Interpretation (contracts): Collective-bargaining agreements: Extrinsic
evidence: Declaratory relief: Vested rights: Injunction:
This Court has long held that collective-bargaining agreements must be
interpreted “according to ordinary principles of contract law.” Tackett,
574 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (citing Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448, 456–457 (1957)).
(…) A contract is not ambiguous unless it is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.
(…) Principle of contract law that the written agreement is presumed to
encompass the whole agreement of the parties.
The “traditional principle,” Tackett explained, is that “‘contractual
obligations will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the
bargaining agreement.’” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (quoting Litton
Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 501
U. S. 190, 207 (1991)). “Contracts that are silent as to their duration will
ordinarily be treated not as ‘operative in perpetuity’ but as ‘operative for a
reasonable time.’” 574 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (quoting A. Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts §553, p. 216 (1960)).
Like Tackett, this case involves a dispute between retirees and
their former employer about whether an expired collective-bargaining agreement
created a vested right to lifetime health care benefits.
When the 1998 agreement expired in 2004, a class of CNH retirees and
surviving spouses (collectively, the retirees) filed this lawsuit, seeking a declaration
that their health care benefits vested for life and an injunction preventing
CNH from changing them.
When a contract is ambiguous, courts can consult extrinsic evidence to
determine the parties’ intentions. See 574 U. S., at ___ (GINSBURG, J.,
concurring) (slip op., at 1) (citing Williston on Contracts §30:7, pp. 116–124
(4th ed. 2012) (Williston)). But a contract is not ambiguous unless, “after
applying established rules of interpretation, it remains reasonably susceptible
to at least two reasonable but conflicting meanings.” Id., §30:4, at
53–54.
“When the intent of the parties is unambiguously expressed in the
contract, that expression controls, and the court’s inquiry should proceed no
further.” Tackett, supra, at ___ (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (slip
op., at 1) (citing Williston §30:6, at 98–104).
(U.S.S.C., Feb. 20, 2018, CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese, Docket No.
17-515, Per Curiam)
Conventions
collectives, éventuellement autres contrats collectifs : leur interprétation
est régie par le droit général des contrats. Un certain nombre de ces principes
sont ici rappelés :
Un contrat
n'est pas ambigu, sauf s'il permet plus d'une interprétation raisonnable.
L'accord
écrit est présumé contenir l'accord complet des parties.
Les
obligations des parties prennent fin au terme du contrat collectif ; les
contrats qui ne prévoient rien s'agissant de leur durée sont considérés comme
restant en vigueur pendant une durée raisonnable.
Quand un
contrat est ambigu, la cour peut se référer à des moyens de preuves extérieurs
aux fins de déterminer l'intention des parties.
Quand
l'intention des parties est clairement exprimée dans le contrat : cette
expression l'emporte, et les investigations de la cour à cet égard prennent
fin.
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