Wednesday, February 15, 2023

California Court of Appeal, G Companies Management, LLC v. LREP Arizona, LLC, Docket No. G060992


Interest Rates

 

Usury Law

 

Public Policy

 

Waiver

 

California Law

 

Forum Selection Clause

 

Loan Agreement

 

 

Procedure:

 

Third Party Cross-Complaint in Favor of Another Forum

 

Order Granting a Motion to Quash Service of Summons or Granting a Motion to Stay the Action on the Ground of Inconvenient Forum

 

 

Remedies:

 

Declaratory Relief

 

Equitable Indemnity

 

Reimbursement

 

Contribution

 

Equitable Apportionment

 

 

 

 

 

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Nathan R. Scott, Judge. Reversed and remanded.

 

 

G Companies Management, LLC, a California limited liability company, appeals from an order staying its cross-complaint against LREP Arizona, LLC, based on the forum selection clause in a loan agreement between the parties. The cross-complaint alleges multiple causes of action, all based on the assertion that the interest rates charged in the loan agreement were usurious under California law, and G Companies contends the trial court erred because a forum selection clause is not enforceable if doing so would deprive a California resident of the protections of our fundamental public policy.1

 

 

1The order staying the third party cross-complaint in favor of another forum is appealable. (Code Civ Proc., §904.1, subd. (3) [an appeal may be taken “from an order granting a motion to quash service of summons or granting a motion to stay the action on the ground of inconvenient forum”].)

 

 

By virtue of its inclusion in article XV, section 1, of our Constitution, and because it cannot be waived, we find that California’s usury law does reflect a significant public policy. It prohibits money lending at rates higher than specified, even while recognizing numerous exceptions to those rate limitations. The complexity of the law does not imply a lack of commitment to the policy. To the contrary, such a fine-tuned approach suggests that significant effort has gone into determining the circumstances under which interest rate limitations are necessary for the protection of Californians.

 

 

If the circumstances of a loan transaction do not fit into one of the exceptions to California’s interest rate limitation, and the rate charged is higher than allowed, then the transaction violates California’s public policy against usury. And since California’s usury law reflects a significant public policy designed to protect its citizens, our law precludes enforcement of a forum selection clause that will deprive a California resident of that protection.

 

 

The loan agreement specified the use of an escrow agent located in Arizona and stated that the loan closing would take place at the agent’s office. The agreement also stated that it “shall be construed and governed by the laws of the state of Arizona without regard to conflict of laws principles. The Parties irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of any federal or state court located within Maricopa County, Arizona over any dispute arising out of or related to this Agreement. Each party hereby irrevocably agrees that all claims with respect to such dispute or any suit, action or proceeding related thereto shall be heard and determined in such courts. G Companies defaulted on the loan, failing to make the first payment due in February 2016. In July 2016, LREP foreclosed on the real property given as security—obtaining it for a credit bid of $315,000—leaving an unpaid loan balance of over $4.6million.

 

 

G Companies, in turn, filed a cross-complaint against LREP, seeking declaratory relief, equitable indemnity and reimbursement, contribution, and equitable apportionment, all based on LREP’s alleged conduct of “collecting usurious interest against the Guarantor Plaintiffs (and indirectly but certainly against the Borrower G Companies as well), ”which is characterized as “illegal, unconscionable, criminal and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the LREP Loan Documents.”

 

 

LREP moved to dismiss or stay the cross-complaint, based upon the mandatory forum selection clause contained in the loan agreement. It argued that enforcement of the clause was not unfair or unreasonable because the chosen Arizona forum is closely tied to the transaction, the parties are sophisticated, and they agreed to it.

 

 

(Hyundai Securities, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391). Hyundai Securities does not involve a motion to enforce a forum selection clause. It concerns the enforcement of an existing Japanese judgment under California’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§1713-1725; the Act). The court concluded the existing Japanese judgment, which incorporated a 20 percent postjudgment interest rate allowed under Japanese law, was required to be recognized as a valid foreign country money judgment under the Act, but upon entry as a California judgment, the 20 percent rate would no longer be applied. Instead, the California judgment would accrue postjudgment interest at the 10 percent rate allowed under California law.

 

 

We explained in Hall that “while ‘California does not have any public policy against a choice of law provision, where it is otherwise appropriate’ [citation]. . . [citation], ‘an agreement designating a foreign law will not be given effect if it would violate a strong California public policy ... or “result in an evasion of ... a statute of the forum protecting its citizens.’”” (Hall, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at pp. 416-417.) We then reasoned that if the pending litigation were transferred to Nevada where Nevada law would be applied, the investors would lose the benefit of California’s Corporate Securities Law of 1968 (Corp. Code, §25000 et seq.), which would otherwise govern the exchange. The investors would thus be denied California’s unwaivable protections against fraud and deception in securities matters. (Hall, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p.417.) Consequently, the trial court erred by enforcing the provision.

 

 

California’s Policy Against Usury

 

Usury in California is addressed in California Constitution, article XV, section 1, which sets interest rates, with exceptions. As explained in Bisno v. Kahn (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1098, “The usury law is based upon article XV, section 1 of the California Constitution as well as an initiative measure adopted in 1918. [Citations.] The initiative measure has not been codified but is published in Statutes and Amendments to the Codes and [West’s Annotated] Civil Code. [Citations.] The initiative measure remains in full force and effect except to the extent it conflicts with the constitutional usury provision. [Citations.] We refer to the constitutional and initiative provisions collectively as the ‘usury law.’” (See Civ. Code, §1916-5 [“This act whenever cited, referred to, or amended may be designated simply as the ‘usury law’”].

 

 

Our usury law does not set ironclad limitations on allowable interest rates. It allows different interest rates to be charged in different circumstances and exempts large categories of lenders while giving our Legislature the power to impose limitations on the exempt lenders. (Cal. Const., art XV, §1.) The law’s complexity has prompted our Supreme Court to remark that “the usury law is ...riddled with so many exceptions that the law’s application itself seems to be the exception rather than the rule.” (Ghirardo, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 807.) That may be true, but the inclusion of the usury law in our Constitution reflects it involves an important public policy. (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 892 [“the California Constitution amply established the existence of a fundamental public policy”]; see Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [“aside from constitutional policy, the Legislature, and not the courts, is vested with the responsibility to declare the public policy of the state”].) We find it significant that the protections of our usury law cannot be waived. (WRI Opportunity Loans II, LLC v. Cooper (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 525, 542-543 [because a usurious provision is void under California law, the prohibition against usury cannot be waived].) A public policy that cannot be waived qualifies as fundamental. (Brack v. Omni Loan Co., Ltd. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1323 [“The relative significance of a particular policy or statutory scheme can be determined by considering whether parties may, by agreement, avoid the policy or statutory requirement”].

 

 

Our usury law protects sophisticated borrowers as well as unsophisticated ones. (Ghirardo, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 807 [“There is . . . no exemption in the usury law for sophisticated borrowers. We decline to create one”].)

 

 

(…) We therefore conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded California’s usury law does not reflect a fundamental public policy.

 

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Feb. 15, 2023, G Companies Management, LLC v. LREP Arizona, LLC, Docket No. G060992, Certified for Publication)

 

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