U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., Total Produce, PLC, Docket No. 18-11595

Dicta

Judicial Precedent

(…) Fresh Results argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider all relevant public factors after concluding that the private factors were not in equipoise. The equipoise standard employed by the district court comes from dicta in our caselaw. Although our holdings are precedential, our dicta are not. See United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2017). Dicta refer to “those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to deciding the case then before us.” Id.  In contrast, our holdings “constitute the precedent, as a point necessarily decided” in that case. Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 4, at 44 (2016); accord Powell v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “a holding is comprised both of the result of the case and those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound”). And we have explained that, “regardless of what a court says in its opinion, the decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that case.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Fresh Results, LLC, a Delaware LLC, v. ASF Holland, B.V., a Dutch Corporation, Total Produce, PLC, an Irish Public Limited Company, April 22, 2019, Docket No. 18-11595, Circuit Judge William Pryor, for Publication)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv

Copyright

Direct Infringement

Volitional Conduct Requirement

Internet Law

Internet Service Provider (ISP)

Metadata

URL

Secondary Liability

DMCA Safe Harbor

Abusive Litigation

Contempt of Court

A Per Curiam Opinion.

John M. Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in the result: Polyvore is an internet service provider that ran a website, Polyvore.com, that allowed users to create and share digital photo collages devoted to fashion, art, and design. Polyvore.com’s “Clipper” tool let users “clip” images from other websites and collect them on Polyvore’s site.

When a user uploaded an image to Polyvore.com, it triggered a series of automatic technical processes: Polyvore (1) attached a hyperlink to that image that linked back to the image’s original site; (2) gave the image a unique Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) that identified its precise location on Polyvore’s website, Polyvore.com; and (3) indexed the photo so it was searchable on Polyvore.com. All posted images were displayed automatically by software—meaning Polyvore employees did not review or interact with user‐posted images before they appeared on the site. Based on these user uploads, Polyvore.com had an extensive library of searchable images—118 million when the complaint was filed.

Because some photos clipped by users were copyrighted images, Polyvore had policies in place that were designed to combat copyright infringement, including terms of service that prohibited users from posting copyrighted images, a repeat‐infringer policy, and a notice‐and‐takedown system.

BWP owns copyrights in celebrity photographs, which it licenses to online and print publications for a fee.

The Volitional Conduct Requirement:

Section 106 of the Copyright Act gives copyright holders an exclusive bundle of rights, including the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,” and the right to “display the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (5). The Copyright Act makes parties who infringe on those rights liable for damages, regardless of whether they had knowledge that the content was infringing. See 17 U.S.C. § 504. In other words, the Copyright Act is a strict liability regime. See EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 844 F.3d 79, 89 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter “MP3tunes”], cert. denied sub nom. Robertson v. EMI Christian Music Grp., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2269 (2017).

The advent of the internet posed a problem for this regime, however, since applying strict liability to infringing content posted online meant that websites could be held liable for infringing content posted by their users based solely on the existence of the website—an outcome that could be unfair. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On‐Line Commcʹn Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368–70 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In response, beginning in the mid‐1990s, courts began to read into the Copyright Act an implicit requirement that for a service provider to be liable for direct infringement, it must have taken some affirmative, volitional step to infringe. See id. The doctrine posits that to hold a service provider liable for direct copyright infringement, that infringement must have resulted from the provider’s own volitional conduct. See id.

(…) An ISP acts volitionally when it creates a program designed to infringe copyrighted material and selects the copyrighted material that it copies. See MP3tunes, 1 844 F.3d at 96.

(…) In contrast, the volitional conduct requirement is not satisfied when an ISP simply displays user‐uploaded images and plays no role in selecting the images.

(…) This principle is also articulated by Justice Scalia in his Aereo dissent: “The defendant may be held directly liable only if the defendant itself ‘trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.’” Aereo, 573 U.S. at 454 (quoting CoStar, 373 F.3d at 550). “Most of the time that issue will come down to who selects the copyrighted content: the defendant or its customers.” Id. at 454–55 (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131–132).

(…) Likewise, an ISP does not act volitionally when it automatically makes a single copy of content selected by the user in response to a user’s request. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123, 132. (…) “Dish’s program created the copy only in response to the user’s command”.

(…) ISPs that provide additional unrequested copies of copyrighted material in response to a user’s request for a single copy, however, may be liable for direct infringement. See MP3tunes, 844 F.3d at 96.

(…) accord Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9^th Cir. 2007) (holding that copyright holders who challenged Google’s creation of a thumbnail version of their copyrighted images, which the user had not specifically requested be made, had made out a prima facie case of direct copyright infringement).

