Florida v. Harris

Search: probable cause: dog: Officer Wheetley executed a sniff test with his trained narcotics dog, Aldo. The dog alerted at the driver’s-side door handle, leading Wheetley to conclude that he had probable cause for a search. That search turned up nothing Aldo was trained to detect, but did reveal pseudoephed­rine and other ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine; suppression hearing; because training and testing records supported Aldo’s reliability in detecting drugs and Harris failed to undermine that evidence, Wheetley had probable cause to search Harris’s truck; in testing whether an officer has probable cause to conduct a search, all that is required is the kind of “fair probability” on which “reasonable and prudent people act.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 235. To evaluate whether the State has met this practical and common-sensical standard, this Court has consistently looked to the totality of the circumstances and rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries; such inaccuracies do not taint records of a dog’s performance in standard training and certification settings, making that perfor­mance a better measure of a dog’s reliability. Field records may sometimes be relevant, but the court should evaluate all the evi­dence, and should not prescribe an inflexible set of requirements.

Under the correct approach, a probable-cause hearing focusing on a dog’s alert should proceed much like any other, with the court allow­ing the parties to make their best case and evaluating the totality of the circumstances (U.S. S. Ct., 19.02.13, Florida v. Harris, J. Kagan, unanimous).

Fouille : "cause vraisemblable" : alerté par l'attitude de son chien devant la voiture d'un conducteur sommé de s'arrêter, un officier de police procède à une fouille du véhicule. Il découvre à l'intérieur des produits interdits mais pas de produits que le chien est entraîné à détecter. Accusé d'infraction relativement aux produits découverts, le conducteur sollicite la suppression de la preuve découverte dans sa voiture. Sa demande est rejetée. Les produits peuvent servir de preuves, obtenues en l'espèce légalement. En effet, l'officier disposait d'une "cause vraisemblable"  lui permettant de procéder à la fouille, soit l'attitude de son chien. Le dossier relatif aux entrainements du chien à reconnaître des produits interdits en fait un chien qualifié, permettant ainsi de satisfaire la condition de "probable cause", même si le dossier des résultats du chien sur le terrain est moins bon. En effet, en se prononçant sur la question de la "probable cause", la Cour doit prendre en considération l'ensemble des circonstances et se prononcer selon le bon sens. Elle doit donc aussi tenir compte des résultats du chien à l'entrainement.

Apple v. Super. Ct., S199384

Credit cards: consumers’ protection: what information can be collected by the retailer in case of online purchases of electronically downloadable products? The Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 (Credit Card Act) governs the issuance and use of credit cards.  (Civ. Code, § 1747 et seq.; all further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated.)  One of its provisions, section 1747.08, prohibits retailers from “requesting, or requiring as a condition to accepting the credit card as payment . . . , the cardholder to write any personal identification information upon the credit card transaction form or otherwise.”  (§ 1747.08, subd. (a) (hereafter section 1747.08(a)).)  It also prohibits retailers from requesting or requiring the cardholder “to provide personal identification information, which the retailer . . . writes, causes to be written, or otherwise records upon the credit card transaction form or otherwise,” and from “utilizing . . . a credit card form which contains preprinted spaces specifically designed for filling in any personal identification information of the cardholder.”  (Ibid.)  In Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524 (Pineda), we considered whether section 1747.08 is violated when a retailer requests and records a customer’s ZIP code during a credit card transaction.  Relying on the statute’s language, legislative history, and purpose, we concluded that a ZIP code constitutes “personal identification information” within the meaning of the statute and that the Credit Card Act forbids a retailer from requesting or recording such information.  (Pineda, at pp. 527–528.)

Like Pineda, this case involves an asserted violation of section 1747.08.  David Krescent, the plaintiff in this case, alleged in his complaint that defendant Apple Inc. requested or required him to provide his address and telephone number as a condition of accepting his credit card as payment.  However, unlike Pineda, which concerned the purchase of a physical product at a traditional “brick-and-mortar” business, this case concerns the purchase of an electronic download via the Internet.  We must resolve whether section 1747.08 prohibits an online retailer from requesting or requiring personal identification information from a customer as a condition to accepting a credit card as payment for an electronically downloadable product.  Upon careful consideration of the statute’s text, structure, and purpose, we hold that section 1747.08 does not apply to online purchases in which the product is downloaded electronically.

