Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., Docket 15-866

Copyright: Designs: Industrial designs: Design patent:

Congress has provided copyright protection for original works of art, but not for industrial designs. The line between art and industrial design, however, is often diffi­cult to draw. This is particularly true when an industrial design incorporates artistic elements. Congress has af­forded limited protection for these artistic elements by providing that “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features” of the “design of a useful article” are eligible for copyright protection as artistic works if those features “can be iden­tified separately from, and are capable of existing inde­pendently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” 17 U. S. C. §101.

(…) Granted certiorari to resolve widespread disagree­ment over the proper test for implementing §101’s separate-identification and independent-existence requirements. 578 U. S. ___ (2016).

A feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be per­ceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protecta­ble pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expres­sion—if it were imagined separately from the useful arti­cle into which it is incorporated.

The first element of a copyright-infringement claim is “ownership of a valid copyright.” Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 361 (1991). A valid copyright extends only to copyrightable subject matter. See M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright §13.01[A] (2010) (Nimmer). The Copyright Act of 1976 defines copyrightable subject matter as “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U. S. C. §102(a).

“Works of authorship” include “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” §102(a)(5), which the statute defines to include “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans,” §101. And a work of authorship is “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when it is embodied in a mate­rial object . . . from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” Ibid. (defini­tions of “fixed” and “copies”).

The statute does not protect useful articles as such. Rather, “the design of a useful article” is “considered a pictorial, graphical, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of exist­ing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” Ibid.

We must now decide when a feature incorporated into a useful article “can be identified separately from” and is “capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects” of the article. This is not a free-ranging search for the best copyright policy, but rather “depends solely on statutory interpretation.” Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 214 (1954).

The statute provides that a “pictorial, graphic, or sculp­tural feature” incorporated into the “design of a useful article” is eligible for copyright protection if it (1) “can be identified separately from,” and (2) is “capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.” §101. The first requirement—separate identification—is not onerous. The decisionmaker need only be able to look at the useful article and spot some two- or three-dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities. See Patry §3:146, at 3–474 to 3–475.

The independent-existence requirement is ordinarily more difficult to satisfy. The decisionmaker must deter­mine that the separately identified feature has the capacity to exist apart from the utilitarian aspects of the article. See 2 OED 88 (def. 5) (defining “capable” of as “having the needful capacity, power, or fitness for”). In other words, the feature must be able to exist as its own pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work as defined in §101 once it is imagined apart from the useful article. If the feature is not capable of existing as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work once separated from the useful article, then it was not a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature of that arti­cle, but rather one of its utilitarian aspects.

Of course, to qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its own, the feature cannot itself be a useful article or “an article that is normally a part of a useful article” (which is itself considered a useful article). §101.

The ultimate separability question, then, is whether the feature for which copyright protection is claimed would have been eligible for copyright protection as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work had it originally been fixed in some tangi­ble medium other than a useful article before being ap­plied to a useful article.

Applying this test to the surface decorations on the cheerleading uniforms is straightforward. First, one can identify the decorations as features having pictorial, graphic, or sculptural qualities. Second, if the arrange­ment of colors, shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the sur­face of the cheerleading uniforms were separated from the uniform and applied in another medium—for example, on a painter’s canvas—they would qualify as “two-dimensional . . . works of . . . art,” §101. And imaginatively removing the surface decorations from the uniforms and applying them in another medium would not replicate the uniform itself. Indeed, respondents have applied the designs in this case to other media of expression—different types of clothing—without replicating the uniform. See App. 273– 279. The decorations are therefore separable from the uniforms and eligible for copyright protection.

We do not today hold that the surface decorations are copyrightable. We express no opinion on whether these works are sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection, see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 358–359 (1991), or on whether any other prerequisite of a valid copyright has been satisfied.

