.)

 

The existence of admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim depends on two factors: location and connection. “A court applying the location test must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. [Citation.] The connection test raises two issues. A court, first, must ‘assess the general features of the type of incident involved,’ [citation], to determine whether the incident has ‘a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.’ [Citation.] Second, a court must determine whether ‘the general character’ of the ‘activity giving rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.’ [Citation.]” (Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock (1995) 513 U.S. 527, 534 (Grubart).) Admiralty jurisdiction is undisputed in this case, and we agree the circumstances – a scuba diving accident in the waters around French Polynesia – comply with the location and connection test as set forth in Grubart.

 

Dutra Grp. v. Batterton __ U.S. __ [139 S.Ct. 2275, 2279]:

The immediate issue in Dutra, as it was in the underlying Ninth Circuit’s Batterton decision, was the availability of punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases. (Dutra, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 2278.)

Dutra includes a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of maritime law – in both its common-law and statutory forms – since the early 19th century. According to the Supreme Court, admiralty law was exclusively judge-made until 1920, when Congress enacted the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C.S. Appen. § 688 et seq., better known as the Jones Act. The Court described the Jones Act as codifying the rights of injured mariners and creating new statutory claims that were freed from many of the common-law limitations on recovery. (Dutra, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 2281.) The Jones Act also provided injured mariners with the right to a jury trial. (Ibid.)

 

(…) Observing that neither the Death on the High Seas Act nor the Jones Act allowed loss of society damages, the Miles court had concluded, “The general maritime claim here alleged that decedent had been killed as a result of the unseaworthiness of the vessel. It would be inconsistent with our place in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more expansive remedies in a judicially created cause of action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death resulting from negligence. We must conclude that there is no recovery for loss of society in a general maritime action for the wrongful death of a Jones Act seaman.” (Miles, supra, 498 U.S. at pp. 32-33.) Atlantic Sounding held that punitive damages were recoverable in an action based on maintenance and cure. (Atlantic Sounding, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 407.) The Supreme Court reaffirmed both cases.

 

(Maintenance and cure, another early judge-made doctrine, required a ship’s master to provide food, lodging, and medical care to a seaman injured while serving aboard ship. This doctrine developed to prevent a ship’s owner or captain from dumping an injured seaman at the nearest port and leaving him to fend for himself. (Dutra, supra, 139 S.Ct. at pp. 2279, 2286.)

 

(…) Awards for punitive damages in maintenance and cure actions were a long-accepted remedy under general maritime law before the Jones Act. (Atlantic Sounding, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 424.) By contrast, there was no history of punitive damages awards in unseaworthiness claims, and so the court, constrained by Miles, declined to recognize “a new entitlement to punitive damages where none previously existed.” (Dutra, supra, 139 S.Ct. at pp. 2284, 2287.)

 

(…) In this case, during the hearing on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, Prickett’s counsel informed the court that his client “is not suing for unseaworthiness” and that her father “is not alleged to have been a seaman.” He also disclaimed any resort to the Jones Act. In her opening brief in this appeal, Prickett asserts that her case is not covered by the Jones Act or the Death on the High Seas Act, that the accident occurred on the high seas, and that her father was neither a seaman nor fatally injured. We accept those analyses.

 

((…) Chan v. Society Expeditions, Inc. (9th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 1398 (Chan). The Chan court recognized a different outcome for longshoremen and passengers injured or killed in state territorial waters, that is, within three miles of shore. (Chan, supra, 39 F.3d at p. 1407.)).

 

((…) The Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C.S. section 30302, provides, “When the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible. The action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s spouse, parent, child, or dependent relative.”).

 

Like the court in Chan, we conclude Miles precludes us from recognizing an entitlement to a remedy under general maritime law where none previously existed. Prickett has not cited any published case in which a child was allowed to sue for loss of society damages for a nonfatal injury to a non-seaman on the high seas. Both Miles and Dutra militate against us being the first to do so.

 

(California Court of Appeal, October 13, 2020, Prickett v. Bonnier Corp., Docket No. G058575, Certified for Publication)