Our dissenting colleagues warn that today’s decision “relegates to the dust heap” the “ ‘robust’ consumer protection . . . at the heart of section 1747.08” (dis. opn. by Kennard, J., post, at p. 6) and represents a “major loss for consumers” (id. at p. 1) that “leaves online retailers free to collect and use the personal identification information of credit card users as they wish” (dis. opn. by Baxter, J., post, at p. 1).  These ominous assertions, though eye-catching, do not withstand scrutiny.  As we explain, existing state and federal laws provide consumers with a degree of protection against unwanted use or disclosure of personal identification information.  The Legislature may believe these measures are inadequate and, if so, may enact additional protections.  Or the Legislature may believe that existing laws, together with market forces reflecting consumer preferences, are sufficient.  It is not our role to opine on this important policy issue.  We merely hold that section 1747.08 does not govern online purchases of electronically downloadable products because this type of transaction does not fit within the statutory scheme.

We review de novo questions of statutory construction.  In doing so, “ ‘our fundamental task is to “ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” ’ ”  (Mays v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 313, 321.)  As always, we start with the language of the statute, “giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning, while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute’s purpose.”  (Pineda, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.)

At the outset, we observe that the text of section 1747.08 makes no reference to online transactions or the Internet.  This is not surprising because former section 1747.8, section 1747.08’s predecessor, was enacted in 1990 (Stats. 1990, ch. 999, § 1, p. 4191), before the privatization of the Internet (see Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention into the Market (2001) 2 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L.Rev. 1, 20) and almost a decade before online commercial transactions became widespread (see, e.g., McDonough v. Toys “R” Us, Inc. (E.D.Pa. 2009) 638 F.Supp.2d 461, 468); we think the text of section 1747.08(a) alone is not decisive on the question before us.  The statutory language suggests that the Legislature, at the time it enacted former section 1747.8, did not contemplate commercial transactions conducted on the Internet.  But it does not seem awkward or improper to describe the act of typing characters into a digital display as “writing” on a computerized “form.”  In construing statutes that predate their possible applicability to new technology, courts have not relied on wooden construction of their terms.  Fidelity to legislative intent does not “make it impossible to apply a legal text to technologies that did not exist when the text was created. . . .  Drafters of every era know that technological advances will proceed apace and that the rules they create will one day apply to all sorts of circumstances they could not possibly envision.”  (Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) pp. 85–86.).

The plain meaning of the statute’s text is not decisive.  An examination of the statutory scheme as a whole is necessary to determine whether it is applicable to a transaction made possible by technology that the Legislature did not envision.

While it is clear that the Legislature enacted the Credit Card Act to protect consumer privacy, it is also clear that the Legislature did not intend to achieve privacy protection without regard to exposing consumers and retailers to undue risk of fraud.  The legislative history shows that the Legislature enacted the statute’s prohibitions only after carefully considering and rejecting the possibility that the collection of personal identification information by brick-and-mortar retailers could serve a legitimate purpose such as fraud prevention.

As previously noted, section 1747.08(d) makes clear that nothing in the statute prevents retailers from requiring customers to provide positive identification — “which may include a driver’s license or a California state identification card, or where one of these is not available, another form of photo identification” — as a condition of accepting a credit card as payment.

The safeguards against fraud that are provided in section 1747.08(d) are not available to the online retailer selling an electronically downloadable product.  Unlike a brick-and-mortar retailer, an online retailer cannot visually inspect the credit card, the signature on the back of the card, or the customer’s photo identification.  Thus, section 1747.08(d) — the key antifraud mechanism in the statutory scheme — has no practical application to online transactions involving electronically downloadable products.  We cannot conclude that if the Legislature in 1990 had been prescient enough to anticipate online transactions involving electronically downloadable products, it would have intended section 1747.08(a)’s prohibitions to apply to such transactions despite the unavailability of section 1747.08(d)’s safeguards.

