Supreme Court of Texas, Compass Bank v. Calleja-Ahedo, Docket No. 17-0065

Internet Law

Identity Theft

Data

Bank Account

Statement of Account

Texas Law and UCC

An identity thief drained F. C.-A.’s bank account through a series of fraudulent transactions in 2012 and 2013. C. sued his bank to recover the stolen funds. The question now is whether C. or his bank must suffer the financial consequences of the theft.

Section 4.406 of the Business and Commerce Code contains the Texas legislature’s answer to that question. “If a bank sends or makes available a statement of account . . . the customer must exercise reasonable promptness in examining the statement. . . to determine whether any payment was not authorized” and “must promptly notify the bank of the relevant facts” regarding the unauthorized payment. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 4.406(c). Section 4.406 limits the liability of the bank when the customer fails to comply with these duties. Id. § 4.406(d).

(…) Section 4.406 precludes C.’ s attempt to hold his bank liable for the losses.

The deposit agreements between C. and his bank do not alter this outcome. (…) (Parties may, by agreement, alter the requirements of section 4.406).

Although the Bank sent statements to the imposter’s address, it made the statements available to C. by other means, triggering his statutory duties to promptly examine the statements and report the fraud. The only remaining question is whether the deposit agreements modify the statute to require a result different from that dictated by applying the text of section 4.406. (…) We conclude that they do not.

C. never signed up for online banking. After June 2012, C. did not receive statements at his brother’s address. He did not notify the Bank of any concerns until eighteen months later, in late January 2014.

(See also Kaplan v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 2358240, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2015) (holding that statements were made available to customer under UCC § 4-406 because they were available online and customer could obtain statements by requesting them in person or by phone, and rejecting customer’s argument that the statements were not made available because she never received them)).

(…) Recovery of these remaining amounts is nevertheless barred by subsection 4.406(d)(2), which provides that, after an initial unauthorized withdrawal, subsequent withdrawals “by the same wrongdoer” cannot be recovered from the Bank if “the customer had been afforded a reasonable period of time, not exceeding 30 days, in which to examine the item or statement of account and notify the bank.” The UCC’s official comment accurately explains the effect of this provision.

(Supreme Court of Texas, Compass Bank v. Calleja-Ahedo, Dec. 21, 2018, Docket No. 17-0065)

Affaire rendue en application du droit de l’état du Texas, lequel reprend le contenu de l’UCC, de sorte que l’on peut s’attendre à des décisions identiques dans les autres états qui considèrent également l’UCC dans ce domaine.

Manifestation de volonté par Internet : selon le droit texan et l’UCC, un relevé de compte bancaire périodique mis à disposition du client doit être contesté dans un certain délai. A défaut, le client est déchu de son droit une fois le délai écoulé.

De la sorte, et c’est en cela que la présente affaire est d’intérêt, un relevé de compte bancaire, mis à disposition du client par le système gratuit e-Banking, sans égard au fait de savoir si le client a installé ce service, et sans savoir si le client dispose d’Internet, est réputé valablement communiqué au client. Ainsi, après le délai prévu pour contester le relevé, le client qui n’a ni consulté Internet ni contesté le relevé est déchu de son droit de contestation.

Cette réglementation légale peut être modifiée conventionnellement.

En l’espèce, le client avait demandé à la banque d’adresser ses relevés à un membre de sa famille. Puis un imposteur est parvenu à obtenir en sa faveur des versements, en plusieurs fois, portant sur la totalité du compte. Dès le premier versement, les relevés bancaires ont été adressés à l’imposteur et non plus au membre de la famille du client. Ni ce proche ni le client ne se sont préoccupés de cette situation, le client ne remarquant que bien plus tard que son compte bancaire était vide. En application de ce qui précède, il ne peut rendre la banque responsable de cette situation et doit supporter intégralement sa perte.

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Solarworld Americas, Inc. v. United States, Docket 18-1373

Customs

Harmonized System

HTSUS

Tariff Classification

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988

Import

Antidumping Duty

Appeal from the United States Court of International Trade in Nos. 1:15-cv-00196-CRK, 1:15-cv-00231-CRK, Judge Claire R. Kelly.

