Retroactivity: due process violation: habeas relief: under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Lancaster may obtain federal habeas relief only if the Michigan Court of Appeals, in rejecting his due process claim, unreasonably applied “clearly established Federal law, as determined by this Court.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). This standard is “difficult to meet”: Lancaster must show that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision rested on “an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___; Held: Lancaster is not entitled to federal habeas relief; in Rogers, the petitioner contested the Tennessee Supreme Court’s retroactive abolition of the common-law “year and a day rule,” which barred a murder conviction “unless the victim had died by the defendant’s act within a year and a day of the act.” 532 U. S., at 453. This Court found no due process violation. “Judicial alteration of a common law doctrine of criminal law,” the Court held, “violates the principle of fair warning, and hence must not be given retroactive effect, only where the alteration is ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.’ ” Id., at 462. Judged by this standard, the retroactive abolition of the year and a day rule encountered no constitutional impediment. The rule was “widely viewed as an outdated relic of the common law,” had been routinely rejected by modern courts and legislators, and had been mentioned in reported Tennessee decisions “only three times, and each time in dicta.” Id., at 462–464; this Court has never found a due process violation in circumstances remotely resembling Lancaster’s case—i.e., where a state supreme court, squarely addressing a particular issue for the first time, rejected a consistent line of lower court decisions based on the supreme court’s reasonable interpretation of the language of a controlling statute. Fairminded jurists could conclude that a state supreme court decision of that order is not “ ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to existing law.’ ” Id., at 462 (U.S. S. Ct., 20.05.13, Metrish v. Lancaster, J. Ginsburg, unanimous).