In this case, there is no evidence that Polyvore designed the Clipper to retrieve exclusively a specific kind of image that Polyvore knew to be copyrighted. Instead, the evidence shows that Polyvore designed a tool that its users could use to clip images generally, whether copyrighted or not. Thus the single act of designing the Clipper does not amount to volitional conduct that can be said to “cause the copy to be made” each time its users selected the image and used the Clipper to create a single copy of the image. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 1 131. Accordingly, Polyvore cannot be liable for direct copyright infringement for designing the Clipper to simply retrieve photos picked out by users from other websites (before Polyvore makes any copies).

Likewise, the undisputed record in this case shows that one copy of user‐uploaded images on Polyvore’s website was displayed automatically by Polyvore’s software. Like the defendant ISP in CoStar, Polyvore simply served as a “conduit” that allowed the user to display his clipped images. 373 F.3d at 551. This “conduit” function aligns Polyvore with the hypothetical ISP that only displayed user supplied content that we discussed in Cablevision. 536 F.3d at 132. At the user’s direction, Polyvore simply displayed the image its user directed it to display. As to that one copy, it is clear to me that the user, who selected the item to be copied, and not Polyvore, “caused the copy to be made.” Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131. Thus, in accordance with Cablevision, Polyvore is not liable for displaying the images its users uploaded.

(…) And, by stripping its resized images of their metadata and housing them at separate URLs where they were able to be viewed by anyone, Polyvore is alleged to have gone further than the defendant in Perfect 10, who only made temporary thumbnail versions of the relevant images. 508 F.3d at 1160‐61.

(…) I think secondary liability is the proper framework for holding an ISP liable for copyright infringement when the ISP does not select the copyrighted material and make the infringing copy itself but is aware of it and encourages or contributes to the infringement by the direct volitional infringer.

(…) Polyvore next argues that even if a jury could find that it directly infringed BWP’s exclusive rights to display and reproduce its copyrighted images, Polyvore cannot be held liable for direct infringement because it qualifies for the safe harbor of § 512(c) found in Title II of the DMCA. Congress passed Title II of the DMCA in 1998 to “clarify the liability faced by service providers who transmit potentially infringing material over their networks.” Viacom Intʹl, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105–190 at 2 (1998)). The act established four safe harbors to spare ISPs from liability for “claims of copyright infringement based on (a) ‘transitory digital network communications,’ (b) ‘system caching,’ (c) ‘information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users,’ and (d) ‘information location tools.’” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 27 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)‐(d)). (…) A service provider that meets all of these criteria is shielded from copyright liability as long as it also “has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and . . . accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1). Since the DMCA safe harbors are affirmative defenses, a defendant generally has the initial burden of establishing that it meets the statutory requirements. See Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 14 F.3d 78, 94 (2d Cir. 2016).

In response, BWP argues that Polyvore is not eligible for any safe harbor under the DMCA because (1) by altering the metadata of 26 images uploaded to its site it interfered with “standard technical measures” in contravention of § 512(i), and (2) the copying of the additional images was not infringement “at the direction of the user.” Appellant’s Br. at 41. I agree with Polyvore that BWP has not raised an issue of material fact as to whether preserving metadata is a “standard technical measure,” but other questions of material fact still prevent me from saying that Polyvore has shown that the copying here was done “at the direction of the user.”

Metadata as a standard technical measure

Because the district court held that Polyvore’s conduct was not infringing, it did not address whether Polyvore’s stripping of metadata interfered impermissibly with “standard technical measures” such that Polyvore was not eligible for the DMCA safe harbor. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). Because the proper interpretation of the statutory phrase “standard technical measures” is a question of law, I address it even though the district court did not. The DMCA defines “standard technical measures” as “technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). To qualify as a standard technical measure, a practice must (1) “have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi‐industry standards process,” (2) be “available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms,” and (3) “not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on their systems or networks.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2). When a measure meets these qualifications, “refusing to accommodate or implement a ‘standard technical measure’ exposes a service provider to liability.” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 41. In other words, section 512(i) encourages copyright owners and ISPs to work together to establish technical means by which service providers can cheaply and easily identify infringing material. See Ventura Content, Ltd. v. Motherless, Inc., 885 F.3d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 2018) (“One can imagine a digital version of the old c in a circle (©) automatically triggering the uploading software to exclude material so marked by the copyright owner.”). At issue here is whether metadata such as that used in the images in this case has become a “standard technical measure.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).

The caselaw provides little guidance on how to know when a widely followed practice has evolved into a “standard technical measure.”

