Common Law
(…) The issue in
Granfinanciera was whether this designation was permissible under the public
rights exception. We explained that it was not.
Although Congress
had assigned fraudulent conveyance claims to bankruptcy courts, that assignment
was not dispositive. See id., at 52. What mattered, we explained, was the
substance of the suit. “Traditional legal claims” must be decided by courts,
“whether they originate in a newly fashioned regulatory scheme or possess a long
line of common-law forebears.” Ibid. To determine whether the claim implicated
the Seventh Amendment, the Court applied the principles distilled in Tull. We
examined whether the matter was “from its nature subject to ‘a suit at common
law.’” 492 U. S., at 56 (some internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at
43–50. A survey of English cases showed that “actions to recover . . .
fraudulent transfers were often brought at law in late 18th-century England.”
Id., at 43. The remedy the trustee sought was also one “traditionally provided
by law courts.” Id., at 49. Fraudulent conveyance actions were thus
“quintessentially suits at common law.” Id., at 56.
We
accordingly concluded that fraudulent conveyance actions were akin to “suits at
common law” and were not inseparable from the bankruptcy process. Id., at 54, 56. The public rights exception
therefore did not apply, and a jury was required.
(U.S. Supreme
Court, June 27, 2024, SEC v. Jarkesy, Docket No. 22-859, C.J. Roberts)
No comments:
Post a Comment