Tuesday, July 24, 2018

Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182


Misappropriation of intellectual property: Infringement: Conversion: Common law: Trade secret:
Montana Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA)

The essential elements of common law conversion are: (1) a claimant’s right of possession or control over the subject personal property; (2) the intentional exercise of possession or control over the property by another inconsistent with the right of the owner and without right or consent; and (3) resulting damages to the claimant. Gebhardt v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 203 Mont. 384, 389, 661 P.2d 855, 858 (1983).

Apart from conversion, the common law further recognizes two related but distinct theories of misappropriation of intellectual property―contract-based misappropriation and property right-based tortious misappropriation. See Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097-98 (N.Y. 1993) (distinguishing breach of non-disclosure agreement, contract misappropriation of intellectual property, and tortious misappropriation of property right-based intellectual property). Accord Nadel v. Play-by-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 374-78 (2nd Cir. 2000) (construing Apfel).

As a specialized variant of a breach of contract theory, the elements of a claim for contract misappropriation of intellectual property are: (1) an agreement for one to communicate an idea or knowledge to another in return for valuable consideration; (2) the idea or knowledge had value to the recipient at the time of contract formation regardless of whether “grossly unequal” or of “dubious value” in relation to the consideration paid or provided in return; (3) the recipient breached the agreement; and (4) resulting damages to the claimant based on breaching party’s beneficial use of the idea or knowledge. See Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1097-98 (emphasizing freedom of contract and subjective assessment of value). Accord Nadel, 208 F.3d at 376-80. While a truly novel idea or knowledge is presumed to be of value to a recipient who paid or pledged valuable consideration to acquire it, an idea or knowledge need not be truly original or novel to be of value to a recipient as a matter of contract consideration. Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1098.

The essential elements of a property rights-based claim for tortious misappropriation of intellectual property are: (1) an idea was communicated by the claimant to another in confidence; (2) the idea was novel and original; (3) the recipient used the idea to the recipient’s benefit; and (4) resulting damages to the claimant based on the tortfeasor’s beneficial use of the idea or knowledge. See Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1097-98; Alevizos v. John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Found., 764 So. 2d 8, 11 (Fla. App. 1999). An idea may give rise to a cognizable property right or interest only if novel and original. Apfel, 616 N.E.2d at 1098; Paul v. Haley, 588 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (idea that is not novel is not cognizable as property and thus cannot be misappropriated or stolen); Downey v. Gen. Foods Corp., 286 N.E.2d 257, 259 (N.Y. 1972) (ideas are cognizable and protectable as property rights only if novel and original).

In contrast to the common law protection of intellectual property, MUTSA defines the term “trade secret” as any “information or computer software, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (a) derives independent economic value . . . from not being generally known. . . [or] readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. Section 30-14-402(4), MCA. In pertinent part, MUTSA defines actionable “misappropriation” of a trade secret as the “disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who . . . used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret.” Section 30-14-402(2)(b)(i), MCA. As used in § 30-14-402(2)(b)(i), MCA, and as pertinent here, “improper means” includes theft, misrepresentation, or breach of a duty to maintain secrecy.


(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018, Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182, J. Sandefur)


Une violation des droits de propriété intellectuelle peut être reconnue si sont réunies alternativement les conditions de :
1 ) la théorie de la « conversion »,
2 ) la théorie de l’appropriation illicite basée sur un contrat,
3 ) la théorie de l’appropriation illicite extracontractuelle.
(Théories à distinguer de la violation d’une clause de confidentialité).

1 ) La notion de « conversion » provient de la Common law et suppose une prise intentionnelle de contrôle ou de possession illicite, par un tiers, d’un droit de propriété du lésé, provoquant un dommage.
2 ) La notion d’appropriation illicite basée sur un contrat provient de la Common law et suppose la transmission conventionnelle d’idées ou de connaissances moyennant contre-prestation (« consideration »), le bénéficiaire de la communication violant par la suite le contrat, par exemple en divulguant à des tiers ce qui lui a été communiqué, causant ainsi un dommage à son cocontractant. L’idée ou les connaissances doivent avoir une certaine valeur pour celui qui les reçoit. L’idée ou les connaissances n’ont pas nécessairement à être nouvelles ou originales.
3 ) La notion d’appropriation illicite extracontractuelle provient elle-aussi de la Common law et suppose la transmission confidentielle à un tiers d’une idée ou de connaissances nouvelles et originales, le tiers violant par la suite la confidentialité en utilisant à son profit l’idée ou la connaissance et causant ainsi un dommage.

