California Court of Appeal, Water for Citizens of Weed Cal. v. Churchwell White LLP, Docket No. C093421

 

Motion to Strike the Complaint

 

Anti-SLAPP Motion

 

SLAPP Back Action Against a Law Firm

 

Ethics

 

Civil Procedure

 

California Law

 

 

 

 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, David I. Brown, Judge. Affirmed.

 

 

This is an appeal from the grant of a special motion to strike a complaint for malicious prosecution. In the underlying action, defendants Churchwell White LLP, a law firm, and two of its attorneys, Barbara A. Brenner and Robin R. Baral (collectively Churchwell) represented a corporation in an action to quiet title to water rights. In the underlying quiet title action, Churchwell sued the City of Weed (City) and the plaintiffs here, Water for Citizens of Weed California, its members, and other citizens of the City (collectively Citizens). The trial court in that action granted Citizens’s special motion to strike the complaint, commonly called an anti-SLAPP motion (strategic lawsuit against public participation). Citizens then filed this action against Churchwell, alleging malicious prosecution for naming them in the quiet title action. The trial court granted Churchwell’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluding Citizens did not establish a probability of prevailing on their claim. They did not show that Churchwell lacked probable cause or acted out of malice in naming them in the quiet title action. We affirm the judgment.

 

 

Citizens filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., §425.16.) (Statutory section citations that follow are found in the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.) Each of the individual plaintiffs submitted a sworn declaration that he or she did not claim and had never claimed any right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the 2.0 cfs of Beaughan Springs water at issue in the case. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion. It found that Citizens were named in the action solely because they exercised their constitutional rights. None of them claimed any private interest in the water. The court refused to address the second step of deciding an anti-SLAPP motion, which asked whether Roseburg could establish a prima facie case of success on the merits.

 

 

(…) Citizens filed the present action, a “SLAPP back” action, against Churchwell for malicious prosecution for suing them on behalf of Roseburg in the quiet title action. Citizens alleged Churchwell had no probable cause to name them in the underlying action, and that Churchwell named them only to silence and chill their exercise of First Amendment rights.

 

 

Churchwell filed an anti-SLAPP motion against the complaint. The trial court granted the motion. It found that although the complaint arose from Churchwell’s exercise of its constitutional rights, Citizens did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. They did not establish a prima facie case of malicious prosecution: that Churchwell lacked probable cause to name them in the underlying action and that Churchwell acted out of malice. Citizens challenge those findings in this appeal.

 

 

We review the trial court’s grant of Churchwell’s anti-SLAPP motion de novo. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.) Our review involves a two-step analysis. We first determine whether Churchwell, the moving party, established that the claim of malicious prosecution arose from its attorneys’s actions in furtherance of their “right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If Churchwell has satisfied that burden, then Citizens bear the burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on their claim. (§425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Citizens must show that their malicious prosecution claim based on Churchwell’s protected activity “is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.).

 

 

Citizens do not challenge the trial court’s determination on the first step of analysis, that their claim for malicious prosecution arose from Churchwell’s exercise of constitutional rights. We thus turn to the second step and determine whether Citizens have established a probability of prevailing on their claim.

 

 

To prevail on their malicious prosecution claim, Citizens must show that the quiet title action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of Churchwell and was pursued to a legal termination favorable to Citizens; (2) was initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (3) was initiated or maintained with malice. (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 775 (Parrish).) No one disputes the first element, so we address the other two.

 

 

We need not address the element of malice. Because we have determined there was probable cause to bring the quiet title action, “the malicious prosecution action fails, whether or not there is evidence that the prior suit was maliciously motivated.” (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 875).

 

 

 

 

(California Court of Appeal, Feb. 9, 2023, Water for Citizens of Weed Cal. v. Churchwell White LLP, Docket No. C093421, Certified for Publication)