“The World Customs Organization publishes the explanatory notes as its official interpretation of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (the Harmonized System), the global system of trade nomenclature . . . .” Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 845 F.3d 1158, 1163 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “The United States and its major trading partners . . . developed a single modern product nomenclature for international use as a standard system of classifying goods for customs,” and therefore base their tariff classification schedules on the Harmonized System. Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1220 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2009). For instance, in 1988, Congress passed legislation implementing the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”). Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1201, 102 Stat. 1107, 1147.

(SolarWorld argues as a legal matter that Customs’ rulings must be afforded more weight than other evidence on the record, we disagree. Whereas Customs is tasked with “fixing the final classification” of imported merchandise under the HTSUS, 19 U.S.C. § 1500; see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221–24 (2001) (outlining Customs’ role in classification), Commerce is authorized to conduct administrative reviews of an antidumping duty order to “determine . . . the amount of any antidumping duty” necessary to remedy the effect of foreign merchandise being sold in the United States at less than its fair value, 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(1)(B); see id. § 1673. In accordance with this authorization, the statute affords Commerce “broad discretion” in identifying the best available information on the record to value factors of production. QVD Food, 658 F.3d at 1323; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(1)(B)).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Dec. 12, 2018, Solarworld Americas, Inc. v. United States, Docket 18-1373, Wallach, Circuit Judge)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Laerdal Medical Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Docket 17-2445

Default (ITC practice v. federal court practice)

19 U.S.C. § 1337 (g) (1) (ITC)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (federal court)

Order to show cause

Exclusion order

Cease and desist order

Export

Despite being served with the amended complaint and notice of investigation, no respondent submitted any response, appeared, or otherwise participated in any way in any of the proceedings. J.A. 2478–99. On October 20, 2016, therefore, Laerdal moved for an order requiring Respondents to show cause why they should not be found in default under § 1337(g)(1). J.A. 2550–59. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) granted Laerdal’s motion and issued the Order to Show Cause on November 7, 2016. J.A. 2584–86. Respondents again failed to respond to or acknowledge that order. Two weeks later, the ALJ issued an initial determination finding all respondents in default. J.A. 2589–95.

(We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6)).

We conclude that the statute, on its face, unambiguously requires the Commission to grant relief against defaulting respondents, subject only to public interest concerns, if all prerequisites of § 1337(g)(1) are satisfied. The statute’s plain text, surrounding context, purpose, and legislative history, as well as the Commission’s own prior decisions, support this conclusion.

(…) Important distinction between district court and ITC practice—the Commission must conduct a preliminary review that district courts do not, and only then may institute an investigation. Rule 55, moreover, governing default judgment in district court litigation, is unlike § 1337(g)(1); it does not require the court to grant relief, it grants the court discretion to “conduct hearings or make referrals” in evaluating whether to “enter or effectuate judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). We presume that Congress was aware of the discretion granted to district courts under Rule 55 when it later drafted subsection (g) to § 1337. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation”).

Here, it is undisputed that Laerdal met the prerequisites for § 1337(g)(1). The amended complaint and notice of investigation were served on all respondents, the respondents failed to respond or appear in any way and failed to show good cause why they should not be found in default, and Laerdal limited the relief it sought to exclusion orders and cease and desist orders against only the respondents. J.A. 2478–99, 2550–59, 2584–86, 2589–95, 2599, 2609–12. Subject only to public interest concerns, therefore, the Commission was required under § 1337(g)(1) to presume all facts alleged in the complaint as true and issue an exclusion order, cease and desist order, or both.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Dec. 7, 2018, Laerdal Medical Corp. v. International Trade Commission, Docket 17-2445, Circuit Judge O’Malley)

Le défaut dans les procédures devant l’ITC, comparé au défaut en procédure devant les cours fédérales. Devant l’ITC, la partie adverse qui ne répond pas sera sommée de justifier son omission par un « Order to show cause ». Sans justification ou si la justification est insuffisante, le défaut sera prononcé et les conclusions de la demande seront adjugées. La Règle 55 de procédure civile fédérale laisse davantage de souplesse à la cour, qui n’est pas tenue, dans de telles circonstances, de rendre de ces faits son jugement au fond.

Merger - Product Market

Competition

Merger

Relevant Market

Product Market

Distinct Characteristics of Chloride TiO2 and Sulfate TiO2

Reasonable Interchangeability

Price Differential

SSNIP

(…) Customers are not willing to substitute sulfate TiO2 for chloride TiO2 in the vast majority of their products, notwithstanding the price differential.

