Bobby v. Van Hook

Sixth Amendment: entitles criminal defendants to the “‘effective assistance of counsel’”—that is, representation that does not fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness” in light of “prevailing professional norms.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970)). That standard is necessarily a general one. “No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.” 466 U. S., at 688–689. Restatements of professional standards, we have recognized, can be useful as “guides” to what reasonableness entails, but only to the extent they describe the professional norms prevailing when the representation took place. Id., at 688.

The Sixth Circuit ignored this limiting principle, relying on ABA guidelines announced 18 years after Van Hook went to trial. See 560 F. 3d, at 526–528 (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 10.7, comment., pp.81–83 (rev. ed. 2003)). The ABA standards in effect in 1985 described defense counsel’s duty to investigate both the merits and mitigating circumstances in general terms: “it is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction.” 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4–4.1, p. 4–53 (2d ed. 1980). The accompanying two-page commentary noted that defense counsel have “a substantial and important role to perform in raising mitigating factors,” and that “information concerning the defendant’s background, education, employment record, mental and emotional stability, family relationships, and the like, will be relevant, as will mitigating circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense itself.” Id., at 4–55.

Quite different are the ABA’s 131-page “Guidelines” for capital defense counsel, published in 2003, on which the Sixth Circuit relied. Those directives expanded what had been (in the 1980 Standards) a broad outline of defense counsel’s duties in all criminal cases into detailed prescriptions for legal representation of capital defendants. They discuss the duty to investigate mitigating evidence in exhaustive detail, specifying what attorneys should look for, where to look, and when to begin. See ABA Guidelines 10.7, comment., at 80–85. They include, for example, the requirement that counsel’s investigation cover every period of the defendant’s life from “the moment of conception,” id., at 81, and that counsel contact “virtually everyone . . . who knew the defendant and his family” and obtain records “concerning not only the client, but also his parents, grandparents, siblings, and children,” id., at 83. 

Judging counsel’s conduct in the 1980’s on the basis of these 2003 Guidelines—without even pausing to consider whether they reflected the prevailing professional practice at the time of the trial—was error.

To make matters worse, the Court of Appeals (following Circuit precedent) treated the ABA’s 2003 Guidelines not merely as evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys would do, but as inexorable commands with which all capital defense counsel “‘must fully comply.’” 560 F. 3d, at 526 (quoting Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F. 3d 690, 693 (CA6 2006)). Strickland stressed, however, that “American Bar Association standards and the like” are “only guides” to what reasonableness means, not its definition. 466 U. S., at 688. We have since regarded them as such. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 524 (2003). What we have said of state requirements is a fortiori true of standards set by private organizations: “while States are free to impose whatever specific rules they see fit to ensure that criminal defendants are well represented, we have held that the Federal Constitution imposes one general requirement: that counsel make objectively reasonable choices.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470, 479 (2000). The narrow grounds for our opinion should not be regarded as accepting the legitimacy of a less categorical use of the Guidelines to evaluate post-2003 representation. For that to be proper, the Guidelines must reflect “prevailing norms of practice,” Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688, and “standard practice,” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 524 (2003), and must not be so detailed that they would “interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions,” Strickland, supra, at 689. We express no views on whether the 2003 Guidelines meet these criteria. (…) But there comes a point at which evidence from more distant relatives can reasonably be expected to be only cumulative, and the search for it distractive from more important duties. JUSTICE ALITO, concurring : I join the Court’s per curiam opinion but emphasize my understanding that the opinion in no way suggests that the American Bar Association’s Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003) (2003 Guidelines or ABA Guidelines) have special relevance in determining whether an attorney’s performance meets the standard required by the Sixth Amendment. The ABA is a venerable organization with a history of service to the bar, but it is, after all, a private group with limited membership. The views of the association’s members, not to mention the views of the members of the advisory committee that formulated the 2003 Guidelines, do not necessarily reflect the views of the American bar as a whole. It is the responsibility of the courts to determine the nature of the work that a defense attorney must do in a capital case in order to meet the obligations imposed by the Constitution, and I see no reason why the ABA Guidelines should be given a privileged position in making that determination (U.S.S.Ct., 09.11.09, Bobby v. Van Hook, Per Curiam).

Le Sixième Amendement de la Constitution fédérale confère au prévenu dans le procès pénal une “assistance effective de son avocat”, soit une représentation de ses intérêts d’une qualité qui ne soit pas inférieure à un standard objectif raisonnable, examiné à la lumière des normes professionnelles prévalantes. Ce standard est nécessairement de caractère général en raison de la variété des circonstances que rencontre l’avocat de la défense et en raison de la variété des décisions relatives à la manière de représenter au mieux le prévenu. Les compilations d’associations professionnelles peuvent aider la Cour à concrétiser le caractère raisonnable dudit standard, mais seulement dans la mesure où ces compilations décrivent les normes professionnelles reconnues au moment de l’exercice de la défense d’un prévenu déterminé. Les lignes directrices de l’Association du barreau américain applicables à la présente cause (2è éd., 1980) décrivent les devoirs de l’avocat en termes généraux, tandis que les lignes directrices publiées en 2003, sur lesquelles l’autorité précédente s’est – à tort – basée, décrivent ces devoirs très en détail. Peut-être cette description très (trop) détaillée, est-elle une des raisons qui ont conduit le Juge Samuel Alito à insister, dans son opinion concurrente (reproduite intégralement ci-dessus) sur le fait que la Cour devrait vraiment considérer les lignes directrices précitées comme non contraignantes pour les Tribunaux. Ces lignes directrices émanent d’une association privée, et non d’une administration publique (Agency, voir ce terme). Les divers types de règles qui émanent des administrations publiques sont considérés avec davantage de déférence, notamment suivant la jurisprudence Chevron. La Cour poursuit en précisant que les standards décrits par l’Association du barreau américain et d’autres associations de ce type ne sont que des guides permettant d’appréhender la signification du « caractère raisonnable » des devoirs de l’avocat. Ce que la Cour a prononcé au sujet de la liberté des 50 états et du District de Columbia de réglementer ce domaine est a fortiori applicable aux standards posés par des associations privées : les états sont libres d’imposer les règles qu’ils estiment appropriées pour assurer une défense adéquate des prévenus. Mais la Constitution fédérale impose une obligation générale : que les choix de l’avocat soient objectivement raisonnables. La Cour laisse ouverte les questions de savoir si les lignes directrices de 2003, très détaillées, interfèrent ou non avec l’indépendance constitutionnellement protégée de l’avocat, et si elles restreignent excessivement la large latitude dont bénéficie l’avocat dans ses décisions tactiques.