En plus de ces théories de la Common law protégeant la propriété intellectuelle, peut s’appliquer la loi (ici de l’état du Montana) protégeant les secrets d’affaires (ce type de lois découle d’une loi uniforme et se retrouve dans d’autres états).



Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182


Copyright and Common law-protected ideas:

Apart from conversion, the common law further recognizes two related but distinct theories of misappropriation of intellectual property―contract-based misappropriation and property right-based tortious misappropriation. See Apfel v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1095, 1097-98 (N.Y. 1993) (distinguishing breach of non-disclosure agreement, contract misappropriation of intellectual property, and tortious misappropriation of property right-based intellectual property). Accord Nadel v. Play-by-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368, 374-78 (2nd Cir. 2000) (construing Apfel).

See also Paul v. Haley, 588 N.Y.S.2d 897, 902-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (distinguishing common law-protected ideas from federal law-copyrightable expressions of ideas).


(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018, Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182, J. Sandefur)


Distinction entre la protection fédérale conférée à l’expression d’une idée par le mécanisme du copyright, et la protection conférée par la Common law à certaines idées.

Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182


Representation: Agent: CEO: Board of directors: Licensing agreement:
Actual authority: Ostensible authority: Ratification: Equitable estoppel:

(…) AMS nonetheless asserts that the 2008 licensing agreement is invalid or unenforceable due to lack of mutual assent on the ground that Diane Ruff executed the agreement in an agency capacity without authorization of AMS’s board of directors.

Agency is “the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another” that the agent shall act on behalf of the principal subject to the principal’s control and consent. Butler Mfg. Co. v. J & L Implement Co., 167 Mont. 519, 523, 540 P.2d 962, 965 (1975). See also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006); § 28-10-101, MCA (agent is one who represents another in dealings with third parties).

Except as otherwise provided by statute, a principal may authorize an agent to perform any act that the principal may lawfully perform. Section 28-10-105, MCA. A principal may create an agency relationship by prior authorization or subsequent ratification of the representative acts of another. Section 28-10-201, MCA.

An agent has the authority actually or ostensibly conferred upon the agent by the principal. Section 28-10-401, MCA. Actual authority is authority that a principal either “intentionally confers” upon the agent or intentionally or negligently “allows the agent to believe the agent possesses.” Section 28-10-402, MCA. Ostensible authority is authority that a principal intentionally or negligently “allows a third person to believe the agent possesses.” Section 28-10-403, MCA. A principal may confer actual or ostensible authority upon an agent by express authorization or circumstantial implication. Freeman v. Withers, 104 Mont. 166, 172, 65 P.2d 601, 603 (1937). An actual or ostensible agent has implied authority to “do everything necessary, proper, and usual in the ordinary course” of the principal’s business “for effecting the purpose of the agency.” Section 28-10-405(1), MCA. A disclosed principal is liable in contract to third parties for the representative acts of an agent within the scope of the actual or ostensible authority conferred on the agent by the principal. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.01; see also §§ 28-10-401 and -405, MCA. Accordingly, unless otherwise “specially restricted” by board directive or bylaw, “a general or managing officer or agent” of a corporation has actual or ostensible authority to “enter into any contract which is usual, proper, or necessary . . . in the ordinary transaction of the company’s business.” Audit Servs., Inc. v. Elmo Rd. Corp., 175 Mont. 533, 536, 575 P.2d 77, 79 (1978).