Respondents argue that sulfate TiO2 and chloride TiO2 are substitutes, and therefore in the same product market, because it is possible for TiO2 customers to use either sulfate TiO2 or chloride TiO2 in approximately 80% of TiO2 end-use products, provided the quality is the same, and that only 10% of TiO2 end-use products must use chloride only. However, as shown above, customers do not find the quality to be the same. Even if it is possible, as a technical matter, for paint companies to make paint with either chloride TiO2 or sulfate TiO2, the fact is that they overwhelmingly choose not to do so. Furthermore, the proper antitrust inquiry, as set forth in the Merger Guidelines, is not whether it is theoretically possible for customers to substitute, but whether customers would reasonably substitute sulfate TiO2 for chloride TiO2 in sufficient volumes to render a small but significant non-transitory increase in price (“SSNIP”) (commonly 5%) unprofitable. Merger Guidelines §§ 4.1.1, 4.1.2. As addressed in more detail in section II.C.3. below, Dr. Hill conducted an empirical analysis and found that a hypothetical monopolist of all chloride TiO2 sales to customers in North America would find it profitable to impose a SSNIP.

(…) Respondents further argue that sulfate and chloride are in the same product market because, according to Respondents’ proffered economic expert witness, Dr. Ramsey Shehadeh, “there is a long-term relationship between sulfate and chloride titanium dioxide prices” characterized by “statistically and economically significant co-movement of prices.” RB at 53. This argument is unconvincing. Even if the prices are correlated, this does not show that the products are reasonably substitutable for each other, especially in light of the proof that TiO2 customers do not substitute. See also Preliminary Injunction Opinion, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155127, at *21 (stating that “the mere fact that the prices of two goods move upward or downward together need not mean that they are substitutes”). As Dr. Hill explained, “the prices of two goods may be correlated, but they may not be in the same market. . . . One example of this would be, hamburger buns and hot dog buns are made from the same thing, and their demands highly correlated. Their prices will be correlated over time, but they are not close substitutes for one another.” Hill, Tr. 1707-08.

(…) The evidence proves that chloride TiO2 is a relevant product market.

(FTC, Office of Administrative Law Judges, In the Matter of Tronox/Cristal USA, Dec. 7, 2018, Docket No. 9377)

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0085/tronoxcristal-usa

Merger - Geographic Market

Competition

Merger

Relevant Market

Geographic Market

Hypothetical Monopolist Test

SSNIP

Critical Loss Analysis

Arbitrage

Correlation and Co-Integration Analyses

Price Elasticity of Demand

Where suppliers can set prices based on customer location, and customers cannot avoid targeted price increases through arbitrage (by purchasing at a lower price from a seller in one geographic area and then transporting the product to another geographic region), the relevant geographic market may be defined around the locations of customers. Polypore, 2010 WL 9549988 at *16 (applying Merger Guidelines § 4.2.2). Under the Merger Guidelines, “if price discrimination based on customer location is feasible as is often the case when delivered pricing is commonly used in the industry, the Agencies may define geographic markets based on the locations of customers. . . .” Merger Guidelines § 4.2.

Courts apply the “hypothetical monopolist test” to ask whether a “hypothetical profit-maximizing firm . . . that was the only present and future seller of the relevant products . . . likely would impose at least a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price (‘SSNIP’). . . .” FTC v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 33 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Merger Guidelines § 4.1.1). “If buyers would respond to the SSNIP by shifting to products produced outside the proposed geographic market, and this shift were sufficient to render the SSNIP unprofitable, then the proposed geographic market would be too narrow.” FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 123 (D.D.C. 2004).

The evidence shows that Respondents set prices on a regional basis; that the North America region includes the United States and Canada, but not Mexico; that chloride TiO2 manufacturers deliver their product to their North American customers’ locations; and that North American customers could not defeat a price increase through arbitrage. Therefore, the relevant geographic market is North America, defined as the United States and Canada.

Respondents’ documents and testimony confirm that they charge different prices to customers depending on the region in which the customer is located (“regional pricing”).

(…) “Pricing in the four regions; U.S. [United States], LATAM [Latin America], EMEA [Europe, Middle East and Africa] and APAC [Asia Pacific] are not comparable. . . . There is no global price.”

