U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Map Geico Marine Insurance Company, v. James Shackleford, Docket No. 18-12105

Maritime Law

Admiralty Jurisdiction

Admiralty Law

Insurance Law

Marine Insurance Contracts

Maritime Contracts

Maritime Doctrine of uberrimae fidei

Policy Construction

Waiver

Right to Contract Out of Federal Maritime Law

Florida Law

(…) In March 2016, Shackleford obtained a liability-only policy from Geico Marine.

General Conditions: (…) CRUISING LIMITS: While afloat, the insured Yacht shall be confined to the waters indicated below:
(There is no coverage outside of this area without the Company’s written permission.)

U.S. Atlantic and Gulf Coastal waters and inland waters tributary thereto between Eastport, ME and Brownsville, TX, inclusive and the waters of the Bahamas including the Turks and Caicos, however the boat must be north of Cape Hatteras, NC from June 1 until November 1 annually.

The day after the policy issued, Shackleford asked Geico Marine to change the policy to “Port Risk Ashore.” That restriction provides no coverage for navigation; instead, it provides coverage only while the vessel is out of the water. Geico Marine issued an endorsement and updated declarations page adding the restriction that same day. Because coverage now applied only if the vessel was ashore, the updated declarations page removed the original navigational limit that required the vessel to be north of Cape Hatteras during hurricane season if afloat.

(…) In May 2016, Shackleford called Geico Marine to seek removal of the Port Risk Ashore restriction so he could sail the vessel to Fort Lauderdale. He also confirmed that the policy now insured the vessel’s hull for $264,000 and that the vessel had “full coverage” for the voyage. On May 27, 2016, Geico Marine sent Shackleford an email confirming that it had removed the Port Risk Ashore restriction. Attached to the email was an endorsement removing the restriction and an updated declarations page. The updated declarations page reinstated the original navigational limit that required the vessel “while afloat” to be “north of Cape Hatteras, NC from June 1 until November 1 annually.”

(…) On May 28, one day after Geico Marine removed the Port Risk Ashore restriction and reinstated the navigational limit, Shackleford set sail from Taylor Boatworks to Fort Lauderdale. After arriving in Fort Lauderdale, Shackleford anchored the vessel in nearby Lake Sylvia. In June 2016, a storm caused the vessel to drag anchor and drove her into a sea wall, leading her to take on water and suffer other damage. Shackleford filed a claim under his insurance policy, but Geico Marine denied coverage.

After denying coverage, Geico Marine filed a declaratory-judgment action against Shackleford, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and invoked admiralty jurisdiction, id. § 1333. Geico Marine sought a declaration that the policy was void ab initio under the maritime doctrine of uberrimae fidei, or utmost good faith, because Shackleford failed to disclose material facts about the vessel when procuring insurance. And it sought a declaration that coverage was barred by the policy’s navigational limit, which required the vessel to be north of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, during hurricane season.

Marine insurance contracts qualify as maritime contracts, which fall within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts and are governed by maritime law. AIG Centennial Ins. Co. v. O’Neill, 782 F.3d 1296, 1302 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1333). Even so, “it does not follow that every term in every maritime contract can only be controlled by some federally defined admiralty rule.” Id. at 1302 (alteration adopted) (quoting Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 313 (1955)). “In the absence of a ‘judicially established federal admiralty rule,’ we rely on state law when addressing questions of marine insurance.” Id. (quoting Wilburn Boat, 348 U.S. at 314); see also Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent § 69, at 570 (2016). The parties agree that Florida law fills any gaps here.

We reject Shackleford’s arguments and agree with Geico Marine that the navigational limit bars coverage. And because we agree with Geico Marine on this issue, we need not address its argument that Shackleford breached a duty of uberrimae fidei. The navigational limit is dispositive.

No established rule of maritime law governs whether a navigational limit is part of a marine insurance contract, so we apply Florida law to determine whether the policy contained a navigational limit. AIG Centennial, 782 F.3d at 1302. Under Florida law, we first look to the text of the policy and construe the policy “in accordance with its plain language.” Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 165 (Fla. 2003). But “if the relevant policy language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the other limiting coverage,” the policy is ambiguous and we must construe it in favor of coverage. Id. (alterations adopted). That “a provision is complex and requires analysis for application” does not “automatically” mean it is ambiguous. Id. Before concluding that a provision is ambiguous, we must “read the policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.” Id. at 166.