A shovel, like a cheerleading uniform, even if displayed in an art gallery, is “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U. S. C. §101. It therefore cannot be copyrighted. A drawing of a shovel could, of course, be copyrighted. And, if the shovel included any artistic features that could be perceived as art apart from the shovel, and which would qualify as protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works on their own or in another medium, they too could be copyrighted. But a shovel as a shovel cannot.

Because we reject the view that a useful article must remain after the artistic feature has been imaginatively separated from the article, we necessarily abandon the distinction between “physical” and “conceptual” separabil­ity, which some courts and commentators have adopted based on the Copyright Act’s legislative history. See H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, p. 55 (1976). According to this view, a feature is physically separable from the underlying useful article if it can “be physically separated from the article by ordinary means while leaving the utilitarian aspects of the article completely intact.” Compendium §924.2(A); see also Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F. 3d 324, 329 (CA2 2005). Conceptual separability applies if the feature physically could not be removed from the useful article by ordinary means. See Compendium §924.2(B); but see P. Goldstein, Copyright §2.5.3, p. 2:77 (3d ed. 2016) (…) Because separability does not re­quire the underlying useful article to remain, the physical-conceptual distinction is unnecessary.

Finally, petitioner argues that allowing the surface decorations to qualify as a “work of authorship” is incon­sistent with Congress’ intent to entirely exclude industrial design from copyright. Petitioner notes that Congress refused to pass a provision that would have provided limited copyright protection for industrial designs, includ­ing clothing, when it enacted the 1976 Act, see id., at 9–11 (citing S. 22, Tit. II, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 Cong. Rec. 3856–3859 (1976)), and that it has enacted laws protecting designs for specific useful articles—semiconductor chips and boat hulls, see 17 U. S. C. §§901–914, 1301–1332—while declining to enact other industrial design statutes, Brief for Petitioner 29, 43. From this history of failed legislation petitioner reasons that Congress intends to channel intellectual property claims for industrial design into design patents. It therefore urges us to approach this question with a presumption against copyrightability.

We do not share petitioner’s concern. As an initial matter, “congressional inaction lacks persuasive signifi­cance” in most circumstances. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v. LTV Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990). Moreover, we have long held that design patent and copyright are not mutually exclusive. See Mazer, 347 U. S., at 217. Congress has provided for limited copyright protection for certain fea­tures of industrial design, and approaching the statute with presumptive hostility toward protection for industrial design would undermine Congress’ choice.

We hold that an artistic feature of the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright protection if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or in some other medium if imagined separately from the useful article. Because the designs on the surface of respondents’ cheerleading uniforms in this case satisfy these requirements, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Secondary sources: Compendium of U. S. Copyright Office Practices §924.2(B) (3d ed. 2014); M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright §13.01[A] (2010); W. Patry, Copyright §3:151, p. 3–485 (2016); Web­ster’s Third New International Dictionary 105 (1976); Random House Dictionary 73 (1966); P. Goldstein, Copyright §2.5.3, p. 2:77 (3d ed. 2016).

(U.S.S.C., March 22, 2017, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., Docket 15-866, J. Thomas).

Copyright : œuvre, protégée par le copyright, fixée à une chose utilitaire :

Le Congrès fédéral a accordé la protection du copyright aux œuvres d'art originales, mais pas aux designs industriels. La ligne entre art et design industriel est cependant souvent difficile à tracer, particulièrement quand un design industriel incorpore des éléments artistiques. Le Congrès a conféré une protection limitée à ces éléments artistiques en disposant que les éléments picturaux, graphiques ou sculpturaux du design d'une chose utilitaire sont susceptibles de bénéficier de la protection du copyright en tant qu'œuvre d'art si ces éléments peuvent être identifiés séparément de la partie utilitaire de la chose, et si ces éléments peuvent exister indépendamment de dite partie utilitaire. 

Un élément incorporé dans le design d'une chose utilitaire ne peut bénéficier de la protection du copyright que si l'élément (1) peut être perçu comme une œuvre d'art à deux ou trois dimensions, séparée de la chose utilitaire et (2) pourrait être qualifié d'œuvre picturale, graphique ou sculpturale protégée, soit en lui-même, soit attaché à un autre medium d'expression, s'il était imaginé séparé de la chose utilitaire.

