Alien Tort Statute: International
law: Corporate responsibility: Common law liability: Separation of powers: Judicial
deference: Jurisdiction: Human rights: Bivens:
Alien Tort Statute, commonly
referred to as the ATS. See 28 U. S. C. §1350.
Petitioners contend that
international and domestic laws impose responsibility and liability on a
corporation if its human agents use the corporation to commit crimes in violation
of international laws that protect human rights. The question here is whether
the Judiciary has the authority, in an ATS action, to make that determination
and then to enforce that liability in ATS suits, all without any explicit
authorization from Congress to do so.
During the pendency of this
litigation, there was an unrelated case that also implicated the issue whether
the ATS is applicable to suits in this country against foreign corporations.
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F. 3d 111 (CA2 2010).
After additional briefing and
reargument in Kiobel, this Court held that, given all the circumstances, the
suit could not be maintained under the ATS. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 569 U. S. 108, 114, 124–125 (2013). The rationale of the holding, however,
was not that the ATS does not extend to suits against foreign corporations.
That question was left unresolved. The Court ruled, instead, that “all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States.” Id., at 124. Dismissal
of the action was required based on the presumption against extraterritorial
application of statutes.
The majority opinion in Kiobel,
written by Judge Cabranes, held that the ATS does not apply to alleged
international-law violations by a corporation. 621 F. 3d, at 120. Judge
Cabranes relied in large part on the fact that international criminal tribunals
have consistently limited their jurisdiction to natural persons. Id., at 132–
137. Judge Leval filed a separate opinion. He concurred in the judgment on
other grounds but disagreed with the proposition that the foreign corporation
was not subject to suit under the ATS. Id., at 196. Judge Leval conceded that
“international law, of its own force, imposes no liabilities on corporations or
other private juridical entities.” Id., at 186. But he reasoned that corporate
liability for violations of international law is an issue of “civil compensatory
liability” that international law leaves to individual nations. Ibid. Later
decisions in the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth, and District of
Columbia Circuits agreed with Judge Leval and held that corporations can be
subject to suit under the ATS. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.
3d 1013, 1017–1021 (CA7 2011); Doe I v.Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F. 3d 1013, 1020 1022
(CA9 2014); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F. 3d 11, 40–55 (CADC 2011),
vacated on other grounds, 527 Fed. Appx. 7 (CADC 2013). The respective opinions
by Judges Cabranes and Leval are scholarly and extensive, providing significant
guidance for this Court in the case now before it.
(…) The Judiciary Act also included
what is now the statute known as the ATS. (…) As noted, the ATS is central to
this case and its brief text bears repeating. Its full text is: “The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350.
(…) This Court now must decide
whether common-law liability under the ATS extends to a foreign corporate
defendant.
So it is proper for this Court to decide
whether corporations, or at least foreign corporations, are subject to liability
in an ATS suit filed in a United States district court. Before recognizing a
common-law action under the ATS, federal courts must apply the test announced
in Sosa. An initial, threshold question is whether a plaintiff can demonstrate
that the alleged violation is “of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory.” 542 U. S., at 732. And even assuming that, under international
law, there is a specific norm that can be controlling, it must be determined
further whether allowing this case to proceed under the ATS is a proper
exercise of judicial discretion, or instead whether caution requires the political
branches to grant specific authority before corporate liability can be imposed.
See id., at 732– 733, and nn. 20–21.
(…) It is proper now to turn first
to the question whether there is an international-law norm imposing liability
on corporations for acts of their employees that contravene fundamental human
rights.
It does not follow, however, that
current principles of international law extend liability—civil or criminal—for
human-rights violations to corporations or other artificial entities. This is
confirmed by the fact that the charters of respective international criminal
tribunals often exclude corporations from their jurisdictional reach.
(…) Sosa is consistent with this
Court’s general reluctance to extend judicially created private rights of
action.
(…) This caution extends to the
question whether the courts should exercise the judicial authority to mandate a
rule that imposes liability upon artificial entities like corporations. Thus,
in Malesko the Court held that corporate defendants may not be held liable in
Bivens actions. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388
(1971). Allowing corporate liability would have been a “marked extension” of
Bivens that was unnecessary to advance its purpose of holding individual
officers responsible for “engaging in unconstitutional wrongdoing.” Malesko,
534 U. S., at 74. Whether corporate defendants should be subject to suit was “a
question for Congress, not us, to decide.” Id., at 72.
Neither the language of the ATS nor
the precedents interpreting it support an exception to these general principles
in this context. In fact, the separation-of-powers concerns that counsel
against courts creating private rights of action apply with particular force in
the context of the ATS. The political branches, not the Judiciary, have the
responsibility and institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns. See
Kiobel, 569 U. S., at 116–117. That the ATS implicates foreign relations “is
itself a reason for a high bar to new private causes of action for violating
international law.” Sosa, supra, at 727.
Congress, not the Judiciary, must
decide whether to expand the scope of liability under the ATS to include
foreign corporations.
(…)
The lack of a clear and well-established international-law rule is of
critical relevance in determining whether courts should extend ATS liability to
foreign corporations without specific congressional authorization to do so.
(…) Judicial deference requires that
any imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations for violations of
international law must be determined in the first instance by the political
branches of the Government.
(U.S.S.C., Apr. 24, 2018, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, Docket No. 16-499, J.
Kennedy)
Alien Tort Statute (28 U. S. C. §1350) : il s'agit d'une loi fédérale qui permet d'engager la
responsabilité de personnes physiques impliquées dans des crimes contre les
droits de l'homme. La question que pose cette affaire est de savoir si la
responsabilité s'étend à des personnes morales, dans la mesure où elles ont été
utilisées par leurs organes pour la commissions de tels crimes. La loi ne répond
pas à cette question. Dès lors, la Cour y répond par la négative : elle
n'entend pas créer une nouvelle voie de droit déduite de la Common law
fédérale. C'est le Congrès qui est compétent pour légiférer à ce niveau.
La Cour observe que les Tribunaux
pénaux internationaux ont de manière consistante limité leurs compétences aux
personnes physiques.
Et pour créer une voie de droit sous
l'angle de la Common law dans le cadre d'une action ATS, une cour fédérale
devrait d'abord reconnaître que le demandeur a démontré que l'infraction
alléguée portait sur une norme spécifique, universelle et obligatoire. Elle
devrait ensuite reconnaître que l'action dont elle est saisie est susceptible
de résolution judiciaire, en écartant la nécessité d'une attribution de
compétence du législateur permettant l'intervention judiciaire pour ce type de
cas.
En l'espèce, la Cour juge qu'il
n'existe à ce jour pas de principe de droit international qui étendrait aux
personnes morales une responsabilité civile ou pénale suite à la violation de
droits de l'homme.
Par ailleurs, du principe de la
séparation des pouvoirs découle qu'une cour de justice ne saurait sans autre créer
le principe d'une responsabilité des personnes morales. La Cour a jugé dans une
autre affaire que, sauf prescription contraire du Congrès, une personne morale
ne saurait être responsable dans le cadre d'une action Bivens (seul l'officier
public peut être responsable, en tant que personne physique).
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