Here, it is beyond genuine material dispute on the Rule 56 record that, at all times pertinent, Diane Ruff was the chief executive officer of AMS with general authority to act on behalf of the corporation within the broad scope of AMS’s ordinary course of business. AMS was engaged in the business of, inter alia, providing payroll recordkeeping and processing services to its clients, including but not limited to the acquisition of software necessary or helpful to that end. It is beyond genuine material dispute on the Rule 56 record that the 2008 licensing agreement and its subject matter were within the scope of the ordinary course of AMS’s business.

AMS’s corporate counsel drafted the licensing agreement for Diane Ruff’s signature in the name of the corporation. AMS made no affirmative factual showing disputing Diane’s authority to enter into the licensing agreement without prior authorization of the AMS board. AMS made no affirmative factual showing that Diane had any reason to believe that either the initial informal agreement or the subsequent licensing agreement was outside the scope of her authority as the chief executive officer of AMS. AMS further made no affirmative factual showing that Daniel had any non-speculative reason to believe that Diane was not authorized to enter into the development and licensing agreements or that Diane actively or intentionally concealed the existence and terms of the licensing agreement from the AMS board. The mere facts that Diane and Daniel were mother and son and that the AMS board was not formally or specifically aware of the licensing agreement until the new AMS executive director raised “concerns” about it in 2013 after Diane left the company are insufficient without more to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Diane was acting outside the scope of her actual or ostensible authority when she executed the licensing agreement seven years earlier. On the Rule 56 record presented, we hold that Ruff was entitled to judgment that Diane executed the 2008 licensing agreement within the scope of her actual and ostensible authority as the chief executive officer of AMS.

The District Court alternatively ruled that, even if arguendo Diane had executed the licensing agreement outside the scope of her actual or ostensible authority, AMS nonetheless ratified the agreement after she left the company. A principal may create an agency relationship by subsequent ratification of the representative acts of another. Section 28-10-201, MCA. “A contract which is voidable solely for want of due consent may be ratified by a subsequent consent.” Section 28-2-304, MCA. Ratification is the affirmative confirmation of a prior act. Erler v. Creative Fin. & Inv., 2009 MT 36, ¶¶ 25-26, 349 Mont. 207, 203 P.3d 744. A principal with knowledge of the material facts may ratify a prior unauthorized act or transaction by express declaration or implicitly by acts, statements, or conduct which reasonably manifests an intent to affirm or be bound by the act. Erler, ¶¶ 25-26; Freeman, 104 Mont. at 172, 65 P.2d at 603. Thus, a principal may ratify an unauthorized act by “knowingly accepting or retaining the benefit of the act.” Section 28-10-211, MCA.

(…) Ratification rests, inter alia, upon the principle of equitable estoppel and “the duty of the principal to repudiate” an unauthorized act of an agent “within a reasonable time after discovery.” Larson, 61 Mont. at 9, 201 P. at 687. See also Butler Mfg. Co., 167 Mont. at 526, 540 P.2d at 966 (duty to repudiate or disavow unauthorized act of agent immediately upon discovery). Thus, a principal with knowledge who acquiesces and affirmatively performs or pays on a previously unauthorized but otherwise lawful and beneficial act of a previously established agent is equitably estopped from later asserting that the act was unauthorized ab initio.


(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018, Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182, J. Sandefur)


