Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter

Arbitration: did arbitrator ex­ceed his powers under §10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act? A party seeking relief under §10(a)(4) bears a heavy burden. “It is not enough . . . to show that the arbitrator committed an error—or even a serious error.” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 671. Because the parties “bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agree­ment,” an arbitral decision “even arguably construing or applying the contract” must stand, regardless of a court’s view of its (de)merits. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U. S. 57, 62. Thus, the sole question on judicial review is whether the arbitrator interpreted the parties’ contract, not whether he construed it correct­ly. Here, the arbitrator twice did what the parties asked: He consid­ered their contract and decided whether it reflected an agreement to permit class proceedings. That suffices to show that he did not ex­ceed his powers under §10(a)(4). Stolt-Neilsen does not support Oxford’s contrary view. There, the parties stipulated that they had not reached an agreement on class arbitration, so the arbitrators did not construe the contract, and did not identify any agreement authorizing class proceedings. This Court thus found not that they had misinterpreted the contract but that they had abandoned their interpretive role. Here, in stark con­trast, the arbitrator did construe the contract, and did find an agreement to permit class arbitration. So to overturn his decision, this Court would have to find that he misapprehended the parties’ in­tent. But §10(a)(4) bars that course: It permits courts to vacate an arbitral decision only when the arbitrator strayed from his delegated task of interpreting a contract, not when he performed that task poorly. (U.S.S.Ct., 10.06.13, Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, J. Kagan, unanimous).

Arbitrage : excès de pouvoir de l'arbitre au sens du paragraphe 10(a)(4) de la loi fédérale sur l'arbitrage : le pouvoir d'examen de la Cour s'agissant du maintien ou de l'annulation de la décision de l'arbitre est très étroit. En effet, la partie qui se plaint devant le Tribunal ordinaire de la décision de l'arbitre ne saurait se limiter à soutenir que l'arbitre a commis une erreur d'interprétation. Dès lors, même si l'arbitre s'est trompé, son erreur subsistera, les parties ayant opté pour l'arbitrage et non pour une résolution judiciaire de leur litige. Par contre, si l'arbitre a failli à sa mission d'interpréter la volonté des parties, le Tribunal peut annuler sa décision.

Peugh v. U.S.

Ex Post Facto Clause: petitioner Peugh was convicted of five counts of bank fraud for conduct that occurred in 1999 and 2000. At sentencing, he argued that the Ex Post Facto Clause required that he be sentenced under the 1998 version of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of his offenses rather than under the 2009 version in effect at the time of sentencing. Under the 1998 Guidelines, Peugh’s sentencing range was 30 to 37 months, but the 2009 Guidelines assigned more severe consequences to his acts, yielding a range of 70 to 87 months. The District Court rejected Peugh’s ex post facto claim and sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

The Ex Post Facto Clause is violated when a defendant is sentenced under Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense. Though no longer mandatory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, the Guidelines still play an important role in sentencing procedures. A district court must begin “by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range,” Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 49, and then consider the parties’ arguments and factors specified in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a). 552 U. S., at 49–50. The court “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable,” id., at 50, and must explain the basis for its sentence on the record, ibid. On appeal, a sentence is reviewed for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. A district court is to apply the Guidelines “in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced,” §3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), but, per the Guidelines, is to use the Guidelines in effect on the date the offense was committed should the Guidelines in effect on the sentencing date be found to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Constitution forbids the passage of ex post facto laws, a cat­egory including, as relevant here, “every law that changes the pun­ishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390. The “scope of this Latin phrase” is given “substance by an accretion of case law.” Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 292. The touchstone of the inquiry is whether a given change in law presents a “ ‘sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’ ” Garner v. Jones, 529 U. S. 244, 250. The Government’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. Its principal claim is that the Sentencing Guidelines lack sufficient legal effect to attain the status of a “law” within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Changes in law need not bind a sentencing au­thority for there to be an ex post facto violation, and “the presence of discretion does not displace the protections of that Clause.” Garner, 529 U. S., at 253. (U.S.S.Ct., 10.06.13, Peugh v. U.S., Sotomayor, J.).

Non rétroactivité en droit pénal : la clause de non rétroactivité est violée lorsqu’un délinquant est condamné sur la base des Lignes directrices fédérales (qui fixent la peine à subir, après le prononcé de la condamnation) promulguées après la commission de l’infraction, pour autant bien entendu que les nouvelles Lignes directrices prévoient une pénalité plus sévère que les anciennes. Il est ici à nouveau rappelé que ces Lignes directrices ne sont plus pourvues de caractère obligatoire, mais qu’elles continuent à jouer un rôle important en pratique. Le Tribunal de première instance commence par déterminer la peine en s’inspirant des Lignes directrices, puis adapte dite peine aux faits de l’espèce, sans partir de l’idée que la peine découlant des Lignes satisfait nécessairement le caractère raisonnable qui doit la sous-tendre. Dans le cadre de la procédure de recours, le caractère raisonnable de la peine est revu sous l’angle de l’abus de discrétion. Est rejeté l’argument selon lequel la clause de non rétroactivité ne saurait s’appliquer ici du fait que les Lignes directrices n’ont pas valeur de loi. En effet, ce qui importe, c’est que ces Lignes directrices sont susceptibles d’entraîner le prononcé d’une peine plus sévère si elles sont comparées à leur ancienne version.