(…) Under the Merger Guidelines, a region forms a relevant geographic market if a SSNIP would not be defeated by arbitrage, e.g., customers in the region travelling outside it to purchase the relevant product and transport it back. Merger Guidelines § 4.2.2. Arbitrage between customers at different geographic locations may be impractical due to transportation costs. Merger Guidelines § 3. The evidence in this case shows that North American customers have not engaged in arbitrage despite higher prices in the North America region and that they would not engage in arbitrage to defeat a SSNIP.

(…) Correlation and co-integration analyses look only at prices. They do not address the relevant antitrust question of whether customers change their purchases in response to relative price changes. “The mere fact that the prices of two goods move upward or downward together need not mean that they are substitutes.” Preliminary Injunction Opinion, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155127, at *21.

(…) Dr. Hill conducted the hypothetical monopolist test several ways. Dr. Hill conducted a critical loss analysis using three different measures to determine whether it would be profitable for the hypothetical monopolist to increase the price by at least a SSNIP. F. 183-185. First, Dr. Hill used his estimate of North American customers’ willingness to switch from chloride TiO2 to sulfate TiO2 (the “price elasticity of demand” measure) to determine whether enough North American customers would switch to another product to defeat a SSNIP by the hypothetical monopolist. F. 186. That measure showed that demand for chloride TiO2 by North American customers was inelastic (-0.45). F. 186. As a result, switching to other products by North American customers would prove inadequate to defeat a SSNIP. F. 186. Second, Dr. Hill used a “substitution components” measure, using data from Respondents, to ascertain whether increased imports or repatriated exports responding to a SSNIP, combined with lost sales, would render the SSNIP unprofitable for the hypothetical monopolist. F. 187. Using this approach and data, Dr. Hill found a SSNIP would be profitable. F. 187. Third, Dr. Hill relied on Tronox’s estimate of the maximum North American sulfate TiO2 demand to determine whether a sufficient number of North American customers would switch to sulfate TiO2 to defeat a SSNIP and found that they would not. F. 188. In each of his three critical loss analyses, Dr. Hill found that the predicted loss is lower than the critical loss, and thus opined that the market passes the hypothetical monopolist test. F. 186-188. (Critical loss analysis is a standard tool used to implement the hypothetical monopolist test to determine whether a candidate market constitutes a relevant antitrust market. Merger Guidelines § 4.1.3. A critical loss analysis has two stages: (1) calculation of the critical loss, which means the percentage of sales a hypothetical monopolist would have to lose to keep its profit unchanged if it increased its price by a small amount; and (2) calculation of the predicted loss, which means the percentage of sales that the hypothetical monopolist would likely lose given a particular price increase and keep its profit unchanged. If the predicted loss is smaller than the critical loss, then the price increase will increase the hypothetical monopolist’s profit. F. 183.)

In addition, Dr. Hill used the measure of price elasticity of demand for chloride TiO2 in North America to determine whether demand would remain inelastic if prices increased by a SSNIP. F. 189. Dr. Hill found that it would, and thus opined that the sale of chloride TiO2 to North American customers passes the hypothetical monopolist test. F. 189. Based on these calculations, Dr. Hill concluded that the relevant market consists of North American chloride TiO2 sales. F.190.

(FTC, Office of Administrative Law Judges, In the Matter of Tronox/Cristal USA, Dec. 7, 2018, Docket No. 9377)

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0085/tronoxcristal-usa

Contract Drafting

Contract Drafting

Common Mistakes in Business English, https://blog.harwardcommunications.com/2012/01/23/

https://englishplus.com/grammar/00000058.htm.

(Cit. in FTC, Office of Administrative Law Judges, In the Matter of Tronox/Cristal USA, Dec. 7, 2018, Docket No. 9377, fn. 8, p. 19)

Merger - Market Shares and Concentration

Competition

Merger

Market Shares and Concentration

Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI)

Coordinated Effects and/or Unilateral Effects

Tacit Collusion = Oligopolistic Price Coordination = Conscious Parallelism

Commodity Product

Barriers to Entry

After determining the relevant product and geographic market, the next step is to “consider the likely effects of the proposed acquisition on competition within that market.” Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 166. The government can establish a presumption that the transaction will substantially lessen competition by showing that the acquisition would produce “‘a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and would result in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market.’” Heinz, 246 F.3d at 715 (quoting Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363); see also Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 982. “Market concentration . . . is often measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (‘HHI’).” Heinz, 246 F.3d at 716; Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 166 n.11.

(…) Sufficiently high HHI figures establish a prima facie case of anticompetitiveness. H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (citing Heinz, 246 F.3d at 715 n.9).