(…) I need not expound upon what may or may not constitute a “standard technical measure” because BWP has not come close to establishing that there is a broad consensus among copyright owners and service providers that preserving metadata should be so considered.

(…) 17 16 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1204, which establish civil and criminal penalties for removing “copyright management information”.

(…) More broadly, Congress did not leave it to the courts to simply pronounce out of thin air that a given technical measure has become a “standard” in the industry such that interfering with it prevents an ISP from claiming the protection of the § 512(c) safe harbors. It is plain from § 512(i) itself that such a pronouncement can only come from “a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi‐industry standards process.” 17 U.S.C. §512(i)(2)(A). I see nothing to show, to date, that such a consensus or such a process has developed. For these reasons, BWP has failed to proffer evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that altering or destroying metadata disqualifies a service provider from the safe harbor protections of § 512(c).

(…) “The § 512(c) safe harbor is only available when the infringement occurs ‘by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.’” Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (emphasis added) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)) (…) Making copies of user‐uploaded materials solely to facilitate user access does not disqualify an ISP from availing itself of the § 512(c) safe harbor.

(…) However, notwithstanding the district court’s denial of legal fees, I cannot let pass my concern over BWP’s record of aggressive litigation, which entails filing hundreds of lawsuits directed at ISPs without even attempting to substantiate its claims in discovery (…) Here, the fact that BWP filed a lawsuit before simply asking Polyvore to take its images down suggests that BWP has a business model that involves abusing the federal courts (Op., p. 37).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, April 17, 2019, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv, Per Curiam)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv

Procedure

Injunctive Relief

Permanent Injunction

Mootness

Damages

Polyvore’s website appears to no longer exist. (…) Even if that is the case, however, BWP’s core claims for damages are unaffected because, “unlike claims for injunctive relief challenging ongoing conduct, a claim for damages cannot evade review” since “it remains live until it is settled, judicially resolved, or barred by a statute of limitations.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 77 (2013). On the other hand, BWP’s request for a permanent injunction would now be moot because Polyvore’s defunct website no longer displays plaintiffs’ photos. See Bank of New York Co. v. Ne. Bancorp, Inc., 9 F.3d 1065, 1067 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that requests for injunctions are “mooted by the occurrence of the action sought to be enjoined”). (John M. Walker, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in the result).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, April 17, 2019, BWP Media USA Inc., v. Polyvore, Inc., Docket No. 16-2825-cv, Per Curiam)

Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur - Update to Form I-526

Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur

USCIS Forms Update Notice

Update to Form I-526, Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur; New Edition Dated 04/15/19.

https://www.uscis.gov/i-526?utm_source=rss-feed&utm_campaign=Forms%20Updates

Contains:

Form I-526

Instructions for Form I-526

Form G-1145, E-Notification of Application/Petition Acceptance

Where to file instructions

Filling Fee

Forms Updates Link: https://www.uscis.gov/forms-updates

Entry Barriers (Antitrust - Swiss Law)

Barrières à l’entrée (droit suisse)

Marchés publics suisses (cantonaux et communaux)

Emoluments de protection en vue de protéger secret d’affaires et savoir-faire

La perception d’émoluments ne satisfait pas au principe de la proportionnalité. D’autres moyens existent : conclusion d’un accord de confidentialité, le choix d’une procédure sélective, la diffusion graduelle des informations ou le refus d’accès sur la base de l’interdiction de l’abus de droit

Droit d’auteur et concurrence déloyale peuvent être ici invoqués par le titulaire d’un secret d’affaires ou du savoir-faire


26. Les pouvoirs adjudicateurs interrogés ont justifié la perception d’émoluments de protection principalement par la volonté de protéger les secrets d’affaires contenus dans les documents d’appel d’offres. Ni la LMI ni l’AIMP ne proposent une définition de la notion de secret d’affaires. La violation du secret de fabrication ou du secret d’affaires (« secret commercial ») est mentionnée à l’art. 162 du code pénal suisse du 21 décembre 1937 (CP; RS 311.0). Plusieurs domaines juridiques se basent sur les critères définis par la jurisprudence pénale pour constater l’existence de secrets d’affaires. La notion de secret telle que précisée dans la jurisprudence du Tribunal fédéral recouvre toutes les informations qui ne sont pas publiques ou librement accessibles et que le détenteur du secret souhaite garder confidentielles en raison d’un intérêt légitime23. Un intérêt légitime au maintien du secret existe lorsque les informations en question sont importantes pour le succès commercial.24