Cette affaire est jugée en application du droit de l’état du Montana.
Etendue des pouvoirs de représentation d’un directeur général : ce directeur engage la société si son acte est expressément autorisé par le conseil d’administration, si le conseil laisse croire par négligence que l’acte est autorisé, ou s’il est ratifié par dit conseil. Le directeur général engage également la société si son acte pouvait raisonnablement être compris par un tiers comme étant autorisé par le conseil. Quant à elle, la ratification peut être expresse ou par actes concluants (par exemple en conservant les bénéfices découlant de l’acte non autorisé). S’agissant de la ratification, il y a plus : la notion de ratification est liée au principe d’ « equitable estoppel » ainsi qu’au devoir du représenté de répudier l’acte non autorisé dans un délai raisonnable après sa découverte. De la sorte, un représenté qui ne répudie pas peut être « equitably estopped » d’alléguer valablement que le représentant a excédé ses pouvoirs.
A défaut de directive contraire du conseil ou de norme statutaire contraire, le directeur dispose de la compétence de conclure tous les types de contrats usuels, ou appropriés, ou nécessaires à la réalisation du but social.
Est en l’espèce discutée la question de la validité d’un contrat de licence conclu par la CEO pour le compte de son entreprise, active dans la fourniture de services digitaux liés à la tenue de dossiers de ressources humaines. Le contrat de licence portait sur un software utile à la réalisation du but social, de sorte que la directrice disposait de la compétence de signer ce contrat au nom de la société. En outre, le contrat de licence avait été rédigé par le service juridique interne de l’entreprise. Dite entreprise n’a nullement contesté l’autorité de sa directrice de signer, et celle-ci n’avait aucune raison de penser qu’elle n’en avait pas la compétence. Et l’autre partie au contrat de licence n’avait aucune raison de penser que la directrice aurait été dépourvue de l’autorité de signer au nom de l’entreprise, ni de penser que la directrice aurait caché au conseil d’administration l’existence et les termes du contrat. Le fait qu’en l’espèce la directrice et l’autre partie au contrat de licence étaient mère et fils n’était en soi pas suffisant pour nier le pouvoir de représentation de la directrice. Aucun conflit d’intérêt n’a été démontré, s’agissant d’une transaction conforme aux conditions du marché.


Thursday, July 12, 2018

Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Systems Corp., Docket No. 16-1945


Conflict of laws: Forum non conveniens: Choice of law: Injunction:

Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988).

In Chick Kam Choo, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court that had previously dismissed claims on forum non conveniens and choice-of-law grounds could enjoin the plaintiffs from reasserting their Texas state law claims in state court. 486 U.S. at 150–51. The Supreme Court explained that such an injunction would be proper under the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act because the validity of the Texas law claim was adjudicated in the original federal action when the district court decided that under applicable choice-of-law principles, the law of Singapore, rather than Texas, controlled the petitioner’s suit. Id. at 150.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, July 12, 2018, Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Systems Corp., Docket No. 16-1945 (2016-1945, 2016-2050), J. Chen)

Si une cour fédérale juge dans une affaire que la cour compétente est à l’étranger et que le droit applicable est un droit étranger, elle peut, par une injonction, prohiber la saisine subséquente d’une cour d’un état pour ce qui est de cette même affaire.

Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Systems Corp., Docket No. 16-1945


Trade secret misappropriation: Labor law:

The parties agree that California law governs Raytheon’s trade secret misappropriation claim. To prevail on its claim under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), Raytheon was required to prove, among other things: (1) it owned a trade secret; and (2) Indigo misappropriated the trade secret, either by acquisition, use, or disclosure. See Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 283 (Ct. App. 2003); see also MedioStream, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 869 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

Under California law, a trade secret must “(1) derive independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) be the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d). Thus, information that is generally known to the public cannot qualify as a trade secret; nor can it form the basis for a misappropriation claim. See Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying California law).

A defendant misappropriates a trade secret if it acquires, discloses, or uses a trade secret. “Misappropriation” is defined as: (1) Acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (2) Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who:

(A) Used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or

(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of the trade secret was: (i) Derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (ii) Acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (iii) Derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or

(C) Before a material change of his or her position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b).

The CUTSA defines the term “improper means” to include “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.” Id. § 3426.1(a). Reverse engineering and independent derivation do not qualify as improper means. Id.

(Here neither party asked the district court to explicitly define the contours of the trade secrets before sending the misappropriation inquiry to the jury.)


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, July 12, 2018, Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Systems Corp., Docket No. 16-1945 (2016-1945, 2016-2050), J. Chen)


L’action en violation du secret des affaires en droit californien. Notamment, un ancien employeur peut agir contre un nouvel employeur si un employé qui passe de l’un à l’autre dévoile de tels secrets.