The Merger Guidelines consider markets with an HHI above 2500 to be “highly concentrated,” and state that “mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.” Merger Guidelines § 5.3; Heinz, 246 F.3d at 715 (citing Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 982) (noting that significant increase in market concentration “establishes a ‘presumption’ that the merger will substantially lessen competition.”).

The North American chloride TiO2 market is dominated by five major producers. Tronox, Cristal, Chemours, Kronos, and Venator account for over 99% of chloride TiO2 sales in North America. Based on producer invoice and other pricing data analyzed by Dr. Hill, the market participants and their market shares in 2016 were as follows: Tronox , Cristal , Chemours , Kronos , and Venator . Post-Acquisition, the combined firm would have a market share of nearly 40% of North American sales of chloride TiO2.

Dr. Hill also calculated HHIs, based on the market share data. Dr. Hill’s calculations show that the Acquisition would increase the HHI by over 700 points, to a level of over 3000, which, under the Merger Guidelines, would render the post- Acquisition North American chloride TiO2 market a “highly concentrated” market. See Merger Guidelines § 5.3. These market share statistics demonstrate that the proposed Acquisition is presumptively anticompetitive. See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 100, 128 (D.D.C. 2016); Sysco, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 52-53.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Complaint Counsel has established a presumption that the effect of the Acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition. Under applicable authorities recited in section II.B.2., this presumption is sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Section 7 and shift the burden of rebuttal to Respondents. Moreover, in the instant case, the presumption is strengthened by additional evidence demonstrating a reasonable probability of anticompetitive effects, as discussed below.

Reasonable probability of anticompetitive effects

As the court explained in ProMedica Health Systems v. FTC, anticompetitive effects of a merger can include coordinated effects and/or unilateral effects.

The idea behind coordinated effects is that, “where rivals are few, firms will be able to coordinate their behavior, either by overt collusion or implicit understanding in order to restrict output and achieve profits above competitive levels.” H&R Block, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 77. . . . Unilateral-effects theory, on the other hand, holds that “the elimination of competition between two firms that results from their merger may alone constitute a substantial lessening of competition.” Merger Guidelines § 6 at 20.

Likelihood of coordinated effects: “Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious parallelism, describes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.” Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). See also Merger Guidelines § 7 (Coordinated interaction includes an implied understanding or parallel accommodating conduct not pursuant to a prior understanding.).

(…) Chloride TiO2 is a commodity product. Markets for homogenous products are more susceptible to coordination (…) Each firm’s product is largely interchangeable with its rivals’ products (…) In this case, given the small number of market participants in the relevant market, and the commodity nature of chloride TiO2, the market is fairly characterized as an oligopoly (…) (“The titanium dioxide market has been described as an ‘oligopoly,’ as TiO2 is a ‘commodity-like product with no substitutes, the market is dominated by a handful of firms, and there are substantial barriers to entry’”).

(…) “Regular monitoring by suppliers of one another’s prices or customers can indicate that the terms offered to customers are relatively transparent.” Merger Guidelines § 7.2. See also Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 (“Without homogeneity or transparency, the market conditions are not conducive to coordinated effects, either tacit or express”). The evidence in this case shows that TiO2 suppliers monitor, and are able to observe, significant moves by their competitors, including as to price and output, from public statements by competitors and information obtained from customers (…) Tronox and Cristal monitor and analyze public statements by competitors such as quarterly earnings updates, presentations at industry conferences, and ratings agency meetings (…) The information provided in public earnings calls and similar public presentations can be specific. Tronox discusses in its quarterly results earnings calls such matters as changes in sales volume, changes in the selling prices by region, margin information, and operation related information such as relative plant utilization rate and inventory levels. (…) The Acquisition will increase the competitive information available to market participants through earnings calls and similar public presentations. Tronox, Chemours, Kronos, and Venator are publically traded companies, and therefore required to report earnings and similar business information to investors and others in the ordinary course of business. Presently, Cristal is a privately held company. With the merger, all participants will be reporting as public companies.

Complaint Counsel’s additional theory of likely anticompetitive effects, that the Acquisition will enable the combined entity to engage in strategic output withholding (unilateral effects), has been fully considered, together with the relevant evidence in the record. However, findings or conclusions as to the likelihood of anticompetitive unilateral effects are unnecessary because the presumption of anticompetitive effects, based on market concentration evidence, combined with the evidence of likely coordinated effects, is already sufficient to make a strong prima facie case of likely anticompetitive effects. Further determining the likelihood of unilateral effects would not affect this result.

