U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Converse, Inc. v. ITC, Docket No. 16-2497

Import: Section 337:

Trademark:

Registered mark, Common-law mark:

Secondary meaning:

Word mark: Product-packaging trade dress: Product-design trade dress:

Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition:

Appeal from the United States International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-936.

Section 337 provides a remedy at the ITC for, among other things, “the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered under the Trademark Act of 1946.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(C). On October 14, 2014, Converse filed a complaint with the ITC alleging violations of section 337 by various respondents in the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, and the sale within the United States after importation of shoes that infringe its trademark. The ITC instituted an investigation on November 17, 2014.

(…) It is confusing and inaccurate to refer to two separate marks—a registered mark and a common-law mark. Rather, there is a single mark, as to which different rights attach from the common law and from federal registration. E.g., In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The federal registration of a trademark does not create an exclusive property right in the mark. The owner of the mark already has the property right established by prior use . . . . However, those trademark owners who register their marks with the [Patent and Trademark Office (‘PTO’)] are afforded additional protection not provided by the common law.”); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (CCPA 1961) (“The Lanham Act does not create trademarks. While it may create some new substantive rights in trademarks, unless the trademarks pre-exist there is nothing to be registered. Neither does it create ownership, but only evidence thereof.”); J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 19:3 (5th ed. 2017 & Supp. 2018).

(…) All trademarks, in order to be valid or protectable, must be distinctive of a product’s source, and “courts have held that a mark can be distinctive in one of two ways.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000). “First, a mark is inherently distinctive if ‘its intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.’” Id. (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). “Second, a mark has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently distinctive, if it has developed secondary meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a mark is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.’” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).

(…) The Supreme Court has held that unlike word marks and product-packaging trade dress, product design trade dress can never be inherently distinctive. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216. As a result, “a product’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectable, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.” Id. Accordingly, Converse must show that its mark has acquired distinctiveness, i.e., secondary meaning.

(…) Because the relevant date is so important to the secondary- meaning analysis, we find that a specific determination of secondary meaning as of the relevant date must be made. In any infringement action, the party asserting trade-dress protection must establish that its mark had acquired secondary meaning before the first infringing use by each alleged infringer. See, e.g., Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that “a claim of trade dress infringement fails if secondary meaning did not exist before the infringement began” and placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff); McCarthy, supra, § 16:34 (noting that the purported “senior user must prove the existence of secondary meaning in its mark at the time and place that the junior user first began use of that mark” and collecting cases); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 19 cmt. b. (Am. Law Inst. 1995 & Supp. 2018). In this respect, Converse argues that it is entitled to rely on the presumption of validity afforded to registered marks. We do not agree that this presumption applies to infringement that began before registration.

(…) For infringement in the period after registration, the Lanham Act entitles the owner of the registered mark to a presumption that the mark is valid, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a), including that it has acquired secondary Meaning.

(…) We conclude that Converse’s registration confers a presumption of secondary meaning beginning only as of the date of registration and confers no presumption of secondary meaning before the date of registration. Thus, with respect to infringement by those respondents whose first uses came before the registration (including all of the intervenors), Converse must establish without the benefit of the presumption that its mark had acquired secondary meaning before the first infringing use by each respondent.

(…) Secondary meaning determination: (“To determine whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning, courts consider: advertising expenditures and sales success; length and exclusivity of use; unsolicited media coverage; copying of the mark by the defendant; and consumer studies.”) (…) Consumer studies (linking the name to a source).  Today we clarify that the considerations to be assessed in determining whether a mark has acquired secondary meaning can be described by the following six factors: (1) association of the trade dress with a particular source by actual purchasers (typically measured by customer surveys); (2) length, degree, and exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising; (4) amount of sales and number of customers; (5) intentional copying; and (6) unsolicited media coverage of the product embodying the mark.

Next, we address the significance of the trademark owner’s and third parties’ prior uses of the mark. We conclude that the ITC relied too heavily on prior uses long predating the first infringing uses and the date of registration. The secondary meaning analysis primarily seeks to determine what is in the minds of consumers as of the relevant date. (…) The most relevant evidence will be the trademark owner’s and third parties’ use in the recent period before first use or infringement.

Secondary authorities: J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 19:3 (5th ed. 2017 & Supp. 2018); Louis Altman & Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 26:101 (4th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2018).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Oct. 30, 2018, Converse, Inc. v. ITC, Docket No. 16-2497, Circuit Judge Dyk)

La présente procédure initiée sous l’angle de la Section 337 discute :

- la distinction entre marque découlant de la Common law et marque enregistrée, les deux ne formant qu’une seule marque, à laquelle différents droits sont attachés, par l’opération de la Common law et par l’opération de l’enregistrement respectivement.

- la marque qui est distinctive de manière inhérente, en ce qu’elle sert à identifier une source particulière, et la marque qui n’est pas distinctive de manière inhérente mais qui a développé son caractère distinct par le fait que dans l’esprit du public, elle identifie la source du produit plutôt que le produit lui-même (on parle dans ce second cas d’une marque qui a développé une signification secondaire).

Au contraire d’une marque verbale ou au contraire d’une marque de nature « product-packaging trade dress », la marque « product design trade dress » ne peut jamais être distinctive de manière inhérente.

Dans toutes actions en violation du droit à la marque, le demandeur doit établir la date à laquelle la marque a acquis « secondary meaning », et cette date doit être antérieure à la première violation. Mais dès l’enregistrement s’applique la présomption de validité de la marque, et la présomption d’acquisition de « secondary meaning ».

L’avant-dernier paragraphe ci-dessus donne une liste très complète des facteurs à considérer pour déterminer si la marque a ou non acquis « secondary meaning ». Six facteurs sont décrits.