Selon les avis reçus, la perception d’émoluments de protection est également justifiée par la protection du savoir-faire. L’interprétation juridique de la notion de savoir-faire présente des similitudes avec celle de la notion de secret de fabrication et de secret d’affaires au sens de l’art. 162 CP. Dans la pratique, le savoir-faire est défini comme les connaissances acquises par une entreprise en vue de résoudre des problèmes de fabrication de produits, de développement de services ou d’organisation de l’entreprise. L’entreprise détient l’exclusivité de ces connaissances tant qu’elle peut les garder secrètes.25

28. La majorité des pouvoirs adjudicateurs a invoqué la protection des secrets d’affaires contenus dans la documentation d’appel d’offres pour justifier la perception d’émoluments de protection. Il convient par conséquent de déterminer si cet argument constitue un motif valable au sens de l’art. 3 LMI. Les documents d’appel d’offres doivent présenter les biens ou services requis au moyen soit d’une description complète des produits ou des tâches, soit d’une liste détaillée des prestations; ils doivent en outre préciser les exigences à satisfaire. Au niveau fédéral, le contenu des documents d’appel d’offres est décrit à l’art. 18 de l’ordonnance du 11 décembre 1995 sur les marchés publics (OMP; RS 172.056.11). Il en ressort que la documentation doit contenir les informations nécessaires à la soumission d’une offre. Ces documents ainsi que les informations qu’ils fournissent sont destinés à tous les offreurs intéressés et, par conséquent, au grand public, étant donné que le pouvoir adjudicateur recherche un fournisseur de prestations et qu’il a en principe intérêt à recevoir plusieurs offres. Comme mentionné plus haut, l’existence d’un secret d’affaires présuppose les éléments suivants: il doit s’agir d’informations qui ne sont pas publiques ou librement accessibles et pour lesquelles il existe un intérêt subjectif ou objectif au maintien du secret. La grande majorité des informations régulièrement communiquées dans les documents d’appel d’offres ne sont pas des faits qui doivent rester confidentiels. Toutefois, selon le mandat, les documents d’appel d’offres peuvent ponctuellement contenir des secrets d’affaires qui doivent, dans certains cas, être protégés contre des offreurs potentiels.

(…) La perception d’émoluments ne satisfait pas au principe de la proportionnalité énoncé à l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI.


(…) Conditionner la transmission des documents d’appel d’offres au paiement d’un émolument ne protège pas les éventuels secrets commerciaux, puisque ces derniers sont communiqués après versement de l’émolument. La perception d’un émolument peut certes réduire le nombre de personnes qui demandent la documentation d’appel d’offres, mais il ne s’agit pas d’un moyen adéquat pour garantir la protection des secrets d’affaires.

31. Même si la perception d’émoluments de protection constituait un moyen adéquat pour protéger les secrets commerciaux, il faudrait, en vertu du principe de proportionnalité énoncé à l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI, qu’elle représente le moyen le moins lourd pour y parvenir. Or, ce n’est pas le cas. Il est par exemple d’usage de conclure au préalable un accord visant à protéger les secrets d’affaires (accord de confidentialité prévoyant une peine conventionnelle). Il est en outre possible de mener une procédure sélective (art. 12, al. 1, let. b, AIMP). Dans ce type de procédure, les personnes intéressées ne déposent pas directement une offre à l’adjudicateur, mais présentent une demande de participation. L’adjudicateur détermine ensuite quels candidats répondent aux critères d’aptitude. Seuls ceux qui satisfont aux exigences reçoivent ensuite les documents d’appel d’offres et sont invités à soumissionner. Une autre possibilité, parfois mise à profit, consiste à diffuser les informations gra- duellement, en fournissant des informations essentielles et détaillées dès la publication du marché sur SIMAP, ce qui permet de transmettre ensuite les documents d’appel d’offres contenant des secrets d’affaires uniquement aux offreurs intéressés. En dernier recours, il serait également possible, en cas de demande indue, de refuser l’accès aux documents d’appels d’offres sur la base de l’interdiction de l’abus de droit. Il ressort de ce qui précède qu’il existe plusieurs possibilités moins contraignantes pour protéger les secrets d’affaires. Par conséquent, la perception d’émoluments de protection ne constitue pas la méthode la moins lourde et ne répond pas au principe de proportionnalité prévu à l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI.

32. En conclusion, il ressort de la présente section que la perception d’émoluments pour protéger les éventuels secrets d’affaires (et le savoir-faire) n’est pas conforme au principe de proportionnalité prévu à l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI, dès lors que les émoluments ne sont pas adéquats et ne constituent pas le moyen le moins lourd à cette fin (d’autres possibilités moins contraignantes existent).