Tuesday, July 10, 2018

Kiobel v. Cravath, Swain & Moore, LLP, Docket No. 17-424-cv



Discovery (foreign company): Evidence (foreign court): 28 U.S.C. § 1782: Trade secret: Attorney: Ethics (client’s documents):

Section 1782 “provides federal‐court assistance in gathering evidence for use in foreign tribunals.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004).
Petitioner‐Appellee Kiobel seeks documents belonging to Royal Dutch Shell (a foreign company) from Shell’s United States counsel, Respondent‐Appellant Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP. The documents were transferred to Cravath for the purpose of responding to discovery requests in a prior case over which the court was ultimately found to lack jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Hellerstein, J.) granted Kiobel’s petition seeking leave to subpoena Cravath. We reverse: it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to grant a 28 U.S.C. § 1782 petition where the documents sought from a foreign company’s U.S. counsel would be “unreachable in a foreign country,” because this threatens to jeopardize “the policy of promoting open communications between lawyers and their clients.” Application of Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 146 (2d Cir. 1997).
For the purpose of pretrial discovery, the district court consolidated Kiobel’s case with other Alien Tort Statute cases arising out of the same events in Nigeria, the Wiwa cases. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). The consolidated cases generated a large volume of discovery, including depositions and documents. The discovery materials were subject to a stipulated confidentiality order entered into in the Wiwa cases, and signed by Kiobel. Most of the documents produced by Shell were marked “confidential,” meaning that they were to be used “solely for purposes” of the then‐pending Kiobel and Wiwa litigations. The parties agreed to destroy or return each other’s confidential material not later than thirty days after the respective cases’ conclusions, and that the order would survive the end of litigation. Any de‐designation of confidential documents or modification of the confidentiality order required agreement by the parties to the confidentiality order, or could be ordered by the district court. Cravath attorneys signed the stipulation in their capacity as Shell’s counsel.
Years after (…), Kiobel prepared to file suit against Shell in the Netherlands, advancing the same allegations made in her Alien Tort Statute suit. Kiobel now wants to deploy the discovery from her American litigation in her Dutch lawsuit, but is impeded by the confidentiality order which limits its use to only the U.S. Kiobel and Wiwa Alien Tort Statute cases. On October 12, 2016, Kiobel filed the pending 28 U.S.C. Section 1782 petition to subpoeana Cravath and obtain “all deposition transcripts from the Kiobel and Wiwa cases,” as well as “all discovery documents and communications produced to the plaintiffs by Shell and other defendants in Kiobel and the Wiwa cases.”
(…) Therefore, although our Court in Ratliff held that Davis Polk was subject to appellant’s subpoena, Ratliff did not disturb Sarrio’s suggestion that a district court should not exercise its discretion to grant a Section 1782 petition for documents held by a U.S. law firm in its role as counsel for a foreign client if the documents are undiscoverable from the client abroad, because this would disturb attorney‐client communications and relations. Sarrio, 119 F.3d at 146; Ratliff, 354 F.3d at 170.
(…) The decision to alter the confidentiality order without Shell’s participation, and without considering the costs of disclosure to Shell, makes this case exceptional, and mandates reversal. See Mees, 793 F.3d at 302 (explaining that under Intel, district courts should apply the standard from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 to assess when a discovery request is unduly burdensome); see also In re Catalyst Managerial Servs., DMCC, 680 Fed. App’x 37, 39 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2017) (discussing a party’s argument about the burdens of discovery on a third‐party putative foreign defendant in the context of the fourth Intel factor).
(…) As amicus the New York City Bar Association notes, its Ethics Opinion 780 states that law firms have an interest in retaining documents where needed to protect themselves from accusations of wrongful conduct. So U.S. law firms may be harmed if they must destroy or return a foreign client’s documents as soon as possible once a proceeding is completed.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, July 10, 2018, Kiobel v. Cravath, Swain & Moore, LLP, Docket No. 17-424-cv, J. Jacobs)