Rebuttal

As noted in section II.B.2. above, a defendant may rebut a prima facie showing of likely anticompetitive effects with evidence that anticompetitive effects are not likely to result from the merger, or that procompetitive benefits, such as efficiencies, outweigh any likely anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 985; Polypore, 2010 WL 9549988, at *9.

(Entry; Efficiencies; Output increasing synergies (vertical integration); Cost savings).

Respondents have failed to rebut the prima facie proof that the Acquisition is reasonably likely to have anticompetitive effects in the relevant market for the sale of chloride TiO2 in North America. Accordingly, the evidence proves that the planned Acquisition may substantially lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.

(FTC, Office of Administrative Law Judges, In the Matter of Tronox/Cristal USA, Dec. 7, 2018, Docket No. 9377)

https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/171-0085/tronoxcristal-usa

Antitrust, Unfair Competition, Harm to a Single Business

Antitrust, Unfair Competition, Harm to a Single Business:

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that under federal antitrust law, harm to a single business may suffice to establish an antitrust violation. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959) (“As such [a boycott by a combination of manufactures and dealers] is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy.”) (Op., fn. 28, p. 32).

(Supreme Court of the State of Hawai’i, Field v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Docket SCWC-15-0000663, J. Pollack, for publication)

Supreme Court of the State of Hawai’i, Field v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Docket SCWC-15-0000663

Unfair competition: Antitrust Law:

Summary judgment:

Hawaii Law:

At issue in this case is what a plaintiff must demonstrate to withstand summary judgment on a claim for an unfair method of competition (here under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 480).

To raise an issue of material fact as to the nature of competition requirement of an unfair method of competition claim following the close of discovery:

1 ) A plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s alleged anticompetitive conduct could negatively affect competition but need not prove that the defendant in fact harmed competition,

2 ) In order to withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff may generally describe the relevant market without resort to expert testimony,

3 ) The plaintiff need not be a competitor of or in competition with the defendant (…) See also HRS § 480-2(e) (“Any person may bring an action based on unfair methods of competition declared unlawful by this section.”)

(In this case, the record indicates that the NCAA’s motion was filed after the close of discovery. It is noted that the movant’s burden is generally greater when a party seeks summary judgment before discovery has concluded. See Ralston v. Yim, 129 Hawai‘i 46, 48, 61, 292 P.3d 1276, 1278, 1291 (2013) (“In general, a summary judgment movant cannot merely point to the non-moving party's lack of evidence to support its initial burden of production if discovery has not concluded.” (citing French v. Hawaii Pizza Hut, Inc., 105 Hawai‘i 462, 472, 99 P.3d 1046, 1056 (2004)))).

(In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, we apply a burden-shifting framework under which the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to the essential elements of the claim and that the undisputed facts entitle the party to judgment as a matter of law. See Gurrobat v. HTH Corp., 133 Hawai‘i 1, 14, 323 P.3d 792, 805 (2014). Where, as here, the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may meet its initial burden by either “(1) presenting evidence negating an element of the non-movant's claim, or (2) demonstrating that the non-movant will be unable to carry his or her burden of proof at trial.” Ralston, 129 Hawai‘i at 60-61, 292 P.3d at 1290-91 (citing French, 105 Hawai‘i at 470-72, 99 P.3d at 1054-56). “Only once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production does the burden shift to the non-moving party to show specific facts that present a genuine issue for trial.” Gurrobat, 133 Hawai‘i at 14, 323 P.3d at 805).

(Supreme Court of the State of Hawai’i, Nov. 20, 2018, Field v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Docket SCWC-15-0000663, J. Pollack)

Faits et preuves à apporter pour éviter que la procédure se termine en défaveur du demandeur par un « summary judgment ». En l’espèce, décision rendue en application du droit de l’état de Hawaii, mais elle est d’intérêt pour les procédures du même type rendues dans les autres états. Elle sera publiée dans le Pacific Reporter.

CBMA Assignment Certification

Customs

Beverage

Craft Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act (CBMA)

Reduced Rate

Export

Collaboration of Swiss Exporter

Republication

Nov. 6, 2018

U.S. CBP

https://www.cbp.gov/trade/basic-import-export/craft-beverage-modernization-tax-reform-act-2017/cbma-assignment-certification

CBMA Assignment Certification

The CBMA Assignment Certification is one of the required documents to substantiate a CBMA claim.  The importer/filer must submit this document via the Document Image System, and link to the Importer of Record. 