S192644, P. v. Beltran

Criminal law: heat of passion (as defined in California): what kind of provocation will suffice to constitute heat of passion and reduce a murder to manslaughter? The Attorney General argues the provocation must be of a kind that would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to kill.  We disagree.  Nearly one hundred years ago, this court explained that, when examining heat of passion in the context of manslaughter, the fundamental “inquiry is whether or not the defendant’s reason was, at the time of his act, so disturbed or obscured by some passion . . . to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.”  (People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49 (Logan).)  The proper standard focuses upon whether the person of average disposition would be induced to react from passion and not from judgment (Cal. S. Ct., 03.06.2013, S192644, P. v. Beltran).

Droit pénal: agir sous l'emprise d'une passion, notion de passion : il convient d'examiner si l'état mental du prévenu, au moment de l'acte, était à ce point perturbé ou obscurci par la passion que toute personne ordinaire de composition moyenne, à sa place, aurait agi dans la précipitation ou sans réflexion, autrement dit aurait agi de cette passion et non de son propre jugement. Du moins est-ce l'analyse en droit californien lorsque se pose la question de savoir si l'élément subjectif de l'acte passionnel permet ou non de requalifier l'infraction de meurtre en " manslaughter".

Nevada v. Jackson

Evidence: criminal law: extrinsic evidence: “The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479, 485 (1984)), but we have also recognized that “‘state and federal rulemak­ers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials,’” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U. S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U. S. 303, 308 (1998)); (…) widely accepted rule of evidence law that generally precludes the admission of evidence of specific instances of a witness’ conduct to prove the witness’ char­acter for untruthfulness. See Fed. Rule Evid. 608(b); C.Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Evidence §6.27, pp. 497–499(4th ed. 2009); this Court has never held that the Confrontation Clause entitles a criminal defendant to introduce extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S. 15, 22 (1985) (per curiam) (observing that “the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to . . . expose testimonial infirmities through cross-examination”). See also Jordan v. Warden, 675 F. 3d 586, 596 (CA6 2012); Brown v. Ruane, 630 F. 3d 62, 70 (CA1 2011) (U.S. S. Ct., 03.06.13, Nevada v. Jackson, Per Curiam).

Preuves : droit pénal : preuves extrinsèques : la Constitution fédérale garantit au prévenu une opportunité effective de présenter une défense complète. Mais la Cour a également reconnu que le législateur fédéral et étatique disposent d'une large latitude leurs permettant de promulguer des règles d'exclusions de preuves au pénal. (…) est largement acceptée la règle selon laquelle n'est pas admissible la preuve extrinsèque portant sur un comportement spécifique d'un témoin en vue de le décrédibiliser. La Cour n'a jamais jugé que la Confrontation Clause confèrait au prévenu un droit d'introduire des preuves extrinsèques en vue d'impeachment. En effet, la Confrontation Clause est généralement respectée lorsque la défense dispose de la possibilité de présenter les infirmités testimoniales par la voie de la cross-examination.

Maryland v. King

Fourth Amendment: search: DNA: when officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and bring the suspect to the station to be de­tained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the ar­restee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; using a buccal swab inside a person’s cheek to obtain a DNA sample is a search under the Fourth Amendment. And the fact that the intrusion is negligible is of central relevance to determining whether the search is reasonable, “the ultimate measure of the con­stitutionality of a governmental search,” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646, 652. Because the need for a warrant is greatly diminished here, where the arrestee was already in valid police cus­tody for a serious offense supported by probable cause, the search is analyzed by reference to “reasonableness, not individualized suspi­cion,” Samson v. California, 547 U. S. 843, 855, n. 4, and reasonable­ness is determined by weighing “the promotion of legitimate govern­mental interests” against “the degree to which the search intrudes upon an individual’s privacy,” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U. S. 295, 300; the only difference between DNA analysis and fingerprint databases is the unparalleled accuracy DNA provides (U.S. S. Ct., 03.06.13, Maryland v. King, J. Kennedy).

Quatrième Amendement de la Constitution fédérale : search : ADN : un prélèvement buccal aux fins d'analyse ADN, tout comme la photographie ou la prise d'empreintes digitales, n'est pas contraire au Quatrième Amendement s'agissant d'une personne arrêtée par la police et conduite au poste pour être détenue (l'arrestation étant par ailleurs conforme au principe de la cause probable, dans le cadre d'un crime sérieux). En effet, le prélèvement d'ADN doit être considéré comme raisonnable. L'intrusion est négligeable, tout comme l'atteinte au domaine privé (privacy). Seul le critère du caractère raisonnable du prélèvement est retenu ici, du fait qu'un warrant n'est pas nécessaire, la personne étant déjà légalement en détention policière. Le caractère raisonnable implique de comparer la promotion des intérêts gouvernementaux légitimes avec le degré d'intrusion dans les intérêts privés de l'intéressé.