Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, Docket No. 16-1276, J. Thomas, with whom JJ. Alito and Gorsuch join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment

Interpretation (statute): Senate report: Committee report: Legislative history:

I join the Court’s opinion only to the extent it relies on the text of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con­sumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 124 Stat. 1376. The question in this case is whether the term “whistleblower” in Dodd-Frank’s antiretaliation provision, 15 U. S. C.§78u–6(h)(1), includes a person who does not report infor­mation to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The answer is in the definitions section of the statute, which states that the term “whistleblower” means a person who provides “information relating to a violation of the securi­ties laws to the Commission.” §78u–6(a)(6). As the Court observes, this statutory definition “resolves the question before us.” The Court goes on, however, to discuss the supposed “purpose” of the statute, which it primarily derives from a single Senate Report. Even assuming a majority of Con­gress read the Senate Report, agreed with it, and voted for Dodd-Frank with the same intent, “we are a government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than by what it intended.” Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U. S. 429, ___ (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1). And “it would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to state in committee reports . . . that which is obvious on the face of a statute.” Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 592 (1980). For these reasons, I am unable to join the portions of the Court’s opinion that venture beyond the statutory text.

(U.S.S.C, Feb. 21, 2018, Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, Docket No. 16-1276, J. Thomas, with whom JJ. Alito and Gorsuch join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

Dans son opinion concurrente, le Juge Thomas, rejoint par les Juges Gorsuch et Alito, expose que dans la mesure où le texte même de la loi répond à la question posée en l'espèce, il n'est nul besoin pour la Cour de se référer à des travaux législatifs pour éclairer la loi, qui n'a pas à l'être, étant déjà suffisamment claire. Nul besoin non plus dans ce cas de recourir à une interprétation téléologique.