[assigning entity letterhead]

ASSIGNING ENTITY CERTIFICATION

I (PRINTED NAME AND TITLE), currently employed by (ASSIGNING ENTITY NAME AND ADDRESS) and authorized to bind the company, certify that (ASSIGNING ENTITY) is the producer/manufacturer of the imported (BEER/WINE/DISTILLED SPIRITS) that is subject to a Craft Beverage Modernization and Tax Reform Act (CBMA) claim.  I certify that I assigned (IMPORTER NAME) to receive the (X REDUCED TAX RATE/CREDIT) for (X NUMBER OF BARRELS/WINE GALLONS/PROOF GALLONS) for (X CALENDAR YEAR).  I certify that this assignment and any other assignment given by (ASSIGNING ENTITY) during this calendar year does not exceed the production of the (ASSIGNING ENTITY) during (X CALENDAR YEAR).  I certify that (ASSIGNING ENTITY) has not assigned more (BARRELS/WINE GALLONS/PROOF GALLONS) to this importer or any other importer, individually or collectively, to receive a reduced tax rate/tax credit than is permissible by the CBMA.

I certify that the information contained in this submission is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.  I am aware that the information contained in this submission may be subject to verification.  I am aware that eligibility of the (ASSIGNING ENTITY) and (IMPORTER) for the reduced tax rate/tax credit under the CBMA can be revoked in the case of any erroneous or fraudulent information provided which is deemed to be material to qualifying for the reduced rate. 

Signature: ____________________
Date: ________________________

Application of the Swiss Cartel Act to not for profit associations

Swiss Competition Commission Opinion (in German)

Competition

Unfair Competition

Antitrust (Geltungsbereich)

Swiss Law

Application of the Swiss Cartel Act to not for profit associations as well as for profit ones, and to their members (but not to students members, nor to honorary members)

Geltungsbereich

Das Kartellgesetz gilt in persönlicher Hinsicht für „Unternehmen“ (Art. 2 Abs. 1 KG). Als solche gelten sämtliche Nachfrager oder Anbieter von Gütern und Dienstleistungen im Wirtschaftsprozess, unabhängig von ihrer Rechts- oder Organisationsform (Art. 2 Abs. 2bis KG). Der Geltungsbereich des Kartellgesetzes ist weit gefasst. Als Unternehmen können auch Unternehmens-vereinigungen wie Vereine oder Genossenschaften gelten, insbesondere, wenn sie selbst eine wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit ausüben.

Die WEKO hat aber auch schon Vereine als Unternehmen qualifiziert, obwohl diese nicht selbst im Wirtschaftsprozess tätig waren bzw. ohne die wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit zu prüfen (RPW 2015/4, 905 f. Rz 14 ff., Gutachten Emmentaler Switzerland; RPW 2012/3, 668 Dispositiv, Recommandations tarifaires de l’Union Suisse des professionnels de l’immobilier; RPW 2001/1, 111 Rz 9, Chambre genevoise de l’étanchéité et de l’asphaltage (CGE)).

Als Unternehmen im genannten Sinn gelten zunächst die Mitglieder des SIA, die in unabhängiger Weise Planungsdienstleistungen erbringen (z.B. Einzelmitglieder, die als selbständige Architekten tätig sind, oder Firmenmitglieder; in der Regel wohl aber nicht Studentenmitglieder und Ehrenmitglieder). Dasselbe gilt für Mitglieder des SIA, die als Organisatoren von (Architektur-) Wettbewerben (namentlich als Jurymitglieder) unternehmerisch tätig sind, indem sie diese Dienstleistung zu Gunsten von Bauherren erbringen. Ist in der Folge von Mitgliedern des SIA die Rede, sind damit nur jene gemeint, welche die Unternehmensvoraussetzungen erfüllen.