5.3.1 Application de la loi sur le droit d’auteur

Le droit d’auteur ne protège pas les décisions, procès-verbaux et rapports qui émanent des autorités ou des administrations publiques (art. 5, al. 1, let. c, LDA). En revanche, il s’applique aux documents internes à l’administration, comme les avis et les rapports d’expert.

En l’absence de dispositions dérogatoires et de pratique ou doctrine divergentes, la possibilité de protéger les dossiers d’appel d’offres par le droit d’auteur doit par conséquent être évaluée à l’aune des principes énoncés à l’art. 2 LDA. Un pouvoir adjudicateur public peut donc invoquer la protection des droits d’auteur de ses documents d’appel d’offres pour autant que ces derniers constituent une œuvre au sens de l’art. 2 LDA. Dans ce contexte, les plans et les dessins présentent un intérêt particulier, étant donné qu’ils constituent une œuvre au sens de la LDA s’ils ont un caractère individuel et si leur contenu est de nature scientifique ou technique.

35. Comme expliqué plus haut, les documents d’appel d’offres peuvent être protégés par le droit d’auteur si les conditions de l’art. 2 LDA sont remplies. Dans ce cas, l’auteur de l’œuvre est le pouvoir adjudicateur, c’est-à-dire la collectivité publique, qui est dotée de la personnalité juridique. La distribution des documents d’appel d’offres ne constitue pas une aliénation au sens de l’art. 12, al. 1, LDA, ni un transfert des droits au sens de l’art. 16, al. 1, LDA, et le pouvoir adjudicateur conserve en principe les droits d’auteur sur cette documentation. En cas de violation du droit d’auteur, le pouvoir adjudicateur peut notamment intenter une action civile (art. 61 ss. LDA) ou une action pénale (art. 67 LDA).

36. En ce qui concerne la justification d’un émolument de protection selon la LMI, il convient de rappeler les principes susmentionnés. L’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI prévoit que les restrictions doivent prendre la forme de charges ou de conditions et ne sont autorisées que si elles répondent au principe de la proportionnalité. Étant donné que la LDA met à disposition des moyens de recours pour les documents d’appel d’offres protégés par le droit d’auteur, il n’est en principe pas nécessaire de prévoir des mesures supplémentaires. Par conséquent, la protection des droits d’auteur ne saurait justifier la perception d’émoluments de protection au regard de l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI.

37. S’agissant spécifiquement des plans, il convient de relever qu’outre les moyens de recours prévus par la LDA, la loi fédérale du 19 décembre 1986 contre la concurrence déloyale (LCD; RS 241) peut s’appliquer à l’utilisation des documents d’appel d’offres. Selon l’art. 5, let. a, LCD, agit de façon déloyale celui qui, notamment, exploite de façon indue le résultat d’un travail qui lui a été confié, par exemple des offres, des calculs ou des plans.

38. Il y a lieu, par ailleurs, de se demander pourquoi les documents d’appel d’offres devraient être mis à disposition uniquement de façon restreinte en cas de craintes fondées d’une éventuelle violation des droits d’auteur. Les autres possibilités mentionnées plus haut seraient là aussi envisageables, à savoir la conclusion d’un accord de confidentialité, le choix d’une procédure sélective, la diffusion graduelle des informations ou le refus d’accès sur la base de l’interdiction de l’abus de droit.

39. S’agissant de l’admissibilité de la protection des droits d’auteur pour justifier la perception d’émoluments de protection, on retiendra ce qui suit: étant donné que le pouvoir adjudicateur conserve le droit d’auteur même après la diffusion des documents d’appel d’offres, la perception d’un émolument de protection ne constitue pas un moyen adéquat pour préserver ce droit. Comme dans le cas de la protection des secrets d’affaires, la protection des droits d’auteur ne peut donc pas être invoquée pour justifier la perception d’émoluments, le critère de proportionnalité de l’art. 3, al. 1, let. c, LMI n’étant pas rempli.

41. Il ressort de ce qui précède que la perception d’émoluments de protection constitue en général une restriction discriminante à la liberté d’accès au marché au sens de l’art. 5, al. 1, LMI, qui ne saurait être justifiée par la protection des secrets d’affaires ou des droits d’auteur selon l’art. 3 LMI.

43. Un marché est considéré comme ouvert lorsqu’il offre un accès aussi libre que possible et que les barrières à l’entrée sont réduites au minimum. La perception d’émoluments de protection dans le cadre de marchés publics constitue une barrière financière à l’entrée.

