Admiralty Law
Maritime Law
Continental Shelf
Drilling Platforms
State Law Adopted as Federal Law?
Pre-emption
California Law (Minimum Wages)
Interpretation (Statute)
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),
67 Stat. 462, 43 U. S. C. §1331 et seq., extends federal law to the
subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf and all attachments thereon
(OCS). Under the OCSLA, all law on the OCS is federal law, administered by
federal officials. The OCSLA denies States any interest in or jurisdiction over
the OCS, and it deems the adjacent State’s laws to be federal law “to the
extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with” other federal law.
§1333(a)(2)(A). The question before us is how to determine which state laws
meet this requirement and therefore should be adopted as federal law. Applying
familiar tools of statutory interpretation, we hold that where federal law
addresses the relevant issue, state law is not adopted as surrogate federal law
on the OCS.
Respondent Brian Newton worked for petitioner
Parker Drilling Management Services on drilling platforms off the coast of
California. Newton’s 14-day shifts involved 12 hours per day on duty and 12
hours per day on standby, during which he could not leave the platform. He was
paid well above the California and federal minimum wages for his time on duty,
but he was not paid for his standby time.
(…) Parker, on the other hand, argues that state
law is not “applicable” on the OCS in the absence of a gap in federal law that
needs to be filled. Moreover, Parker argues that state law can be
“inconsistent” with federal law even if it is possible for a party to satisfy
both sets of laws. Specifically, Parker contends that, although the FLSA
normally accommodates more protective state wage-and-hour laws, such laws are
inconsistent with the FLSA when adopting state law as surrogate federal law
because federal law would then contain two different standards.
Although this is a close question of statutory
interpretation, on the whole we find Parker’s approach more persuasive because
“ ‘the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme.’ ” Roberts v. Sea-Land
Services, Inc., 566 U. S. 93, 101 (2012).
That rule is particularly relevant here, as the
terms “applicable” and “not inconsistent” are susceptible of interpretations
that would deprive one term or the other of meaning. If Newton is right that
“applicable” merely means relevant to the subject matter, then the word adds
nothing to the statute, for an irrelevant law would never be “applicable” in
that sense (…) And if Parker is right that “applicable” means “necessary to
fill a gap in federal law,” it is hard to imagine circumstances in which “not
inconsistent” would add anything to the statute, for a state law would rarely
be inconsistent with a federal law that leaves a gap that needs to be filled.
(…) In short, the two terms standing alone do
not resolve the question before us. Particularly given their indeterminacy in
isolation, the terms should be read together and interpreted in light of the
entire statute. See Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity
Brands, Inc., 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 6) (“
‘Interpretation of a phrase of uncertain reach is not confined to a single sentence
when the text of the whole statute gives instruction as to its meaning’ ”).
Our pre-OCSLA decisions made clear that the
Federal Government controlled the OCS in every respect, and the OCSLA
reaffirmed the central role of federal law on the OCS. As discussed, the OCSLA
gives the Federal Government complete “jurisdiction, control, and power of
disposition” over the OCS, while giving the States no “interest in or
jurisdiction” over it. §§1332(1), 1333(a)(3). The statute applies federal law
to the OCS “to the same extent as if the OCS were an area of exclusive Federal
jurisdiction located within a State.” §1333(a)(1). Accordingly, the only law on
the OCS is federal law, and state laws are adopted as federal law only “to the
extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with” federal law. §1333(a)(2)(A).
Taken together, these provisions convince us
that state laws can be “applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law under
§1333(a)(2)(A) only if federal law does not address the relevant issue. As we
have said before, the OCSLA makes apparent “that federal law is ‘exclusive’ in
its regulation of the OCS, and that state law is adopted only as surrogate
federal law.” Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.
S. 352, 357 (1969). The OCSLA extends all federal law to the OCS, and instead
of also extending state law writ large, it borrows only certain state laws.
These laws, in turn, are declared to be federal law and are administered by
federal officials.
Given the primacy of federal law on the OCS and
the limited role of state law, it would make little sense to treat the OCS as a
mere extension of the adjacent State, where state law applies unless it
conflicts with federal law. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
564 U. S. 604, 617–618 (2011). That type of pre-emption analysis is applicable
only where the overlapping, dual jurisdiction of the Federal and State
Governments makes it necessary to decide which law takes precedence.
(…) The question is whether federal law has
already addressed the relevant issue; if so, state law addressing the same
issue would necessarily be inconsistent with existing federal law and cannot be
adopted as surrogate federal law. Put another way, to the extent federal law
applies to a particular issue, state law is inapplicable.
(…) In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 U. S. 97 (1971), the Court again viewed the OCSLA as adopting state law to
fill in federal-law gaps. In Huson, the question was whether federal
admiralty law or a state statute governed a tort action arising from an injury
that occurred on the OCS. Id., at 98–99. Describing Rodrigue’s
analysis, we explained that where “there exists a substantial ‘gap’ in federal law,”
“state law remedies are not ‘inconsistent’ with applicable federal law.” 404 U.
S., at 101. We highlighted that “state law was needed” as surrogate federal law
because federal law alone did not provide “ ‘a complete body of law,’ ” which
is why “Congress specified that a comprehensive body of state law should be
adopted by the federal courts in the absence of existing federal law.” Id.,
at 103–104. In other words, the OCSLA “made clear provision for filling in the
‘gaps’ in federal law.” Id., at 104. And because Congress had decided
not to apply federal admiralty law on the OCS, leaving a gap on the relevant
issue, we held that it was appropriate to “absorb” the state law as federal
law. Id., at 104, 109.
(…) All law on the OCS is federal, and state law
serves a supporting role, to be adopted only where there is a gap in federal
law’s coverage.
(…) Applying this standard, some of Newton’s
present claims are readily resolvable. For instance, some of his claims are
premised on the adoption of California law requiring payment for all time that
Newton spent on standby. See Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc.,
60 Cal. 4th 833, 842, 340 P. 3d 355, 361 (2015); Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §510(a)
(West 2011). But federal law already addresses this issue. See 29 CFR §785.23
(2018) (“An employee who resides on his employer’s premises on a permanent
basis or for extended periods of time is not considered as working all the time
he is on the premises”); see also 29 U. S. C. §207(a). Therefore, this
California law does not provide the rule of decision on the OCS, and to the
extent Newton’s OCS-based claims rely on that law, they necessarily fail.
Likewise, to the extent Newton’s OCS-based
claims rely on the adoption of the California minimum wage (currently $12),
Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §1182.12(b) (West Supp. 2019), the FLSA already provides
for a minimum wage, 29 U. S. C. §206(a)(1), so the California minimum wage does
not apply.
(…) Of course, it is conceivable that state law
might be “inconsistent” with federal law for purposes of §1333(a)(2) even
absent an on-point federal law. For example, federal law might contain a
deliberate gap, making state law inconsistent with the federal scheme. Or,
state law might be inconsistent with a federal law addressing a different issue.
We do not foreclose these or other possible inconsistencies (fn. 2, p. 14).
(U.S. Supreme Court, June 10, 2019, Parker
Drilling Management Services, Ltd. v. Newton, Docket No. 18-389, J. Thomas,
unanimous)
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