(Schlussbericht des Sekretariats der WEKO vom 30. Oktober 2018 in Sachen Vorabklärung gemäss Art. 26 KG betreffend SIA-Honorarordnungen wegen allenfalls unzulässiger Wettbewerbsabrede gemäss Art. 5 KG, in RPW 2019/2, p. 289)

Application of the Swiss Cartel Act to Non-Binding Decision by a Professional Association

Swiss Competition Commission Opinion (in German)

Competition

Unfair Competition

Antitrust

Swiss Law

Non-Binding Decision by a Professional Association

A decision by an association, even non-binding for it or for its members (i.e. a recommendation), can amount to a forbidden agreement as contemplated by the Swiss Cartel Act. Case law targets especially price recommendations. Whether those recommendations are followed or not is not dispositive. Whether they do have an effect on the market is not relevant either.

Auch ein Vereinsbeschluss kann eine Vereinbarung darstellen. Dies ist namentlich der Fall, wenn die Mitglieder eines Verbandes gemeinsam eine Empfehlung beschliessen.

Für die Anwendbarkeit des KG spielt es keine Rolle, ob eine Vereinbarung rechtlich erzwingbar ist oder nicht. Diese Qualifizierung hat allenfalls einen Einfluss auf die Einschätzung der Schwere eines Verstosses.

RPW 2012/3, 659 Rz 32, USPI – Section NE; RPW 2006/4, 593 Rz 24; RPW 2003/2, 278 Rz 31, Fahrschule Graubünden; RPW 2000/2, 172 Rz 29, Tarifs conseillés de l’AFEC.

Die WEKO hat dazu u.a. festgehalten, dass Empfehlungen von Tarifbändern (im Sinne von nicht erzwingbaren Vereinbarungen) als Preisabreden im Sinne von Art. 5 Abs. 3 Bst. a KG zu qualifizieren sind. In Bezug auf horizontal vereinbarte Listenpreise hat die WEKO ausgeführt, dass es für die Qualifizierung einer Preisabrede genüge, wenn die Preisbasis koordiniert werde, unabhängig davon, ob dann den Kunden/-innen tatsächlich der Listenpreis verrechnet werde. Auch das Sekretariat hat zu empfohlenen Tarifen bereits früher festgehalten: „Ob der VTR-Tarif angewendet wird oder nicht, das heisst ob die Abrede (genügend) Wirkung auf dem Markt erzeugt oder nicht, ist für die Qualifizierung als Preisabrede gemäss Artikel 5 Absatz 3 Buchstabe a KG unerheblich.“

Es zeigt sich somit, dass die SIA-Honorarempfehlungen Abreden über Preisbestandteile darstellen.

RPW 2012/3, 660 Rz 36 ff., USPI – Section NE.

Liegt eine Wettbewerbsabrede zwischen Unternehmen, die tatsächlich oder der Möglichkeit nach miteinander im Wettbewerb stehen (gleiche Marktstufe) ,über den Preis im Sinne von Art. 5 Abs. 3 Bst. a KG vor, ist eine Marktabgrenzung zur Prüfung des quantitativen Elements der Erheblichkeit einer Wettbewerbsbeschränkung nicht nötig. Gemäss GABA-Urteil des Bundesgerichts aus dem Jahre 2016 ist das Kriterium der Erheblichkeit als Bagatellklausel zu verstehen. Schon ein geringes Mass ist ausreichend, um als erheblich qualifiziert zu werden. Das Gericht stellte sodann klar, dass die Frage der Erheblichkeit bei Wettbewerbsabreden nach Art. 5 Abs. 3 und 4 KG grundsätzlich nur unter dem Gesichtspunkt qualitativer Elemente zu würdigen ist. In der Regel sind solche Wettbewerbsabreden bereits aufgrund ihres Gegenstandes erheblich. Quantitative Aspekte sind hierbei nicht zu prüfen. Schliesslich ist nicht erforderlich, dass sich die betreffenden Abreden tatsächlich negativ auf den Wettbewerb ausgewirkt haben. Es genügt, dass sie den Wettbewerb potenziell beeinträchtigen können. Abreden nach Art. 5 Abs. 3 KG sind demnach vorbehältlich einer Rechtfertigung durch Gründe der wirtschaftlichen Effizienz (Art. 5 Abs. 2 KG) grundsätzlich unzulässig.

(Schlussbericht des Sekretariats der WEKO vom 30. Oktober 2018 in Sachen Vorabklärung gemäss Art. 26 KG betreffend SIA-Honorarordnungen wegen allenfalls unzulässiger Wettbewerbsabrede gemäss Art. 5 KG, in RPW 2019/2, Rz 51, 53, 63, 64, 69 p. 290-292)