(…) L’intensité de la concurrence tend à s’accroître avec le nombre d’offres. Une large palette d’offres et la concurrence entre les offreurs profitent à l’entité adjudicatrice, car cette dernière peut faire son choix parmi un grand nombre de propositions comparables. À l’inverse, un nombre d’offres réduit nuit à la concurrence, l’entité adjudicatrice devant alors baser son choix sur moins d’offres comparables, ce qui limite ses chances de sélectionner la meilleure offre.


8. Recommandation
50. En résumé, la COMCO parvient aux conclusions suivantes:
A Constatations

1.   A-1  La perception d’émoluments de protection pour la mise à disposition de documents dans les marchés publics cantonaux ou communaux constitue de manière générale une discrimination au sens de l’art. 5, al. 1, LMI et donc une violation de cette norme.

2.   A-2  Sur la base de l’art. 3, al. 1, LMI, la protection des secrets d’affaires et des droits d’auteur ne constituent pas des motifs pouvant justifier la restriction de la liberté d’accès au marché, étant donné que, conformément au principe de proportionnalité, d’autres mesures moins contraignantes sont également possibles.

Dans la mesure où les motifs avancés ne remplissent pas les conditions posées à l’art. 3 al. 1, LMI, la restriction à la liberté d’accès au marché constitue une violation de l’art. 5 LMI. Il appartient aux pouvoirs adjudicateurs de fournir d’autres motifs valables selon l’art. 3, al. 1, LMI.

A-3 Des mesures moins contraignantes peuvent être examinées:

·       -  accords contractuels (accord de confidentialité, p. ex.);

·       -  choix d’une procédure sélective;

·       -  mise à disposition graduelle des documents d’appel d’offres;

·       -  refus de l’accès aux documents d’appel d’offres fondé sur l’interdiction de l’abus de droit.

B Recommandation
B-1 La COMCO recommande de renoncer aux émoluments de protection pour la mise à disposition des documents d’appel d’offres dans les marchés publics cantonaux ou communaux.

23 ATF 142 II 268 consid. 5.2.1.
24 ISABELLE HÄNER, « Zugang zu Informationen, Öffentlichkeitsprinzip – Geschäftsgeheimnis », in: Zeitschrift für Datenrecht und Informationssicherheit, 2016, p. 119 s.
25 KAMEN TROLLER, Grundzüge des schweizerischen Immaterialgüterrechts, 2001, p. 170 s.


(COMCO - Recommandation du 8 avril 2019, DCP 2019-4, p. 1278-1282: Recommandation au sens de l’art. 8, al. 3, de la loi fédérale du 6 octobre 1995 sur le marché intérieur concernant les émoluments de protection dans les marchés publics à l’intention des gouvernements cantonaux)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc., Docket No. 18-1075

Trade Secrets

Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), 18 U.S.C. § 1836

Iowa Trade Secrets Law, Iowa Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), Iowa Code § 550

Statute of Limitations

Discovery Rule

Conversion ("Civil Equivalent" to Theft)

Unjust Enrichment

In Equity v. at Law

Equitable Claim

Iowa Law

Statutory Causes of Action

The DTSA creates a private right of action for an owner of a trade secret when that secret has been misappropriated, if the secret relates to a product used in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1836. Trade secrets include, as relevant here, "scientific, technical . . . engineering information, including patterns, plans, . . . designs." Id. § 1839(3). However such information only qualifies as a trade secret if the owner has "taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret" and the information has economic value. Id. § 1839(3). "Misappropriation" essentially means to acquire the trade secret of another by improper means and without the owner's consent. Id. § 1839(5)-(6). The UTSA is similar and both statutes have a three-year statute of limitations for bringing a claim for trade secret misappropriation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d); Iowa Code § 550.8.

The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until such time as the injured person knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, the fact and cause of the injury. Woodroffe v. Hasenclever, 540 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1995). The rule extends when the plaintiff "first becomes aware of facts that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to begin seeking information as to the problem and its cause." Estate of Montag v. T H Agric. & Nutrition Co., 509 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa 1993). The ultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed. Franzen v. Deere & Co., 377 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 1985). Once a plaintiff is on inquiry notice, he is charged with knowledge that a reasonably diligent investigation would have disclosed, and has a duty to do such an investigation, regardless of the plaintiff's exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49. The plaintiff need only know a problem exists. Id. While this can be an issue for the factfinder, it is not always so. See, e.g., Shams v. Hassan, 905 N.W.2d 158, 163 (Iowa 2017) (holding that this inquiry can be one for the factfinder "unless the issue is so clear it can be resolved as a matter of law"). While Iowa Parts has the burden of proving the statute of limitations bars the action, CMI Roadbuilding has the burden of proving the discovery rule tolls application of the statutory bar. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc. v. Acorn Window Sys., Inc., 394 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2005).