In his brief (but not in his complaint), Krescent argued that requiring a customer to provide his or her name, credit card number, card expiration date, and credit card identification number suffices to prevent fraud.  But it is clear that the Legislature has disagreed.  A customer’s name, credit card number, expiration date, and security code are all apparent to a “brick-and-mortar” retailer on the credit card itself when the card is presented during an in-person transaction.  Yet the Legislature expressly authorized retailers to request additional information — namely, a driver’s license, state identification card, or another form of photo identification — in order to combat fraud.  (§ 1747.08(d).)  The Legislature has thus decided that the information on the credit card is not necessarily sufficient by itself to protect consumers and retailers against fraud.

We have no occasion here to decide whether section 1747.08 applies to online transactions that do not involve electronically downloadable products or to any other transactions that do not involve in-person, face-to-face interaction between the customer and retailer.

Although “statutory interpretation must be prepared to accommodate technological innovation,” this is only possible “if the technology is otherwise consistent with the statutory scheme.”  (Slocum, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1652.)  Having thoroughly examined section 1747.08’s text, purpose, and history, we are unable to find the clarity of legislative intent or consistency with the statutory scheme necessary to conclude that the Legislature in 1990 intended to bring the enormous yet unforeseen advent of online commerce involving electronically downloadable products — and the novel challenges for privacy protection and fraud prevention that such commerce presents — within the coverage of the Credit Card Act.

We must conclude that online transactions involving electronically downloadable products fall outside the coverage of the statute (Cal. S. Ct., S199384, 04.02.2013, Apple v. Super. Ct.)

Cartes de crédit : protection des consommateurs : quelles informations peuvent-elles être collectées par les détaillants dans les cas d'achats en ligne de produits téléchargés par Internet ? La loi californienne sur la délivrance et l'usage des cartes de crédit interdit aux détaillants de demander ou d'exiger du détenteur de carte, comme condition d'acceptation d'un paiement par carte de crédit, des informations écrites portant sur l'identification de la personne du détenteur de carte. Le code postal de domicile constitue une telle donnée d'identification de la personne. La loi californienne en question ne s'applique pas dans le cas d'achats de produits qui peuvent être téléchargés électroniquement. C'est au législateur d'intervenir s'il souhaite modifier cette situation. Par ailleurs, d'autres lois californiennes et le droit fédéral apportent déjà un certain degré de protection en faveur du consommateur pour prévenir une divulgation ou un usage non souhaité de données d'identifications personnelles. Dans les cas où la loi sur les cartes de crédit s'applique, les détaillants peuvent tout de même demander au client d'établir son identité par exemple à l'aide du permis de conduire. Une telle possibilité de s'assurer de l'identité du client (pour prévenir une fraude) n'existe pas dans le cadre de détaillants qui vendent un produit à télécharger sur Internet. Bien que l'interprétation d'une loi doit être mise en œuvre pour tenir compte de l'innovation technologique, cela n'est possible que si la nouvelle technologie est compatible avec le système de la loi en question. A la lumière du droit applicable, de son histoire législative et de son but, la Cour ne peut appliquer les principes de protection des consommateurs prévus dans le Credit Card Act aux transactions impliquant l'achat par Internet d'un produit qui peut être directement téléchargé en ligne.

Apple v. Super. Ct., S199384

Interpretation of a statute in California: “the declaration of a later Legislature is of little weight in determining the relevant intent of the Legislature that enacted the law.”  (Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 50, 52).  “Unpassed bills, as evidences of legislative intent, have little value.”  (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1396) (Cal. S. Ct., S199384, 04.02.2013, Apple v. Super. Ct.).

Interprétation d'une loi en Californie : les déclarations du corps législatif postérieures sont de peu de poids s'agissant de déterminer l'intention du législateur qui a adopté la loi en cause. Des projets de loi qui n'ont pas été adoptés sont également de peu de valeur à ce niveau.

Apple v. Super. Ct.