28 U.S.C. § 1782 prévoit l’assistance des cours fédérales dans le processus de production de moyens de preuve à l’intention de Tribunaux étrangers.
En conformité avec sa jurisprudence Sarrio rendue en 1997 (analysant 28 U.S.C. § 1782), le 2è Circuit fédéral juge en l’espèce qu’une cour de district fédérale ne peut pas ordonner d’une étude d’avocats sur territoire U.S. la production de moyens de preuve appartenant à un client étranger de l’étude quand le but de cette procédure est la production de ces moyens de preuve dans le cadre d’une autre procédure hors U.S., laquelle procédure ne permettant pas (encore) la production desdits moyens de preuve (même s’ils peuvent être produits ultérieurement). De la sorte, ces moyens de preuve ne peuvent pas être obtenus si la procédure hors U.S. n’a pas encore débuté et que dite procédure (typiquement des systèmes de droit civil) ne connaît pas l’institution de « discovery » antérieure au procès proprement dit (typiquement des systèmes de Common law).
En juger autrement reviendrait à porter atteinte au principe de libre et complète communication entre le client et son avocat.
Il est à noter que la partie requérante ne sollicitait la production qu’à l’encontre de l’étude d’avocats, et non à l’encontre de son client.
Par ailleurs, en l’espèce, les moyens de preuve recherchés avaient antérieurement été produits dans une procédure, terminée, devant les cours U.S. Les parties à cette procédure avaient convenu de leur caractère confidentiel, ces moyens devant être détruits ou retournés après la fin de la procédure. Les parties avaient convenu que la confidentialité ne pouvait être levée que de leur mutuel consentement, ou par ordre de la cour de district fédérale. Dès lors, sans l’intervention de la cour de district, les moyens de preuve ne pouvaient pas être produits hors U.S. considérant la confidentialité promise. D’où la présente procédure en production fondée sur 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Le 2è Circuit juge donc ici que requérir et obtenir ces documents contreviendrait au principe de libre communication entre le client et l’avocat.
Cette affaire est considérée comme exceptionnelle par la cour. Dans des affaires plus « ordinaires » n’impliquant ni clauses de confidentialité ni principe de libre communication entre client et avocat, les cours fédérales examinent une requête en production fondée sur 28 U.S.C. § 1782 sous l’angle des quatre facteurs établis par la jurisprudence Intel rendue par la Cour Suprême fédérale en 2004 (542 U.S. 241).
(La présente décision cite aussi l’ « Ethics Opinion 780 » de l’association du barreau de la ville de New York, qui dispose que les études d’avocats ont un intérêt à la conservation des documents, pour pouvoir faire face cas échéant à des reproches de violations d’obligations professionnelles).

Tuesday, July 3, 2018

E-commerce, Restore Online Shoppers' Confidence Act


E-commerce: Consumer protection: Competition: Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act (ROSCA): Continuity plans: Negative Options: Injunction: FTC:

Time for a ROSCA recap: FTC says “risk free trial” was risky – and not free
By: Lesley Fair | Jul 3, 2018
FTC
Republication

Like the three sides of a triangle, ROSCA – the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act – has three basic compliance requirements for online sellers who enroll consumers in continuity plans, often known as negative options. The law bans online negative options unless the seller: 1) clearly discloses all material terms of the deal before obtaining a consumer’s billing information; 2) gets the consumer’s express informed consent before making the charge; and 3) provides a simple mechanism for stopping recurring charges.
A federal district court has granted the Federal Trade Commission’s request to stop a group of San Diego-based Internet marketers from deceptively advertising free trial offers and not only charging consumers full-price for the trial product, but also enrolling them in expensive, ongoing continuity plans without their knowledge or consent. The court order announced today temporarily halts the operation, freezes its assets, and appoints a temporary receiver over the business.


The complaint for permanent injunction and other equitable relief:
The counts:
Count 1: Misrepresentations of the price of the trial offers
Count 2: Misrepresentation that order is not complete
Count 3: Failure to disclose adequately material terms of trial offer
Count 4: Unfairly charging consumers without authorization
Count 5: Violations of ROSCA – Auto-renewal continuity plan, violations of the Electronic Fund transfer Act and Regulation E
Count 6: Unauthorized debiting from Consumers’ accounts