(…) Application of the inquiry notice portion of the discovery rule. As stated above, the ultimate focus is whether the plaintiff was aware a problem existed. Franzen, 377 N.W.2d at 662.

(…) At the point it was on notice there was a possible problem, it had a duty to investigate, regardless of its exact knowledge. Woodroffe, 540 N.W.2d at 48-49.

Unjust Enrichment

Equitable Claim

Even if the unjust enrichment claim was not time-barred, which it likely was, see Iowa Code § 614.1(4), Iowa Parts was entitled to summary judgment because an equitable claim fails when there is an adequate remedy at law. Where a party seeks damages pursuant to both a statutory and an equitable claim, the very existence of the statutory claims bars recovery on the equitable claim, "even if recovery under the statutes is time-barred." United States v. Bame, 721 F.3d 1025, 1031 (8th Cir. 2013).

(…) Indeed, Iowa law recognizes that "equity generally will not provide relief where an adequate remedy at law existed and defendant was denied that relief for appropriate legal reasons." Mosebach v. Blythe, 282 N.W.2d 755, 761 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979). See also State ex rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154 n.2 (Iowa 2001) ("The adequacy of a legal remedy is a general limitation on the exercise of equity jurisdiction . . . .").

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, April 4, 2019, CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc., Docket No. 18-1075)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Kroma Makeup EU, LLC (a United Kingdom Limited Liability Company), v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc. (a Nevada Corporation), Docket No. 17-14211, Published

Trademark

Jurisdiction

Conflict of Laws

Distribution Agreement

Licensing Agreement

Standing to Sue

Statutory Standing

Cause of Action

Import in Europe

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

Promissory Estoppel (under Florida Law)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Our sister courts of appeals have agreed with the general sentiment that a license agreement between two parties can limit a licensee’s ability to bring a Lanham Act claim.

Plaintiff-Appellant Kroma Makeup EU, LLC (“Kroma EU”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment based on its finding that Kroma EU lacked standing to enforce the KROMA trademark. Because Kroma EU does not have sufficient rights in the mark to sue under the Lanham Act, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

Kroma EU is the former European distributor of cosmetics products using the federally registered mark, KROMA. The owner and registrant of the mark is By Lee Tillett, Inc. (“Tillett”) and the rights to use the KROMA mark in the United States rest solely with Tillett. In October 2012, Tillett granted an exclusive license to Kroma EU to import, sell, and distribute KROMA products in Europe, and to use the KROMA mark in furtherance of its business. As part of the licensing agreement, Tillett guaranteed that it owned the KROMA mark and would hold Kroma EU harmless from any judgments against Tillett based on the mark. Tillett retained the right to use the KROMA mark in the United States.

Defendant-Appellees—the Kardashian sisters—were celebrity endorsers of a cosmetic line called “Khroma Beauty,” sold and manufactured by Defendant Boldface Licensing & Branding, Inc. (“Boldface”). The Kardashians claim that they had no personal knowledge of the KROMA trademark until an entertainment news website, TMZ, published an article about the Kardashians’ potential infringement. However, before the Khroma Beauty line launched, Boldface had purportedly conducted a trademark search that revealed the existence of the KROMA mark. The Kardashians claim that they did not receive this information. Boldface sought to register the KHROMA or KARDASHIAN KHROMA mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, but registration was denied because of likelihood of confusion with the previously registered KROMA mark.

After the Khroma line was released, Boldface sought a declaratory judgment in California federal court that Boldface did not infringe the KROMA trademark. There, Tillett filed a trademark infringement counterclaim, adding the Kardashians as counterclaim defendants. The California district court granted Tillett’s motion for a preliminary injunction against Boldface, finding that Tillett had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the trademark infringement claim. Boldface Licensing + Branding v. By Lee Tillett, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (C.D. Cal. 2013). Thereafter, Boldface rebranded the product line to “Kardashian Beauty” and the parties settled the dispute. Kroma was not a party to the California action and did not receive a share of the settlement recovery from Tillett.