Internet: online privacy in California: finally, the California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (COPPA) shows that the Legislature knows how to make clear that it is regulating online privacy and that it does so by carefully balancing concerns unique to online commerce.  COPPA provides that “an operator of a commercial Web site or online service that collects personally identifiable information through the Internet about individual consumers residing in California who use or visit its commercial Web site or online service shall conspicuously post its privacy policy on its Web site . . . .”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22575, subd. (a).)  The privacy policy must: “(1) Identify the categories of personally identifiable information that the operator collects through the Web site or online service about individual consumers who use or visit its commercial Web site or online service and the categories of third-party persons or entities with whom the operator may share that personally identifiable information. (2) If the operator maintains a process for an individual consumer who uses or visits its commercial Web site or online service to review and request changes to any of his or her personally identifiable information that is collected through the Web site or online service, provide a description of that process.  (3) Describe the process by which the operator notifies consumers who use or visit its commercial Web site or online service of material changes to the operator’s privacy policy for that Web site or online service. (4) Identify its effective date.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22575, subd. (b).)

COPPA requires online retailers to “conspicuously post” their privacy policies, to disclose “the categories of personally identifiable information” they collect, and to identify “the categories of third-party persons or entities with whom they may share that personally identifiable information.”  (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 22575, subds. (a), (b).)  If a consumer is not satisfied with the policy of a particular retailer, he or she may decline to purchase a product from that retailer.  The Legislature could have reasonably believed that its disclosure regime creates significant incentives, in light of consumer preferences, for online retailers to limit their collection and use of personally identifiable information.

Federal law also provides some degree of protection against the use of personal identification information for unwanted commercial solicitation.  The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA; Pub.L. No. 102–243 (Dec. 20, 1991) 105 Stat. 2394) was enacted “to protect the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the home and to facilitate interstate commerce by restricting certain uses of facsimile . . . machines and automatic dialers.”  (Sen.Rep. No. 102-178, 1st Sess., p. 1, reprinted in 1991 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 1968; see 47 U.S.C. § 227.)  “The TCPA instructs the Federal Communications Commission to issue regulations ‘concerning the need to protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.”  (Charvat v. NMP, LLC (6th Cir. 2011) 656 F.3d 440, quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1).)  “In 2003, two federal agencies — the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) — promulgated rules that together created the national do-not-call registry.  [Citations.]  The national do-not-call registry is a list containing the personal telephone numbers of telephone subscribers who have voluntarily indicated that they do not wish to receive unsolicited calls from commercial telemarketers.  Commercial telemarketers are generally prohibited from calling phone numbers that have been placed on the do-not-call registry, and they must pay an annual fee to access the numbers on the registry so that they can delete those numbers from their telephone solicitation lists.”  (Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC (10th Cir. 2004) 358 F.3d 1228, 1233–1234, fns. omitted.)  Thus, federal legislation limits the commercial use of customer telephone numbers (Cal. S. Ct., S199384, 04.02.2013, Apple v. Super. Ct.).

Internet : protection des données et Internet en droit californien : la loi de 2003 à ce sujet dispose que l'opérateur d'un site Internet commercial qui recueille des informations personnelles identifiables par le biais d'Internet au sujet de consommateurs individuels domiciliés en Californie qui utilisent ou visitent son site Internet commercial doit indiquer de manière apparente sa politique en matière de protection des données sur dit site Internet. Dite politique en matière de protection des données doit : (1) identifier les catégories d'informations personnelles que l'opérateur recueille par son site Internet au sujet des consommateurs individuels et indiquer les catégories d'entités tierces avec lesquelles ces informations sont partagées; (2) indiquer si l'opérateur maintient une procédure par laquelle le consommateur peut vérifier ses données personnelles précitées et en demander la modification; si une telle procédure est en place, sa mise en œuvre doit être expliquée; (3) décrire la procédure par laquelle l'opérateur annonce au consommateur une modification de sa politique en matière de protection des données; (4) divulguer les dates auxquelles dite politique est en vigueur.

Le droit fédéral apporte également un certain degré de protection contre l'usage de données personnelles à des fins de sollicitations commerciales indésirables. Une loi de 1991 protège contre des appels téléphoniques non sollicités et automatiques. Un registre "do-not-call" fut établi pour protéger le consommateur contre le télémarketing.