U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Gonzales, Docket No. 17-35041

Copyright infringement: Contributory infringement: Peer-to-peer: Internet platforms: Distribution: IP address: Leave to amend:

Plaintiff alleged unauthorized downloading and distribution of the film through peer-to-peer BitTorrent networks. The panel held that the bare allegation that the defendant was the registered subscriber of an Internet Protocol address associated with infringing activity was insufficient to state a claim for direct or contributory infringement. The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to the defendant under 17 U.S.C. § 505.

(…) Because multiple devices and individuals may be able to connect via an IP address, simply identifying the IP subscriber solves only part of the puzzle. A plaintiff must allege something more to create a reasonable inference that a subscriber is also an infringer. Nor can Cobbler Nevada succeed on a contributory infringement theory because, without allegations of intentional encouragement or inducement of infringement, an individual’s failure to take affirmative steps to police his internet connection is insufficient to state a claim.

(…) Records subpoenaed from Comcast identified (…) Gonzales as the subscriber of the internet service associated with the IP address.

(…) The only facts in support of Cobbler Nevada’s direct infringement claim were that Gonzales was “the subscriber of the IP address used to download or distribute the movie, and that he was sent notices of infringing activity to which he did not respond.”

(…) During his deposition, Gonzales testified that, once he became aware of the infringing activity, he attempted to find out who the infringer was and instructed everyone to stop infringing. He also testified that the staff took the same steps, but no one was able to identify the infringer (fn. 1).

(…) The magistrate judge ordered Cobbler Nevada to show cause why the Second Amended Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to cure the deficiencies identified in the court’s dismissal of the First Amended Complaint, or for failure to identify the unknown party in a timely manner pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

To establish a claim of copyright infringement, Cobbler Nevada “must show that it owns the copyright and that the defendant himself violated one or more of the plaintiff’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act.” Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). Cobbler Nevada has not done so.

(…) In light of Cobbler Nevada’s prior amendments to the complaint and the futility of any further amendment, however, the district court acted within its discretion in not granting further leave to amend. See Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013); Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).

(…) At the outset, we recognize that Gonzales’s position—a subscriber to internet service—does not fit cleanly within our typical contributory liability framework, which often involves consumer-facing internet platforms. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919–20 (computer software provider); Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1171 (search engine). Nevertheless, it is no leap to apply the framework of similar technology-based cases to our analysis of Gonzales’s liability.

In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court held that liability for another’s infringement cannot arise from the mere distribution of a product that is “widely used for legitimate, [non-infringing] purposes.” 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). The Court later refined the standard for liability, holding that “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919.

“Mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability.”

Secondary sources: Nimmer on Copyright § 12.04.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Aug. 27, 2018, Cobbler Nevada, LLC v. Gonzales, Docket No. 17-35041, Judge McKeown, for publication)

Participation à la violation du copyright : rappel des conditions nécessaires à une condamnation. Le cas d’espèce reprend et confirme les décisions de principes déjà rendues dans ce domaine (Napster, Grokster, etc.), bien que ces jurisprudences antérieures concernaient plutôt des plateformes Internet en relation avec des consommateurs (p. ex. des providers de softwares, des moteurs de recherches). Dans certaines de ces jurisprudences, la Cour Suprême fédérale avait jugé que la seule distribution d’un produit largement utilisé à des fins légales ne permettait pas de condamner le distributeur pour participation à une violation d’un copyright, cela même si le distributeur connaissait le potentiel du produit de porter atteinte au copyright, ou même s’il connaissait des cas de violations.

Le détenteur de l’adresse IP ne peut de ce seul fait être condamné pour violation du copyright ou pour participation à la violation du copyright. Il n’est en effet pas nécessairement la seule personne à avoir accès à l’ordinateur ou à la tablette lié à l’adresse IP. Le demandeur doit donc apporter d’autres moyens de preuve visant une personne déterminée comme utilisatrice du moyen informatique lié à l’adresse IP. En outre, le détenteur de l’adresse IP n’est pas tenu de surveiller l’usage de sa connexion Internet. L’important est qu’il ne s’implique pas dans une démarche de violation.

En l’espèce, dès qu’il a été informé de la violation du copyright par le biais de sa connexion Internet, le défendeur a tenté de découvrir l’auteur, et a instruit les personnes admises à utiliser sa connexion de cesser toutes violations.

La cour a accordé au demandeur le bénéfice de l’art. 4(m) des Règles de procédure civile fédérale, lui octroyant un délai approprié pour identifier l’auteur inconnu. Le demandeur a échoué dans ses tentatives d’identification, et a abandonné ses prétentions en retirant sa procédure. D’où sa condamnation aux frais d’avocat adverse au sens de 17 U.S.C. § 505.