Kroma EU subsequently filed this action in the Middle District of Florida against Boldface and the Kardashians, alleging that Boldface directly infringed the KROMA trademark under common law trademark infringement and the Lanham Act by distributing “Khroma” branded cosmetics in Europe, and that the Kardashians were vicariously liable for Boldface’s infringement. Kroma EU also brought claims against Tillett, alleging a cause of action for promissory estoppel. As to the promissory estoppel claim, the district court held in an earlier order that under Florida law, a foreign licensee could not state a claim for promissory estoppel against its licensor; however, Kroma EU was able to proceed against Tillett under a breach of contract theory. Kroma Makeup EU, Ltd. v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-1551-ORL, 2015 WL 1708757, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2015).

The Kardashians moved for summary judgment arguing that Kroma EU did not have the requisite standing to bring the infringement action and that the trademark infringement cause of action was barred by claim preclusion. Kroma EU also moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. Earlier in the litigation, Tillett successfully moved to compel arbitration and Kroma EU’s claim against Tillett remains stayed pending the arbitration.

The district court granted the Kardashians’ motion. The court found that Kroma EU lacked standing to sue for trademark infringement and did not reach the Kardashians’ claim preclusion argument. Relying primarily on the licensing agreement between Tillett and Kroma EU, the district court held that the agreement “plainly authorized only Tillett to enforce the trademarks” and to “protect” the mark “from any attempts of illegal use,” while “Kroma EU’s sole directive was to inform Tillett of instances of infringement.” Based on this reading, the district court concluded that these provisions “plainly authorized only Tillett to enforce the trademarks governed by the License Agreement.” Therefore, Kroma EU “lacked contractual authority, and hence standing, to pursue § 1125(a) violations against infringers in its own capacity.” Based on Kroma EU’s purported lack of standing, the court denied Kroma EU’s motion for partial summary judgment as moot.

The issue before us is the extent of a licensee’s rights in a trademark infringement action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. While the Lanham Act typically evokes questions of standing, as a licensee, Kroma EU’s rights thereunder rely upon the licensing agreement it entered with Tillett. We adopt the position taken by the district courts in this circuit—that a licensee’s right to sue to protect the mark “largely depends on the rights granted to the licensee in the licensing agreement.” Drew Estate Holding Co. v. Fantasia Distrib., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting Hako-Med USA, Inc. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., No. 8:06-cv- 1790-T-27EAJ, 2006 WL 3755328, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2006)). See also Aceto Corp. v. TherapeuticsMD, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (“Standing to sue depends largely on the rights granted to the licensee under the licensing agreement.”).

(…) The statute affords a cause of action to “any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged.” But, despite this broad language, 1125(a) does not get “such an expansive reading” so as to allow “all factually injured plaintiffs to recover.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129 (2014) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv'r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 (1992)). This is especially true where, as here, a licensing agreement between two parties governs each party’s entitlement to infringement claims.

The court below focused its attention on whether the license agreement between Tillett and Kroma EU conferred adequate standing on Kroma EU to bring a claim under Section 1125(a). But, the question before us is not that of traditional standing. Indeed, it is “not of standing at all.” City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1276 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). Rather, it is whether the statute “grants the plaintiff the cause of action that he asserts.” Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1302 (2017). See also Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 128 n.4. (“We have on occasion referred to this inquiry as ‘statutory standing’ and treated it as effectively jurisdictional. That label is an improvement over the language of ‘prudential standing,’ since it correctly places the focus on the statute. But it, too, is misleading, since the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” In other words, does the licensing agreement between Tillett and Kroma EU give Kroma EU, the licensee, sufficient “rights in the name” to sue under the Lanham Act? Camp Creek Hosp. Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., 139 F.3d 1396, 1412 (11th Cir. 1998).

The answer is no.

To start, “a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests ‘fall within the zone of interest protected by the law invoked.’” Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). The licensing agreement affords rights and imposes obligations on the parties relating to the enforcement of any trademark claims. As such, there is little dispute between the parties that we turn to that agreement to determine if Kroma’s interests fall within the zone of interest protected by the Lanham Act. In so doing, we fall back on basic principles of contract interpretation and “construe the agreement as a whole,” Westport Ins. Corp. v. Tuskegee Newspapers, Inc., 402 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2005), careful to afford the plain language meaning of “each and every word the agreement contains,” Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir. 2009).

Here, applying the licensing agreement to this inquiry is a straightforward exercise. The plain language of the agreement demonstrates the parties’ intent for Tillett to retain all ownership and enforcement rights. Kroma EU—while it may have other rights under the agreement—does not possess the ability to assert its rights in the mark in this proceeding.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Kroma Makeup EU, LLC (a United Kingdom Limited Liability Company), v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc. (a Nevada Corporation), April 1, 2019, Docket No. 17-14211, Judge Goldberg, Published)

Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, United States Court of International Trade Judge, sitting by designation.