Monday, August 27, 2018

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., Docket No. 18-1688


Trademark: Trade name: Likelihood of confusion: DuPont factors: Cancellation:

Appellant Zheng Cai DBA Tai Chi Green Tea Inc. (“Mr. Cai”) appeals an opinion of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) cancelling registration of his mark “WU DANG TAI CHI GREEN TEA” due to a likelihood of confusion with Appellee Diamond Hong, Inc.’s (“Diamond Hong”) registered mark, “TAI CHI,” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012). See Diamond Hong, Inc. v. Zheng Cai, Cancellation No. 92062714, 2018 WL 916315, at *5–8 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 14, 2018); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (providing a mark may not be placed on the principal register if it so resembles a mark already registered “as to be likely . . . to cause confusion”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B) (2012).
We affirm.

Diamond Hong petitioned for cancellation of Mr. Cai’s mark based on a likelihood of confusion with its registered TAI CHI mark. See Appellee’s Suppl. App. 23. The TTAB found likelihood of confusion, giving limited consideration to Mr. Cai’s briefing because it “contravened” certain provisions of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (“TBMP”). Diamond Hong, 2018 WL 916315, at *3, *5−7.

Section 1052(d) provides that a trademark may be refused if it consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the USPTO, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).

In Application of E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., our predecessor court articulated thirteen factors to consider when determining likelihood of confusion (“DuPont factors”). See 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). “Not all of the DuPont factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.” In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

The thirteen factors are as follows: (1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity and nature of goods described in the marks’ registrations; (3) similarity of established trade channels; (4) conditions of purchasing; (5) fame of the prior mark; (6) number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) nature and extent of actual confusion; (8) length of time and conditions of concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; (9) variety of goods on which mark is used; (10) market interface between applicant and owner of a prior mark; (11) extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark; (12) extent of potential confusion; and (13) any other established probative fact on effect of use. See Application of E.I. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361.


A showing of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion.

The Opinion of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board is
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Aug. 27, 2018, Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., Docket No. 18-1688, Circuit Judge Wallach)


Requête en annulation de l’enregistrement d’une marque concurrente, pour risque de confusion. Description des étapes procédurales. Analyse du risque de confusion selon les treize facteurs DuPont. Ces treize conditions n’ont nullement besoin d’être réalisées pour aboutir à la reconnaissance d’une confusion contraire au droit des marques : seuls les facteurs relevant dans chaque espèce sont à considérer.
L’existence d’une confusion effective n’est pas nécessaire pour reconnaître un risque de confusion illicite.


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