Monday, January 8, 2018

Tharpe v. Sellers, J. Thomas, with whom J. Alito and J. Gorsuch join, dissenting (Per Curiam opinion), Docket 17-6075


Retroactivity (here in a criminal context):



(…) First, no reasonable jurist could argue that Pena-Rodriguez applies retroactively on collateral review. Pena-Rodriguez established a new rule: The opinion states that it is answering a question “left open” by this Court’s earlier precedents. 580 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13). A new rule does not apply retroactively unless it is substantive or a “watershed rule of criminal procedure.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion). Since Pena-Rodriguez permits a trial court “to consider [certain] evidence,” 580 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17), and does not “alter the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes,” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U. S. 348, 353 (2004), it cannot be a substantive rule.

And Tharpe does not even attempt to argue that Pena-Rodriguez estab­lished a watershed rule of criminal procedure—a class of rules that is so “narrow” that it is “‘unlikely that any has yet to emerge.’” Schriro, supra, at 352 (quoting Tyler v. Cain, 533 U. S. 656, 667, n. 7 (2001)). Nor could he. Not even the right to have a jury decide a defendant’s eligibility for death counts as a watershed rule of criminal procedure. Schriro, supra, at 355–358.



(U.S.S.C., Jan. 8, 2018, Tharpe v. Sellers, J. Thomas, with whom J. Alito and J. Gorsuch join, dissenting (Per Curiam opinion), Docket 17-6075).



Une nouvelle règle de droit (ici pénal, établie par la Cour Suprême) n'est pas d'application rétroactive, sauf si elle est de nature "substantive" ou qu'elle constitue un tournant majeur en procédure pénale. Par exemple, un principe jurisprudentiel qui permet à une cour pénale de première instance de prendre en compte certains moyens de preuve, sans altérer les comportements qualifiés de délictueux ni la classe des personnes punissables, ne saurait être qualifiée de règle "substantielle". Et le droit à ce qu'un jury (et non la cour) décide de la question ultime du prononcé de la peine capitale n'est pas une règle qui constitue un tournant majeur en procédure pénale.

No comments:

Post a Comment