Reading the policy as a whole, we readily conclude that it unambiguously contained a navigational limit when the loss occurred.

(…) No established rule of maritime law governs the waiver of a navigational limit, so we apply Florida law to determine whether Geico Marine waived its right to enforce that provision. AIG Centennial, 782 F.3d at 1302. In Florida, implied waiver of a contractual right requires “conduct which implies the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So. 2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005). Shackleford’s theory of implied waiver appears to be that Geico Marine waived the navigational limit by agreeing to a course of conduct that it knew would make it impossible for Shackleford to comply with the requirement that his vessel be north of Cape Hatteras by June 1. We are unpersuaded.

Geico Marine knew Shackleford was taking the vessel to Fort Lauderdale for “extensive repairs,” and it could reasonably have expected that Shackleford would comply with the navigational limit by having the vessel hauled ashore for repairs in Fort Lauderdale by June 1. The only way Geico Marine’s conduct could have suggested it intended to waive the navigational limit is if the voyage to Fort Lauderdale was impossible to complete by June 1. But Shackleford conceded at oral argument that the vessel arrived in Fort Lauderdale by June 1 and that he intended to haul the vessel ashore upon arrival, which would have complied with the navigational limit.

That the vessel arrived in Fort Lauderdale by June 1 shows that it was possible to complete the voyage by June 1. So Geico Marine plainly did not agree to a course of conduct that it knew would make compliance with the navigational limit impossible. Nothing in this record supports the conclusion that Geico Marine voluntarily and intentionally relinquished its right to enforce the navigational limit. The district court erred in ruling otherwise.

Even if Geico Marine did not waive the navigational limit, Shackleford argues that his breach of the navigational limit does not bar coverage because Florida law does not strictly enforce express warranties in marine insurance contracts. As Shackleford acknowledges, federal maritime law requires “strict” or absolute enforcement of express navigational warranties. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Cooke’s Seafood, 835 F.2d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1988); see also Strict, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Absolute; requiring no showing of fault.”). And established federal maritime rules, like the rule requiring absolute enforcement of express navigational warranties, ordinarily control “even in the face of contrary state authority.” AIG Centennial, 782 F.3d at 1303. But Shackleford contends that he and Geico Marine contracted out of the federal maritime rule of enforcement and instead selected Florida’s more forgiving rule.

Although parties to a marine insurance policy are generally free to contract out of federal maritime law, King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1537, 1540–42 (11th Cir. 1990), we are not persuaded that Shackleford and Geico Marine did so.

The phrase “terms of this policy” appears in a provision titled “Conformity to Law,” and as its name suggests, the provision operates to conform any illegal policy terms to Florida law. Provisions like this one exist to address conflicts between the contract the parties wrote and what the law requires.

Shackleford effectively asks us to transform the policy’s conformity-to-law provision into a choice-of-law provision. By default, federal maritime law displaces contrary state law when construing a marine insurance contract. AIG Centennial, 782 F.3d at 1302–03. Shackleford would have us read the conformity- to-law provision as reversing this default rule, so that state law displaces any contrary federal maritime rule. But the provision does no such thing. The parties could have included a choice-of-law provision selecting state law over federal law, but they did not. And we “may not rewrite the parties’ contract, add meaning that is not present, or otherwise reach results contrary to the intentions of the parties.” Taurus Holdings, 913 So. 2d at 532.

Because the parties did not contract out of maritime law, we must apply the federal rule requiring absolute enforcement of express navigational limits. Under that rule, “breach of an express navigational warranty by the insured releases the insurance company from liability even if compliance with the warranty would not have avoided the loss.” Lexington, 835 F.2d at 1366. Here, the policy contained a navigational limit that conditioned coverage on the vessel being “north of Cape Hatteras, NC from June 1 until November 1 annually” if the vessel was “afloat.” The vessel suffered damage while afloat during a storm in Florida in early June. Because the vessel was outside of the covered navigational area when the loss occurred, the policy does not cover the loss.

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, December 17, 2019, Map Geico Marine Insurance Company, v. James Shackleford, Docket No. 18-12105, For Publication)