Peugh v. U.S.

Ex Post Facto Clause: petitioner Peugh was convicted of five counts of bank fraud for conduct that occurred in 1999 and 2000. At sentencing, he argued that the Ex Post Facto Clause required that he be sentenced under the 1998 version of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of his offenses rather than under the 2009 version in effect at the time of sentencing. Under the 1998 Guidelines, Peugh’s sentencing range was 30 to 37 months, but the 2009 Guidelines assigned more severe consequences to his acts, yielding a range of 70 to 87 months. The District Court rejected Peugh’s ex post facto claim and sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

The Ex Post Facto Clause is violated when a defendant is sentenced under Guidelines promulgated after he committed his criminal acts and the new version provides a higher sentencing range than the version in place at the time of the offense. Though no longer mandatory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, the Guidelines still play an important role in sentencing procedures. A district court must begin “by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range,” Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38, 49, and then consider the parties’ arguments and factors specified in 18 U. S. C. §3553(a). 552 U. S., at 49–50. The court “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable,” id., at 50, and must explain the basis for its sentence on the record, ibid. On appeal, a sentence is reviewed for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. A district court is to apply the Guidelines “in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced,” §3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), but, per the Guidelines, is to use the Guidelines in effect on the date the offense was committed should the Guidelines in effect on the sentencing date be found to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Constitution forbids the passage of ex post facto laws, a cat­egory including, as relevant here, “every law that changes the pun­ishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390. The “scope of this Latin phrase” is given “substance by an accretion of case law.” Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U. S. 282, 292. The touchstone of the inquiry is whether a given change in law presents a “ ‘sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.’ ” Garner v. Jones, 529 U. S. 244, 250. The Government’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. Its principal claim is that the Sentencing Guidelines lack sufficient legal effect to attain the status of a “law” within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Changes in law need not bind a sentencing au­thority for there to be an ex post facto violation, and “the presence of discretion does not displace the protections of that Clause.” Garner, 529 U. S., at 253. (U.S.S.Ct., 10.06.13, Peugh v. U.S., Sotomayor, J.).

Non rétroactivité en droit pénal : la clause de non rétroactivité est violée lorsqu’un délinquant est condamné sur la base des Lignes directrices fédérales (qui fixent la peine à subir, après le prononcé de la condamnation) promulguées après la commission de l’infraction, pour autant bien entendu que les nouvelles Lignes directrices prévoient une pénalité plus sévère que les anciennes. Il est ici à nouveau rappelé que ces Lignes directrices ne sont plus pourvues de caractère obligatoire, mais qu’elles continuent à jouer un rôle important en pratique. Le Tribunal de première instance commence par déterminer la peine en s’inspirant des Lignes directrices, puis adapte dite peine aux faits de l’espèce, sans partir de l’idée que la peine découlant des Lignes satisfait nécessairement le caractère raisonnable qui doit la sous-tendre. Dans le cadre de la procédure de recours, le caractère raisonnable de la peine est revu sous l’angle de l’abus de discrétion. Est rejeté l’argument selon lequel la clause de non rétroactivité ne saurait s’appliquer ici du fait que les Lignes directrices n’ont pas valeur de loi. En effet, ce qui importe, c’est que ces Lignes directrices sont susceptibles d’entraîner le prononcé d’une peine plus sévère si elles sont comparées à leur ancienne version.