La première condition d'une action en violation du copyright consiste en l'existence d'un copyright valide. La loi fédérale de 1976 sur le copyright définit la chose pouvant bénéficier de ce droit comme une œuvre originale attachée à un medium d'expression. Il peut s'agir d'une œuvre picturale, graphique, sculpturale, incluant les œuvres à deux ou trois dimensions, et comprenant par exemple les photographies, cartes, globes, cartes, diagrammes, modèles, dessins techniques, et plan d'architectes. Par ailleurs, l'œuvre est attachée à un medium d'expression quand elle est attachée à un objet matériel duquel l'œuvre peut être perçue, reproduite ou autrement communiquée.

La loi ne protège pas la chose utilitaire en tant que telle.

L'élément artistique susceptible d'être protégé par le copyright doit donc pouvoir être identifié séparément de la chose utilitaire. Il s'agit de regarder la chose utilitaire et d'être capable de distinguer un ou plusieurs éléments à deux ou trois dimensions, éléments qui présentent des qualités picturales, graphiques ou sculpturales.

L'élément artistique doit aussi pouvoir exister indépendamment de la partie utilitaire. La réalisation de cette exigence est plus délicate. Il s'agit ici de déterminer que l'élément séparé peut exister indépendamment de l'aspect utilitaire de la chose de base, qu'il peut exister pour lui-même comme œuvre picturale, graphique, ou sculpturale. Si tel n'est pas le cas, l'élément séparé n'est qu'un aspect utilitaire de la chose de base.

Bien entendu, pour être reconnu comme une œuvre picturale, graphique ou sculpturale en elle-même, l'élément ne doit pas être lui-même une chose utilitaire.

En l'espèce, il s'agit d'appliquer ces principes aux dessins qui décorent les uniformes des cheerleaders. Tout d'abord, il est possible d'identifier les motifs décoratifs comme éléments présentant des qualités picturales, graphiques ou sculpturales. Ensuite, si les arrangements de couleurs, formes, bandes et chevrons décorant la surface des uniformes étaient séparés de l'uniforme lui-même et appliqués sur un autre medium, ils s'analyseraient en une œuvre d'art à deux dimensions. Et retirer virtuellement ces décorations de l'uniforme pour les appliquer sur un autre medium ne répliquerait pas l'uniforme lui-même. Ces décorations sont dès lors séparables des uniformes et peuvent revendiquer la protection du copyright.

(Une pelle, comme un uniforme de cheerleader, même présentée dans une galerie d'art, est une chose pourvue d'une fonction intrinsèquement utilitaire, qui ne revient pas à décrire l'apparence de la chose ni à diffuser de l'information (cf. 17

U. S. C. §101). Elle ne saurait ainsi bénéficier d'un copyright. Le dessin d'une pelle pourrait bien entendu en bénéficier).

La Cour rejette ici l'opinion selon laquelle un article utilitaire doit demeurer après séparation virtuelle de l'élément artistique. Elle abandonne donc la distinction entre séparation physique et séparation virtuelle. L'opinion abandonnée soutenait qu'un élément est séparable physiquement de la chose utilitaire s'il peut être séparé par des moyens ordinaires tout en laissant complètement intact l'aspect utilitaire de la chose de base ; quant à elle, la séparation virtuelle s'applique si l'élément ne peut pas être séparé de la chose utilitaire de base par des moyens ordinaires.

Dès lors, comme la notion de séparation n'exige pas la pérennité de l'article utilitaire de base, la distinction entre séparation physique et séparation virtuelle n'est pas nécessaire.

La Cour n'entend pas opposer le copyright et le "design patent". Le Congrès a prévu un copyright limité s'agissant de certains éléments de design industriel, et il serait erroné de présumer une hostilité du Congrès envers la possibilité de conférer la protection du copyright aux designs industriels.