Jurisdictional rule: Claim-processing rule: Clear-statement rule: Waiver:
Forfeiture: Equity: Dismissal:
In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 210–213 (2007), this
Court clarified that an appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute will be
regarded as “jurisdictional,” meaning that late filing of the appeal notice
necessitates dismissal of the appeal. But a time limit prescribed only in a
court-made rule, Bowles acknowledged, is not jurisdictional; it is,
instead, a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture if not
properly raised by the appellee. Ibid.; Kontrick v. Ryan,
540 U. S. 443, 456 (2004). Because the Court of Appeals held jurisdictional a
time limit specified in a rule, not in a statute, 835 F. 3d 761, 763 (CA7
2016), we vacate that court’s judgment dismissing the appeal.
A time limit not prescribed by Congress ranks as a mandatory
claim-processing rule, serving “to promote the orderly progress of litigation
by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain
specified times.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435
(2011).
This Court and other forums have sometimes overlooked this distinction,
“mischaracterizing claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action as
jurisdictional limitations, particularly when that characterization was not
central to the case, and thus did not require close analysis.” Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 161 (2010).
But prevailing precedent makes the distinction critical. Failure to
comply with a jurisdictional time prescription, we have maintained, deprives a
court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal—a “drastic”
result. Shinseki, 562 U. S., at 435; Bowles, 551 U. S., at 213 (“When
an ‘appeal has not been prosecuted . . . within the time limited by the acts of
Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’” (quoting United
States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 113 (1848))). The jurisdictional defect
is not subject to waiver or forfeiture and may be raised at any time in the
court of first instance and on direct appeal. Kontrick, 540 U. S., at
455. In contrast to the ordinary operation of our adversarial system,
courts are obliged to notice jurisdictional issues and raise them on their own
initiative. Shinseki, 562 U. S., at 434.
Mandatory claim-processing rules are less stern. If properly invoked,
mandatory claim-processing rules must be enforced, but they may be waived or
forfeited. Manrique v. United States, 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017)
(slip op., at 4). “Claim-processing rules . . . ensure relief to a party
properly raising them, but do not compel the same result if the party forfeits
them.” Eberhart v. United States, 546
U. S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam).
We have reserved whether mandatory claim-processing rules may be subject
to equitable exceptions. See Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 457.
The terms waiver and forfeiture—though often used interchangeably by
jurists and litigants—are not synonymous. “Forfeiture is the failure to make the
timely assertion of a right; waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.’” United States v. Olano, 507 U. S.
725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464
(1938)).
(…) If a time prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority
from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation is
jurisdictional (…) In cases not involving the timebound transfer of
adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another, we have
additionally applied a clear-statement rule: “A rule is jurisdictional ‘if the
Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope
shall count as jurisdictional.’” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S.
134, 141 (2012) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S.
500, 515 (2006)). See also, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.
S. 428, 431 (2011) (statutory deadline for filing notice of appeal with
Article I tribunal held not jurisdictional). “This is not to say that Congress
must incant magic words in order to speak clearly,” however. Sebelius v.
Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 153 (2013). In
determining whether Congress intended a particular provision to be
jurisdictional, “we consider ‘context, including this Court’s interpretations
of similar provisions in many years past,’ as probative of Congress’ intent.” Id.,
at 153–154 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.
S. 154, 168 (2010)). Even so, “in applying the clear statement rule, we have
made plain that most statutory time bars are nonjurisdictional.” United
States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 6).
(…) “Mandatory and jurisdictional” is erroneous and confounding
terminology where, as here, the relevant time prescription is absent from the
U. S. Code. Because Rule 4(a)(5)(C), not §2107, limits the length of the
extension granted here, the time prescription is not jurisdictional. See Youkelsone
v. FDIC, 660 F. 3d 473, 475 (CADC 2011) (“Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s
thirty-day limit on the length of any extension ultimately granted appears
nowhere in the U. S. Code.”).
(U.S.S.C., Nov. 8, 2017, Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of
Chicago, Docket 16-658, J. Ginsburg, unanimous).
En procédure
fédérale, un délai prescrit par une loi au sens formel (soit promulguée
directement par le Congrès), tel un délai de recours, n'est en soi pas
susceptible de prolongation. Il est a priori de nature
"juridictionnelle". Cela même si la partie adverse ne se prévaut pas
de son inobservation. L'autorité devra constater d'office que le délai n'a pas
été respecté, et devra prononcer une décision d'irrecevabilité. Et la partie
adverse peut se prévaloir de l'absence de compétence de l'autorité en tout
temps pendant la procédure, ainsi qu'en appel direct. Par contraste, les délais
fixés par un acte autre qu'une loi au sens formel, ou fixés par le Tribunal,
sont susceptibles d'être prolongés. L'autorité ne rendra pas de décision
d'irrecevabilité si la partie adverse ne se prévaut pas du dépassement du
délai.
La Cour a
réservé pour une décision ultérieure la résolution de la question de savoir si
les délais qui permettent la prolongation sont ou non susceptibles de faire
l'objet d'exceptions déduites de l'"equity".
Les notions
de "waiver" et de "forfeiture", souvent utilisées à tort de
manière interchangeables, ne sont pas synonymes. "Forfeiture"
implique le fait de manquer à se prévaloir d'un droit dans les temps.
"Waiver" implique l'abandon intentionnel d'un droit.
Pour
déterminer si un délai est de nature "juridictionnelle", la règle de
l'intention claire du législateur s'applique : pour connaître l'intention du
Congrès, le texte de la loi est relevant, mais aussi son contexte, ainsi que l'interprétation
donnée par la jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême à des dispositions semblables.
La plupart des délais, cependant, ne sont pas de nature juridictionnelle.
